省级政府公共品供给与地区经济联系——基于外部性理论的经验分析

在分析我国省域间经济联系现状的基础上,本文利用理论模型和经验实证,分析了省级政府公共品竞争性供给对地区经济联系的影响。研究结果显示:地区财政支出竞争对省域间经济联系呈现出了倒U型的影响路径;地方政府公共品供给的竞争性主要体现在其供给公共品的外部性上,正外部性公共品的供给有利于加强省域间的经济联系,而地方保护主义行为等负外部性公共品的供给不利于加强省域间的经济联系。相应的政策建议为:打破地方保护主义的隔阂,实现生产要素在省域间的自由流动;构建省域间政府公共品供给竞争的良性机制;优化市场机制,完善整体市场环境,为省域间加强经济联系提供保障。     

民营经济公共品供给的十大“误区”

<正>发展民营经济需要政府出台各种政策、措施，需要政府提供高效、全方位的公共品供给。提高公共品的供给水平，满足民营经济发展的公共品需求，逐渐成为地方政府发展经济的一项大事。但是，目前由于地方政府普遍缺乏对发展民营经济的公共品的需求性质、供给状况、供给措施研究，使得民营经济公共品的供给水平较低，供给途径上步入了不少“误区”。本     

财政集权、转移支付与民生类公共品供给

1994年分税制改革以来,地方政府财政收支平衡面临较大压力,影响了地区民生类公共品供给。文章基于新财政集权理论和中央转移支付效应,提出了三个相关假说来验证财政集权对民生类公共品供给的影响。通过构造分省的民生类公共品供给指数、财政集权和转移支付的面板数据,文章实证分析发现:第一,财政集权对民生类公共品供给影响不显著,但会抑制转移支付的激励效应;第二,转移支付对民生类公共品供给具有显著的促进作用,并且两者呈现倒U型关系;第三,财政集权、转移支付对民生类公共品供给的影响存在地区异质性,在税收净流入地区转移支付的激励效应更大。最后,本文提出了完善财政集权体制、促进民生类公共品供给的政策建议。     

对地方公共品供给的影响我国财政分权

在国家财政统筹下,分税制体制逐步开始实施,自实施以来其财政分权也从不同方面影响了基层地区公共品的供给。本文对于其影响因素做出一定分析并且就时下财税体制下地方政府的公共品供给困难的情况提出一些初步的建议。     

我国财政分权对地方公共品供给的影响

在国家财政统筹下,分税制体制逐步开始实施,自实施以来其财政分权也从不同方面影响了基层地区公共品的供给。本文对于其影响因素做出一定分析并且就时下财税体制下地方政府的公共品供给困难的情况提出一些初步的建议。     

基于竞争视角的地方政府债务研究述评

基于竞争视角,从公共品的提供、地方政府的负债经营、博弈论视角下的政府竞争与地方政府债务、债务风险防范四个方面对地方政府债务问题进行了梳理和分析,总结出了政府竞争对于地方政府债务的作用机制,充分阐述了自上而下的“标杆竞争”、政府追求财源行为的异化、预算软约束等与地方政府债务的内在联系,并展望了地方政府债务问题研究的进一步发展方向。     

全球公共品供给的筹资分析

传统理论将国内公共品的供给机制分为市场供给、政府供给和自愿供给三种。现有的全球公共品供给的分析基本上是沿传统的国内公共品供给理论展开的,但这种推演却因全球公共品与国内公共品间的些许差异而在理论上陷入困境。全球公共品供给呈现新的特征,即特定条件下的市场供给和很多情况下的自愿供给。     

城市公共品供给中各级政府事权与财权的划分

政府在城市公共品供给中需要考虑如何合理划分各级政府的事权与财权.城市公共品的特性是各级政府事权划分的基础,而事权与财权相统一的原则是各级政府财权划分的理论依据.通过对我国城市公共品供给中各级政府间财政关系进行实证研究发现,各级政府在事权划分上存在模糊、重复、越位和缺位的情况,而财权的划分则没有能够实现与相应事权的匹配.因此,需要重新界定各级政府的事权与财权,从而完善政府的城市公共品供给职能.     

