Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Equity Partnerships: Evidence from Hollywood's Slate Financing Agreements

We use a movie industry project‐by‐project data set to analyze the principal–agent problem in slate financing arrangements. Under this specific film financing regime, which has become a significant mode of raising capital in Hollywood over the past decade, an external investor concludes a long‐term contract with a film producer and commits to cofinance a larger number of future film projects of that particular partner. In line with our theoretical conjectures, slate cofinanced movies receive poorer quality ratings and yield considerably lower return rates. Our data suggests that a substantial part of these performance differences may be attributed to adverse project selection and producer moral hazard.     

Endogenous trading in credit default swaps

We introduce a real options model in order to quantify the moral hazard impact of credit default swap (CDS) positions on the corporate default probabilities. Moral hazard is widely addressed in the insurance literature, where the insured agent may become less cautious about preventing the risk from occurring. Importantly, with CDS the moral hazard problem may be magnified since one can buy multiple protections for the same bond. To illustrate this issue, we consider a firm with the possibility of switching from an investment to another one. An investor can influence the strategic decisions of the firm and can also trade CDS written on the firm. We analyze how the decisions of the investor influence the firm value when he is allowed to trade credit default contracts on the firm’s debt. Our model involves a time-dependent optimal stopping problem, which we study analytically and numerically, using the Longstaff–Schwartz algorithm. We identify the situations where the investor exercises the switching option with a loss, and we measure the impact on the firm’s value and firm’s default probability. Contrary to the common intuition, the investors’ optimal behavior does not systematically consist in buying CDSs and increase the default probabilities. Instead, large indifference zones exist, where no arbitrage profits can be realized. As the number of the CDSs in the position increases to exceed several times the level of a complete insurance, we enter in the zone where arbitrage profits can be made. These are obtained by implementing very aggressive strategies (i.e., increasing substantially the default probability by producing losses to the firm). The profits increase sharply as we exit the indifference zone.     

Investor co-attention and stock return co-movement: Evidence from China’s A-share stock market

This study attempts to link investor co-attention to stock return co-movement in China's A-share stock market. On the one hand, stock price will co-move for stocks within the same industry and within the same market, which is labelled “return co-movement”. On the other hand, investor attention will also co-move as investors systematically search for relevant information for stocks of similar characteristics or as the stocks experience common information shocks, which is termed “investor co-attention”. The empirical evidence suggests that stock return co-movement can be explained by investor co-attention to a great extent, even after controlling for stock fundamentals and firm characteristics, and this effect is more salient for stocks with lower institutional ownership. Moreover, we employ large national lottery jackpots as exogenous shocks to investor attention. The empirical findings show that the co-movement of both investor attention and stock return increase on large lottery jackpot days, while investor co-attention contributes less to return co-movement on large lottery jackpot days. In summary, we offer an alternative explanation for return co-movement by observing the causal relationship between investor co-attention and stock return co-movement.     

Mutual fund flows and window-dressing

We use a sequential game to analyze an agency problem in the mutual fund industry where a representative fund manager considers window-dressing his portfolio holdings for the purpose of attracting fund flows from a representative investor. The manager is motivated to window-dress to improve the investor's perception of managerial skill which may positively affect fund flows in the next period. However, the investor may suspect window-dressing and thus downgrade perceived managerial skill. The model supports a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the manager window-dresses only when receiving a low return in the first period and the investor withdraws funds only when observing low returns in both periods. Consequently, we show that window-dressing is a rational behavior even when fund outflows may result.     

Disclosure quality,price efficiency,and expected returns

Using a composite disclosure quality measure, we examine the effect of disclosure quality on price delay and the effect of price delay determined by disclosure quality on expected returns in the Taiwan stock market. We find that higher disclosure quality can reduce stock price delay through more investor attention and higher stock liquidity after we control for accounting quality variables and consider the endogeneity issue. Furthermore, we show that disclosure quality reduces expected stock returns through the price efficiency channel associated with both investor attention and stock liquidity. Our results indicate that increasing a firm’s standardized information rating by one standard deviation can reduce its expected stock return by 0.63% annually. Taken together, our evidence suggests that regulatory activities enforced to improve public firms’ disclosure quality in the Taiwan stock market can make the stock market more efficient and therefore lower investors’ required return for stocks.     

