Patent pools,vertical integration,and downstream competition

Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.     

Vertical integration,foreclosure, and productive efficiency

We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two‐part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output‐shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below‐cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.     

The economic role of foreclosures

We consider the economic consequences of changing the foreclosure rules. By incorporating renegotiation into the analysis, we show that although renegotiation decreases the number of foreclosures it can make the effects of foreclosure more significant. Even when foreclosure does not actually occur, a change in foreclosure rules changes the threat points of lender and borrower in any renegotiation, and thus changes the effective interest rate that the lender receives. In the long run, stated interest rates on loans will adjust to compensate for any change in the effective interest rate. We also examine the impact of a change in foreclosure laws on the borrower's welfare.     

The effect of foreclosure laws on securitization: Evidence from U.S. states

A mortgage that defaults is more likely to enter foreclosure rather than renegotiation if it has been securitized in the private non-agency market, according to previous research. We study whether this foreclosure-propensity affects lenders’ securitization decision ex-ante. Due to the higher foreclosure probability, the value of a mortgage should be more sensitive to foreclosure costs if it is securitized. Comparing loans made in the same metropolitan area but under different foreclosure laws, we find that lenders are less likely to securitize mortgages in states with higher foreclosure costs, as measured by laws requiring judicial foreclosure. Two additional results are consistent with the proposed channel. First, the effect increases for loans with higher expected default rates and disappears for mortgage-like loans not subject to these laws. Second, the effect of judicial requirements increases for loans with higher expected default rates, consistent with differences in loss given default driving the results. Borrowers in states without judicial requirements also get riskier loans.     

The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrowers' Default Behavior

This paper conducts loan‐level analysis to investigate the influence of expected foreclosure delay on a borrower's default propensity. We include the actual foreclosure times in the analysis to capture the dynamic nature of foreclosure duration. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a statistically and economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior. In the current market condition where many borrowers have negative equity, the increase in delay may make default an optimal choice for more borrowers. The negative effect of increased foreclosure delay may need to be considered when devising policies to aid troubled borrowers.     

Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis

We examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers, focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan. Conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent, we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank-held loans when compared to similar securitized loans: across various specifications and origination vintages, the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank-held loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative terms). There is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers. A quasi-experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results.     

Wimp or tough guy: Sequential default risk and signaling with mortgages

When analyzing what to do with a currently defaulted loan, the lender must consider the impact of his foreclosure versus workout decision on the expected payoff of subsequent loans as well as on the payoff of the current loan. This is because borrowers with future loan payoff dates can observe the lender's actions and update prior information regarding the lender's toughness or wimpiness when dealing with defaulted loans. In this paper we consider the strategic interaction between a lender and multiple borrowers, where borrowers have distinct, sequentially maturing mortgage loans and where the lender has private information regarding the magnitude of his foreclosure costs. We find that a variety of strategic outcomes can occur that explain the co-existence of workout and foreclosure in the mortgage marketplace. In general, the lender's workout/foreclosure response depends on the cost of bluffing (e.g., foreclosing when workout is cheaper) versus the value of reducing expected defaults and workout concession losses on future loans (e.g., imperfect foreclosure cost information leads future borrowers to payoff the mortgage when default would have been optimal under perfect information). Given recently revised expectations regarding the depth of the real estate recession, our results may explain the move by many lenders away from granting workout concessions and toward taking a harder line when dealing with defaulting borrowers.     

State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the Subprime

Foreclosure procedures in some states are considerably swifter and less costly for lenders than in others. In light of the foreclosure crisis, an empirical understanding of the effect of foreclosure procedures on the mortgage market is critical. This study finds that lender-favorable foreclosure procedures are associated with more lending activity in the subprime market. The study uses hand-coded state foreclosure law variables to construct a numerical index measuring the favorability of state foreclosure laws to lenders. Mortgage origination data from state-border areas shows that lender-friendly foreclosure is associated with an increase in subprime originations, but has less effect on the prime market.     

