How does population aging affect the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus over the business cycle?

What is the impact of population aging on the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus over the business cycle? We address this question by estimating state-dependent fiscal multipliers in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A government spending shock is identified as a forecast error of government spending and its output effect is estimated by using the local projection method. We find that there is no effect of population aging on output effects of fiscal spending shocks in expansionary times, whereas in recessions the output effects of fiscal spending shocks are weakened as population ages. This result points to important policy implications in that population aging would call for a larger fiscal stimulus to support aggregate demand during recession. Thus, this requires a larger fiscal space to allow for a wider swing of the fiscal position without creating concerns for fiscal sustainability.     

Automation and the employment elasticity of fiscal policy

This paper investigates whether automation (the use of industrial robots in production) makes fiscal policy less powerful for stimulating job creation. It posits that a fiscal stimulus will lead to fewer new jobs if the supplementary demand that it creates can be met by using more robots in production processes. Using data for 18 European countries over recent decades, including data on the use of industrial robots, our results show three main findings. First, the pace of automation for the average country in the sample has halved the sensitivity of employment to fiscal stimulus. Second, manufacturing industry employment reacts less to fiscal stimulus in the presence of rapid automation as the average substituability between labor and machines is relatively higher. Third, low-skill jobs as well as women employment are less sensitive to fiscal stimulus in the presence of rapid robot use. We conclude that the effectiveness of fiscal policy in expanding job creation faces an important challenge in a world undergoing structural changes such as the rapid pace of automation.     

Expansionary Contractions and Fiscal Free Lunches: Too Good To Be True?

This paper builds a framework to jointly examine the possibilities of both expansionary fiscal contractions (austerity increasing output) and fiscal free lunches (expansions reducing government debt), arguments which in recent debates have been supported by the austerity and stimulus camps, respectively. We propose a new metric quantifying the budgetary implications of fiscal action, a key aspect of fiscal policy particularly at the monetary zero lower bound. We find that austerity needs to be highly persistent and credible in order to be expansionary, and stimulus needs to be temporary, responsive, and well‐targeted in order to lower debt. We conclude that neither is likely, especially during periods of economic distress.     

Is Abe's Fiscal Policy Ricardian? What Does the Fiscal Theory of Prices Mean for Japan?

The second arrow of Abenomics is flexible fiscal policy. However, it does not mean just fiscal stimulus as the Abe administration decided on the fiscal consolidation target of achieving a primary surplus by fiscal year 2020. Improving the primary balance implies making government debt more sustainable. Although the consumption tax rate was raised from 5% to 8% in April 2014, the Abe administration has decided twice to postpone increasing the consumption tax from 8% to 10%. In addition, a fiscal stimulus package was implemented. We use a Fiscal Stance Index to examine fiscal policy from the viewpoint of fiscal sustainability and a Markov switching model to examine fiscal policy from the viewpoint of the fiscal theory of the price level, and find that the Abe's fiscal stance is not Ricardian.     

Was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act an Economic Stimulus?

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 envisaged a fiscal stimulus of approximately $800 billion, the largest in American history. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012a) show that the state fiscal relief that was part of this stimulus increases employment. The other objective of ARRA was to “promote economic recovery”. We therefore examine its effect on states’ economic growth. Since the stimulus each state received is endogenous to a state’s economic environment, ordinary least squares underestimates the effect. This endogeneity problem is addressed by using a state’s pre-recession Medicaid spending level to instrument for the ARRA fiscal relief each state receives. We find that the ARRA state fiscal relief has indeed had a positive effect on gross state products.     

Policy coordination and the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus

This paper shows that government spending shocks in the U.S. has become ineffective due to lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. Employing the post-war U.S. data, we report strong stimulus effects of fiscal policy during the pre-Volcker era, which rapidly dissipate as the sample period is shifted toward the post-Volcker era. We explain the causes of this phenomena via a sentiment channel. Employing the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, we show that forecasters tend to systematically overestimate real GDP growth in response to positive innovations in government spending when policies coordinate well with each other. On the other hand, they are likely to underestimate real GDP responses when the monetary authority maintains a hawkish stance that conflicts with the fiscal stimulus. The fiscal stimulus, under such circumstances, generates consumer pessimism, which reduces private spending and ultimately weakens the output effects of fiscal policy. We further report statistical test results that confirm our claims.     

