内部审计机构定位在公司治理中的作用研究

正确对待内部审计在公司治理结构中的重要地位,完善公司内部审计制度,以促进公司治理结构的完善是一项十分紧迫而重要的任务。本文从公司治理结构和内部审计的互动关系出发,分析了不同公司治理结构中内部审计机构定位的优劣势,提出现实选择中我国内部审计机构的定位。     

完善企业内部控制制度的思考

针对企业目前内部控制制度存在的问题,如内部控制建设最终谁负责的问题不明确、法人治理结构不规范,内部控制制度缺乏相应的内部监督、内部控制制度,缺乏相应的外部审计监督等问题,提出完善内部控制制度的措施。强调建立单位负责人的法律责任制度、完善企业的法人治理结构、建立相对独立的内部审计机构、强化对内部控制制度的外部监督与相应的信息披露制度的重要作用。     

关于我国企业内部控制制度组织的思考

公司治理结构主要对公司的管理层与所有者进行规范。好的治理结构可以激励管理层同时保护所有者利益。而内部控制是对公司各个层面进行约束,以使之符合公司利益。好的内部控制更需要好的执行。组织保障主要是参与内部控制制度的机构,比如董事会,监事会,内部审计委员会等机构。本文主要分析了我国企业内部控制组织的现状,并提出了提高我国企业内部控制制度组织保障的措施。     

论会计信息失真与公司治理

公司的治理结构深刻影响着会计信息的质量。当前大多数公司的治理结构存在诸多问题,在公司外部治理结构中,证券市场缺乏约束经营者的条件、经理市场和产品市场竞争性缺失;在公司内部治理结构中,股权结构不合理、董事会结构不合理、监事会监督功能弱化、经理层激励制度不完善,上述问题将增大公司会计信息失真的风险。对此,在公司外部治理结构方面,应发展和完善资本市场、建立和完善经理市场,以及在公司内部治理结构方面大力发展机构投资者、完善董事制度、完善监事制度、建立健全经理报酬激励制度。     

加强内部审计推进公司治理

内部审计是企业内部控制的一个重要组成部分,在公司治理结构中具有较高的权威性和独立性。要明确内部审计机构在公司治理中的重要作用,充分发挥以审计委员会为核心的内审监督体系的作用。内部审计应积极参与公司的风险管理,以内部控制制度为着力点,加强公司治理的有效性。     

我国内部审计存在的问题及对策分析

本文从国际内部审计协会及美国相关法律法规对内部审计的相关规定入手,通过分析内部审计对公司治理结构、经营业绩以及内部控制有效性作用说明了内部审计的重要性。由于公司治理结构的不完善,目前我国存在内部审计机构地位低下且缺乏独立性、内部审计职能尚未转变和内部审计法规制度不完善等问题。最后针对出现的问题提出了推行审计委员会制度、转变内部审计职能以及加强内部审计的法律法规建设的解决措施。     

从公司治理结构角度完善内部控制

公司治理结构与内部控制这两者之间的关系是相互依存与联系的,公司治理结构作为内部控制的外部制度环境,是促进内部控制有效运行的重要基础,而内部控制又是处理企业各个利益相关者间的关系、建立现代企业制度的重要手段。为此对内部控制的加强应从完善公司治理结构的角度出发。本文首先简要介绍了公司治理结构与内部控制的基本涵义,谈后就企业治理结构与内部控制的关系作了进一步的分析与探讨,并从公司治理结构角度出发,提出了完善企业内部控制有效措施,希望能为实际工作起到一定的指导作用。     

关于构建新型国有企业审计委员会制度框架体系的思考

审计委员会制度是西方企业普遍建立的一种内部控制制度,与公司治理结构失衡有密切联系。审计委员会建立的初衷是为了保证独立会计师和内部审计师的审计质量,主要是保证审计的独立性。随着其发展的日益完善,现在它的职责从关注财务报告的公允性,扩展到公司法人治理、公司控制方面。审计委员会已成为公司内部治理最为重要的机构,对保证审计可信度、实现董事会对公司的有效控制以及提高公司的治理水准,起着至关重要的作用。     