Harmful Procompetitive Effects of Trade in Presence of Credit Market Frictions

We explore the consequences of international trade in an economy that encompasses technology choice and an endogenous distribution of mark-ups due to credit market frictions. We show that in such an environment a gradual opening of trade may—but not necessarily must—have a negative impact on productivity and overall output. The reason is that the procompetitive effects of trade reduce mark-ups and hence make access to credit more difficult for smaller firms. As a result, smaller firms—while not driven out of the market—may be forced to switch to less productive technologies.     

Effects of Bankruptcy Exemptions and Foreclosure Laws on Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Rates

This study analyzes the effects of state bankruptcy asset exemptions and foreclosure laws on mortgage default and foreclosure rates across different segments of the mortgage market. We found that the effects of these legal provisions are larger for subprime than for prime mortgages and larger for adjustable rate mortgages than for fixed rate mortgages. These results demonstrate that the effect of variation in bankruptcy exemptions and foreclosure laws is most pronounced in the most risky segments of the mortgage market, which are those that have been most affected by the continuing housing slump in the United States.     

Growth Strategies and Value Creation: What Works Best for Stock Exchanges?

In recent years, demutualized stock exchanges increasingly have been engaging in mergers and acquisition (M&A) and alliance activities. To examine the effect of these growth strategies on exchange shareholders’ value creation, we focus on 15 public stock exchanges and investigate their short‐run share price responses to the formation of 111 M&As and alliances around the world spanning the period 2000–2008. Our findings show that the average stock price responses for M&As and alliances are positive. M&As create more value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate more value than nonequity alliances. More value accrues when the integration is horizontal than when it is vertical. Cross‐border integration creates more value than domestic integration. In addition, there is evidence of learning‐by‐doing effects in stock exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that when the partnering exchange is located in a country with better shareholder protection, accounting standards, and capital market development, more shareholder value accrues to our sample exchange. These patterns are consistent when we examine the exchanges’ long‐run performance.     

Does vertical integration affect firm performance? Evidence from the airline industry

We investigate the effects of vertical integration on operational performance. Large U.S. airlines use regional partners to operate some of their flights. Regionals may be owned or governed through contracts. We estimate whether an airline's use of an owned, rather than independent, regional at an airport affects delays and cancellations on the airline's own flights out of that airport. We find that integrated airlines perform systematically better than nonintegrated airlines at the same airport on the same day. Furthermore, the performance advantage increases on days with adverse weather and when airports are more congested. These findings suggest that, in this setting, vertical integration may facilitate real‐time adaptation decisions.     

Cost-benefit analysis of single-family foreclosure alternatives

Over the last ten years, single-family mortgage lenders have become more aware of the financial benefits of finding alternatives to foreclosure for borrowers who default on their mortgage obligations. In this article, expected costs of foreclosure alternatives are parameterized to solve for minimum probabilities of borrower success necessary to make pursuing them profitable for lenders. These break-even probabilities are found to be very insensitive to changes in a variety of factors, including interest-rate environments and time horizons. Simulations are performed across house-price-deflation scenarios, loan-to-value ratios, and post-default cure rates. Stochastic processes are introduced through time distributions for foreclosure processing, property disposition, and house-price appreciation.     

Strategic default,workout, and commercial mortgage valuation

This paper extends existing equilibrium commercial mortgage pricing models by endogenizing negotiated workout into the usual noncooperative lending game. Workout is a feasible subgame strategy for the lender to play whenever foreclosure transaction costs exist for either party to a loan transaction. In particular, negotiated workout solutions Pareto dominate the foreclosure alternative when default occurs. To obtain our results, we embed a cooperative bargaining game within a noncooperative mortgage loan/default game. We also address the valuation wedge problem that occurs when foreclosure transaction costs are introduced. Through the notion of replacement game equilibrium, we find symmetric mortgage pricing solutions that eliminate the valuation wedge and thus suggest that lending will occur in commercial real estate mortgage markets even when foreclosure transaction costs exist.     

Subprime Loan Default Resolutions: Do They Vary Across Mortgage Products and Borrower Demographic Groups?

