An other view of integral futures: De/reconstructing the IF brand

This paper points to some limitations of the narrow version of integral futures (IF) as represented in the recent special issue of Futures (2008, vol. 40, issue 2). I also propose several ways that the IF brand could be refreshed through a broader and deeper approach to integral futures by way of a scholarly engagement with other kindred discourses. The main focus of this paper is to open out beyond the “myth-of-the-given” in relation to the notion of integral and in this way broaden and deepen possibilities for integral futures.     

BE/ME and E/P work better than ME/BE or P/E in regressions

Researchers often form ratios of variables to measure firm characteristics, but which ratios create the most powerful tests? For example, if we use ratios of book value of equity (BE) and market value of equity (ME), or earnings (E) and price (P), does it matter which variable appears in the denominator? Any variable in the denominator, when close to zero, creates outliers and is less likely to produce effective tests. Our tests, using data from 1972 to 2008, indicate the choice between reciprocals often produces significantly different outcomes. While ME/BE is a more commonly used control variable than BE/ME or LN(BE/ME), we find the latter two produce better results, even if the data are trimmed to mitigate the outlier problem. Similarly, using E/P generally produces better results than P/E, and while ratios with book value of assets (BA) in the numerator work better than those with it in the denominator, the difference is less pronounced than when BE or E is part of the ratio. While the focus of our empirical findings is on growth measures, the principal applies anytime a ratio has a denominator that is frequently near zero.     

The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.     

Wolf / Lindacher / Pfeiffer: AGB-Recht. Kommentar

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Analyst reputation and the issuance of disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S

Although sell-side analysts privately forecast revenues and expenses when producing earnings forecasts, not all analysts choose to provide I/B/E/S with earnings forecasts disaggregated into revenues and expenses. We investigate the role of reputation in explaining this decision. We find that analysts without established reputations are more likely than reputable analysts to issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S, consistent with I/B/E/S exposure benefits accruing to analysts seeking to establish a reputation. Among less reputable analysts, those with high ability are more likely to disaggregate, consistent with this group reaping greater benefits from the exposure I/B/E/S provides. Additional tests support our primary hypotheses. Among less reputable analysts, those who disaggregate are more (less) likely to be promoted (demoted or terminated). The stock market responds similarly, with more weight assigned to earnings forecast revisions provided by analysts who disaggregate their earnings forecasts.