Reframing the Debate Between Agency and Stakeholder Theories of the Firm

The conflict between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm has long been entrenched in organizational and management literature. At the core of this debate are two competing views of the firm in which assumptions and process contrast each other so sharply that agency and stakeholder views of the firm are often described as polar opposites. The purpose of this paper is to show how agency theory can be subsumed within a general stakeholder model of the firm. By analytically deconstructing the assumptions of agency theory, it is argued that agency theory: (1) must include a recognition of stakeholders; (2) requires a moral minimum to be upheld, which places four moral principles above the interests of any stakeholders, including shareholders; (3) consists of contradictory assumptions about human nature and which give rise to the equally valid assumptions of trust, honesty and loyalty to be infused into the agency relationship. In this way, stakeholder theory is argued to be the logical conclusion of agency theory. Empirical hypotheses are presented as a means to substantiate this claim.     

Compensating Outside Directors with Stock: The Impact on Non-Primary Stakeholders

Two obvious trends in corporate governance include broadening board accountability beyond shareholders’ interests and paying outside directors with equity compensation (stock and stock options). By integrating common agency and instrumental stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of stock compensation on secondary stakeholders and a firm’s participation in social issues, two areas where interests are less aligned with shareholder value. Consistent with our predictions, we found that while stock compensation may be an effective way to align directors’ goals to those of shareholders, it has adverse effects on important non-shareholder constituencies in the company’s operating environment.     

经理股票期权激励制度的理论基础

经理股票期权激励制度是激励机制的一种创新,通过授予股票期权使经营者的目标同股东的目标保持一致.在追求个人利益最大化的同时实现了股东利益的最大化.经理股票期权作为一种制度安排,背后有着深刻的理论依据,如委托代理理论、人力资本理论、激励理论和X(低)效率理论.     

Shareholder Theory and Kant’s ‘Duty of Beneficence’

This article draws on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to explore whether a corporate ‘duty of beneficence’ to non-shareholders is consistent with the orthodox ‘shareholder theory’ of the firm. It examines the ethical framework of Milton Friedman’s argument and asks whether it necessarily rules out the well-being of non-shareholders as a corporate objective. The article examines Kant’s distinction between ‘duties of right’ and ‘duties of virtue’ (the latter including the duty of beneficence) and investigates their consistency with the shareholder theory. The article concludes that it is possible within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of non-shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral consequences of the firm’s activities on non-shareholding stakeholders.     

Citizens as Contractualist Stakeholders

This article examines the way that for-profit businesses should take into account the interests of the citizens in the liberal democratic societies in which they operate. I will show how a contractualist version of stakeholder theory identifies the relevant moral interests of both shareholders and citizen stakeholders, and provides a method for giving their interests appropriate consideration. These include (1) the interests that individuals have with respect to private property, (2) the interests citizens have in receiving equitable consideration in the political process, and (3) citizens?? interests which give them the collective right to determine the legal and economic structure of their societies. Using this contractualist analysis, I argue that corporations should consciously take into account the interests of citizen stakeholders when there is no other social mechanism for protecting their interests as citizens.     

The natural environment as a salient stakeholder: non-anthropocentrism, ecosystem stability and the financial markets

The current debate as to whether the natural environment should be accorded stakeholder status involves an assumption that it is in some way 'different' from other stakeholders, requiring favourable discriminatory treatment. Essentially it is regarded as passive, requiring regulatory agencies to represent its interests or the wider public to demand its protection on the occasion of, for example, oil spills that leave wildlife in a visibly distressed state. But the natural environment does not have 'consciousness' as do traditional classes of stakeholders such as employees, shareholders and contractors, nor does it negotiate in markets over the price at which it sells its output in the way that a trader haggles with potential buyers. This paper proposes that in the context of financial markets the natural environment possesses stakeholder status, founded upon the essentiality of ecosystem stability for their proper functioning and the structuring of instruments traded on them.     

