Capacity investment and green R&D in a dynamic oligopoly under the potential shift in environmental damage

We develop a differential oligopoly game to investigate firms’ capacity investment and green R&D efforts in the presence of the potential shift in environmental damage and under the spillover effect of R&D activities among firms. We find that when both the probability of potential shift in environmental damage and the efficacy of R&D activities are high, the spillover effect will discourage the R&D effort but encourage the capacity investment. Otherwise, the spillover effect will encourage the R&D effort but discourage the capacity investment. Moreover, the potential shift in environmental damage can significantly impact the capacity and green R&D decisions as well as the Pigouvian tax, especially in the case of a large number of firms, a high profitability of the product, a high level of interest rate, and a high level of R&D spillover among firms.     

Indeterminate equilibrium growth with product and R&D spillovers

The paper revisits an endogenously growing economy à la Romer (1990) to explore the possibility of local and global indeterminacy where, along with the usual R&D spillover, a manufacturing sector generates a product spillover on R&D. When the product spillover facilitates R&D, the dynamic market equilibrium is unique and determinate. However, when the product spillover is strongly negative on R&D, multiple balanced market equilibria emerge and are therefore globally indeterminate. Furthermore, global indeterminacy coexists with local indeterminacy under the joint condition on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. Local indeterminacy also emerges when the product spillover is mildly negative in tandem with a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Hence, a dynamic market economy with product spillovers in the R&D sector enriches the understanding of observable growth phenomena, including business and growth cycles and income and growth disparity, among countries with the same economic fundamentals.     

Pollution abatement with disruptive R&D investment

This paper examines a model of investment in abatement where polluting firms produce output while investing in R&D. This investment, however, increases production costs, thus disrupting first-period output. We identify three equilibrium profiles where firms choose to either: (1) invest in R&D alone (thus rationalizing a common modeling assumption in the literature); (2) produce output alone; or (3) engage in both activities. We evaluate how the emergence of each result is affected by the market structure in which firms compete and by the severity of spillover effects. We then measure welfare levels in each equilibrium profile. Overall, we show that firms endogenously choose to focus on R&D only when the market is concentrated and spillover effects are small. In other type of industries, our findings indicate that firms may focus on output production or engage in both activities under relatively large conditions.     

Product differentiation, process R&D, and the nature of market competition

We investigate the relationship between process and product R&D and compare the incentives for both types of R&D under different modes of market competition (Bertrand versus Cournot). It is shown that: (i) process R&D investments increase with the degree of product differentiation and firms invest more in product R&D when they can do process R&D than when they cannot; (ii) Bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product R&D whereas Cournot firms invest more in process R&D; and (iii) cooperation in product R&D promotes both types of R&D relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of R&D discourages R&D relative to cooperation in just product R&D.     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.      

R&D spillover effects on firms’ export behavior: evidence from South Korea

This paper investigates the spillover effects of R&D investments made by foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) and domestic firms on their export activities, using a manufacturing firm-level panel dataset from South Korea. The theoretical framework predicts two conflicting spillover effects: positive technology spillovers and negative market rivalry spillovers. Thus, the net spillover effect is determined by the relative degree of the two conflicting spillovers. The empirical results show that negative intra-industry spillovers exist from the R&D of foreign MNEs on the export performance of firms, which implies that, in general, negative market rivalry spillovers dominate positive technology spillovers. However, notably, in the case of firms equipped with absorptive capacity, the negative spillovers can be alleviated; firms can gain positive spillovers by muting negative ones. Firms without absorptive capacity cannot avoid such negative effects. This paper shows that absorptive capacity is vital in capturing positive spillovers as firms build competency by accumulating their own know-how and improving their ability to capture better external technologies.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Technological knowledge,spillover and productivity: evidence from Taiwanese firm level panel data

Using a panel data on Taiwanese manufacturing firms from 1990–1997, this study investigates the relationship among technological knowledge, spillover and productivity. In addition to R&D stock, we also employ patent counts to construct the output-side indicators of knowledge and spillover to explore the relationship between knowledge and productivity. We find a very significant contribution of R&D, patents and spillover stock to productivity. In addition, the magnitude of the patent stock coefficient is substantially larger than that estimated by R&D stock. Our results imply that innovative activity investment has been very productive in increasing output for Taiwanese manufacturing firms in the 1990s.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.     

