The Wealth Effect of Domestic Joint Ventures: Evidence from Taiwan

This study presents important international evidence by examining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms. In opposite to United States evidence, we find that announcements of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms are, on average, associated with significantly negative abnormal stock returns. We also find that the stock market response to announced domestic joint ventures is significantly positively related to the announcing firms' investment opportunities, size of investment and debt ratio, and is significantly negatively related to the business relatedness variable. In contrast, free cash flow, firm size, relative firm size and managerial ownership are found to have no significant power in explaining the market response. Our results support the investment opportunities, synergy and complementarity hypotheses as well as a broad interpretation of the free cash flow hypothesis, but reject the absolute size, relative size and alignment-of-interests hypotheses. This study makes valuable contributions to the literature by providing the first direct evidence on the role of investment opportunities, synergy and alignment-of-interests in explaining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures     

Investment Opportunities,Free Cash Flow and Stock Valuation Effects of Corporate Investments: The Case of Taiwanese Investments in China

This paper examines the importance of investment opportunities and free cash flow in assessing the stock market reaction to announcements of cross-border investments in China by Taiwanese firms. Our results support the investment opportunities hypothesis that Taiwanese firms with favorable investment opportunities have significantly positive response to the announcements of their investments in China whereas firms with poor investment opportunities have negative response to such announcements. In contrast, we find no support for the free cash flow hypothesis. Our findings add to the understanding of the determinants of the wealth effect of cross-border investment decisions in the Asia-Pacific region.     

Failed takeovers, methods of payment, and bidder returns

This study documents bidding-firm stock returns upon the announcement of takeover terminations. On average, bidding firms that offer common stock experience a positive abnormal return, and firms that offer cash experience a negative abnormal return. The positive performance is primarily driven by bidders initiating the takeover termination. Commonstock-financed bidders earn a return not significantly different from that earned by cashfinanced bidders when terminations are initiated by the target firm. The results are consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, that the decision not to issue common stock conveys favorable information to the market. In addition, bidder returns at takeover termination are positively related to the amount of undistributed cash flow, supporting the free cash flow hypothesis.     

Liquidity and the Future Stock Returns of the REIT Industry

This paper examines how deviations from expected optimal cash holdings affect future stock returns in the real estate investment trust (REIT) industry. Our findings indicate that REIT managers elect to hold less cash to reduce the agency problems of cash flow, supporting the pecking order theory that growth opportunities lead managers to retain more cash on hand. The results show that any deviation from the estimated optimal cash holdings is significantly detrimental to future market performance, suggesting that excess or insufficient cash is harmful to stock returns. The adverse influence of deviations above the optimal value is insignificantly stronger than that of deviations below the optimal value. We also find that the return performances of deviations that do not differ from the expected optimal value surpass those of deviations that differ significantly from the expected level. This implies that REIT managers determine their cash policies based on future growth opportunities and the external costs of capital. Finally, for REIT firms, holding excess or insufficient cash increases the possibility of agency conflict or underinvestment, which will consequently worsen the firm??s future performance.     

贸易自由化对制造业企业现金储蓄的影响——预防性动机还是投资挤压?

随着加入世界贸易组织,中国企业的出口及投资机会增多,但与此同时面临的进口竞争压力也与日俱增。本文基于1998-2007年中国工业企业数据和行业进口关税数据,以中国2001年加入世界贸易组织为准自然实验,采用双重差分法(DID)模型,首次系统地考察了贸易自由化对制造业企业现金储蓄的影响及作用机制。研究发现:(1)中国贸易自由化不仅没有提高国内制造业企业的现金储蓄率,反而通过投资挤压显著降低了企业的现金储蓄率,这与发达国家的相关研究结果大相径庭。(2)贸易自由化对企业现金储蓄的作用依赖于市场竞争程度,即关税减让会显著降低竞争性行业以及高集聚区域内企业的现金储蓄率。(3)高关税行业的关税降低后,进口竞争会侵蚀纯内销企业的投资机会,尤其是小规模企业,进而降低其现金储蓄。经过一系列检验后,结论依然成立。     

