REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

Financial reforms initiated in most transitional socialist economiesdo not yet adequately provide many of the financial servicesassociated with market-oriented financial systems. Such services—mobilizingresources, selecting firms and allocating capital, monitoringfirm managers, and facilitating the management of transactionsand risk—are a necessary condition for economic reformto improve living standards. This article envisages four central strategies to guide reformof the financial sector: • Building an infrastructure based on clear and enforceableproperty rights, modern accounting and auditing standards, reliablepayments systems, sound prudential and enforcement regulations,and professionals trained in finance • Ending the shell game of trying to hide the losses ofstate-owned enterprises, and separating government decisionsto finance "priority" firms from the allocation decisions ofindependent financial institutions • Privatizing some financial institutions early—althoughnot necessarily precipitously—in concert with the privatizationof firms and supervisory capabilities, meanwhile cleaning upbank loans to maximize the chances that firms and banks willsucceed as private entities • Improving the tax system and stressing a prudent interestrate policy to reduce uncertainty, distortions, and excessiverepression of the financial sector.      

FINANCIAL MARKETS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

Many factors contributed to the rapid growth of the economiesof East Asia in the past quarter century. This article examinesone important aspect of that growth—commonly referredto as the "East Asian miracle"—public policies affectingthe financial markets. East Asian governments intervened extensivelyin financial markets at all stages of their development. Whatsets their actions apart from those of other developing countriesthat have not fared as well? We do not have the informationto answer conclusively what effect particular actions had (thatrequires a counterfactual test of what growth would have beenwithout the particular intervention). But we can identify themarket failures the East Asian governments addressed, assesssome of the theoretical reasons why each policy might be growthenhancing, and provide some data attesting to the impacts ofthe policy. Several characteristics of financial sector interventionsin East Asia stand out: they incorporated design features thatimproved the chances of success and reduced opportunities forabuse; interventions that did not work out were dropped unhesitatingly;and policies were adapted to reflect changing economic conditions.      

Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailand's Industrial Firms

New data on Thailand's industrial firms shed light on the originsof the East Asian financial crisis and on the response of themanufacturing sector to the structural adjust-ment program supportedby the international financial institutions. Before the crisis,Thai firms had declining profitability, but they neverthelessmaintained high levels of investment, often in domesticallyoriented areas (notably the auto sector). Thai firms financedthese investments with short-term borrowing from financial institutions,which in turn borrowed short term on foreign markets. That only40 percent of firms provided audited financial statements totheir banks meant that the financial sector had poor informationfor assessing the true riskiness of these investments. The financialstructure was thus vulnerable even to small shocks. How well did the adjustment program deal with the crisis? Thaifirms had difficulty increasing their exports quickly becauseof investment in the wrong sectors, a decline in regional demand,and bottlenecks that included red tape and poor customs administration.Because of the poor export response, the brunt of adjustmenthad to come through compression of demand and of imports. Inretrospect, the macroeconomic program— which assumed quickexport recovery— was too tight.      

HOW MUCH DOES TRADE WITH THE SOUTH AFFECT WORKERS IN THE NORTH?

Does trade with developing countries have a small and benigneffect on workers in industrial countries, as most economistshave maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the generalpublic and advocates of protection believe? A review of theevidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable.The methods that economists have conventionally used to measurethe effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The truesize of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studiessuggest that it is much larger than previously estimated. Tradewith the South has probably significantly altered the sectoralcomposition of employment in the North, shifting workers outof manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important,it has probably significantly worsened the relative economicposition of unskilled workers in industrial countries, and mayalso have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflationwith low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects oftrade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed.And the popular remedy—protection—is clearly wrong.What is needed instead is more action by governments to offsetthe reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor throughtraining and education, job creation, and income redistribution.      

Corporate Performance in the East Asian Financial Crisis

The sharp decline in the once-stellar performance of East Asiancorporations following the 1997 financial crisis has sparkedan intense debate. Some observers argue that external shocks,including a drop in aggregate demand and a shortage of workingcapital, explain the corporate sector's poor performance. Othersassert that the difficulties were apparent well before the crisisand that the risky financial policies pursued by these firmsleft them vulnerable. A survey of the literature shows littlemicroeconomic evidence to support either view. This article compares the growth and financing patterns of EastAsian corporations in the years before the crisis with thosein other countries. It finds little microeconomic evidence thatcorporate growth was weakening but some support for the argumentthat many firms had a weak financial structure that left themvulnerable to an economic downturn. Based on a sample of morethan 850 publicly listed firms in the four crisis countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand and—andtwo comparators, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore, it appearsthat firm specific weaknesses already in existence before thecrisis were important factors in the deteriorating performanceof the corporate sector.      

