Unemployment insurance design: Inducing moving and retraining

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex ante. The problem of characterizing constrained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature. We construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled. The model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobservable job-search. Absent wealth effects on behavior, we derive closed-form solutions showing that when the moving/retraining incentive constraint binds, unemployment benefits should increase over the unemployment spell, with an initial period with low benefits and an increase after this period has expired.     

Testing for hysteresis in unemployment an unobserved components approach

We suggest a new test for hysteresis in unemployment based on an unobserved components model. Observed unemployment rates are decomposed into a natural rate component and a cyclical component. The impact of lagged cyclical shocks on the current natural component is the measure of hysteresis. To identify the two components of unemployment, we assume that the cyclical compoentn is correlated with capacity utilization. The model is applied to U.S. and German data. We find no evidence of hysteresis in U.S. data. German unemployment rates exhibit substantial hysteresis. A shock of 1.0 percent to the current cyclical component permanently increases future German natural rates by about 0.5 percent. For both countries, natural rate shocks turn out to be an important impulse mechanism to explain movements in observed unemployment rates.     

The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

Theories of the labor market generally predict that high unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages, thus diminishing the profitability of employing labor and exacerbating unemployment. It remains to be explained why firms agree to contribute to generous schemes (replacement rates for general schemes in Europe and US are in the range 50–85%) that they are often willing to supplement (with sector- or firm-specific schemes that may involve even 100% replacement and long benefit duration). An answer can be found by including in the shirking–efficiency wage model, the hypotheses that workers are risk-averse and that those discharged for misconduct are not eligible to benefits. It is then optimal for risk-neutral firms (and for employment) to introduce an insurance scheme with full income coverage and with a duration limited only by the workers' participation constraint (there is no trade-off between level and duration of benefits). The more difficult it is to detect and fire shirkers, the higher is the rent workers enjoy above the competitive wage and the longer is the benefit duration consistent with the participation constraint. This result can be interpreted as a complementarity between the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the duration of benefits, which seems to conform with broad patterns observed in primary vs. secondary employment and in continental Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon countries.     

Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe

Non-employment rates in all central and eastern European countries have increased dranatically thoroughout the transition and are currently larger than those of the lowest income OECD countries. Non-employment benefits other than unemployment benefits are providing income support to this growing number of able-bodied individuals out of work. Under the present design of unemployment benefits and social assistance, there may be serious incentive problems related to the shift from unemployment benefits to other, means-tested, non-employment benefits and this shift occurs in transition countries at rather early stages of an unemployment spell; these incentive problems are bound to become particularly acute in a less inflationary environment.     

Multivariate models with dual cycles: implications for output gap and potential growth measurement

Structural time series models applied to the factor inputs of a production function often lead to small output gaps and to erratic measures of potential growth. We introduce a dual cycle model which is an extension to the multivariate trend plus cycle model with phase shifts à la Rünstler. The dual cycle model is a combination of two types of model: the trend plus cycle model and the cyclical trend model, where the cycle appears in the growth rate of a variable. This property enables hysteresis to be taken into account. Hysteresis is likely to show up in unemployment, but it can also affect the capital stock due to the existence of long investment cycles. In the proposed model, hysteresis may affect all the factor inputs of the production function and phase shifts are extended to the dual cycles. Genuine measures of potential growth can be computed that are hysteresis-free and less prone to volatility. A complementary measure of the output gap that takes hysteresis into account can be derived.     

Labour market institutions in open economy: Sectoral reallocations,aggregate adjustments,and spillovers

We introduce frictional unemployment in a multiworker heterogeneous firm model with a dynamic matching process, one‐ and two‐sector equilibria, and international markets. A change in labour market policies transforms the share of exporters and affects average productivity. The closure of equilibrium with or without sectoral arbitrage plays an important role in generating macro‐level outcomes for employment subsidies. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, make unemployment and openness rise, independently of sectoral reallocations. We also find that simultaneous implementation of labour market policies remove potential gain in the trade share, and, when it comes to unemployment benefits, may even be detrimental.     

The Effect of Hysteresis on Fluctuations in Unemployment and Inflation when Inflation Expectations are Adaptive

The recent level of unemployment may affect the natural rate of unemployment. The implications of such an hysteresis effect for macroeconomic fluctuations is analyzed using a stochastic dynamic model. The greater the importance of an hysteresis effect, the more pronounced are fluctuations in unemployment and inflation. Complete hysteresis causes the economy to be unstable.     

