Would Freeing Up World Trade Reduce Poverty and Inequality? The Vexed Role of Agricultural Distortions

Trade policy reforms in recent decades have sharply reduced the distortions that were harming agriculture in developing countries, yet global trade in farm products continues to be far more distorted than trade in non‐farm goods. Those distortions reduce some forms of poverty and inequality but worsen others, so the net effects are unclear without empirical modelling. This article summarises a series of new economy‐wide global and national empirical studies that focus on the net effects of the remaining distortions to world merchandise trade on poverty and inequality globally and in various developing countries. The global Linkage model results suggest that removing those remaining distortions would reduce international inequality, largely by boosting net farm incomes and raising real wages for unskilled workers in developing countries, and would reduce the number of poor people worldwide by 3 per cent. The analysis based on the Global Trade Analysis Project model for a sample of 15 countries, and nine stand‐alone national case studies, all point to larger reductions in poverty, especially if only the non‐poor are subjected to increased income taxation to compensate for the loss of trade tax revenue.     

Escaping a protectionist rut: Policy mechanisms for trade reform in a democracy

This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young thereby determining the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence education decisions and thus voters' trade policy preferences. We show that there may exist two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or tariff liberalization by trading partners, but generally not by transfer payments to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be necessary for escaping a protectionist political rut.     

Trade, wages, and the political economy of trade protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms

Worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in how trade policy affects wages in many trade models. Yet, most research has focused on how trade policy affects wages by altering the economy-wide returns to a specific worker characteristic (i.e., skill or education) rather than through worker industry affiliation. This paper exploits drastic trade liberalizations in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and industry wage premiums. We relate wage premiums to trade policy in an empirical framework that accounts for the political economy of trade protection. Accounting for time-invariant political economy factors is critical. When we do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, we find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. Allowing for industry fixed effects reverses the result: trade protection increases relative wages. This positive relationship persists when we instrument for tariff changes. Our results are in line with short- and medium-run models of trade where labor is immobile across sectors or, alternatively, with the existence of industry rents that are reduced by trade liberalization. In the context of the current debate on the rising income inequality in developing countries, our findings point to a source of disparity beyond the well-documented rise in the economy-wide skill premium: because tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors employing a high fraction of less-skilled workers, the decrease in the wage premiums in these sectors affected such workers disproportionately.     

Protection and unemployment

Job loss concerns strongly influence the politics of trade, yet the formal political economy of trade literature has largely ignored unemployment. This paper seeks to extend the literature by merging an unemployment model with a trade policy model. The theory implies that labor turnover rates and unionization rates may significantly affect protection for individual industries. I use US data to test the model and find that protection for an industry declines with its turnover rate and increases with its unionization rate. The results also imply that protection does not increase with output and increases with the number of unemployed workers.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.     

Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries

A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable in a standard protection for sale framework. The model is then estimated and its predictions tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained.     

入世后我国主要贸易税收政策功能调整的定位分析

入世后,我国贸易税收政策的功能必须在经济全球化的背景下制定和调整。本文通过分析关税、出口退税、反倾销税三大贸易税收政策的主要功能在内、外部因素的影响下发生的变化,提出了我国入世后贸易税收政策功能调整的战略方向及措施:应强化关税产业保护功能,弱化财政收入功能;应以“走出去”战略为依据,真正发挥出口退税制度的保护产业和鼓励出口的基本功能;应发挥经济比较优势,加强国际分工合作,避免反倾销税成为过度产业保护的工具。     

Timing of trade liberalization

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization on growth and long-run global income inequality using a two-country model of human capital accumulation by credit-constrained households. I show that the timing of trade liberalization is a crucial determinant of its effects on growth. Moreover, I show that the size of the long-run income gap between the two countries depends on the difference in domestic income inequality when they open up to trade. Based on these results, I analyze the effects of redistributive policy within a country. I show that redistribution in one country may increase income per capita of its trading partner if it is undertaken in a steady state, while the opposite is true if the policy is undertaken during transition.     

Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements

Why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose? We address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups (SIGs) by focusing on a set of important policies: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient NTBs; commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic SIGs. Using detailed data we find support for several of the model's predictions including: (i) tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTBs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions; (ii) tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a SIG. Thus, the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements.     

Trade liberalisation and human capital adjustment

This paper highlights the way in which workers of different ages and abilities are affected by anticipated and unanticipated trade liberalisations. A two-factor (skilled and unskilled labour), two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin trade model is supplemented with an education sector which uses skilled labour and time to convert unskilled workers into skilled workers. A skilled worker's income depends on her ability, but all unskilled workers have the same income. Trade liberalisation in a relatively skilled labour abundant country increases the relative skilled wage and induces skill upgrading by the existing workforce, with younger and more able unskilled workers most likely to upgrade. But not all upgraders are better off as a result of the liberalisation. The older and less able upgraders are likely to lose. For an anticipated liberalisation we show that the preferred upgrading strategies depend on a worker's ability and that much of the upgrading will take place before the liberalisation. Hence some workers who would have upgraded had they anticipated the liberalisation will not if it is unanticipated, and adjustment assistance that applies only to post-liberalisation upgraders will fail to compensate some losers and distort the upgrading decisions of others.     

Taxation of Foreign Profits with Heterogeneous Multinational Firms

This paper analyses optimal taxation of foreign profits using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms that serve a foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise because of intra‐firm trade. It turns out that, in contrast to recent claims, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption of foreign income from tax.     

