Agency costs of free cash flow and conditional conservatism

This study investigates whether agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are associated with conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that conditional conservatism improves ex ante efficient investment decisions and facilitates ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions. As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF. Using excess cash as a proxy for the agency costs of FCF, I provide evidence that firms with higher agency costs of FCF incorporate losses in a timelier manner relative to gains compared to their counterparts. Additionally, the association between excess cash and conditional conservatism predictably varies with the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms that mitigate FCF problems, such as debt or dividend payouts or repurchases. Further investigation suggests that greater conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of overinvestment among firms bearing high agency costs of FCF, demonstrating the ability of conservatism to reduce agency costs of FCF.     

Dynamic auction environment with subcontracting

This article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction‐based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints. We demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation. Restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12% and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20%. The article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability.     

Announcements of Interest Rate Forecasts: Do Policymakers Stick to Them?

If central banks value the ex post accuracy of their published forecasts, previously announced interest rate paths might influence the current policy rate. We explore if “forecast adherence” has affected monetary policy in New Zealand and Norway, where central banks have published their interest rate forecasts the longest. We derive and estimate policy rules with separate weights on past interest rate forecasts and find that they have explanatory power for current policy decisions, over and above their correlation with other conventional interest rate rule arguments.     

Investing in a relationship

A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable, informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts, as they induce higher investment ex ante: the principal invests not only to generate direct returns, but also to improve relational incentives. Unobservability of returns increases the principal's ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives. The optimal information structure depends on bargaining power.     

Search and herding effects in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from prosper.com

I examine loan data from Prosper.com—a website which allows borrowers to post loans and for lenders to bid on those loans. The Prosper market somewhat resembles the theoretical model of search, herding, and crowding in a large market described in Berkovich and Tayon (Phd. dissertation—Essays on search and herding. University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, 2009). That model predicts that assets with high and low prices have high variance in the difference between price and true value. These extreme price regions of the asset-space are where private information provides excess returns. In the Prosper market, I find some evidence for the model since loans with low ex post returns show higher variance of the difference between price and ex post return. I also find that high-priced loans provide excess returns even after accounting for risk-aversion.     

Information feedback in first price auctions

I apply the notion of a self‐confirming equilibrium (SCE) to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs (justifying the assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, affiliated, private values model, bidding strategies and revenue are (weakly) higher if only the highest bid is revealed. I also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature.     

Mutual to Stock Conversion, Information Cost, and Thrift Performance

In the 1980s, a large number of thrifts converted from the mutual to the stock form of ownership. The literature has noted that investors in those conversions earned abnormally high short-term returns. However, over the long run the converters earned very poor returns. The major reason for the poor returns was the extra noninterest operational costs associated with the stock form of ownership. Since those extra operational costs were predictable, the stock offerings may have been overpriced, ex ante as well as ex post.     

Catastrophic Losses and Insurer Profitability: Evidence From 9/11

We examine the effects of 9/11 on the insurance industry, hypothesizing a short‐run claim effect, resulting from insufficient premium ex ante for catastrophic losses, and a long‐run growth effect, resulting from ex post insurance supply reductions and risk updating. Following Yoon and Starks (1995) we use short‐ and long‐run abnormal forecast revisions to measure both effects, analyzing them as a function of firm‐specific characteristics. We find that firm type, loss estimates, reinsurance use, and tax position are important determinants of the short‐run position. Firm type, loss estimates, financial strength, underwriting risk, and reinsurance are key determinants of the firm's long‐run position.     

“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?

Of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage. We first formalize hold‐up regarding entry costs that preys on second‐price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill‐bidding activity. We derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions. Second, we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post, which offers some valuable flexibility: the English auction with jump bids implements, then, the first best in general environments.     

Exchange risk, exposure, and the option to trade

Rather than impeding trade, increased exchange rate uncertainty may on average create trade as it implies a higher probability that ex post deviations from Commodity Price Parity will exceed tariffs and transportation costs. We demonstrate such an effect in a small-country, short-term model, under the alternative assumptions of perfect competition and of a monopolist trader-producer. The proofs rely on the fact that such firms' exposures can be replicated (and hedged) by standard options. Under partial monopoly scenarios, the effect of volatility is ex ante unclear, though. (JEL F31)     

Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in monitoring managers’ investment decisions

Watts (2003), among others, argues that conservatism helps in corporate governance by mitigating agency problems associated with managers’ investment decisions. We hypothesize that if conservatism reduces managers’ex ante incentives to take on negative net present value projects and improves the ex post monitoring of investments, firms with more conservative accounting ought to have higher future profitability and lower likelihood (and magnitude) of future special items charges. Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms with more conservative accounting have (i) higher future cash flows and gross margins and (ii) lower likelihood and magnitude of special items charges than firms with less conservative accounting.     

