Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in — the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction — for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations — some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.     

Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?

For over 40 years, the gravity equation has been a workhorse for cross-country empirical analyses of international trade flows and — in particular — the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. However, the gravity equation is subject to the same econometric critique as earlier cross-industry studies of U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers and U.S. multilateral imports: trade policy is not an exogenous variable. We address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. Although instrumental-variable and control-function approaches do not adjust for endogeneity well, a panel approach does. Accounting econometrically for the FTA variable's endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.     

Agricultural Policies and Trade Paths in Turkey

In 1959, shortly after the European Economic Community was founded under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, Turkey applied for Associate Membership of the then six‐member common market. By 1963, a path for integrating the economies of Turkey and the eventual European Union had been mapped. As with many trade agreements, agriculture posed difficult political hurdles, which were never fully cleared, even as trade barriers to other sectors were eventually removed and a Customs Union formed. In this paper, we trace the influences the Turkey‐EU economic institutions have had on agricultural policies and the agricultural sector. Using an applied general equilibrium framework we provide estimates of what including agriculture under the Customs Union would mean for the sector and the economy. We also discuss the implications of fully aligning Turkey's agricultural policies with the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, as would be required under full membership.     

Free Trade Agreements In the Americas: Are the Trade Effects Larger than Anticipated?

This paper argues that the ‘competitive liberalisation’ of national governments of the past several decades reflects national governments’ expectations of larger trade impacts from regional economic integration agreements (EIAs) than typical ex ante economic models have suggested. Moreover, we show that previous (typically cross‐section) ex post empirical evaluations of the effects of EIAs on trade have seriously over‐ or underestimated the effects, partly due to ignoring the (endogenous) self‐selection bias of country pairs into EIAs. Accounting for this bias, we find that economic integration agreements in the Americas have had much larger impacts on trade over the period 1960–2000 than previously found and the ex post estimates are less fragile than those in earlier cross‐section analyses. The results shed further light on understanding the causes and consequences of the growth of regionalism in the world.     

Market presence, contestability, and the terms-of-trade effects of regional integration

This paper examines the impact of market presence and contestability on the price behavior of US exporters in Brazil’s market when MERCOSUR and MFN trade liberalization take place. Using detailed panel data on trade and tariff rates, we find that both the preferred supplier’s market presence and threat of entry lower (raise) the US price reaction to MFN (preferential) trade liberalization, with similar quantitative effects. Thus, presence in, or threat of entry into, partners’ markets implies lower optimal MFN tariffs, and regional agreements can have pro-competitive effects in contestable markets. We also examine the ‘symmetry’ hypothesis between the effect of tariffs and exchange rates.     

Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO

Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process.     

A simple approach to international monetary policy coordination

This paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policymakers of two countries, in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. It offers an excursus on non-cooperative towards cooperative solutions. In a non-cooperative equilibrium the monopolistic allocation prevails in both countries, because of the incentive to use strategically the terms of trade. In a cooperative solution where both policymakers internalize the externalities given by the terms of trade, the competitive allocation is reached. However, cooperation can be counterproductive. We then characterize a problem of delegation in which the set of choice is restricted to the Pareto efficient allocations and in which the participation constraints implied by the non-cooperative equilibrium are taken into account.     

Province-Level Impacts of Canada’s Trade Agreements

Given Canada’s extended geography and regional economic diversity, individual provinces have differing exposures to particular international trade agreements. We demonstrate this by estimating the impacts of the Canada-Korea free trade agreement on the province of Ontario, using a dynamic general equilibrium model to generate Canada-level impacts, which are then decomposed on the basis of partial equilibrium model simulations on a trade dataset in which Ontario is represented as a separate international trading entity. We show that geography and sectoral specialization matter and that general equilibrium effects must be taken into account in partial equilibrium assessments of sectoral impacts of major trade agreements.     

Time consistent export quotas in an oligopolistic world market

We investigate the strategic behavior between exporting countries that face endogenous terms of trade on the world market. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal export quota is not time consistent as the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign import demand curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show that the exporters’ inability to irrevocably commit to their quota may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. If exporters can sell forward a proportion of their exports before production decisions are made, they will do so even though, in equilibrium, it may decrease welfare compared to a situation in which forward markets do not exist. Moreover, the equilibrium with forward markets is welfare inferior to the commitment equilibrium for exporters.     

New Bilateralism in the Asia–Pacific

This paper reviews recent changes in the geographic pattern of regional trading agreements (RTAs), focusing on examples from the Asia–Pacific area. The general pattern is one of new bilateral agreements combined with a trend towards continentalism. The new trend towards bilateralism can be explained largely by a fear of countries being excluded from their major markets as other countries secure preferential and superior access to these markets. This pattern is creating many intersections between RTAs with consequential multi–tiered preferences and multiple systems of trade rules. Viewed dynamically, however, this pattern may have positive effects on world trade. It mitigates the effects of large continental RTAs and may lead to coalescence or enlargement of RTAs. The paper reviews models which ask the important question as to whether this process will progress all the way to free trade for the world economy.     

