Entry and market selection of firms: A laboratory study

We study how markets adjust to the entry of new firms under different conditions. Two incumbents face entry by three other firms. When firms’ costs are equal, entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. With cost asymmetries, market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers’ standpoint but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. Simultaneous entry is in the short run more favorable to consumers than sequential entry. A longer incumbency phase favors consumers after entry.     

Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies

Optimal entry policy is considered in markets served by both domestic and foreign firms. Compared with the prior entry literature, introducing foreign producers as market participants reduces incentives for entry deterrence and enhances incentives for entry subsidization. Incentives are changed because entry produces "terms-of-trade" gains. The optimal entry subsidy is analyzed under complete and incomplete information regarding the entrant's costs. Incomplete cost information creates differences in the optimal subsidy for domestic and foreign entrants, with foreign entrants relatively less subsidized. Domestic entrants with low marginal costs are oversubsidized and those with high marginal costs are undersubsidized.     

Deregulation,innovative entry and structural diversity as a source of stable and rapid economic growth

The importance of free innovative entry (deregulation) for diversity of structure and competition is studied. I demonstrate quantitatively that even with a narrow definition of entry (firms), and given observed entry behavior, successful entrants completely dominate the long-run performance characteristics of the economy. Rapid and stable long-run macro economic growth can only be achieved if innovative competitive entry is vigorous. Free access to markets alone is a necessary condition, with competence a sufficient condition. It is probably wrong to believe that the (ex ante) threat of entry is sufficient for dynamic competition. A growing economy requires a steady showering with optimistic entrants, a few of which turn out ex post to be superior performers. Failing and exiting firms are part of the innovation costs to society for steady and rapid economic growth. The benefits of financial innovations like junk bonds are to reduce barriers to competitive entry to make both successes and failures possible.     

The duration of new firms in banking: an application of Cox regression analysis

This paper studies the duration of two cohorts of entrants in the Italian financial intermediation industry. Using the Cox (1972) Proportional Hazards Model, it analyses the link between duration of each newborn firm and its start-up size, as well as a series of industry-specific characteristics. It emerges that not only did regulatory reform in 1990 result in a process of branch proliferation and industry concentration, but it also set in motion a pre-entry selection mechanism. Conversely, before completion of the regulatory reform, in 1989, entry was possible even for very small firms, and larger new entrants survived longer than their smaller counterparts, and this independently of the features of spatial and structural competition. First version received: Nov. 98/final version received: Oct. 99     

Small firm performance in online markets

Firms which enter the online marketplace do so for a variety of reasons. The effects of the motive for entry on the ultimate success of entry, for both online and ‘blended’ firms, are largely unknown. This study utilises a unique data set of small Australian firms and examines the relationship between the strategic motivation for entry and the actual results of entry. Utilising a trivariate probit model with exogenous ‘reason for entry’ dummy variables, estimates of aftermarket business performance are obtained. The study finds that the entry goal materially affects subsequent performance: firms entering to expand their market size ordinarily succeed, but those entering to reduce costs are often disappointed. Blended firms enjoy no strong advantages over pure online entrants.     

商业模式与新进入者领先：来自电动汽车产业的实证研究

从商业模式视角探索为何目前在电动汽车市场上处于领先地位的是新进入者而非在资源上更具优势的在位者。分别在中美两国选择新进入者比亚迪和特斯拉及在位者上汽和通用汽车进行案例研究。基于专家访谈、实地参观和文献调研发现，新进入者和在位者商业模式存在显著差异，发挥电动汽车技术特性价值主张、垂直整合价值网络和可变成本较低的收支结构是新进入者获取领先优势的重要因素。丰富了现有关于新进入者创新及电动汽车产业商业模式的研究，有助于加深对两个问题的理解：一是当在位者比新进入者更早采用新技术时，新进入者应如何利用商业模式取得领先地位；二是哪种商业模式更有利于企业在电动汽车产业市场上获取领先地位。     

Gales of creative destruction and the opportunistic incumbent: The case of electric vehicles in California

This paper explores the introduction of electric vehicles in response to Californian regulatory pressures as an example of a disruptive technology. The central thesis is that this disruption may open the automobile market to new entrants but only if they collaborate with incumbent automobile manufacturers. This appears to support Schumpeter's argument that large incumbent firms possess innovation advantages over the small entrepreneurial entrant. However, these innovatory advantages lie in the downstream complementary assets required for success in the automobile market.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A TWO‐TIER OLIGOPOLY: COORDINATION,VERTICAL INTEGRATION,AND WELFARE*

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two‐tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.     

