Bailouts,Inflation, and Risk-Sharing in Monetary Unions

This paper presents a new rationalization for bailouts of sovereign debt in monetary unions, such as those observed during the recent Euro crisis. It introduces a model where member countries of the monetary union are ex-ante identical, and each derives utility from consumption and disutility from the union-wide inflation rate. The union’s central bank is utilitarian and lacks commitment. Countries borrow or save in a market for nominal sovereign debt in response to idiosyncratic income shocks, with countries that receive positive income shocks saving and countries that receive negative income shocks borrowing. Ex post, the monetary union’s central bank will attempt to devalue sovereign debt through surprise inflation, as this will redistribute income from rich creditor countries to poor debtor countries. Creditor countries choose to bailout debtor countries because bailouts will weaken the redistributive motives of the central bank and forestall surprise inflation. As bailouts in this environment constitute a payment from lucky creditor countries to unlucky debtor countries, they mimic a risk-sharing arrangement that insures against income shocks. The payments made by creditor countries are incentive-compatible due to the shared currency and inflation rate in the monetary union. This ability of countries to provide each other with incentive-compatible insurance constitutes a novel theory of optimal currency areas. This insurance benefit of the monetary union is largest for countries with negatively correlated income shocks, in contrast to the classic Mundell-Friedman optimal currency area criterion.

     

Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates: An OCA Approach to the Operation of Stable Intermediate Currency Regimes

The criteria of the theory of optimum currency areas suggest that many countries are not good candidates for either of the poles of genuinely fixed exchange rates or freely floating exchange rates. Thus, many countries should have an interest in intermediate exchange rate regimes. However, in a world of substantial capital mobility most forms of intermediate exchange rate regimes have proven to be highly crisis prone. This essay argues that the unholy trinity paradigm doesn't imply that intermediate exchange rate regimes are inherently unstable, but rather that exchange rate and monetary policies need to be jointly determined. The difficulties of maintaining such consistency are as much political as economic since temporarily pegged or managed rates create a time inconsistency problem. It is argued that OCA theory provides the framework for determining the appropriate weights and limits on the amount of sterilized intervention to maintain the consistency between exchange rate and monetary policies necessary to avoid currency crises. The paper also considers a number of the issues involved in integrating this approach with the literature on open economy aspects of inflation targeting.     

Inflation and Business Cycle Convergence in the Euro Area: Empirical Analysis Using an Unobserved Component Model

The literature on optimum currency areas states that large inflation differentials can undermine monetary union. In the euro area, inflation rates diverged after the creation of the single currency, but started to converge again from mid-2002. Against this background, we assess the convergence of inflation rates and business cycles and study the relationship between them. The analysis is made using an unobserved component model estimated with the Kalman filter. In general, from 1980 to 2008 inflation rates and business cycles became more aligned in the euro area, but inflation rates converged more quickly than business cycles. The output gap is found to be a better indicator of the business cycle than unit labour cost when studying convergence. By looking at the causality between the convergence of inflation and output gap, it is found that inflation divergence has a limited destabilising economic impact.     

Inflation Differentials in a Currency Area: Facts,Explanations and Policy

The determinants of inflation differentials in a currency area are analyzed both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. The empirical analysis shows that a sizeable dispersion of HICP inflation rates across euro-area countries arises mostly in the components based on non-traded goods. There is also a significant cross-country heterogeneity in the response to changes in a common latent factor which accounts for a large fraction of the dispersion in national inflation rates. A stylized model of a currency area is used to understand the interrelation among shocks, structures and policies in driving the data generating process. The model shows that the dynamic of the inflation differentials is largely driven by the variability of productivity in the non-tradable sector of the more flexible economy. Conversely, the output differentials is largely driven by the variability in the productivity of the tradable sector, also of the more flexible economy. Optimal policy is investigated together with an analysis of the optimal adjustment to adopting a common currency with initial incorrect real exchange rate parity.     

The choice of an invoicing currency in international trade and the balance of trade impact of currency depreciation

Cross-country differences in the choice of an invoicing currency in international trade is one reason for cross-country differences in estimated exchange rate coefficients in short-run balance of trade equations. If exports are invoiced in domestic currency while imports are invoiced in a foreign currency, a depreciation will increase the domestic currency value of outstanding import contracts, and may cause the balance of trade to fall in the short run. Countries with different invoicing patterns will have different effects on the short-run trade balance following a depreciation. We explore a simple theory of invoicing currency choice, drawing inferences regarding the likely choices for 14 countries. This allows a classification of countries according to the expected short-run balance of trade effect of a currency depreciation. Empirical estimates support the hypothesized groupings based on suggested currency invoicing patterns.     

Optimal Currency Area: A twentieth Century Idea for the twenty-first Century?

