Credence Goods,Efficient Labelling Policies,and Regulatory Enforcement

We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures. When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat effect”.      

Environmental Policy in a Green Market

This paper studies the impact of some frequently-used environmental policies in a duopolistic market where purchasers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods. When consumers differ in their environmental awareness, a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium. The higher the average willingness-to-pay for the good, the lower are variants' unit emissions but the higher are industrial aggregate effluents. A maximum unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants, but boosts firms' sales and consequently increases industrial aggregate emissions. As a result, social welfare may be reduced. We also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges, including differentiation of charges.     

Behavioural Economics,Hyperbolic Discounting and Environmental Policy

This paper reviews some recent research in “behavioural economics” with an application to environmental issues. Empirical results from behavioural economics provide a reminder that human behaviour is context-dependent, implying that policy may go awry if based upon models of behaviour which are inappropriate to the contexts in which decisions are made. Recognizing that agents may, in some contexts, systematically make mistakes raises challenging questions about the role of “paternalism” in government policy. The paper considers the research into hyperbolic discounting, and examines the implications for environmental policy. We develop a model of resource management under hyperbolic discounting, which shows that if a planner is unable to commit to a policy, the temptation to re-evaluate the policy in future could lead to an inadvertent collapse in the stocks of a natural resource.     

Are green products over-priced?

This article investigates conditions under which high prices, in conjunction with low levels of pollution, signal environmentally clean products. It is shown that, when consumers cannot ascertain the environmental performance of products, the price must be distorted upward to signal a clean product. A clean producer saves less from emitting pollution and so raises price and restricts output with less reluctance than does a dirty producer. The theoretical result of over-pricing is consistent with the evidence that “green” products receive higher prices than conventional products. However, optimistic prior beliefs of high-environmental performance may cause signaling to fail.      

Entry Facilitation by Environmental Groups

We consider a model of vertical product differentiation where consumers care about the environmental damage their consumption causes. An environmental group is capable of increasing consumers’ environmental concern via a costly campaign. We show that the prospect of such a campaign can induce entry by a firm that is able to employ a cleaner technology than the one used by the incumbent. We further demonstrate that the subsequent competition can lead to an adverse effect on aggregate pollution, i.e. the decline in average industry pollution per product is offset by the increase in aggregate production.      

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

环境信息披露机制与企业发展——以日常耐用品生产企业为例

日常耐用消费品与人们的生活息息相关,其环保程度,对大众的身体健康有着重要影响。企业通过信息披露机制反映自身关于企业污染、治理方面的信息,可反映企业产品的环保程度,有利于消费者更好地了解企业,更好地反映产品的品质信息。企业披露高质量的环境信息,有利于建立良好的社会形象,有利于发展与消费者、政府间的互信机制,有利于强化企业产品的差异化程度,增强产品市场竞争力。     

What is the Best Distribution for Pollution Abatement Efforts? Information for Optimizing the WFD Programs of Measures

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) has mobilized economic theory in order to encourage E.U. Member States to reach desirable environmental water pollution levels by conciliating economic and ecological interests. For this purpose, a stringent standard (“good status”) has been set. Nevertheless, it will be possible to relax this standard if it appears that total abatement costs required for reaching this “good status” exceed expected environmental benefits. This ambitious policy updates the issue of the abatement costs and environmental benefits assessment. Concerning the costs, a full discrimination of the abatement effort minimizes the total cost when the impact of polluters changes spatially, while a uniform effort can reach a pollution target in flexible ways. In this case, the increase of the degree of discrimination of the abatement effort is required only if it generates significant positive economies. Our theoretical and empirical results have shown that the discrimination advantage becomes insignificant for either very demanding or very little demanding ecological standards and varies according to the polluters’ profile. In the case of “intermediate” standards, efficiency gains become negligible with a restricted number of effort “levels”.     

Can green consumerism replace environmental regulation?—a differentiated-products example

This paper assumes that consumers are willing to pay an extra premium for a good if it has a low impact on the environment. We examine if a little dose of such idealistic behavior has a large impact on the market equilibrium, and to what extent it can replace the environmental regulation. The analysis is carried out in a model with product differentiation, where consumers differ in their preferences for product quality. Consumers’ willingness to pay the environmental premium may be uniformly or non-uniformly distributed. Green consumerism will only be modestly influential in both cases, despite the fact that product differentiation leads to relaxed competition and increased profits, and thereby creates leverage.     

Economic Growth and (Re-)Distributive Policies in a Non-cooperative World

Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing (“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively high growth.     