Do Trade Agreements Stimulate International Trade Differently? Evidence from 296 Trade Agreements

In a seminal article, Rose (2004) found that the assumed positive impact of the WTO on international trade was questionable. This finding has been scrutinised and modified in subsequent research, using different data sets, econometric methods and separating the WTO from other forms of trade agreements. A key characteristic of the subsequent literature is the rather simplistic way in which trade agreements are treated whereby all trade agreements are lumped together. Trade agreements come, however, in many different forms and shapes. This study addresses these differences in trade agreements. Using a unique database of 296 trade agreements, we distinguish 17 trade‐related policy domains and indicate whether the agreements contain legally enforceable commitments. This extensive and novel taxonomy of trade agreements enables us to allow for the possible heterogeneity of the impact of trade agreements on international trade. Using a gravity model, we find that trade agreement heterogeneity indeed matters for international trade and that countries experience significant trade increases due to comprehensive trade agreements even if not all participants are in the WTO.     

Tariffs and the most favored nation clause

In an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.     

Regional Trade Agreements and the Pattern of Trade: A Networks Approach

This paper uses a complex network approach for the analysis trade effects from regional trade agreements on world trade flows. We use bilateral trade data to compute the network community structure for every year between 1970 and 2000. We compare this to null community structures that emerge from various models based on regional and geographical classifications, the implementation of RTA's and gravity models of trade. Our results show that RTA formation appears to have a cyclical pattern on the world trade network community structure. We document periods where bilateral trade flows and the structure of the world trade network are consistent with those predicted by formation of RTAs. These cycles occur in 1980–86 and 1990–96. At the same time, we document periods in which the pattern in the world trade network is not explained by RTA formation. Two periods, 1986–90 and 1997–2000, show a pattern of bilateral trade flows that moves away from the prediction that results from assuming RTA formation as the driving force in the determination of the world trade network structure. Factors contributing to the latter parts of the cycle during our sample period include formation of regional trade networks in East Asia that account for a significant portion of world trade but are not formalised by RTAs in force.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system

I evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas (FTAs) on the world trading system. I use an oligopolistic-political-economy model where the external tariffs of FTA members, as well as the decision to form FTAs, are endogenously determined. In this context, I show that FTAs are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system. This conclusion is based, first, upon the finding that FTAs induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs, and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between FTA members and non-members. While this ensures gains for the latter, in general FTA members may not gain. I show, however, that governments will endorse only welfare-improving arrangements, in spite of their political motivations; as a result, FTA members benefit from ratified arrangements as well. Finally, I find that FTAs, by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments' trade regime decisions, also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level.     

Comprehensive Trade Agreements: Conditioning Globalisation or Eroding the European Model?

Trade dynamics within the EU are presently pushing it towards deepening globalisation through bilateral comprehensive trade agreements which establish far-reaching rules that govern the bilateral trade relationship. The European Commission has defended these agreements as a vehicle through which to promote world trade in accordance with European values and norms. However, the theory of fiscal federalism and the principle of subsidiarity tell us that one should not centralise decisions at the supranational level which are better taken at the national or regional level when there are different preferences among countries or regions. Consequently, member state and regional competences ought not to be perceived as a mere obstacle to swift trade deals. Rather, they can provide an important checks and balances function with regard to whether EU trade policy is truly working to condition globalisation according to European values and preferences.     

Do Trade Agreements Increase Food Trade?

In addition to multilateral trade agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO), the world has seen a remarkable proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the last two decades. This study investigates whether these multilateral and regional trade institutions increase food trade and bring the world into a freer flow of food. The gravity model of international trade is used for the empirical analysis. The model is developed in a large panel data setting and attempted to address some potential problems in the estimations including multilateral trade resistances, zero trade values and endogeneity. The results suggest that both the WTO and RTAs have delivered significant positive effects on trade among the participant countries, but not food. Only RTAs are found to have increased food trade among the participant countries. However, although on average the WTO is found to have negative implications on food trade, it facilitates the developing countries more than the developed countries.     

Free Trade Agreements and Governance of the Global Trading System

This article explores how far free trade agreements (FTAs) have strengthened or weakened global governance of the trading system. We open with an analysis of the altered political and economic context within which countries have come, in recent years, to assign a new importance to regional and bilateral trade agreements in their trade policies. We then consider each of the main provisions included in FTAs and comment on how these may separately affect the management of trade relations. We conclude with some observations of the broader trends affecting global governance that are associated with the spread of trade agreements as a whole.