Government Regulation,Corporate Board,and Firm Value: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of board composition and its consequences on firm value in China by focusing on the impact of ultimate owner type and financial needs under the institution environment with government intervention and weak investor protection. We find that State‐Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to choose politically connected directors without professional backgrounds, but non‐SOEs are more likely to have independent directors, or politically connected directors with professional business backgrounds. Appointment of independent directors has no effect on firm value. Due to weak legal investor protection in China, a dominant shareholder can easily remove independent directors, as there is no mature market for directors. Politically connected directors without professional business backgrounds are negatively associated with a firm's value. Although such directors can help a company establish relationships with the government, their firms may suffer due to inferior professionalism.     

Financialisation,ownership and employee interests under private equity at the AA,part two

This article examines a theoretically informed case study of the effects of financialisation at the workplace. It focuses in particular on trade union de‐recognition and trade union recognition in the furtherance of ownership interests. The paper reports on the continued diffusion of investor‐owner interests under the private equity business model which has recently witnessed the AA re‐listed on the stock market. It addresses two research questions. One, how are investor‐owner interests secured by trade union de‐recognition and re‐recognition? Two, how and why, as a de‐recognised trade union, does the GMB continue to campaign for and represent GMB members in the AA when the IDU (the independent democratic union) has sole recognition at the firm?     

A model for IPO pricing and contract choice decision

This paper attempts to reconcile the average underpricing phenomenon with the expected wealth maximizing behaviors of market participants. Under the usual informational asymmetry, the optimal offer price for best efforts IPOs is derived as a function of the uncertainty about market’s valuation, the expected return on proposed projects and the size of offerings relative to the firm’s market value. According to these firm-specific characteristics, best efforts IPOs can be underpriced, fairly priced, or overpriced. Employing the investment banker as an outside information producer, the basic pricing model is extended to provide empirical implication for underwriting contract choice decision as well as for the pricing. Consistent with the existing empirical evidences, the model predicts that the issuers with greater uncertainty about market’s valuation choose best efforts contract over firm commitment contract and that the dispersion of initial returns would be greater for best efforts IPOs than for firm commitment IPOs.     

Horizontal mergers and the balance of trade

This paper explores the relationship between market structure and the balance of trade in a dominant firm/competitive fringe model. It is shown that, absent efficiency effects, a horizontal merger between the dominant producer and a domestic fringe firm leads to a deterioration in the balance of trade, but, where efficiencies arise, this effect may be reversed. A sufficient condition for such reversal to occur is derived.     

The momentum and reversal effects of investor sentiment on stock prices

In this paper, we illustrate the real function relationship between the stock returns and change of investor sentiment based on the nonparametric regression model. The empirical results show that when the change of investor sentiment is moderate, the stock return is positively correlated with the change of investor sentiment, presenting an obvious momentum effect. However, the stock return is negatively correlated with the change of investor sentiment if the change of investor sentiment is dramatic, presenting significant reversal effects. Moreover, the degree of reversal effect caused by extremely optimistic sentiment is greater than that driven by extremely pessimistic sentiment, which shows a significant asymmetry. Our findings offer a partial explanation for financial anomalies such as the mean reversion of stock returns, the characteristic of slow rise and steep fall in China's stock market and so on.     

The road to cooperative supply‐chain environmental management: trust and uncertainty among pro‐active firms

The pressures on firms to improve their environmental performance have caused them to look outside their boundaries towards their supply chains. In such approaches, firms work with vendors to develop the environmental profile of supplied materials (for example) by reducing materials' toxicity or the amount of packaging used. While large firms can mandate that their suppliers comply with such initiatives, more cooperative approaches are generally likely to be more fruitful. This article presents the results from an exploratory, two phase study of the conditions under which firms engage in cooperative supply‐chain environmental management. First, the authors conducted interviews with 14 leading‐edge firms. In the second phase, the authors conducted a theoretical‐sample survey to examine a model of the antecedents of cooperative supply‐chain environmental management. The results suggest that inter‐firm trust, uncertainty and pro‐active environmental management most directly affect the extent to which firms engage in cooperative supply‐chain environmental management. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

投资者认知、审计质量与公司价值

投资者认知是决定市场资源配置的重要因素,认知水平越高,公司价值越大。审计作为一种降低信息不对称的制度安排,能够影响公司信息传递,进而正向调节认知效应;审计还具有缓解代理冲突的功能,而代理成本与审计质量存在对应关系,因此审计质量也体现为对认知效应的负向调节。我国股市目前主要体现为后一种情况,表明审计提升公司价值的主要路径是缓解公司的代理冲突,公司对高质量审计的需求动机远比满足投资者信息需求的动机更为强烈。聘用大型事务所能够向市场投资者传递积极信号,对认知提升公司价值的效应有正向调节作用。审计模式选择需要考虑公司的信息传递特征,并与投资者对公司的认知水平相契合。     