Gales of creative destruction and the opportunistic incumbent: The case of electric vehicles in California

This paper explores the introduction of electric vehicles in response to Californian regulatory pressures as an example of a disruptive technology. The central thesis is that this disruption may open the automobile market to new entrants but only if they collaborate with incumbent automobile manufacturers. This appears to support Schumpeter's argument that large incumbent firms possess innovation advantages over the small entrepreneurial entrant. However, these innovatory advantages lie in the downstream complementary assets required for success in the automobile market.     

The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.     

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

This paper analyzes the optimal worksharing and access amounts granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s (PO) costs. I show that when the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal “access discount” given to entrants is set in a pro-competitive way. This facilitates the entry of firms that are less efficient than the PO. However, the optimal “worksharing discount” may prevent the entry of mailers that are more efficient than the PO.     

Entry and exit as a source of aggregate productivity growth in two alternative technological regimes

This paper proposes a neo-Schumpeterian model in order to discuss how the mechanisms of entry and exit contribute to industry productivity growth in alternative technological regimes. Our central hypothesis is that new firms generate gains in aggregate productivity by increasing both the productivity level and competition intensity. By assuming that firms learn about the relevant technology through a variety of sources, and by allowing a continuous flow of entry and exit into the market, our study shows that firm exit and output contraction take mostly place among less productive firms, while output expansion and entry are concentrated among the more efficient ones. The greater is the competitive pressure generated by new entrants, the higher is the expected productivity level of established firms. Overall, our analysis suggests that micro analysis is the proper complement to aggregate industry studies, as it provides a considerable insight into the causes of productivity growth.     

Dynastic entrepreneurship,entry, and non-compete enforcement

We investigate entry in a dynastic entrepreneurship (overlapping generations) environment created by employee spinoffs. Contracting failures, caused by non-verifiability of profits from new activities in original firms and overall profits from subsequent entrants, may lead respectively to implementation of new employee ideas in spinoffs and constraints on borrowing to buy out non-compete agreements. If borrowing constraints are not binding, enforcement of non-compete agreements unambiguously improves social welfare outcomes, increasing the entry of both original firms and subsequent generations of spinoffs. However, if employees are unable to buy out their non-compete covenants, enforcement of these agreements shuts down socially profitable spinoff firms. Non-enforcement sacrifices entry of original firms that would be marginally profitable in the absence of employee spinoffs, but otherwise clearly improves social welfare outcomes over enforcement in the presence of binding finance constraints.     

Technology diffusion and growth

Suppose firms are subject to decreasing returns and permanent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Suppose also firms can only stay in business by continuously paying a fixed cost. New firms can enter. Firms with a history of relatively good productivity shocks tend to survive and others are forced to exit. This paper identifies assumptions about entry that guarantee a stationary firm size distribution and lead to balanced growth. The range of technology diffusion mechanisms that can be considered is greatly expanded relative to Luttmer (2007) [21]. If entrants can make only small improvements over the technologies used by the least productive incumbents, then the firm size distribution approximates Zipf?s law and entry and exit rates are high, as in the data.     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

Strategic Reaction of Vertically Integrated Firms to Downstream Entry: Deterrence or Accommodation

The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic behavior of vertically integrated firms when there is downstream entry, taking into account the balance between competition in the market and competition for the market. This analysis can serve to explain diverse distributional structures, including the coexistence of vertically integrated firms and independent retailers. And it shows that the relative efficiency of downstream entrants and the level of competition among incumbents are two major factors in determining equilibrium configuration.     

How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

网络产业中的转换成本研究综述

网络产业的融合化发展打破了传统的产业边界,但转换成本却影响公司跨产业经营,阻碍了网络融合的进展.本文通过对国内外学者在网络产业转换成本方面的研究进行分类综述,重点介绍了基于双双寡头模型的多期博弈,旨在介绍相关理论方法及重要研究成果.通过分析转换成本与市场进入的关系,本文指出了转换成本通过对用户产生锁定效用而增强在位企业的垄断力量,阻碍大规模的市场进入;转换成本助长寡头间的默契合谋,产生劣币驱逐良币现象,进而产生肥猫效应,导致新进入企业产生低效率进入;最后分析了对忠实用户采取隐瞒信息情况下转换成本所产生的竞争效果.研究结论拓宽了相关研究思路,并对于网络产业进一步融合发展具有一定的借鉴意义.     

EFFECTS OF STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN'S 1994 PATENT REFORM

Does strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) in terms of a longer patent life induce more patents? This article investigates the responses of high‐technology firms to Taiwan’s 1994 patent reform. Empirical analyses reveal that firms’ patenting propensity rose gradually before patent reform and showed an increase after patent reform, tending to support the viewpoint that stronger IPR can induce more patents. However, this cannot lead to lasting effect. Furthermore, patenting capability can serve as the access ticket for potential entrants to a science park under the circumstance of stronger IPR protections. These new entrants are found to have a better post‐entry performance in patenting relative to the incumbents in the short run. (JEL O14, O31)