关于提升商业银行内部审计工作的几点思考

商业银行内部审计是商业银行法人治理的重要组成部分,是金融监管体系在商业银行内部的延伸。近期,随着国家将金融安全提升到治国理政高度,提出坚决守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线,在强化金融监管的同时,强调金融机构自身的风险防控能力,对金融机构的公司治理结构提出了更高的要求,让金融机构站在金融风险防控的第一线。本文从内部审计职能出发,提升商业银行内部审计工作的几点有效措施。     

我国金融监管制度的目标框架选择

金融结构变迁要求具有动态适应性的金融监管制度,在金融结构变迁的过程中动态的调整金融监管制度能控制金融风险,增强金融系统的资金配置效率并促进金融结构的变迁。目标金融监管制度应具有前瞻性、经济可行和一定的弹性,我们应当以金融结构变迁为基础,逐渐从以行政干预为主、行业自律为辅的监管过渡到以行业自律为主、行政干预为辅的监管结构;从机构监管过渡到功能监管;从分业监管过渡到统一监管。     

Do Internal Governance Mechanisms Impact on Firm Performance? Empirical Evidence from the Financial Sector in China

The financial sector plays an important intermediary role in the Chinese economy. However, there has been very limited research concerning improvement in corporate governance within this sector. Using an unbalanced data set of 139 firm-year observations covering 1999 to 2009, this study examines the impact of internal governance mechanisms on the performance of Chinese listed financial institutions. Findings suggest that state ownership, legal person ownership, board size, and supervisory board meetings are negatively related to the profitability of these institutions, whereas factors including ownership concentration, foreign ownership, independent directors, board meetings, and supervisory board size have no impacts.     

The impact of proximity within elite corporate networks on the Shariah governance-firm performance nexus: Evidence from the global Shariah elite

Research shows the importance of social networks in the generation of valuable firm resources through informational flows. We extend this conceptualization to Shariah governance and the global Shariah elite as embodied by the Shariah supervisory board. Utilizing a unique dataset of 140 Islamic financial institutions over 2011–2015, across 16 nations, we find that interlocking behavior amongst Shariah supervisory boards is time-invariant and network proximity has an inverted U-shaped curvilinear impact on the performance of Islamic financial institutions. Our findings extend the academic literature on SSB interlocking behavior by disentangling the impact of network proximity on the Shariah governance-firm performance nexus.     

Corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance in China: panel data evidence on listed non financial companies

The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the influence of corporate governance characteristics and corporate ownership concentrations on the financial performance of Chinese companies. This is based on analysis of a panel data set covering the years 2001 to 2005. The characteristics considered are the ratios of independent directors and professional supervisors on the companies' two boards, and the level of concentration in and type of ownership of the companies. Our chosen performance metric is Tobin's Q. We find that ownership concentration in general is a significant factor in determining firm performance. The degree of board independence is significant, but it only appears to have a positive impact on performance in larger companies. The expertise of the supervisory board is not a significant determinant of corporate financial performance in China. Our findings support a continued focus on making improvements to the operation and effectiveness of China's institutions of corporate governance.     

Ethical Issues in the Evolution ofCorporate Governance in China

China is establishing its corporate governance structures by emulating the stylized Anglo-American model. However, the country does not yet have the necessary formal and informal institutions, or the financial infrastructure to make these structures work effectively. Corruption, stock market manipulation, tax cheating, fraudulent dealing, all manners of plundering of state assets and the lack protection of shareholders' rights are some of the more conspicuous manifestations of the ethical issues that have emerged in this mismatch. This study shows how these issues arise in the context of the characteristics of country's economic and corporate governance development. It evaluates various potential policy responses that may be implemented to improve governance effectiveness and diminish the damage from those problems.     

Opaque Networks: Business and community in the Isle of Man, 1840–1900

The role of ‘opaque’ networks are analysed within the context of an infant economy with low levels of corporate governance. A period of economic expansion is studied, documenting the effects of credit liberalisation. This article outlines the significance of networks, emerging business cliques, particularly around financial institutions and the interlocking directorates these affiliations allow. Their effects upon financial reporting, business credibility and its effects upon the network life cycle are considered. Market manipulation, the importance of monitoring in instances of unsophisticated governance structures and the agents used (but particularly local/national press) are all analysed.     

Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey

Corporate governance has received much attention in recent years, partly due to the Asian financial crisis. We review the literature on corporate governance issues in Asia to develop region‐specific and general lessons. Much attention has been given to poor corporate sector performance, but most studies do not suggest that Asian firms were badly run. The literature does confirm the limited protection of minority rights in Asia, allowing controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Agency problems have been exacerbated by low corporate transparency, associated with rent‐seeking and relationship‐based transactions, extensive group structures and diversification, and risky financial structures. The controlling shareholder bears some of agency costs in the form of share price discounts and expenditures on monitoring, bonding and reputation building. The Asian financial crisis further showed that conventional and alternative corporate governance mechanisms can have limited effectiveness in systems with weak institutions and poor property rights. Overall, the understanding of the determinants of firm organizational structures, corporate governance practices and outcomes remains limited, however.     

监管松弛、过度创新与资产泡沫——对美国金融危机的一个分析逻辑

美国监管层对金融自由化的信奉,导致金融监管松弛;而金融监管松弛诱致甚至怂恿金融机构为追求高额利润而进行过度创新;过度创新导致经济体系中信贷膨胀、资产泡沫;当预期风险增加、信贷收缩时,资产泡沫破灭,便引发全面金融危机。     

Balancing Performance, Ethics, and Accountability

Practical mechanisms for aligning performance, ethics, and accountability are urgently needed. The context for this includes the organisational, technological, and regulatory transformations underlying current patterns of globalisation. These factors, combined with the associated emergence of civil action concerned with corporate accountability and deeper value-shifts, make such realignments a practical possibility. Social and ethical accounting, auditing, and reporting provides one of the few practical mechanisms for companies to integrate new patterns of civil accountability and governance with a business success model focused on deepening stakeholder relationships around core non-financial as well as financial values and interests. Experience over the past decade has enabled viable and effective methods to evolve and to lay the foundation of "standards-in-practice" against which future accounting, auditing, and reporting, will be benchmarked. Institutions are emerging to regularise this arena of actions, in the first instance through voluntary codes and process standards. A number of challenges exist in securing social and ethical accounting and auditing as a legitimate and effective framework within which organisations can achieve an appropriate balance of financial and non-financial interests, aims, actions, and outcomes. The emerging experience, expertise, methodologies, and institutions provide the basis for these challenges to be effectively met.     

论完善农业政策性金融体系

文章指出,长期以来由于国家对农业发展银行没有一个长远的系统规划,加之农业政策性金融条例和有效财务安排的缺乏,导致我国农业发展银行缺乏独立生存发展的外部环境和有效营运机制,其生存发展面临困境。为完善我国农业政策性金融体系,文章认为,国家应以全额投资方式建立若干个全国性的具有专门职能的农业政策性金融机构,由国家、地方政府联合出资共同设立若干个区域性农业政策性金融机构,同时通过国家、地方政府参股或控股地方农村金融机构,形成一个产权结构多元化、业务经营专业化、经营形式多样化的农村政策性金融服务体系,从根本上解决我国市场经济发展过程中农村金融与农村经济发展之间的矛盾,推进农村经济建设和社会发展。     

Responsibility, accountability and governance

'Responsibility', 'accountability' and 'governance' are key terms within business ethics. This paper aims to construct a framework to help us understand the relationships between these terms. I first of all analyse the concept of responsibility to show the place of accountability within it, then move to analyse accountability as a sub–concept of responsibility, then finally attempt to show how accountability along with responsibility in general figures within governance structures. While obviously not as complex as the concept of responsibility of which it is part, the sub–concept of accountability is somewhat more complex than often seems to be supposed. The view taken of governance is that as a concept it is relatively straightforward. It acquires complexity only with the involvement of responsibility along with accountability and other aspects of responsibility. The vexed questions as to how these are to be applied lie at the heart of disputes about corporate governance. Though not offering a solution to those disputes, the fact that they arise from the involvement of responsibility, accountability and related matters means that the analysis of concepts given here does offer a framework for thinking about these disputes more clearly.