We take stock of the history of the European Monetary Union and pegged exchange-rate regimes in recent decades. The post-Bretton Woods greater financial integration and under-regulated financial intermediation have increased the cost of sustaining a currency area and other forms of fixed exchange-rate regimes. Financial crises illustrated that fast-moving asymmetric financial shocks interacting with real distortions pose a grave threat to the stability of currency areas and fixed exchange-rate regimes. Members of a currency union with closer financial links may accumulate asymmetric balance-sheet exposure over time, becoming more susceptible to sudden-stop crises. In a phase of deepening financial ties, countries may end up with more correlated business cycles. Down the road, debtor countries that rely on financial inflows to fund structural imbalances may be exposed to devastating sudden-stop crises, subsequently reducing the correlation of business cycles between currency area’s members, possibly ceasing the gains from membership in a currency union. A currency union of developing countries anchored to a leading global currency stabilizes inflation at a cost of inhibiting the use of monetary policy to deal with real and financial shocks. Currency unions with low financial depth and low financial integration of its members may be more stable at a cost of inhibiting the growth of sectors depending on bank funding.     

Fixed Exchange Rates and Disinflation in Emerging Markets: How Large Is the Effect?

We examine developing countries which have institutional quality ratings for the effects of exchange rate rigidity on inflation. The level of institutional development exerts no effect on the impact of currency regimes. However, the interaction of institutional quality and exchange rates has, in the most plausible specifications, a negative impact on inflation. This suggests that fixed exchange rates exert at most a contingent effect on inflation, and indicates that countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America contemplating currency pegs would be better off improving institutional quality prior to adopting the euro or dollar and expecting a large subsequent disinflationary effect. JEL no.  F31, O11     

汇率制度虚报与中国的选择

汇率制度虚报是指公开宣称浮动汇率制度,但实际实行固定汇率制度的国家行为。这一现象在新兴市场经济体(包括中国)中很普遍。本文探讨了汇率制度虚报本身对经济发展正向效应的机制。文章指出,对于中国,公开宣称浮动汇率制度是争取主动权以应付可能的投机资本冲击,而操作层面的固定汇率制度是出于稳定通胀预期考虑的最优选择。文章进一步指出,这种虚实结合的汇率制度选择不应成为美国攻击人民币的借口。     

Exchange Rate Variability and the Macro-economy: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries

Abstract

Using annual data, the paper studies the time-series evidence regarding the allocation of fluctuations in the exchange rate between demand components, real growth, and price inflation in a sample of developing and advanced countries. The evidence reveals patterns of interaction between the macro-economy and exchange rate variability. Across developing countries, appreciation decreases the cost of imports and price inflation, while depreciation shrinks the output supply, indicating high dependency on imported goods. The reduction in output supply correlates with higher inflation and an increase in the import value. In contrast, the evidence of the negative effect of currency appreciation on output growth is more prevalent across advanced countries, while depreciation stimulates competitiveness, resulting in higher demand for exports, investment and consumption. Across developing countries, exchange rate variability decreases trend real growth and increases trend price inflation. Across advanced countries, exchange rate variability decreases trend real growth while increasing the variability of price inflation and import growth. Minimizing variability of the exchange rate would be beneficial to sustain higher growth and reduce cyclical variability in developing and advanced countries.     

Substitution Monétaire dans les Pays Africains

The practice of currency substitution in developing countries in general, and in sub‐Saharan countries in particular, differs from what obtains in industrialized countries. Whereas in developed countries currency substitution is chiefly as a result of diversified port folios, in third world countries, the phenomenon arises from the neglect of the national currency by economic operators. This article aims first to study the various aspects of currency substitution in Africa based on the functions of money and, secondly, to access the consequences of this phenomenon on the economic policies governments intend to implement. After observing that currency substitution exists in Africa for varied reasons, such as paucity of payment instruments, high inflation rates, low effective interest rates, the weakness of a new currency, exchange rate fluctuations and so on, the most serious of which is capital flight, we have come to the conclusion that this practice seriously undermines the success of the envisioned monetary and/or budgetary policies of these countries.     

Some Unpleasant Consequences of EMU

The recent economic woes of some Eurozone countries have raised doubts about whether they can remain in the Eurozone. Prior to these problems emerging, the price levels in these countries rose faster than the average Eurozone price level and their rates of economic growth were higher. It is conjectured in this paper that the two sets of events are connected. Using a formal theory of inflation in the Eurozone based on a stylised version of the New Keynesian model, it is shown that, due to a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy, inflation rates in individual Eurozone countries are unlikely to converge, and their price levels are likely to diverge, causing large differences in levels of competitiveness over time. The reason for this is different real effects in these economies such as productivity differences or different fiscal policies. In other words the Eurozone is not an optimal currency area. Despite the outstanding record of the ECB in achieving its inflation goals, it is powerless to affect the underlying problem.     