This paper examines default outcomes for subprime first lien loans during the recent subprime mortgage boom. It conducts this investigation in two phases. The paper first examines factors associated with pre-foreclosure outcomes for subprime mortgages in default. It then examines factors associated with different outcomes for loans that enter foreclosure. These factors include less understood elements such as mortgage product features and borrower demographics. The analysis is based on detailed loan-level data and employs multinomial logit models in a hazard framework. Results show that default resolutions vary with product features and borrower demographics. Adjustable rate and interest-only mortgages, and loans with low- or no-documentation are more likely to enter foreclosure proceedings, and, once in foreclosure, are more likely to become REO. The existence of junior liens increases the probability of the loan remaining in default. Owner-occupancy is associated with lower likelihood of foreclosure initiation and REO, and greater likelihood of curing default. Additionally, default outcomes are impacted by local legal, economic and housing market conditions, and the equity in the home.     

Foreclosure of Securitized Commercial Mortgages—A Model of the Special Servicer

The decision to foreclose on a CMBS mortgage is made by the special servicer. A mortgage loan is in special servicing when it is either delinquent or in a state of imminent default. A special servicer should represent the interests of the underlying CMBS bondholders by returning the highest possible value to the investors. In this paper, we show that a special servicer’s compensation structure results in an incentive for her to extend a loan beyond the time desired by its bondholders. We develop a model and demonstrate how compensation incentives interact and influence a special servicer’s foreclosure decisions. Our model takes into consideration the dynamic nature of such a decision by viewing is as a dynamic programming problem whereby foreclosure represents a discrete terminal state of an optimal stopping problem. This model thus captures the trade-off between continuation of a loan and termination and we use this model to determine how the stopping rule changes under various compensation structures.     

Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values

Previous studies have shown that foreclosure often results in vandalism, disinvestment and other negative spillover effects in the neighborhood. This paper extends these views into a formal theoretical model through pricing based on comparables. We project that the spillover effect of a foreclosure on neighborhood property values depends on two factors: the discount of foreclosure sale and the weight placed on the foreclosed property as a comparable in the valuation. The former is related to housing cycle and the latter varies by time of foreclosure and its distance from the subject property. Empirical results based on a 2006 sample show that this effect is significant within a radius of 0.9 km (roughly 10 blocks) and within 5 years from its liquidation. The most severe impact is an 8.7% discount on neighborhood property values, which gradually drops to anywhere between −1.2 to −1.7% for foreclosures liquidated within the past 5 years. These spillover effects vary slightly when the sample selection bias is taken into account. Based on an alternative sample of purchase transactions in 2003, the estimated spillover effects in booming years are reduced by half, confirming on the important role played by housing cycles.

Vertical integration,exclusive dealing,and expost cartelization

This article uncovers an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical organization. A vertically integrated firm can use exclusive dealing to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to cartelize the downstream industry. Neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieves these anticompetitive effects. The cartelization effect of these two practices may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization also depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.     

Are Commercial Mortgage Defaults Affected by Tax Considerations?

We study whether tax considerations are an important determinant of commercial mortgage default. We also study whether large lenders are better informed, or better at interpreting information for lending purposes, and hence have lower foreclosure rates; whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, and hence have lower foreclosure rates on larger loans; and whether commercial mortgage defaults are related to debt service coverage and loan-to-values, both initial and contemporaneous. The paper’s main findings are fourfold. First, holding all else equal, there is evidence that tax considerations influence investors’ decisions about when to “put” assets to lenders. The results are consistent with the argument of Constantinides (J Financ Econ 13:65–89, 1984). Second, the evidence suggests that large lenders are especially knowledgeable about commercial mortgage borrowers and commercial property markets, in that they have lower foreclosure rates than smaller lenders. Third, on the question of whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, we find that larger loans have, on average, lower default rates than smaller loans. Fourth, the findings suggest that lower default rates are associated with higher debt service coverage ratios, both initial and contemporaneous.     

Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance

The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in number of foreclosures. The average length of time from onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded dramatically. Although most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled them to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Thus, foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default—suggesting that improvement in credit card performance during the post-crisis period would likely be slowed by the removal of the temporary liquidity benefits as foreclosures reach completion.