The presence of unemployment hysteresis in the OECD: what can we learn from out-of-sample forecasts?

This paper investigates the relevance of unemployment hysteresis in seventeen OECD countries. We employ an out-of-sample forecast exercise in which a mean-reverting autoregressive model is compared to an autoregressive model with an imposed unit root. A substantial difference in forecasting performance between the two models is established for many countries, but the results are mixed in their strength. The evidence for unemployment hysteresis in Austria, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan and Sweden is, however, convincing. For no country can unambiguous support for a mean reverting unemployment rate be found.     

HYSTERESIS HYPOTHESIS IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIAN STATES AND TERRITORIES *

This article simultaneously investigates the hysteresis hypothesis of unemployment and labour force participation using regional level data in Australia. The conventional univariate and panel unit root tests indicate that the hysteresis hypothesis cannot be rejected for most of the regions in Australia. To further confirm if the hysteresis finding in unemployment and labour force participation results from not considering structural breaks. We employ a panel stationarity test recently developed by Carrion‐i‐Silvestre et al. (2005 ), which considers multiple structural breaks and cross‐sectional dependence. The test results lend support for unemployment hysteresis and participation regime‐wise stationarity. Accordingly, the findings imply that a temporary shock may have permanent effects on the unemployment rate but not on labour force participation in Australia and thus call for policies aimed at improving the adjustment mechanism in unemployment.     

Worker flows, job flows and unemployment in a matching model

Standard matching models of unemployment generate far too little volatility in unemployment and vacancies relative to the variation in the shock variables. Shimer (2005) showed that in US data the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is about 26 times more volatile than the standard model predicts. He identified the flexibility of wages as the key issue and triggered a heated debate on possible improvements of the core model to accommodate these empirical facts. In this paper, we first document Shimer's facts for the UK and find them to be qualitatively similar to US facts. We then develop and calibrate a model based on the Mortensen and Pissarides approach that increases the volatility of the v/u ratio 20-fold compared to the standard framework. The key features of our model relate to the job creation decision by firms and the search options of workers. We allow these to search whilst employed, and firms to re-advertise jobs that have been quit from. This leads us to use a different job creation process, whereby potential vacancies, or job ‘ideas’, arise at a finite rate per period over a range of idiosyncratic productivities. Calibrating the model to UK data, we show that it delivers volatility in unemployment and vacancies much closer to, though still not as large as, that observed for the UK, whilst retaining the standard wage determination process.     

What goes up sometimes stays up: shocks and institutions as determinants of unemployment persistence

We analyse the determinants of unemployment persistence in four OECD countries by estimating a structural Bayesian VAR with an informative prior based on an insiders/outsiders model. We explicitly insert unemployment benefits and labour taxes so that our identification is not affected by the Faust and Leeper (1997) critique. We find widespread hysteresis: demand shocks play a dominant role in explaining unemployment also in the medium‐run. Moreover real wages have low sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations and to labour market disequilibria. Our results emphasise the real power of the unions and their interactions with structural shocks and other institutions as crucial determinants of hysteresis.     

Shocks and the unavoidable road to higher taxes and higher unemployment

This paper considers a matching model in which multiple steady-state unemployment rates exist if government expenditures and unemployment benefits are high enough. The focus on the extensive margin and a possible transition to a steady state with higher unemployment rates imply that the effect of tax rates can be high even when the elasticity between consumption and leisure is low. The matching friction limits transitions between steady states due to self-fulfilling expectations. After a sufficiently large increase in the unemployment rate and after a large enough increase in the tax burden caused by an exogenous increase in government spending, however, transition towards the high-unemployment steady state is unavoidable in an economy with generous unemployment benefits.     

Hysteresis in the development of unemployment: the EU and US experience

We examine hysteresis in EU and US unemployment by panel unit root tests. First generation tests indicate that unemployment is stationary. Second generation tests show mixed results. Idiosyncratic components are stationary in the US. A unit root in the US common component depends on the starting point of the sample. While the common component is nonstationary over the whole period, it is mean-reverting after initial observations are dropped. Hysteresis in EU unemployment is attributed to idiosyncratic, but not to common components. The findings might reflect a different regulation of labour markets and a lower degree of migration in the EU.     