中国式财政分权与城乡收入差距:分析框架及实证检验

随着中国经济的快速发展,城乡收入差距不断扩大。在分析城乡收入差距现状的基础上,基于中国式财政分权,重点围绕理论研究和实证检验两个方面展开相关研究。首先,结合当前中国式财政分权的基本事实,勾勒和总结中国式财政分权下地方政府的激励机制,并分析地方政府的行为选择与公共品供给偏好对城乡收入差距的影响,构建中国式财政分权对城乡收入差距的影响机制框架;其次,对当前我国城乡居民收入主要来源结构和城乡收入差距形成的原因进行统计分解,找到城乡收入差距的主要原因;再次,以中国式财政分权有关指标作为解释变量,检验政府教育支出偏向城市对城乡收入差距的影响;最后,提出有关的政策建议。     

生产性公共品对西部农村经济增长的贡献

本文结合两部农村生产性公共品供给现状，采用1995--2008年我国西部12省面板数据，对其对西部地区农村经济发展的影响做了实证研究。结果表明，农村生产性公共品中农村水利、电力、农村治碱等的供给对西部地区农村经济发展有显著的促进作用，各级政府应加大西部地区生产性公共品的供给。     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

区域公共物品政府供给的博弈分析

区域公共物品是一种特殊的公共物品,不仅具有公共物品的一般属性,还具有其自身特殊属性。正是由于区域公共物品的这些特性,区域内地方政府在供给区域公共物品时容易陷入"囚徒困境",导致区域公共物品供给不足,阻碍区域经济一体化的发展。本文运用博弈分析原理,对区域公共物品供给不足进行了分析,认为区域公共物品供给不足除了区域公共物品的特性以外,政府的有限理性和信息不对称也是导致区域公共物品供给不足的重要因素,并就区域公共物品供给不足提出一些政策建议。     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

PRINCIPLES AND THEORIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The role of local government is viewed in the context of the overall role of government per se. A particular advantage of local government lies in its ability to arrange for the provision of local public goods in line with local tastes and preferences. A number of arguments suggest that local governments should be assigned adequate powers of local taxation to finance their expenditure responsibilities rather than having to rely on central government grant.     

区域经济合作推动公共产品供给的机理及对策

市场经济存在着市场失灵,因此需要政府提供公共产品,同时,由于存在着区域间发展不均衡和地方利益保护,公共产品的供给也存在着严重的不均衡,反过来限制了区域经济一体化的发展和进程。文章研究根据区域经济一体化理论,提出了构建区域经济一体化推动的横向公共产品供给模式,以此更好地推动区域经济合作的思路。     

政府间转移支付与地方公共支出关系的实证研究——基于协整、VAR模型的分析

政府间转移支付的一个重要功能是增强地方政府的财力,满足其提供公共产品的需要。文章运用协整分析和VAR模型对我国政府间转移支付与地方公共支出之间的关系进行了实证考察。结果表明,在控制其他变量的影响后,政府间转移支付与地方公共支出之间存在长期均衡关系,而格兰杰因果检验表明二者是双向因果关系。以上结论意味着转移支付有利于地方财政支出的增加和财政纵向均衡目标的实现等含义。最后,文章给出了相应的政策建议。     

The government wage bill and private activity

We estimate the macroeconomic effects of public wage expenditures in U.S. data by identifying shocks to public employment and public wages using sign restrictions. We find that public employment shocks are mildly expansionary at the federal level and strongly expansionary at the state and local level by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force participation and private sector employment. Similarly, state and local government wage shocks lead to increases in consumption and output, while shocks to federal government wages induce significant contractionary effects. In a stylized DSGE model we show that the degree of complementarity between public and private goods in the consumption bundle is key for explaining the observed heterogeneity.     

Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities

In a production economy, multiple public goods are produced by firms in competitive markets, and provided by the government together with contributions from consumers. There are widespread externalities: all consumers’ consumption and contributions and all firms’ production enter into utility functions. Public goods can be imperfect substitutes or complements, and they can be local public goods or club goods. Zero bounds that require consumers to make nonnegative contributions complicate the differentiable approach. Applying the transversality theorem for smooth economies in a regular parameterization, we obtain the existence of equilibrium in such an economy, and generically equilibria are regular and locally unique.