A theory of international currency: Competition and discipline

We explicitly consider strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country two-currency search-theoretic model. Each government finances public goods by means of seigniorage. Compared with a regime with two local currencies, a regime with one international currency allows the issuer of the international currency to reduce the inflation tax while collecting more seigniorage, and forces the other issuer to raise the rate to compensate for a diminished tax base. However, the country with a local currency is sometimes constrained by an inflation discipline: the more open a country is, the stronger is the discipline. Strategic selection of equilibrium gives rise to a further inflation discipline: the larger country tries to have its currency circulate abroad, while the smaller country tries to prevent the circulation of Foreign currency.     

Welfare Implications of Currency Integration: Labor Mobility and Pricing-to-Market

In this paper, we examine the welfare cost of renouncing monetary policy autonomy in a model that includes labor mobility and pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior in firms. We find that renouncing monetary policy autonomy becomes a cost of currency integration when the consumption basket weights differ between candidate countries and when country-specific total factor productivity (TFP) shocks hit economies, even when the union fulfills the classic optimum currency area theory of labor mobility. We also found that a firm's PTM behavior has a significant effect on the welfare implications of currency integration combined with labor mobility. For instance, currency integration does not produce greater welfare losses in the PTM case (where the labor input weights differ across member countries and asymmetric labor disutility shocks occur), although greater welfare losses arise in the case of producer currency pricing.     

加强中央银行独立性的重要意义--以日本为实例的分析

以日本为实例的分析表明,如果一国的中央银行缺乏应有的独立性,一般说来并不会像“时间非一致性”理论所分析的那样,会促使政府反反复复地背弃维护物价稳定的承诺,去有意制造通货膨胀,也不会像政治商业周期理论所分析的那样,会引发政府为谋求连任而周期性地运用货币政策愚弄选民。部分西方学者以通货膨胀率的讷氏来分析是否应该加强中央银行独立性的观点是极其片面的。为了使货币政策选择免受个别政治家或某届政府不合理的干预,避免国际压力对货币政策运营产生错误影响,使货币政策真正起到稳定经济运行的作用,必须赋予中央银行以充分的独立性。     

Convergence of EMU Equity Portfolios

This paper demonstrates that, after integration, equity portfolios of countries that joined the European Monetary Union have converged at faster rate than those of NON EMU countries. This outcome can be interpreted as a combination of the convergence of inflation rates and the convergence of investment barriers. On the one hand, the common monetary policy might have driven a stronger comovement in inflation rates, leading to increasingly similar hedging strategies among member countries. On the other hand, exposure to the common currency might have homogenized bilateral investment barriers, thus inducing increasingly similar portfolio allocations among member countries. We find that the comovement of inflation rates has not significantly increased after EMU inception, pointing toward an exclusive role for convergence in investment barriers.     

The theory of monetary integration

Research dealing with the theory of monetary integration is reviewed. After briefly describing the genesis of the theory as foreshadowed in work on optimum currency areas, the paper assesses two main areas of recent research — the analysis of the effects of disturbances on participating countries in a currency area, and reputational considerations. With regard to disturbances, the paper finds that it is difficult to draw clear-out inferences from theoretical work on the optimal degree of exchange rate management and from empirical studies on the effects of shocks. Work on reputational issues is found to suffer from conceptual problems and has generated empirical results that have not supported the hypothesis that participation in a currency area is a sufficient condition to enhance reputation.     

DO FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS PROMOTE OR DETER FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CROSS‐COUNTRY DATA

Foreign currency deposits (FCD) are prevalent in many low‐income developing countries, but their impact on bank lending has rarely been examined. An examination of cross‐country data indicates that a higher proportion of FCD in total deposits is associated with more private credit only in inflationary circumstances. FCD can lead to a decline in private credit below a certain threshold level of inflation. Given that FCD exhibit persistence, deregulating them in low‐income countries could cause more harm than good to financial intermediary development in the long term.     

Does the dispersion of unit labor cost dynamics in the EMU imply long-run divergence?

Using unit labor cost (ULC) data from Euro area countries as well as US States and German Länder we investigate inflation convergence using different approaches, namely panel unit root tests, cointegration tests and error-correction models. All in all we cannot reject convergence of ULC growth in EMU. However, country-specific deviations from the rest of the currency union are much more pronounced and much more persistent in Europe than in the US or Germany. This holds before and after the introduction of the common currency. Hence, asymmetric shocks in the future might take a long time to dissipate.     

通货膨胀与人民币升值并存问题研究

据"购买力平价理论",开放经济条件下,高通货膨胀率引起通货对外贬值,而我国目前的经济表现是高通货膨胀率环境下人民币汇率对外升值态势更加强劲,这一经济现象与传统的经济学原理相违背,给国民经济健康发展造成极大危害。本文分析了通货膨胀与人民币升值并存的原因,提出了相应的政府调控政策建议。