Environmental regulatory enforcement with “green” consumers

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions     

Environmental Tax in a Green Market

We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers’ environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage is, the higher the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large. Finally, when marginal environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly.     

The noisy crisis and all those trade-offs

Stewart Udall’s environmental book,The Quiet Crisis and the Next Generation, and the preponderant use of the word “trade-off” in environmental work motivate this paper. Udall’s book is a history of increasing awareness about environmental quality and business activity becomes a topic of increasing concern. Elementary economics typically emphasizes the inevitability of trade-offs. Thus far, and perhaps consequently, society’s approach to solving environmental problems has been adversarial. Adversaries solve problems by fighting to determine who will win and lose in the trade-offs. This paper suggests a different emphasis in our elementary microeconomics material, an emphasis focusing more on choices in which all parties win, choices which are therefore consistent with a non-adversarial approach to our growing environmentla problems. This paper introduces the “apparent trade-off.”     

Firms’ Compliance to Environmental Regulation: Is There Really a Paradox?

It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: firms are inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the pattern seems less paradoxical: enforcement of minor violations is lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations, on the other hand, are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment, and such violations are more uncommon. This seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory. We argue that the empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the international literature. The claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is generally higher than predicted by standard theory should thus be regarded as a hypothesis rather than an established fact.     

Experts with a conflict of interest: a source of ambiguity?

We present an experimental design where uncertainty is generated from the advice of experts with conflicts of interest. In this experiment clients are faced with a variant of a multi-armed bandit problem with a random end-time. On the known arm (the “task screen”), clients can earn a certain payment per completion of a decoding task. However, clients may also opt for the unknown arm where they earn an uncertain amount if they end the experiment on this “expert screen”. The amount is uncertain to the clients because the value is being communicated through an “expert” with conflicted incentives. A control session provides for direct transmission of the value to the clients. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is alive-and-well in this environment. Also, when we vary the wage rate on the known arm we find that higher opportunity cost clients are less likely to heed the advice of conflicted experts.     

On the growth and welfare effects of monopolistic distortions

The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap” may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.      

The physical environment as a global economic concern

From Aristotle to Scitovsky the nature and scope of human economy and economics have remained essentially the same, viz. the prudent/efficient/welfaremaximizing administration/utilization of the scarce resources (chrèmata, “choses utiles,” etc.) comprising the household and the expertise there-of. Aristotle’s protégé, Theophrastus (d. 287 B.C.), went to the extent of counseling that, for the “health and well-being” of all its members (including the livestock), theoikos “should be airy in the summer and sunny in the winter,” it no doubt going without saying that its roof should be kept in good repair. Today, it behooves us to critically re-examine our traditional concepts of wealth, “land,” “the environment,” and the socioeconomic unit whose storehouse of resources is to be managed aright, particularly along the history-of-thought lines presented here. Address delivered at a session on March 25, 1994 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Chicago. The author thanks Tom Coffey (Latin), Brace Malina and Plinio Prioreschi (Italian) for linguistic assistance.     

Price Competition and Consumer Externalities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Information Disparities

In this paper, we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to consider information disparities about quality differences and their effects on price competition. If uninformed consumers overestimate vertical differentiation, asymmetric information is a source of market power and informed consumers exert positive externalities on high quality product purchasers and negative externalities on low quality product purchasers. Such a result is consistent with the fact that information undermines brand. If uninformed consumers are skeptical, adverse selection issues arise and market demands may be perfectly inelastic to prices. With elastic demands equilibrium prices may be either distorted downwards or reflect real quality if the share of informed consumers is suffciently high. Therefore, with skeptical consumers firms may want either to signal quality or subsidize information provision.     

Using Choice Experiments to Value the Environment

This paper we outline the “choice experiment” approach to environmental valuation. This approach has its roots in Lancaster's characteristics theory of value, in random utility theory and in experimental design. We show how marginal values for the attributes of environmental assets, such as forests and rivers, can be estimated from pair-wise choices, as well as the value of the environmental asset as a whole. These choice pairs are designed so as to allow efficient statistical estimation of the underlying utility function, and to minimise required sample size. Choice experiments have important advantages over other environmental valuation methods, such as contingent valuation and travel cost-type models, although many design issues remain unresolved. Applications to environmental issues have so far been relatively limited. We illustrate the use of choice experiments with reference to a recent UK study on public preferences for alternative forest landscapes. This study allows us to perform a convergent validity test on the choice experiment estimates of willingness to pay.     

The political economy of constitutional restraints

Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and, therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom (absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of “democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world.