An Optimally Viable Version of Stakeholder Theory

This article is the final one in a series of four papers investigating the stakeholder approach to running businesses. It argues that the optimally viable version of that approach is one in which employees have a co-equal status as stakeholders with shareholders (the maximum allowed for under stakeholder theory) while other groupings only have a minimal status as stakeholders and are generally restricted to just customers, suppliers, and lenders. This version is argued for on the grounds that it both overcomes the implementation problems attendant upon having to serve the interests of a range of groupings and is justified in terms of stakeholder membership being confined to those groupings with a claim on the services of a business in virtue of directly contributing to its economic functioning. The ranking of non-shareholder stakeholders in the recommended version and, in particular, the maximal ranking granted to employees is argued to reflect the scale of the various contributions as measured by the degree to which making it exposes those stakeholders to both financial risk and a non-financial “work-related” risk peculiar to employees. It is concluded that although this is the best available version of the stakeholder approach it may not be the best of all possible ways of running a business. John Kaler is a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Plymouth Business School. He is the co-author of the books An Introduction to Business Ethics and Essentials of Business Ethics, and was co-editor for Teaching Business Ethics, a website hosted by the Institute of Business Ethics. He is an ex-member of the Executive Committee of the European Business Ethics, U.K., and has published on a wide range of business ethics topics.     

What Managers Could See in the Philosophical Block of “Free Will”?

Business ethics’ theories have come under a lot of criticism lately. The problem has been the lack of a philosophical base or the inadequate implementation of it. We are trying to solve this problem by examining the roots of ethics and then applying it to the business environment. The root that has been undeservedly overlooked has been the concept of free will, the oldest philosophical problem on which every ethics theory lies. We have chosen two theories that we think would be the best base for business ethics. We will shortly present the others. Since free will presents the core of business ethics, business ethicists must first agree on which theory to implement. Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ theory of free will best amplify the core of economic theory, because it gives reason a central and most important role in the theory. The concept of free will is mainly philosophical as is business ethics so the article follows this tradition, but we tried to give business examples where possible. We do not give a final conclusion because it should be reached by debate and mutual agreement between business ethicists. Matej Drascek is presently a graduate student at University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Studies. His research interests include: corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory and business ethics. Stane Maticic got his Phd in Theology at University of Lateran, Rome. He is presently a priest at the Archbishopric of Ljubljana. His research interests include: ethics, symbolism and theology.     

Co-creation in effectuation processes: A stakeholder perspective on commitment reasoning

In this article, we seek to contribute to theory on market co-creation through effectuation. To achieve this goal, we examine the different kinds of reasoning behind stakeholder commitments in effectuation processes. Although effectual and causal logics sufficiently account for decision-making in instrumental rationality, scholars have paid little attention to value rationality, and how it might influence stakeholder commitments and behavior. Different commitments may follow different rationales, ranging from instrumentally rational commitments based on causal or effectual logics, to value rational commitments based on state-belief or change-belief. The typology of these four commitment reasoning types provides a framework for analyzing stakeholder behavior based on different perceptions of the commitment decision space. Our typology shows that commitments based on value rationality may be qualitatively different from those driven by instrumental rationality and that value rationality may enable commitments under conditions that preclude instrumentally rational actions. Furthermore, different commitments influence market co-creation processes in different ways. In this article, we examine how different commitments affect (1) conflict and effectual churn and (2) the relative path dependence, or shapability, of the market co-creation space. Based on this typology, we propose avenues for future research on co-creation in effectuation processes, with a special focus on stakeholders.     