Uneven Development and Bilateral Conflict

We consider the dynamics of bilateral conflict within the framework of a standard two‐country, two‐sector model of international trade with increasing returns in one sector. Free trade leads to asymmetric equilibria among otherwise identical countries and, in some circumstances, to uneven development in the sense of persistent disparities in wages, income and welfare. In the latter case, distortionary industrial policy by the less developed country may be welfare enhancing. When the dynamics of policy change are endogenized, the model gives rise to periodic changes in industrial leadership or leapfrogging. Implications of this phenomenon for the empirical literature on convergence are discussed.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

政府对利益集团收入的关注与贸易摩擦的形成——基于贸易政策的政治经济学分析

本文借鉴社会关注模型中的观点,即政府制定贸易政策时会关注特定利益集团的福利状况,并结合保护待售模型,在贸易政策政治经济学的理论框架下对贸易摩擦的成因进行了分析。研究表明,一国政府出于维护国内进口或出口利益集团利益的目的,会选择贸易保护政策,从而引发贸易伙伴国之间在贸易政策方面的冲突,出现贸易摩擦,其中政府给予利益集团福利的权重以及利益集团代表的人数在总人数中所占的比例对政府贸易政策的选择,存在一定的影响。     

Intermediate inputs,external rebalancing and relative price adjustment

The traditional multi-sector macro model without production inputs is a value-added trade model. This paper shows that calibrating such a misspecified value-added trade model to available gross-flow trade data – a common practice in the literature – can lead to mismeasured (i) preference weights and (ii) price elasticities. Further, the calibrated model can give substantially different predictions regarding the relative price response to external rebalancing, when compared to a preferred alternative model with inputs that is consistent with gross-flow trade data. We find that mismeasured preference weights and price elasticities both contribute sizably to deviations in model predictions and estimate correctly-measured parameters for the value-added trade model.     

Lobbying and tariff formation: A deadweight loss consideration

This paper presents a model in which two organized groups spend real resources to influence a country's tariff policy. Being ‘small’ is shown to be advantageous in lobbying activities. The size of a group is measured by its share of national income. A small group bears only a small share of the deadweight loss which its lobbying and consequent deviation from free trade creates. Under plausible conditions, this advantage enables the smaller group engaged in lobbying to obtain trade restrictions which it views as beneficial.     

Welfare implications of trade liberalization and fiscal reform: A quantitative experiment

This paper studies the welfare implications of revenue-neutral trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs for developing economies using a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. We analyze how different combinations of tariffs – on imported consumption goods, intermediate inputs, and capital goods – and taxes – on consumption, labor income and capital income – affect the transitional and long-run welfare. We report three main findings. First, trade liberalization programs financed by consumption and labor income taxes tend to result in substantial welfare gains, but financing the lost tariff revenue through capital income taxes can have an adverse impact on welfare. Second, a significant fraction of welfare changes is due to transitional effects stemming from the allocation of resources in response to changes in tariffs and taxes. Third, trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs often translate into much larger welfare gains in countries that are more open to international financial markets.     

Wage Effects of Trade Reform with Endogenous Worker Mobility

In this paper, we use a linked employer–employee database from Brazil to evaluate the wage effects of trade reform. With an aggregate (firm-level) analysis of this question, we find that a decline in trade protection is associated with an increase in average wages in exporting firms relative to domestic firms, consistent with earlier studies. However, using disaggregated, employer–employee level data, and allowing for the endogenous assignment of workers to firms due to match-specific productivity, we find that the premium paid to workers at exporting firms is economically and statistically insignificant, as is the differential impact of trade openness on the wages of workers at exporting firms relative to otherwise identical workers at domestic firms. We also find that workforce composition improves systematically in exporting firms, in terms of the combination of worker ability and the quality of worker–firm matches, post-liberalization. These results stand in stark contrast to the findings reported in many earlier studies and underscore the importance of endogenous matching and, more generally, non-random labor market allocation mechanisms, in determining the effects of trade policy changes on wages.     

Pro-poor trade policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the presence of a pro-poor bias in the existing structure of protection of six Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Madagascar. We build on a simple agricultural household production model and we propose an extension to include adjustments in labor income. Our approach, which can be implemented without repeated cross-sections of household level data, suits well the data constraints in SSA. It also allows us to capture the heterogeneity in trade protection at the tariff line level. The pro-poor bias indicators suggest that SSA's trade policies tend to be biased in favor of poor households, as these policies redistribute income from rich to poor households. This is because protection increases the agricultural prices of goods that are sold by African households and this effect dominates both the impacts of higher consumption prices and the strong Stolper–Samuelson effects that benefit skilled over unskilled workers.     

A note reconsidering a post-Keynesian model of growth and distribution in the globalization context

We treat an extension of the Metcalfe and Steedman model of growth and distribution in a small open economy with government activity. We show, simultaneously, that certain kinds of taxation and government expenditures will not affect the essential nature of the “Cambridge Equation.” This is important due to the increasing process of Financial Globalization which can be responsible for changing the profit distribution between capitalists and workers. The present note aims at integrating the public sector and the foreign trade together into the model, based on previous literature that, with few exceptions, treats them separately. To do so, a new framework is proposed. Our contribution shows that workers’ income grows when the Current Account in the balance of payments is in surplus, a result not studied by Teixeira and Araújo. The discussion includes recent literature concerning with limits of applicability of such analytical model, dealing with more realistic economies including the process of globalization.