Overinvestment,corporate governance,and dividend initiations

Firms with low Tobin's Q and high cash flow have significantly more positive dividend initiation announcement returns than do other firms. I interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that reductions in the agency costs of overinvestment at firms with poor investment opportunities and ample cash flow are reflected in higher dividend initiation announcement returns. Further tests, such as examining the impact of governance metrics on initiation announcement returns following the dividend tax cut of 2003 and examining the long-run cash-retention policies of dividend-initiating firms, are consistent with this interpretation. There is also some evidence that is consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, as dividend-initiating firms with low Tobin's Q and low pre-initiation cash flow experience substantial revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and significantly positive initiation announcement returns.     

Levered Returns

This paper revisits the theoretical relation between financial leverage and stock returns in a dynamic world where both corporate investment and financing decisions are endogenous. We find that the link between leverage and stock returns is more complex than static textbook examples suggest, and depends on the investment opportunities available to the firm. In the presence of financial market imperfections, leverage and investment are generally correlated so that highly levered firms are also mature firms with relatively more (safe) book assets and fewer (risky) growth opportunities. A quantitative version of our model matches several stylized facts about leverage and returns.     

Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?

This paper examines the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts a positive association between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the wealth effects of capital investments are negatively associated with CEO reputation. We find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for firms with more reputable CEOs. Moreover, CEO reputation mitigates the negative stock price reaction associated with announcements of capital investments by firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Additional analysis indicates that firms with more reputable CEOs exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance improvements than those with less reputable CEOs, especially in firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Collectively, our results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the rent extraction hypothesis in terms of net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firm.     

Product market competition and the value of corporate cash: Evidence from trade liberalization

This paper uses the 1989 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement as a source of exogenous variation in product markets to establish the impact of increased competition on the market valuation of corporate cash reserves. I find that the trade liberalization leads to a significant increase in the value of cash for firms experiencing a larger shock to their competitive environment. The impact of the trade liberalization is stronger among firms that face greater risk of losing investment opportunities to rivals. I also show that these inferences about the valuation effect of competition apply more broadly to a large sample of firms.     

Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean `chaebols'

We compare the investment–cash flow sensitivity of Korean chaebols (conglomerates) and non-chaebol firms. We show that investment–cash flow sensitivity is low and insignificant for chaebol firms but is high and significant for non-chaebol firms. On the other hand, a chaebol firm's investment is significantly related to the growth opportunities but that of a non-chaebol firm is not. A chaebol firm's investment is significantly affected by the cash flow of other firms within the same chaebol even though they are independent legal entities. With these findings, we argue that there is an internal capital market in a chaebol and the internal capital market reduces the financing constraints of the chaebol. However, the operation of the internal capital market does not improve the efficiency of allocation of scarce funds in the Korean economy since we find that chaebols invest more than non-chaebol firms despite their relatively poor growth opportunities.     

VALUATION EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET STOCK REPURCHASES FOR FINANCIALLY WEAK FIRMS

We test the proposition that announcements of open market stock repurchases improve the flow of positive information regarding the firm's prospects, particularly for financially weak firms. For financially strong firms with already good prospects for cash flows, the role of stock repurchases is less important. We provide evidence for an inverse relationship between financial risk, measured by bond rating, and the magnitude of stock repurchase-induced abnormal returns. Results also suggest that the value of information implied by announcements of open market repurchases about increases in cash flows and leverage, is more important for financially weak firms than for financially strong firms.     

Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis

We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.     

Investment opportunities,free cash flow,and stock valuation effects of secured debt offerings

This paper examines the role of investment opportunities and free cash flow in explaining the source of the stock valuation effects of secured debt offerings. We find a significantly positive relation between a firm's investment opportunities and its stock price response to announcements of secured debt issues. This evidence supports the investment opportunities hypothesis that secured debt financing is more valuable for issuing firms with high growth opportunities. In contrast, we find a lack of support for the free cash flow hypothesis. These findings hold even after controlling for other potentially influential variables. Our study provides a better understanding of the relative importance of various potential determinants in explaining the variation in the valuation impact of secured debt issues.