Performance effects of setting targets and pay–performance relations before or after operations

This study investigates both theoretically and experimentally whether and how ex post use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) information in determining performance target levels and profit sharing ratio (PSR) levels affects employer profit performance. Our findings show that employers use RPE information, i.e. peer performance, to adjust performance target levels and PSR levels to reflect economic conditions. More importantly, we find that ex post use of RPE information, i.e. peer performance, improves profit performance. However, ex post adjustment of target levels and PSR levels based on peer performance have different performance implications. Specifically, we find that ex post target contracts improve employer residual profit over ex ante target contracts, while ex post PSR contracts do not improve employer residual profit over ex ante PSR contracts. Our supplemental analyses suggest that this difference is likely because employees are more sensitive to prior period compensation determined by ex post PSRs than ex post targets. Compared to ex post targets that are likely perceived to be fair based on peer performance, ex post PSRs based on the peer performance can be used opportunistically by employers and/or are perceived so by employees, which leads to future repercussions manifested in lower employee effort and employer residual profit.     

Ex ante performance from ex post models of global equity market correlations

Analysis of ex post returns reveals the time series properties of correlations, but ex ante correlations are required for efficient diversification. We find that a time-varying parameter model offers the best fit to ex post global equity market correlations, suggesting changing mean correlations and changing rates of adjustment back to the means. Nevertheless, we do not find improved forecast performance from time-varying parameter models in holdout periods. The added complexity of time-varying models does not translate into lower forecast errors.     

Identifying Noise Shocks: A VAR with Data Revisions

We propose a new Vector Autoregression (VAR) identification strategy to study the impact of noise, in the early releases of output growth figures, which exploits the informational advantage of the econometrician. Economic agents, uncertain about the underlying state of the economy, respond to noisy early data releases. Econometricians, with the benefit of hindsight, have access to data revisions as well, which we use to identify noise shocks. A surprising report of output growth produces qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller effects than a demand shock. We also illustrate how a noise shock cannot be identified unless ex‐post information is used.     

Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection

We characterize the set of second‐best “menus” of student‐loan contracts in an economy with risky labor‐market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk aversion. We combine student loans with optimal income taxation. Second‐best optima provide incomplete insurance because of moral hazard. Optimal repayments must be income contingent, or the income tax must comprise a graduate tax. Individuals are ex ante unequal because of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, because taxation trades off incentives and redistribution. In addition, second‐best optima exhibit an interim equalization property: the poststudy but prework expected utilities of newly graduated student types must be equal.     

Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle

The substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to launching a bid. Moreover, auction theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a competitive advantage over rival bidders. Nevertheless, with a sample exceeding 10,000 initial control bids for US public targets, we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since the early 1980s and is now surprisingly rare. At the same time, the average toehold is large when it occurs (20%), and toeholds are the norm in hostile bids. To explain these puzzling observations, we develop and test a two-stage takeover model where attempted merger negotiations are followed by open auction. With optimal bidding, a toehold imposes a cost on target management, causing some targets to (rationally) reject merger negotiations. Optimal toeholds are therefore either zero (to avoid rejection costs) or greater than a threshold (so that toehold benefits offset rejection costs). The toehold threshold estimate averages 9% across initial bidders, reflecting in part the bidder's opportunity loss of a merger termination agreement. In the presence of market liquidity costs, a threshold of this size may well induce a broad range of bidders to select zero toehold. As predicted, the probability of toehold bidding decreases, and the toehold size increases, with the threshold estimate. The model also predicts a relatively high frequency of toehold bidding in hostile bids, as observed. Overall, our test results are consistent with rational bidder behavior with respect to the toehold decision.     

The Impact of Regret on the Demand for Insurance

We examine optimal insurance purchase decisions of individuals that exhibit behavior consistent with Regret Theory. Our model incorporates a utility function that assigns a disutility to outcomes that are ex post suboptimal, and predicts that individuals with regret‐theoretical preferences adjust away from the extremes of full insurance and no insurance coverage. This prediction holds for both coinsurance and deductible contracts, and can explain the frequently observed preferences for low deductibles in markets for personal insurance.     

Rollover Risk,Liquidity and Macroprudential Regulation

I study rollover risk in wholesale funding markets when intermediaries hold liquidity ex ante and fire sales may occur ex post. Multiple equilibria exist in a global rollover game: intermediate liquidity holdings support equilibria with both positive and zero expected liquidation. A simple uniqueness refinement pins down the private liquidity choice, which balances the forgone expected return on investment with reduced fragility and costly liquidation. Due to fire sales, liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes. Intermediaries free ride on the holdings of other intermediaries, causing excessive liquidation. To internalize the systemic nature of liquidity, a macroprudential authority imposes liquidity buffers.     

Field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions: more Magic on the Internet

I present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first‐price, sealed‐bid auctions. The auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the Internet for collectible trading cards from the game Magic: the Gathering. I examine a number of outcomes, including the number of participating bidders, the probability of sale, the levels of individual bids, and the auctioneer's revenues. The benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric, risk‐neutral bidders with independent private values. The results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding. Many bidders behave strategically, anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others' bids.