政府采购中寻租行为的防范

租金、寻租和设租“寻租”作为经济学术语是由美国著名经济学家安&;#183;O&;#183;克鲁格1974年在《寻租集团的政治经济学》一文中提出的。所谓寻租是指那些借助于权力的力量,来追求自身经济利益的非生产性活动。它又被巴格瓦蒂称为“寻求直接非生产性利润”(简称DUP)。市场通过经济规律配置资源被称为“看不见的手”,而寻租通过权力谋求非生产性利润则被称为“看不见的脚”。寻租活动是人类社会的“负和博奕”,亦即一场就社会整体而言损失大于利得的竞赛,它不但造成寻租行为本身的资源非生产性消耗,而且通过引起经济扭曲而导致效率损失。这种效率损失被称为是“看不见的脚”踩住了“看不见的手”。寻租行为中的“租”也称“租金”,其经济学概念在历史上最初表现为农场主为使用土地而支付给土地所有者的报酬。土地作为一种投入的生产要素,具有总量上的不变性、时间上的不可毁性、空间上的不可转移性等特性,在供求关系中表现为供给刚性而外界对土地的需求量又非常大,因而便产生了最原始的租金概念——地租。现代寻租理论所探讨的租金已将地租的概念一般泛化为经济租金,指那些缺乏供给弹性的要素为其所有者带来的超额报酬,而一切利用权力配置资源大发横财的行为都被称为寻租行为。具体到政府采购...     

"权力寻租"的经济学思考与规避

自古以来"权力寻租"一直影响着人们的社会生活,本文以经济学的视角探讨了权力寻租的背景,具体阐述了权力寻租的边际外部正效应和边际外部负效应,最后并从体制的设计上提出了"权力寻租"的规避建议与评价.     

管理层权力与薪酬业绩敏感性关系研究——以中国民营上市公司为例

本文利用我国民营上市公司2007-2010年的经验数据,实证检验了管理层权力与薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系.研究表明,对民营上市公司而言,管理层权力越大,自定薪酬的动机越强;民营上市公司管理层权力与薪酬业绩敏感性表现出与国有上市公司的同质化,即管理层权力越大,薪酬与盈利业绩的敏感度越高,与亏损业绩的敏感度越低.管理层的权力寻租行为削弱了自身的薪酬风险,薪酬契约包含了无激励价值的权力租金,导致了薪酬激励过度和薪酬契约的“真空化”.研究还发现,民营上市公司所处地区的市场化程度会削弱管理层权力在薪酬契约制定中的寻租动机,降低管理层的薪酬.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露中信息偏差研究

自愿性信息披露是上市公司管理层的一种信息权力,这些权力形成了管理层的信息租金,他们经常会对自愿性信息披露进行选择,产生一定的信息偏差,利用这种非对称信息达到寻租目的,有必要对上市公司的自愿性信息披露行为进行有效的管制,提高自愿性信息披露的质量。     

存贷款中的寻租行为分析

一、寻租概念的界定寻租是指那种利用资源并通过政治过程获得特权从而构成对他人利益的损害大于租金获得者利益的行为,因而也常被称为“直接的非生产性寻利活动”(ＤＵＰ),从这个概念不难看出,寻租是通过自己握有的资源或是特权来实现的;另一方面,他在获得租金的同时构成了对他人利益的损害,而且这个损害要大于自己所获得的租金。　　二、国有商业银行存在寻租行为中国目前商业银行的国有性质决定了其在存贷款中必然会存在寻租现象,这是一个不争的事实,笔者认为,其中原因可以归纳为如下几个方面:首先,也是最根本的原因,我们虽然把四家专业银…     

股权分置与大股东权力寻租的治理

我国股市的股权分置制度和公司治理制度的不完善,导致了上市公司的非流通股股东利用本身绝对控股的权力,进行权力寻租,侵蚀上市公司利益,损害其他股东权益,导致我国资本市场的低效率.本文提出了建立起针对投融资人的资信评价体系;以新带老,缩小流通股与非流通股价差;加强公司内部治理制度和证券市场监管等措施,规范非流通股股东行为,防止大股东权力寻租的一些方法.     