How Does Being Public Affect Firm Investment? Further Evidence from China

What role does the stock market play in the allocation of capital? Few studies have examined how being public affects firm investment in emerging markets. This study fills this gap by comparing investment behavior in public and private Chinese firms over the period 2004–2010. We find an overall improved capital allocation of public firms relative to private firms in China. By disentangling the financial constraints effect from the agency effect, we show that public firms are less likely to underinvest when there is cash flow insufficiency and more likely to overinvest when there is free cash flow. We conclude that both effects coexist and that whether or not being public improves investment behavior depends on the net effect of loosening financial constraints and worsening agency conflicts. Further examination shows that financial information plays a limited role in these effects, implying that the association between being public and firm investment may not be attributed to information asymmetry but, rather, institutional arrangement in China.     

Investment and financing decisions of private and public firms

We examine differences in the allocation of cash flow between Western European private and public firms. Public firms have a higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity than comparable private firms. This difference is not attributable to more severe financing constraints of public firms. Instead, because differences in investment‐cash flow sensitivities are only observed for the unexpected portion of firms’ cash flow, the empirical evidence supports an agency‐based explanation. Similar patterns are observable for the expected and unexpected portion of firms’ shareholder distributions. Our results are driven by firms from countries with low ownership concentration and more liquid stock markets, where shareholders have lower incentives to monitor. The results are also more pronounced for public firms with low industry Tobin's q and high free cash flow, which are more prone to suffer from agency problems.     

Firms' profit instability and the cross-section of stock returns: Evidence from China

This study utilizes samples from the Chinese A-share market to examine the relation between firms’ profit instability and cross-sectional stock returns. The empirical evidence indicates that firms with high profit instability have substantially lower future stock returns than those with low profit instability. The predictive information contained in profit instability is not subsumed by the level of profitability or the volatility of cash flow and is robust after controlling for well-known firm characteristics and risks. In addition, the long-term predictive performance of the firm’s profit instability is permanent over at least five years. Moreover, the profit instability effect is stronger among firms with better recent past performance, more lottery-like payoffs, and higher arbitrage risk. This finding suggests that the immaturity of investors and high constraints on arbitrage are the main sources of the profit instability effect in the Chinese market, which is consistent with the implications of behavioral mispricing explanations. Our investigation enriches the studies on profitability anomalies by uncovering profit instability as an incremental signal in predicting stock returns. Furthermore, this study provides a novel view to better understand the mechanisms of the anomalies related with firms' profitability in undeveloped stock markets of emerging economies, thereby benefiting investors from all over the world to seek more efficient investment strategies.     

Internal Finance and Corporate Investment

This paper examines Pecking Order/Free Cash Flow behavior in small ($25–$50 million), medium ($100–250 million), and large ($1000 million and over) firms. The purpose is to proffer an explanation for the important role of cash flow on the investment expenditure of firms that is more complete than the commonly given accounts. The Pecking order theory (PO) emphasizes the value‐enhancing influence of cash flow, while the free cash flow hypothesis (FCF) underscores its value‐destroying effect. Using the vector error correction model, we find that although the overall behavior of small firms support the pecking order theory, the cash flow of these firms does not have any causal effect on their investment. We further find evidence of free cash flow theory in large firms.     

Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions

We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.     

Financing decisions and bidder gains

This paper analyzes the relation between bidder gains and the source of financing funds available. We document that after controlling for the form of payment, financing decisions during the year before a takeover play an important role in explaining the cross section of bidder gains. Bidder announcement period abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to the amount of ex ante equity financing. This relation is particularly strong for high q firms. We further report a negative and significant relation between bidder gains and free cash flow. This relation is particularly strong for firms classified as having poor investment opportunities. The amount of debt financing before a takeover announcement is not significantly related to bidder gains. Together, we take these findings as supportive of the pecking-order theory of financing and the free cash flow hypothesis.