Are there free rides out of a recession? The case of Switzerland

During the 2008/2009 recession, most countries resorted to discretionary fiscal policy measures. In this paper, we run two simulations with the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s macroeconomic model to assess how both the Swiss stimulus measures, and the measures taken by Switzerland’s major trading partners, have affected the Swiss economy. The KOF baseline estimate incorporates fiscal stimulus packages in Switzerland and abroad. We re-run the model, modifying the exogenous variables to represent situations in which no fiscal action was taken (a) in Switzerland and (b) elsewhere. We find that the spillover from the foreign efforts to curb the recession dwarfs the effect of the domestic stimulus packages. In addition to making its own (rather limited) efforts to fight the recession, Switzerland also took a long free-ride that far exceeded the short one it paid for.     

Re-examining the “twin deficits” hypothesis: evidence from Australia

This paper re-examines the relationship between fiscal imbalances and net foreign borrowing. A general analytical approach is first developed which suggests that, other things equal, a rise (fall) in any advanced economy’s fiscal deficit should be fully matched by a rise (fall) in its net foreign borrowing, in accordance with the so-called twin deficits hypothesis. In the case of Australia, one of the world’s largest foreign borrower economies for its size, empirical estimation yields the novel result that Australia’s consolidated budget imbalance and its foreign borrowing were approximately twinned on the basis of quarterly data for 1983–2009, when Australia’s exchange rate floated and international capital mobility was high. This result is consistent with the conceptual framework and suggests that fiscal policy is likely to be ineffective as an instrument for influencing the real economy.     

The Spending Multiplier in the Medium Run

Most of the discussion about fiscal stimulus focuses on the multiplier of government spending on impact. In this paper we shift the focus to the multiplier at the end, i.e., to the period in which a deficit spending program terminates. We show that recent time‐series analyses and neoclassical as well new Keynesian business cycle models predict that the multiplier turns negative before spending expires. This means that aggregate output at the time of expiry of fiscal stimulus is lower than it could be without deficit spending. Here, we show why this phenomenon is a general outcome of mainstream business cycle theory and explain the underlying mechanism. Using phase diagram analysis, we prove that the aggregate capital stock at the time of expiry of fiscal stimulus is lower than it would be without a deficit spending program. This fact explains why aggregate output is below its laissez faire level as well.     

State-dependent fiscal multipliers in NORA - A DSGE model for fiscal policy analysis in Norway

We develop a novel medium-scale DSGE model, called NORA, for fiscal policy analysis in Norway. NORA contains a sheltered and exposed sector allowing us to model wage bargaining between a labor union and the exposed sector, reflecting Scandinavian wage formation institutions. Wages are subject to a downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). Inspired by many countries' fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession and the coronavirus pandemic, we investigate the model's ability to generate state-dependent fiscal multipliers. We find, that both the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and DNWR individually can account for higher fiscal multipliers during recessions. In joint presence, however, the existence of DNWR reduces the multiplier at the ZLB. Moreover, the DNWR significantly relaxes the paradox of toil at the ZLB. We show that the state-dependency is robust to alternative assumptions about the origin of the recession, the nature of the fiscal stimulus and its financing source.     

THE SIZE OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND THE STANCE OF MONETARY POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Implementing fiscal programs during monetary policy expansions seems to improve significantly their economic stimulus. We find this result by estimating the effect of government consumption shocks on gross domestic product (GDP) using a panel of 23 developing economies. Our goal is to better understand the reasons for the low fiscal multipliers found in the literature by performing estimations for alternative exchange rate regimes, business‐cycle phases, and monetary policy stances. In addition, we perform counterfactual simulations to analyze the possible gains from fiscal‐monetary policy coordination. Our results also show lower multipliers in developing economies with flexible regimes, especially during economic slowdowns. (JEL E62, E63, F32)     

Possible Policies for Expansion

The Australian economy appears certain to be operating at well below full employment into 1992, or even longer. Further reductions in interest rates would operate on output only with long lags, and would be the most inflationary form of stimulus. But cuts in a wide range of indirect taxes, and tax incentives for new investment - especially if announced as temporary - would reduce the length and depth of the recession.
Results of simulations with macro-economic models for a number of countries imply that cuts in indirect taxes or in taxes on employment (either alone or in combination with other fiscal measures) reduce prices as well as stimulating employment and real output. Similar fiscal measures are likely also to improve the current account at any given level of employment or real output, and even more likely to increase the country's net wealth (private investment less the current account deficit).
Failure to adopt appropriate types of fiscal stimulus would reduce the benefits of microeconomic reform and make such reforms harder to achieve. Even if it were true that these forms of fiscal stimulus would not raise real output, the tax cuts in question would at least reduce inflation and could not then increase the current account deficit.     