Firm size and types of innovation

We propose a general theory of innovation that illustrates the relative benefits of performing process versus product R&D when firm size is endogenous. A firm's size, scope, and R&D portfolio are shown to reflect the same underlying characteristic of the firm, namely manufacturing efficiency. We demonstrate that efficient firms become larger, have greater scope, and perform more of both process and product R&D. In light of decreasing returns to R&D, this implies small firms obtain more product innovations per dollar of R&D than large firms, which is consistent with evidence we present that small firms are more innovative than large firms as they obtain more patent counts and citations per dollar of R&D.     

Racing in two dimensions

In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation.     

Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets

We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries.

We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Stochastic innovation and product market organization

Summary This paper analyzes how different types of product market organization affect firms' R&D investments in a stochastic innovation framework. Product market competition determines payoffs to successful and unsuccessful firms. Restrictions on the research project success probability distribution are identified that yield an invariance result for expenditure per R&D project. The impact of the number of firms (n) on the amount of market R&D is shown to be sensitive to product market organization. For a major process innovation, firms undertake more R&D projects under Cournot product market competition than under Bertrand competition, forn sufficiently large. A numerical example is used to illustrate welfare tradeoffs.Tom Lyon, Herman Quirmbach, Ferenc Szidarovszky, Mark Walker and two anonymous referees gave us helpful comments and suggestions on prior versions of this paper. Lucy Atkinson provided expert research assistance on numerical computations. Special thanks to Ted Bergstrom who gave us valuable suggestions about the first proposition.     

STRATEGIC R&D AND NETWORK COMPATIBILITY

We analyse the effects of network externalities in strategic R&D competition. We present a model of two firms competing with R&D investments and prices in a differentiated consumer market. Buyers form firm-specific networks which can be compatible. A high degree of compatibility and large spillovers moderate price competition due to weak strategic value of firm-specific networks and R&D investments, respectively. Asymmetry in product qualities brings out network effects that cancel out in conventional symmetric settings. The lower quality firm increases R&D and decreases its price as spillovers or network compatibility is increased. This happens when R&D and firm-specific network size have high strategic value.     

Effects of coordinated strategies on product and process R&;D

Using a game theoretical model on firms’ simultaneous investments in product and process R&D, we advance and empirically test hypotheses on the role of externalities on the optimal R&D portfolio of cooperating firms and independently competing firms. We use Community Innovation Survey data on 3,696 Italian manufacturing firms. In line with our model we find that members of a group of firms invest significantly more into product, process, and aggregate R&D than independent firms. Further, their R&D portfolios tend to show a higher product versus process ratio. However, with regard to R&D performance and efficiency we find that independent firms are superior.      

Firm's objective function and product and process R&D

Firms undertake different kinds of R&D activities. They do product R&D (R&D aimed at improving the quality of existing products, and creating new products). They also do process R&D (R&D aimed at lowering the cost of making existing and new products). Moreover, firms often do both product and process R&D simultaneously. As far as the objective of firms is concerned, this need not be limited to profit-maximization only. Rather, firms may have a broader objective, where they care about profits as well as consumer surplus. This paper studies effects of a firm having a general objective function (that takes into consideration both profits and consumer surplus) on its product and process R&D choices, and corresponding implications.I consider product and process R&D choices of firms in an infinite horizon set-up with discrete time. Firms in my framework can simultaneously do both product and process R&D in every period, face a discrete-choice model of consumer demand with vertical product differentiation, and maximize a discounted, weighted sum of their profits and consumer surplus over the infinite time horizon.I show how process and product R&D differ from each other in my framework, and the role of a firm's objective function in this regard. I compare process and product R&D choices across firms that differ in their objective function, and illustrate effects of providing general R&D subsidies (subsidies given for any R&D, regardless of whether it is product or process R&D) to firms. I also characterize how in my framework, the choice of process R&D in total R&D — R&D composition — by an individual firm varies over time, and how process and product R&D choices, process and product R&D productivity, and the choice of R&D composition vary across firms that differ in size but are otherwise similar.