The lessons from stakeholder theory for U.S. business leaders

It has been 20 years since Freeman [Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Marshfield, MA: Pittman Publishing.] first proposed his stakeholder approach to strategic management, which stated that corporations must consider the needs and demands not only of their shareholders but also those of a wide range of other external constituencies, or “stakeholders.” Examples of stakeholders include customers, employees, suppliers, and communities. Freeman's theory has generated an extensive body of research, including not only the efforts of the management researchers who have tested, revised, and refined the theory, but also the views of corporate executives who have used the stakeholder approach in their strategic planning. This article, based upon a review of that literature, identifies five important lessons from the stakeholder model for today's business leaders. These lessons are particularly timely, given the inappropriate behavior that has occurred in the business world during recent years.     

Ethical Audit Decisions: A Structuration Perspective

The public accounting profession has long relied on its reputation for integrity and veracity as justification for its professional status and monopoly privilege predicated on claims of acting in the public interest. If such status and privilege are to be justified and sustained, serious consideration of what constitutes ethical behavior, how such behavior is motivated as well as an explicit recognition of the rights and interests of affected parties constitutes an ethical imperative for the profession. Traditionally, work on ethics and auditing is quite narrow, failing to recognize the social context of individual actions, failing to identify the relevant constituencies of the profession, and failing to articulate processes through which the constituencies interests can be identified. Generally, the accounting literature has taken a cognitive perspective on ethical decision making which views the resolution of ethical dilemmas as primarily a function of the moral makeup of the actor responding within the context of the Code of Professional Conduct. The purpose of this paper is to broaden the theoretical base of ethical research, specifically within the area of professional accounting and more generally in the area of business. We propose the application of structuration theory in conjunction with stakeholder theory and a responsibility ethic. The application of stakeholder theory is a means for identifying affected constituencies. A responsibility ethic recognizes the situatedness of an individual within an ongoing professional community. Structuration theory provides a theoretical framework for articulating and investigating both the structures within which action is carried out as well as the interaction between the social structures and the actors. Taken together, the theories allow for an enhanced ability to define ethical behavior within a business context and to understand the contextual antecedents and consequences of ethical acts.     

The Narrow Application of Rawls in Business Ethics: A Political Conception of Both Stakeholder Theory and the Morality of Markets

This paper argues that Rawls’ principles of justice provide a normative foundation for stakeholder theory. The principles articulate (at an abstract level) citizens’ rights; these rights create interests across all aspects of society, including in the space of economic activity; and therefore, stakeholders – as citizens – have legitimate interests in the space of economic activity. This approach to stakeholder theory suggests a political interpretation of Boatright’s Moral Market approach, one that emphasizes the rights/place of citizens. And this approach to stakeholder theory – in terms of citizens – raises a further question, what rights and obligations do economic agents have, beyond those attached to their roles as citizens? Rawls would reject additional rights and obligations of this sort for two reasons, one tied to freedom and one tied to pluralism. Rawls’ work therefore presses us to re-conceptualize the place of ethical claims in the economic context.     

股东派生诉讼的法经济学分析

公司治理研究越来越受到学术界与企业界的关注,控股股东与中小股东的利益争论也受到广泛关注。我国公司法2005年的修订,更多关注中小股东利益,派生诉讼的明确即为一例,但用法律经济学的视角而论,派生诉讼是否能确实保护中小股东利益且公平有效,因此,以此为出发点,研究中小股东派生诉讼的经济效用。     

Reasoning about Responsibilities: Mining Company Managers on What Stakeholders are Owed

Stakeholder theories propose that managers are responsible not only for maximizing shareholder value, but also for taking into account the well being of other parties affected by corporate decisions. While the language of stakeholder theory has been taken up in industries like mining, controversy remains. Disagreements arise not only about the apportionment of costs and benefits among stakeholders, but about who counts as a stakeholder and about how "costs" and "benefits" are to be conceived. This paper investigates these questions empirically by examining how managers in one mining company talk about corporate responsibilities and by analysing the explicit and implicit values systems and moral logics which inform this talk. The investigations discovered that while some claims by stakeholder groups were readily accommodated by managers, others were not. Analysis of the value frameworks employed by the mangers confirms the views of leading stakeholder theorists that stakeholder theory is grounded in the realities of management practice and behaviour.     

