效率与公平兼顾的最优所得税:理论框架及最优税率估计

最优所得税主要探讨税收如何兼顾公平与效率问题,以及给定公平偏好程度下,如何确定最优边际税率水平。即使在崇尚罗尔斯社会福利函数的社会里,政府同时兼顾再分配和财政收入目标的基础上,只要略加考虑税收对劳动供给的效应,哪怕是微弱的考虑和兼顾,最高边际税率都不会达到100%。而且,借鉴斯特恩最优线性所得税模型及美国个人所得税制度,估计我国现行个人所得税最高边际税率还可以适当降低到36%左右。     

个人所得税税率的国际比较及其对中国的启示——以美英两国为样本

20世纪80年代以来,以“降低税率、减少级距”为主要内容的个人所得税税率改革已是大势所趋,中国目前的个人所得税税率未能很好地起到调节收入的作用,我们可以借鉴美英两国个人所得税税率改革过程的经验,结合中国国情,通过对免征额和初始税率、最高边际税率累进数及管理成本等因素的确定,选择有波动的减速累进路线。     

The Optimal Asymptotic Income Tax Rate

This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal income tax rate at the top: a measure of labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution. We find that the asymptotic tax rate is not affected by the degree of inequality aversion as long as the marginal utility of consumption converges to zero. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution, we find that the optimal marginal tax rate at the top should be between 33% and 60%, which is in line with the existing rates in the real world.     

Redistributive taxation as social insurance

The modern literature on nonlinear optimal taxation treats differences in income as being due to unobserved differences in ability. A striking result of this assumption is that high income agents should face a zero marginal tax rate. In this paper I assume that differences in observed income are due to exogenous differences in luck. Hence the optimal redistributive tax involves trading off the benefits due to ‘social insurance’ with the costs due to reduced incentives. I derive the optimal forms for linear and nonlinear taxes, and compute some algebraic and numeric examples. Typically high income individuals will face quite high marginal tax rates.     

Optimal taxation over the life cycle

We derive the optimal labor income tax schedule for a life cycle model with deterministic productivity variation and complete asset markets. An individual chooses whether and how much to work at each date. The government must finance a given expenditure and does not have access to lump sum taxation. We develop a solution method that uses the primal approach to solve for the optimal non-linear tax function. The average tax rate determines when an individual will work while the marginal tax rate determines how much she will work. Even in the absence of redistributive concerns, the optimal tax schedule has an increasing average tax rate at low levels of income to encourage labor market participation. The marginal tax rate at the top is strictly positive. Finally, the model is used to assess the effects of changing the current tax schedule to the optimal one. Under the preferred parameters, this delivers a welfare gain equivalent to 0.67 percent of lifetime consumption.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing

This paper examines a two-period model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing, in which second-period wages are an increasing function of first-period labour supply. We consider the cases when the government can and cannot commit to its second-period tax policy. In both cases, the canonical Mirrlees/Stiglitz results regarding optimal marginal tax rates generally no longer apply. In particular, if the government cannot commit and each consumer's skill-type is revealed, it is optimal to distort the high-skill type's labour supply downwards through a positive marginal tax rate to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. Our analysis therefore identifies a setting in which a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill individual can be justified, despite its depressing effect on both labour supply and wages.     

中国资源税问题研究与改革取向

随着经济的不断发展,中国原有的资源税暴露出许多弊端,如资源税课税范围较窄、依据不合理、单位税额总体偏低、对级差收入调节不够等,中国资源税改革应在借鉴国外税制的基础上,扩大征税范围,提高税率和按量计征,强化资源节约和环境保护.     

The effect of potential emigration on the optimal linear income tax

This paper amends a standard model of optimal linear income taxation to allow individuals to escape taxation by migrating. The income tax is used only to redistribute income in this model. It is found that, if individuals with low and high ability levels are prevented from migrating, then the optimal marginal tax and poll subsidy increase. But preventing migration at ability levels in some intermediate interval lowers the optimal marginal tax.     

税收与收入分配:基于发展中国家个人所得税的思考

对于税收分配作用的不同理解和看法导致了税制设计方案的差异。发达国家普遍采用的累进综合个人所得税在发展中国家里面临着更高的管理成本、遵从成本、经济效率成本和政治成本,因而可能不是发展中国家实现收入分配职能的最优策略。对于中国而言,未来个人所得税的改革方向应当是在合理确定劳动所得和资本所得税负水平的基础上,根据纳税人家庭人口数量及就业状况对费用减除标准加以细分。在商品税方面,对日常生活必需品和农业生产资料免征增值税,将更多奢侈品纳入消费税的征收范围,并对与低收入群体日常生活密切相关的服务项目免征营业税。     

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.     