International fragmentation: Boon or bane for domestic employment?

In this paper, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed that international fragmentation and outsourcing to low wage countries lead to domestic job-losses. We develop a novel diagrammatic tool to illustrate the main labour market effects of international fragmentation. We also explore how preferences for fair wages and the size of unemployment benefits govern the employment effects of outsourcing and critically assess the role of political intervention that aims to reduce unemployment benefits under internationally fragmented production.     

Equilibrium unemployment: Theory and measurement in Australia using the Phillips curve

This paper reviews the measurement of equilibrium unemployment in Australia using the Phillips curve. To provide a theoretical framework through which these measurement exercises can be understood, the theory of equilibrium unemployment based on wage bargaining is also described and reviewed. The paper shows how studies have moved from specifying a unique and constant equilibrium rate of unemployment to specifications which emphasise the influence of unemployment benefits, hysteresis and a range of equilibrium rates of unemployment.     

Unemployment Hysteresis in the US States and the EU: A Panel Approach

This paper applies the panel unit root test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) to test for unemployment hysteresis in the US states and the EU countries against the alternative of a natural rate. The results show that hysteresis for the EU and the natural rate for the US states are the most plausible hypotheses.     

Renewable energy and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

Using a three-sector general equilibrium model, the impact of renewable electricity support policies on the rate of equilibrium unemployment is analyzed. In a simple two-factor version of the model, the paper shows analytically that renewable electricity support policies lead to an increase in the rate of unemployment. A numerical analysis is conducted with an expanded three-factor model. In this version, most scenarios analyzed also lead to an increase in equilibrium unemployment. However, the paper identifies conditions in which renewable energy support policies can decrease the rate of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, when capital is not mobile internationally, and when the labor intensity of renewable generation is high relative to conventional generation, renewable electricity support policies may reduce the rate of equilibrium unemployment. The model is parameterized to represent the US economy, such that the magnitudes of quantities can be observed. Although there is some variation in the results depending on parameters, the findings suggest in general that reducing electricity sector emissions by 10% through renewable electricity support policies is likely to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate by about 0.1–0.3 percentage points.     

Renewable energy and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

Using a three-sector general equilibrium model, the impact of renewable electricity support policies on the rate of equilibrium unemployment is analyzed. In a simple two-factor version of the model, the paper shows analytically that renewable electricity support policies lead to an increase in the rate of unemployment. A numerical analysis is conducted with an expanded three-factor model. In this version, most scenarios analyzed also lead to an increase in equilibrium unemployment. However, the paper identifies conditions in which renewable energy support policies can decrease the rate of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, when capital is not mobile internationally, and when the labor intensity of renewable generation is high relative to conventional generation, renewable electricity support policies may reduce the rate of equilibrium unemployment. The model is parameterized to represent the US economy, such that the magnitudes of quantities can be observed. Although there is some variation in the results depending on parameters, the findings suggest in general that reducing electricity sector emissions by 10% through renewable electricity support policies is likely to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate by about 0.1–0.3 percentage points.     

BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF LABOR MARKET SEARCH AND SELF‐INSURANCE*

I introduce risk‐aversion, labor‐leisure choice, capital, individual productivity shocks, and market incompleteness to the standard model of labor search and matching and investigate the model’s cyclical properties. I find that the model can generate the observed large volatility of unemployment and vacancies with a reasonable replacement rate of unemployment insurance benefits of 64%. Labor‐leisure choice plays a crucial role through additional utility from leisure when unemployed and further amplification from adjustments of hours worked. On the other hand, the borrowing constraint or individual productivity shocks do not significantly affect the cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies.     

Speculative securities

Summary. A speculative security is an asset whose payoff depends in part on a random shock uncorrelated with economic fundamentals (a sunspot) about which some traders have superior information. In this paper we show that agents may find it desirable to trade such a security in spite of the fact that it is a poorer hedge against their endowment risks at the time of trade, and has an associated adverse selection cost. In the specific institutional setting of innovation of futures contracts, we show that a futures exchange may not have an incentive to introduce a speculative security even when all traders favor it. Received: July 19, 1998; revised version: August 31, 1998