转轨时期的政府干预、银行行为及其经营绩效——基于我国城市商业银行的分析

在我国推进改革的转轨时期,资源配置以租金机制为主、价格机制为辅,地方政府对城市商业银行经营管理的干预是一种必然。本文构建了一个寻租理论框架来分析这一问题。理论分析表明,面对地方政府的干预,我国城市商业银行寻租动机较强,寻租行为和生产行为形成一种特殊的互补关系。同时,本文基于2006—2011年期间的城市商业银行样本数据进行了实证检验。检验结果表明,政府干预会导致城市商业银行形成较高的不良贷款率,一定范围内的政府干预虽然不会对银行的资产收益率产生显著影响,但干预程度较大时还是会对银行的资产收益率产生负面影响。本文的研究对我国改善地方政府与城市商业银行的关系,促进城市商业银行的良性发展不乏启示意义。     

信贷市场中的"寻租"现象浅析:现状、原因和对策

"寻租"是经济主体寻求非生产性利润的行为.本文详细地分析了我国信贷领域"寻租"现象的现状和原因--目前国家实行信贷控制和利率管制政策,同时指出信贷领域的"寻租"对社会造成的损失,最后提出通过放弃金融抑制、让人们无租可寻和改变寻租者的成本--收益函数、从防范制度上减小"寻租"发生的可能性等措施来解决信贷领域的"寻租"行为.     

租金挤占分析及化解建议

权利与权力是两个不同的概念,前者属于法律上的概念,后者则属政治上的概念,但两者存在密切的联系。一束财产权利中的一项或几项权利在特定市场交易中形成权利租金,而公共权力对经济活动干预或管制所形成的超额收益形成权力租金。公共权力支持下公共产权对私有产权的挤占,以及公共产权委托特定私有产权行使公共产权条件下特定私有产权对公共产权和普遍私有产权的挤占,将造成权力租金挤占权利租金、公共产权租金挤占私有产权租金、特定私有产权租金挤占公共产权租金和普遍私有产权租金的情况发生。本文将结合我国现实案例,分析比较各类租金挤占情况,并认为建设保障普遍私有产权的法治市场经济社会可以有效化解租金挤占行为。     

美国政府采购法中的反商业贿赂条款

透明度原则有效制约商业贿赂明度原则有效制约商业贿赂细化采购程序和模式,限制权力寻租严格供应商的管理,从源头杜绝不合格供应商进入采购程序实行政府采购人员资格认证制加强对商业贿赂行为的监控和防范争议解决机制为商业贿赂受损方提供有效的事后救济     

The determinants of CEO compensation: Rent extraction or labour demand?

CEO compensation is topical and controversial and accordingly receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders. We investigate whether rent extraction or labour demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia. We do so by examining the determinants (economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation level and explore the relationship between predicted excess compensation and subsequent firm performance. Our results suggest that governance and ownership attributes, in addition to economic attributes, are significant determinants of CEO compensation. However, these attributes differentially determine the various components of CEO compensation. Our evidence is consistent with: (1) the determination of fixed salary and share-based compensation reflecting a firm's demand for a high-quality CEO; and (2) the CEO's ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. However, the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year. This is in sharp contrast to the US evidence where rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent [Core, J., Holthausen, R., Larcker, D., 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371–406].     

租金理论及其对资源税的影响

本文从租金的理论回顾入手,简要介绍了西方经济理论中的“经济租”、“稀缺租金”和“霍特林租金”的经济含义和相互关系,并以此为基础论证了我国资源税和矿产资源补偿费的经济性质,进而提出了资源税参与调节经济生活的理论依据和不可或缺的重要作用及其重新定位,即作为社会公共收入而不是作为国有资源租金表现形式的资源税,将以可持续发展为基本立足点,与环境保护政策相配合,专注于校正外部效应、维护代际资源利用公平、调整私人贴现率与社会贴现率的差异以及消除垄断对社会公平的损害和节能降耗等目标,这才应该成为资源税的基本定位和改革方向。     

Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and Profitability

While it is known that information exchange (IE) in a value chain improves resource coordination, scant attention has been paid to two issues. The first issue is the effect of relative bargaining strengths of the parties on whether and how IE will be implemented. The second issue is whether a resource-based costing system is adequate to motivate the implementation of information exchange. In this paper, we model a value chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer gets (private) demand information that has the potential of improving the manufacturers resource decisions. In this model, it is always beneficial for the value chain to implement IE. We show that in a monopsony or in a bilateral monopoly when the retailer has sufficient bargaining power, IE can be implemented if and only if the wholesale price compensates him for the loss of the information rent that he would get without IE. Using this model as the benchmark, we also examine other settings where the retailers have less bargaining power due to competition or size. In such settings, even though the retailers are better informed, the manufacturer can implement the IE regime costlessly and appropriate the information rent partially or fully. In effect, the manufacturer benefits both by improved resource coordination and by reduced payment for information rent. In all these settings, we find the retailer will not be motivated to adopt IE solely by a resource-based costing and pricing system.     

Rent control: The citizen,the market,and the state

The paper is a positive and normative public choice analysis of rent control. The positive public choice section hypothesizes that differences in rent control regimes across countries emerge out of differences in the political power of tenants and landlords, out of differing attitudes to security of tenure and the fairness of gains from property ownership, and out of differing values regarding equality of opportunity versus equality of result. The normative public choice analysis evaluates rent control by asking whether rent control would be allowed under a unanimously approved constitution. It is argued control would not be allowed; not because the objectives of control are outside the sanctioned domain of government but because control is horizontally inequitable.     

The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.     

内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金

本文首先对内部资本市场存在于多元化企业集团的观点提出了质疑,认为多元化可以扩大内部资本市场的运作空间,但不是判断企业集团是否存在内部资本市场的必要条件；其次对内部资本市场交易按其特征进行分类,并对其与关联交易的区别进行了辨析；最后从组织租金视角研究内部资本市场的本质,界定了内部资本市场租金的内涵,提出内部资本市场的本质是租金的创造与分配。     

Return decomposition and the Intertemporal CAPM

The Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) from Merton (1973) has had a strong impact in empirical asset pricing leading to numerous multifactor models. This paper shows that the explanatory power of the ICAPM application by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) relies critically on the computation of Dimson (1979) covariances (betas). If one employs the standard factor covariances (excluding lagged factors), the two-factor ICAPM has virtually no explanatory power for the average returns of the 25 size/book-to-market portfolios. More specifically, it is the covariance with the lagged innovation in one of the state variables (the value spread) that drives the explanatory power of the model. These results are inconsistent with the central economic intuition from the ICAPM. By specifying a more general version of the ICAPM, the fit of the model improves relative to the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) model.     

Pricing Upward-Only Adjusting Leases

This paper presents a stochastic pricing model of a unique, path-dependent lease instrument common in the United Kingdom and numerous commonwealth countries, the upward-only adjusting lease. In this lease, the rental rate is fixed at lease commencement but will be reset to the market rate at predetermined intervals (usually every five years) if it exceeds the contract rent. We derive a closed form expression for the market rent of a lease with upward-only adjustments. Results indicate what the initial coupon rate on a 10-year lease with one reset should be relative to that on a symmetric up-and-downward adjusting variable rate lease under various economic conditions (level of real interest rates and expected drift and volatility of the underlying rental service flow). We also consider the calculation of effective rents when free rent periods are given.     

Private contracting and corporate governance: Evidence from the provision of tag-along rights in Brazil

We identify two opposing effects of issuing equity with tag-along rights that secure an equal price in the event of a takeover. First, the anti-self dealing effect commits controlling owners to sell only to new owners that increase shareholder value. Second, the rent transfer effect shifts rents to existing unprotected minority owners. The institutional setting in Brazil's stock market allows us to test this trade-off. We find that announcements of tag-along rights are associated with an average cumulative abnormal return of around 5%, and that the probability of issuing shares with tag-along rights increases with the cost of self-dealing and decreases in the share of existing unprotected minority investors. Overall, our analysis confirms that private contracting can mitigate the economic costs associated with the inadequate legal protection of investors in emerging markets.     

企业家商业模式创新行为分析

基于经济租金理论和商业模式创新特点,考量企业家商业模式创新的动因、企业家商业模式创新中的能力构成以及创新绩效。运用结构方程模型对相关假设进行实证检验,结果表明,企业家发现机会的能力、承担风险和不确定性的能力对商业模式创新行为具有显著正向影响,且企业家商业模式创新行为对创新绩效的正向影响显著,商业模式创新行为实现了经济租金的获取。