Infrastructure Privatization and Regulation: Promises and Perils

Infrastructure is crucial for generating growth, alleviatingpoverty, and increasing international competitiveness. For muchof the twentieth century and in most countries, the networkutilities that delivered infrastructure services—suchas electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railroads,and water supply—were vertically and horizontally integratedstate monopolies. But this approach often resulted in extremelyweak services, especially in developing and transition economiesand especially for poor people. Common problems included lowproductivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue,and shortfalls in investment. Over the past two decades manycountries have implemented far-reaching institutional reforms—restructuring,privatizing, and establishing new approaches to regulation.This article identifies the challenges involved in this massivepolicy redirection within the historical, economic, and institutionalcontext of developing and transition economies. It also reviewsthe outcomes of these policy changes, including their distributionalconsequences—especially for poor households and otherdisadvantaged groups. Drawing on a range of international experiencesand empirical studies, it recommends directions for future reformsand research to improve infrastructure performance.      

Does insiders share pledging stifle innovation? Evidence from China

We examine the relation between insiders share pledging activities for personal loans and firm innovation. Firstly, we find a negative effect of both the existence of pledging and the intensity of pledging activities on firm innovation, measured by R&D and patent application. Pledging by insiders with decision rights is associated with a 4.6% decline in R&D activities and 0.5% decline in patent applications, respectively, which accounts for 4.0% and 10.6% of the mean of each variable. This result holds using a propensity-score matched sample. In addition, we instrument pledging activities by financing constraints faced by other firms controlled by the same controlling insiders who pledge shares. IV estimation yield similar results. Secondly, we find share pledge activities have more pronounced effect on firm innovations when firms are located in areas with strong property rights protection, when firms are non-SOEs, or when pledging insiders serve on corporate boards. Lastly, we also find a negative effect of share pledging of other firms with common shareholders on firm innovations of interest. Overall, our findings suggest that pledging shares by insiders stifle firm innovation because share pledging reduce insiders' preference for risk taking.     

Formal and Informal Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints

Water markets—either formal or informal—can be anefficient method for reallocating scarce water supplies. Atthe same time certain constraints can raise the transactioncosts of trading water. This paper reviews the conditions necessaryto establish successful water markets, identifies potentialproblems, and offers mitigating strategies. It also uses examplesof several informal and formal water markets already in operationto illustrate these problems and the solutions to them.      

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: The Effect on the Poor

Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation andcommercialization in agriculture work their way through to thepoor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But thisview is not universal: some hold that these forces for changecan interact with, or even induce, institutional and marketfailure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instancesin which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or evenhave lost, from the technological change or commercialization.Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostlyattributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features;often, when technology or commercialization has been blamedfor the decline in income of the poor, other—not necessarilyconnected—policies have in fact been responsible for thedamage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large,correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulateagricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expandfood supply—all central to the alleviation of poverty.The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extensionof this view—that through "social engineering" the benefitsfrom technology and commercialization can easily be targetedtoward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targetingshould of course be seized.      

THE DESIGN AND DIFFUSION OF IMPROVED COOKING STOVES

The poorer half of the world's people have long relied for theirenergy needs on woodfuels. Since the oil shocks of the 1970s,pressure on forest resources has increased and the costs oftraditional use of woodfuels have been growing—to thehouseholder, in cash or collection time, and to society in inefficientenergy use, deforestation, and local and global harm to healthand the environment. Modern, efficient stoves can alleviatesome of these problems; programs to design and disseminate themwould seem a worthwhile pursuit for development activity. But do such programs in fact warrant the investment? Why haveso many failed to catch on as expected? The authors find thatprograms have been most successful when targeted to specificareas where woodfuel prices or collection times are high. Fieldtesting, consumer surveys, and involvement of local artisansfrom the outset have been critical to the ultimate adoptionof the stoves. With these elements in place, external supportfrom governments and donors can be useful; lacking them, subsidiesmay succeed only in distributing stoves that ultimately molderaway unused. This article's review of what makes for successand failure is instructive for the design of stove programsin particular, and of development projects that propagate improvedmethods and technologies in general.      