A fresh look at fiscal multipliers: one size fits it all? Evidence from the Mediterranean area

Following the adoption of important fiscal stimuli to fight the recent crisis, a large literature estimated fiscal multipliers. Focusing on an area particularly appealing, given its diversity and the diversity of the response of countries that compose it to the current crisis, namely the Mediterranean area, we unveil major disparities regarding the significance, sign and size of fiscal multipliers depending mainly on the economic characteristics, the type of multiplier, the time span and the type of fiscal stimulus. Evidence of such important heterogeneities highlights the need for better cooperation among countries, particularly regarding the design of fiscal policy. Failing to do so might divert public resources to ineffective fiscal policies in some countries, or, on the contrary, deprive other countries of potentially high benefits of appropriate fiscal policies, including a reliable tool for exiting the current crisis.     

DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORROWING FROM A MONOPOLISTIC LENDER: STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LEADERSHIP*

We develop a two‐period model with endogenous investment and credit flows. Credit is subject to quantitative restrictions. With an exogenous restriction, we analyse the welfare effects of a temporary consumption tax. We then consider three scenarios under which a monopoly lender optimally decides the level of credit and a borrower country chooses a consumption tax: one in which the two parties act simultaneously and two scenarios where one of them is a Stackleberg leader. The equilibrium under the leadership of the borrower country is Pareto superior to the simultaneous move equilibrium but may or may not be to that under the leadership of the lender. If the sequence of moves is itself chosen strategically, leadership by the borrower emerges as the unique equilibrium.     

完善中国政府间转移支付的路径选择

作为分权化财政体制的组成部分,政府间转移支付在不同制度环境下产生的效果也存在很大差异。中国自上而下的财政分权强调更多的是发挥中央政府的宏观调控作用和保证中央政府取得足够的财政资源,因此转移支付在很大程度上被用于弥补地方财政缺口,成为中央政府实现纵向控制的重要手段。改进中国转移支付体系的策略应当是进一步完善以公式为基础的分配标准,并在政治上可行的情况下促进均等化。     

Turning the page? EU fiscal consolidation in the wake of the crisis

The fiscal cost of the financial and economic crisis in Europe is huge. The paper provides provisional estimates of this cost and looks at its implications for the sustainability of public finances, taking into account also the impact of aging populations. The historical experience suggests that economic growth is persistently lowered in the aftermath of financial crisis, making fiscal consolidation more difficult yet all the more essential. Meanwhile the timing of the exit from fiscal stimulus and subsequent fiscal consolidation must reconcile sustainability and stabilisation goals—a delicate balancing act. The paper will argue in favour of structural reform to boost the economic growth potential alongside fiscal consolidation. The fiscal coordination framework in the EU, together with the Europe 2020 strategy, is seen to underpin this approach.     

Fiscal policy,macroeconomic performance and industry structure in a small open economy

We analyse how fiscal policy affects both the macroeconomy and the industry structure, using a multi-sector macroeconomic model of the Norwegian economy with an inflation targeting monetary policy. Our simulations show that the magnitude of the government spending and labour tax cut multipliers, whether monetary policy is active or passive, is comparable to what is found in the literature. A novel finding from our simulations is that the industry structure is substantially affected by an expansionary fiscal policy, as value added in the non-traded goods sector increases at the expense of value added in the traded goods sector. Moreover, expansionary fiscal policy reduces the mark-ups in the traded goods sector, while the mark-ups are roughly unchanged in the non-traded goods sector. The contraction of activity in the traded goods sector increases when monetary tightening accompanies the fiscal stimulus. Hence, we find that such a policy mix is likely to produce significant de-industrialization in a small open economy with inflation targeting.     

A dynamic model of unsecured credit

We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender cannot observe the borrower?s ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lender?s optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Finally, we study the impact of changes in the initial cost of lending on the contract terms.     

Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower's consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way.     

Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

The paper considers a principal–agent relationship between a borrower and lender based on a model from Bowles (Microeconomics: behavior, institutions, & evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003). It expands the model by incorporating borrower collateral as an exogenous variable to partly assuage lender concerns about excessive risk, and a theory of lender deception is then developed. Deception is posited as a costly activity that effectively makes fraud undetectable and extracts the borrower’s economic rent arising from moral hazard despite the presence of third-party enforcement and borrower collateral. We identify under what conditions a lender may have sufficient incentives for employing deception and to what extent they would employ it. The likelihood of, and outcomes from, deception are compared between monopoly lenders those in competitive markets. The model suggests that competitive lenders have more incentive to deceive than a monopoly lender facing the same borrower.