Optimal income taxation and migration: a world welfare point of view

This paper considers a world in which a distortionary income tax must be employed to raise and redistribute revenue. The optimal taxation of emigrants relative to those left behind is examined under the objective of world social welfare maximization. When tastes for consumption and labor do not depend directly on residence, the optimal tax system induces individuals to reside where the marginal products of their chosen labor supplies are highest. This paper also proves the existence of an optimal tax system under which each individual resides where he pays the greatest tax. This result holds even when tastes are allowed to vary with residence in an interesting way.     

地方税收效率及公平性实证研究

在现行经济及税收制度下,增值税和行为税收入比重提升会提高资本要素的产出效率;营业税和企业所得税比重的增加在提高资本要素产出效率的同时,却会降低劳动要素的产出效率;个人所得税和财产税比重提高有助于提升劳动要素的产出效率,而后者同时会降低资本产出效率;资源税类收入比重提高将会降低资本要素产出效率;流转税、所得税、行为税和财产税占税收收入比重的增加都会引起经济的总体产出的减少;我国地方税收收入具有显著的公平效应,其中所得税和财产税的公平效应相对更强,资源税及增值税也具有明显的公平收入分配的作用。     

The Optimal Linear Income Tax Model: Utility or Equivalent Income?

This paper compares the use of equivalent income with that of utility, in the social welfare function, in optimal income tax models. Equivalent income is a money metric welfare measure that, unlike utility, is not affected by monotonic transformations of utility. The use of equivalent income is found to produce an optimal tax rate that is more sensitive to the degree of inequality aversion, compared with the use of utility. With Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions, the optimal tax rate is the same for utility and equivalent income where relative inequality aversion is unity. When using equivalent incomes, the case for high marginal rates does not depend on the assumption of a very low elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.     

我国绿色税收政策效果分析及改革设想

我国在经济快速发展过程中出现了许多社会问题,其中环境污染是最严峻的问题之一。税收政策在促进环境改善方面具有十分明显的作用,通过制定税收政策引导企业经营方式的改变,从而实现环境改善已是各国的通行作法。与欧美国家相比我国税制的绿化程度很低,且不成体系。与生态环境有关的税收政策,散见于资源税、消费税、企业所得税等税种中,许多仍以费的形式存在,有较大的空间。应在借鉴国外绿色税收政策成功作法和经验的基础上,增加现行税种的环境保护功能,实行专门的环保税种,实行费改税等。     

Tax policy in the presence of emigration

This paper investigates the relationship between utilitarianism and horizontal equity in models of income taxation in particular and self-selection in general. An example involving well-behaved individual preferences is constructed in which a maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function leads via income taxation to horizontal inequities. Sufficient conditions for utilitarianism to bring horizontal equity are derived. The results are applied to the question of whether income tax credits are an appropriate way to treat differences in family size.     

累进税率税收筹划的数学分析与应用研究

超额和全额累进税率在中国的税率设计与实践中普遍存在,税收筹划也经常对它们进行筹划从而达到节税①的目的。通过对累进税率进行数学分析与研究,寻求累进税率税收筹划中更为原则性、具体化和精确性的推论,即当预期单次的收入适用累进税率时,可以结合纳税期限,把收入分别在不同的纳税期限里来实现。     

Time-consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and a balanced government budget

Abstract .  This paper analyzes optimal, time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget. When tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump-sum transfers, leisure would be higher than its social optimum. Pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax. Also, it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax, and hence it is not a practical guide to policy. Further, a consumption tax, or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate, can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income.     

Optimal Dynamic Taxation with Distinctive Forms of Social Status Attainment

We examine the role of both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons in setting dynamic optimal income taxation. Under complete information, state‐invariant labor income taxes are used to remedy the externality caused by consumption‐induced social comparisons, while state‐contingent capital income taxes are used to remedy the externalities caused by both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons. Under incomplete information, distinct types of agents are subject to an identical marginal capital income tax, which removes social comparisons. To solve the information problem, low‐productivity agents could be subject to a lower marginal labor tax than high‐productivity agents, which contradicts the traditional result in the Mirrlees–Stiglitz models.     

Growth and Welfare Effects of Tax Cuts: The Case of a Productive Public Input with Technological Risk

This paper analyzes the dynamic impact of tax cuts within a stochastic model of endogenous growth with a congested public input. A decreasing taxation of deterministic income parts leads to the well-known positive growth effect. Nevertheless, due to the insurance effect associated with the taxation of stochastic income flows, the overall growth impact of taxation is ambiguous. It is shown that the optimal structure of financing government expenditure does not only depend on the degree of rivalry but also on the degree of risk aversion. The optimal real value of government debt decreases with a rise in congestion. We identify that in the case of proportional congestion, the base for tax cuts should be the growth neutral consumption tax. Maximizing the growth rate does not automatically coincide with maximizing welfare. Hence, the base for tax cuts gains importance to realize a welfare optimal policy.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.