Corporate Governance and Development

The literature shows that good corporate governance generallypays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It isassociated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity,greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders,although the direction of causality is not always clear. Thelaw and finance literature has documented the important roleof institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement,including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-leveldata, researchers have documented relationships between countries’corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance,valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financingon the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance,firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistanceby entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and politicaleconomy factors at the level of markets and countries partlyexplain why they do not.      

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and theirliberalization on the activities of US multinational firms.These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducingreported local profitability and increasing the frequency ofdividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impactof local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27%higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countriesimposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliatesto remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliateslocated in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higherinterest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of thesame parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls.Capital control liberalizations are associated with significantincreases in multinational activity—property, plant, andequipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations.The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interestrates discourages investment in countries with capital controls,and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls.(JEL F21, F23, F36, F42, G15, G32, G34)     

Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets

Poor rural and urban households in developing countries facesubstantial risks, which they handle with risk-management andrisk-coping strategies, including self-insurance through savingsand informal insurance mechanisms. Despite these mechanisms,however, vulnerability to poverty linked to risk remains high.This article reviews the literature on poor households' useof risk-management and risk-coping strategies. It identifiesthe constraints on their effectiveness and discusses policyoptions. It shows that risk and lumpiness limit the opportunitiesto use assets as insurance, that entry constraints limit theusefulness of income diversification, and that informal risk-sharingprovides only limited protection, leaving some of the poor exposedto very severe negative shocks. Public safety nets are likelyto be beneficial, but their impact is sometimes limited, andthey may have negative externalities on households that arenot covered. Collecting more information on households' vulnerabilityto poverty—through both quantitative and qualitative methods—couldhelp inform policy.      

EDUCATION VOUCHERS IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY

An education voucher system exists when governments make paymentsto families that enable their children to enter public or privateschools of their choice. The tax-funded payments can be madedirectly to parents or indirectly to the selected schools; theirpurpose is to increase parental choice, to promote school competition,and to allow low-income families access to private schools.Some opponents predict that vouchers will destroy the publicsystem, aggravate poverty, and foster segregation. Others fearthat voucher-receiving independent schools will be regulatedout of recognition. The main purpose of this article is to examine the recent emergenceof voucher systems as an interesting phenomenon in its own right.The evidence summarized relates to voucher systems operatingin twenty countries, provinces, and states. The typical "funds-follow-the-child"voucher system, in which governments subsidize "schools of choice"in strict proportion to enrollment, appears to be the favoriteform. This type of voucher has been adopted by developing countries—notablyBangladesh, Belize, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, and Lesotho—aswell as by industrial countries such as Poland, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States. Much of the recordedexperience with such programs is pertinent to the longstandingtheoretical debates on the desirability of voucher systems.      

PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM MARKET ECONOMIES

In the past decade governments all over the world have begunprivatizing state enterprises—indeed, it is becoming quitehard to find a country without a program of privatization underway or at least on the policy agenda. This striking reversalof the push to expand state ownership in the 1960s and 1970sresults from generally poor performance of state enterprisesand a disappointing record of past reform efforts that fellshort of ownership change. This article examines the objectives of privatization and thestrategies for achieving them, documenting recent trends andreviewing the experience with privatizing state-owned commercial,manufacturing, and service enterprises in both competitive andnoncompetitive markets. The authors analyze the various tacticsthat can be or have been employed, in relation to scope, pace,sequencing, and methods of implementation. The evidence showsthat privatization produces benefits of efficiency and innovation—ifdone right. The lessons of experience discussed in the articleoffer guidance on how to realize the promise of privatizationwhile minimizing the risks and costs.      

Government assisted earnings management in China

As the socialist system in China embraces the market economy, it has created many conflicts of interests and collusion between firms and different layers of governments. The central government in China sets regulations to ensure the quality of firms listed in the capital market, while local governments engage in inter-jurisdictional competition for more capital, and their interests are aligned with listed firms through the stringent IPO quota system. This paper examines how local governments in China help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. We find that local governments provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings above the regulatory threshold of rights offering and delisting. Moreover, this collusion between government and listed firms in earnings management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments.     

Privatization and Corporate Governance: Principles, Evidence, and Future Challenges

Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective,privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improvedperformance with accountability. This article introduces theconcept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbinghands of public and private actors by providing informationand accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers.Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provideestimates of the relative importance and strength of privateand formal chains of governance. The framework and empiricalbenchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizationsand suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to besure to get the most out of future privatization activity.