Ownership Concentration,Institutional Development and Firm Performance in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European transition economies. We focus on private, non‐listed firms that have been largely neglected by the extant literature. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find an inverted u‐shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for those firms that operate in non‐EU‐member countries as well as those firms that are situated in less developed institutional systems. We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ problem with rising ownership concentration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Turnpikes and detours in the renewable resource exploitation under price shocks

In this paper we show that the Averch-Johnson effect of overcapitalization by a regulated monopoly does not obtain when the firm operates in the decreasing cost range of output. We develop a dynamic adjustment-cost model of the firm and apply a recent result by Brock and Dechert for non-concave Hamiltonians to solve for the optimal investment policy for the firm. With a phase diagram analysis we are able to make sharp comparisons between the regulated and unregulated cases. In particular we show that investment by a regulated firm is lower than that of an unregulated firm, even when the rate of return constraint is not binding.     

Asset allocation with contagion and explicit bankruptcy procedures

In this paper, we consider the asset allocation problem of an investor allocating his funds between several corporate bonds and a money market account. In particular, we provide a realistic model of financial distress: firstly, we model Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies as different possible outcomes of financial distress. Secondly, we take into consideration that, in practice, “default” is not the end, but the beginning of financial distress, eventually leading to a reorganization or a liquidation of a distressed firm. Thirdly and most importantly, we are able to analyze the impact of contagion on an investor’s demand for corporate bonds. Contagion is an important phenomenon, as it reduces the investor’s ability to diversify his portfolio, and we show that the bond demand can change by more than 50%.     

Quality competition and entry deterrence: When to launch a second brand

We study the rationale for an incumbent to launch a second brand when facing potential entry into a market with quality‐differentiated products and a fringe producer. Depending on market size, the cost of a second brand and a potential entrant's setup cost the incumbent might use a second brand both when deterring and when accommodating entry. For low costs of brand proliferation, the high‐quality firm will prevent entry with limit qualities or multiple brands. The high‐quality incumbent will accommodate entry only if it cannot be prevented. Accommodation is always accompanied by an additional brand safeguarding the premium brand.     

Peer‐to‐Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer‐to‐peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client–server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit‐maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.     

Partner Type Diversity in Alliance Portfolios: Multiple Dimensions,Boundary Conditions and Firm Innovation Performance

Our research extends the current knowledge based view on the configuration of alliance portfolios and their deployment in different external knowledge environments. We study these alliance portfolios in a longitudinal sample (1996–2010) for over three thousand firms that operate in a large number of industries in the Netherlands. Our findings indicate that partner type variety and partner type relevance, as different dimensions of partner diversity in alliance portfolios, both have an inverted U‐shaped association with firm innovation performance. However, alliance portfolios characterized by both high partner type variety and high relevance cause inferior innovation performance. Different external knowledge environments, characterized by different levels of industry modularity and scope of knowledge distribution, moderate the inverted U‐shaped associations of partner type variety and relevance in alliance portfolios with firm innovation performance in opposing directions. While for partner type variety, a high level is found to be optimal in environments with greater modularity or broader scope of knowledge distribution, for partner type relevance it turns out that a low level is optimal under more modular industry conditions.     

Vertical Disintegration: A Dynamic Markovian Approach

In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its intermediate‐input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of independent suppliers decrease when their number increases), the assembler’s marginal return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than the market value of an independent supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm’s initial number of upstream subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads to a mixed strategy whereby the assembler keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability.     

Investment and Uncertainty: A Theory‐based Empirical Approach*

This paper provides empirical evidence on the dynamic effects of uncertainty on firm‐level capital accumulation. A novelty in this paper is that the firm‐level uncertainty indicator is motivated and derived from a theoretical model, the neoclassical investment model with time to build. This model also serves as the base for the empirical work, where an error‐correction approach is employed. I find a negative effect of uncertainty on capital accumulation, both in the short run and the long run. This outcome cannot be explained by the model alone. Instead, the results suggest that the predominant mechanism at work stems from irreversibility constraints.