The ethics of going private

In this paper, we analyze some of the ethical dimensions of going private transactions (GPTs), wherein publicly traded firms are taken private. Financial theory suggests that efficiencies may be realized in these transactions such that outside shareholders are made better off. Empirical evidence supports this theory. We therefore argue that GPTs are not inherently exploitive or unethical. The issues of the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to shareholders and their obligations to non-shareholders are also explored. Douglas A. Houston is Associate Professor of Business Economics at the University of Kansas. He has written several articles which have been published in journals such as Cato Journal and Kansas Law Review. John S. Howe is Assistant Professor of Business at the University of Kansas. In 1985 he was awarded Outstanding Educator in the MBA Program. His articles have appeared in Journal of Banking and Finance and Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.     

Stakeholder Perspectives and Business Risk Perception

Stakeholder theory calls for decision makers to balance stakeholder interests, but before this can happen, management must understand how other parties view its decisions. Effective stakeholder dialogues convened to reach this understanding require management to appreciate how others perceive the risks posed by their decision. Although understanding others’ risk perception is crucial for effective communications, we do not have a clear idea of how viewing a situation from multiple stakeholder perspectives affects risk perception. Based on a technique derived from risk perception studies of health and environmental issues, an experiment with 224 business students examined how an individual’s risk perception can account for both managerial and customer perspectives. Factors described as customer participation, extent of the effect, and management input, together with the respondent’s self-assessed understanding of the decision process, help categorize overall risk perceptions and are shown to be associated with behaviors based on the decision’s riskiness. Discussion includes implications for designs of business communications, including their content and transparency, and for understanding the audience for these communications.     

Stakeholder Salience in Public and Private Firms: Results from Tanzania

It has become evident that Western concepts of business and management must be evaluated within their realms of application. The objective of this research was to analyze the effects of stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency on the stakeholder salience of shareholders, employees, customers, and community in state-owned and privatized firms in Tanzania. In general, the framework developed and used in Western studies proved useful in characterizing Tanzanian management perceptions toward stakeholders. That is, when using a common questionnaire, results were obtained that linked stakeholder saliency with underlying attributes. Nevertheless, the saliency profile for stakeholders was different in the Tanzanian culture from previous studies in the United States and Spain. In a Tanzanian context, employees, customers, and community attained inferior status compared to the results obtained in developed countries for which the theory had been developed. Profiles were also different in comparing state-owned and privatized firms in Tanzania. Results indicated that the effects on salience are similar for shareholders but different for the remaining stakeholder groups in the two categories of firms. Some policy recommendations are made as a consequence of observations, and the need for further work is acknowledged.     

Cooperation in Stakeholder Networks: Firms’ ‘Tertius Iungens’ Role

In stakeholder theory, most research on cooperation has been focused on inter-organizational collaboration field centered at the dyadic level, excluding the relational or network data. Relational or network data are important as the firms do not simply respond to each stakeholder individually but to an interaction of influences from the entire stakeholder set. The purpose of this article is to analyze the cooperation process among the firm and its stakeholders by considering the relational data and to describe the role of the firm in such cooperation processes. The empirical evidence is provided by an inductive in-depth case study on the company ‘Gas-Nat’ and its stakeholders cooperating on the ‘natural gas pipeline program’ in Argentina. To do so, I combined both quantitative sociometric data and qualitative data from grounded theory and ethnographic observations. This research suggests a stakeholder cooperation model based on structural (stakeholder’s position) and relational factors (framing process). The results indicate that stakeholder cooperation is not just determined by stakeholder position, but they can vary depending on the political opportunity structure in the network and on the framing process. It was found that network structure may create a context for selective cooperation but doesn’t explicitly determine it which is different from the previous research in stakeholder network literature. The role of the firm in the cooperation process was found as a tertius iungens role which implies to join, unite, or connect, and it is different from the existing prominent network literature of tertius gaudens.