Forecasting Housing Approvals in Australia: Do Forecasters Herd?

Price trends in housing markets may reflect herding of market participants. A natural question is whether such herding, to the extent that it occurred, reflects herding in forecasts of professional forecasters. Using more than 6,000 forecasts of housing approvals for Australia, we did not find evidence of forecaster herding. On the contrary, forecasters anti‐herd and, thereby, tend to intentionally scatter their forecasts around the consensus forecast. The extent of anti‐herding seems to vary over time. We also found that more pronounced anti‐herding leads to less accurate forecasts.     

Do Current Account Forecasters Herd? Evidence from the Euro Area and the G7 Countries

Data from the Consensus Economics Forecast Poll is used to analyze how current account forecasters form expectations. The results suggest that forecasts do not satisfy traditional unbiasedness and orthogonality criteria for forecast rationality. In addition, this paper finds anti‐herding behavior among forecasters for the euro area and G7 countries. It also shows that the cross‐sectional heterogeneity with regard to anti‐herding is associated with cross‐sectional heterogeneity in forecast accuracy. More specifically, this paper finds some evidence indicating that forecasters who tend to herd provide more accurate forecasts than their colleagues who follow an anti‐herding strategy.     

Asymmetric loss and herding behaviour of exchange rate forecasters: evidence from South Africa

This study examines the asymmetry of the loss function for private forecasters in exchange rate forecasts of the South African rand. It tests rationality under the possibility of an asymmetric loss function. The results indicate less evidence of asymmetry for a horizon of 1 month but considerable evidence of asymmetry for a horizon of 3 months. However, the shapes of the distributions formed by estimated asymmetry parameters of sub-samples for each forecaster are symmetric, regardless of the forecast horizons, which implies that these forecasters do not herd or antiherd. In fact, the results of our empirical herding test show that forecasters neither herd nor antiherd, which is in sharp contrast to recent findings on antiherding for foreign exchange rates in emerging market economies. Our findings provide consistent evidence for a recent suggestion that antiherding might result in the rejection of rationality, even under asymmetric loss functions. Our findings also suggest that central bank transparency might be associated with herding behaviours.     

Forecaster Rationality and Expectation Formation in Foreign Exchange Markets: Do Emerging Countries Differ from Industrialized Economies?

ABSTRACT

This paper uses the Consensus Economic Forecast poll to investigate how forecasters in the foreign exchange market form expectations and whether the expectation formation process differs between industrialized and emerging countries. In order to explain the expectation formation of forecasters in countries and country groups, we analyze around 50,000 forecasts for 22 OECD member currencies. We find that differences between the way forecasters in industrialized countries and emerging countries form exchange rate expectations. However, we show that one important difference is due to a difference in forecasting behavior of emerging countries. Controlling for this feature lets the forecasting behavior in emerging countries resemble more the ones found for industrialized countries, but not for all forecast horizons.     

Do forecasters of major exchange rates herd?

This paper uses forecast data from 1995 through 2014 to examine, whether the market consensus of exchange rate forecasts has an effect on the forecasts of individual experts. Such an effect could take the form of herding or anti-herding. We use a very comprehensive data set to study experts' forecasts of three of the most important exchange rates. The results indicate that anti-herding vis-à-vis the consensus of forecasts occurs more often than herding. We also show how the increase in the forecasting horizon and financial crises affect the intensity of anti-herding behavior. Moreover, we report that the (anti-)herding behavior does not affect the forcasting performnce.     

A heterogeneous agent exchange rate model with speculators and non-speculators

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent exchange rate model of speculators and non-speculators from a simple monetary framework. The model replaces rational expectations with an adaptive learning rule that forecasts future exchange rates with an econometric model, and assumes two types of market participants, speculators and non-speculators, that differ by their forecasting model. Speculators employ a correctly specified forecasting model, are relatively short-term oriented, and are subject to momentum and herding effects via an expectation shock; non-speculators utilize a simple forecasting model, have no incentive to be short-term oriented, and are not subject to herding effects. Parameters are calibrated and estimated using the method of simulated moments, and simulation results show that the model is able to replicate foreign exchange market stylized facts better than a model of representative agent rational expectations. Furthermore, the dynamics of the model are shown to derive from both agent heterogeneity and the expectation shock.     

Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

A note on the anti-herding instinct of interest rate forecasters

With regard to interest rate forecasts, earlier researchers have found mixed evidence of forecaster herding. Using the Livingston survey data, we reexamined the case for forecaster herding. We did not find evidence of forecaster herding. On the contrary, we found strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding.     

The random walk versus unbiased efficiency: can we separate the wheat from the chaff?

Abstract:

In the issue under investigation the wheat cannot be separated from the chaff because all we have is chaff. The random walk and unbiased efficiency are equally bad forecasters that should not be used as benchmarks for measuring forecasting accuracy. The simulation and econometric results show that when two forecasters are not independent they produce forecasts of similar quality, in which case it is erroneous to use the forward rate as a forecaster and the spot rate as a benchmark. Theoretical and intuitive explanations are presented for why the random walk and unbiased efficiency produce poor-quality forecasts that are almost identical. The failure of unbiased efficiency is explained primarily in terms of the post Keynesian view of the forward exchange rate.     

Forecaster Overconfidence and Market Survey Performance

The authors document using the ZEW panel of German stock market forecasters that weak forecasters tend to be overconfident in the sense that they provide extreme forecasts and their confidence intervals are less likely to contain eventual realizations. They further show that moderate filters based on forecast accuracy of past performance over short rolling windows, which delicately balance ignoring relevant information and noise reduction, are somewhat successful in improving predictability. While poor performance can be due to various factors, a filter based on forecaster overconfidence, a prior tendency to have high forecast standard deviations, also improves the performance of market survey forecasts.     

Can the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model Account for Traders' Expected Currency Returns?

This study uses survey data on traders' exchange rate forecasts to test whether their expected excess returns are related to the covariance between the exchange rate and consumption; as predicted by the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). The covariance is measured through the novel use of rolling windows of the realized covariance (both forward and backward looking) and testing is conducted with the cointegrated VAR. The model is able to account for expected returns with more plausible degrees of risk aversion, but only when using sufficiently long, backward‐looking measures of the covariance. This suggests that market participants assess risk, in part, based upon the pro‐cyclicality of returns, and infer it from experience in the recent past. There is also evidence that inclusion of the real exchange rate improves the plausibility of the estimates and the model fit.     

Time-varying exchange rate exposure and exchange rate risk pricing in the Canadian Equity Market

This paper aims to extend the existing literature on foreign exchange rate risk pricing. Unlike the existing studies on Canada, we use six alternative bilateral and one multilateral exchange rate proxies. Furthermore, using both a two-factor and a three-factor capital asset pricing model (CAPM), we test for the presence of a long-run relationship among exchange rate risk pricing, herding behavior, term structure and the interest rate. The estimated results based on both the ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS) estimation techniques confirm that exchange rate risk in the Canadian equity market is priced and that the pricing of this risk is time-varying. This result holds for all seven exchange rate proxies. Our empirical analysis also suggests the presence of a long-run relationship among exchange rate risk pricing, herding behavior, term structure and the interest rate. This relationship is found to be insensitive to variations in the world market return.     

Do foreign exchange forecasters apply asymmetric loss functions? Evidence from three major exchange rates

This article investigates which type of loss function is consistent with the hypothesis that major exchange rate forecasts, i.e. the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen vis-à-vis the US dollar, are rational. We apply a comprehensive data set, which also allows us to examine different forecast horizons and heterogeneity of forecasters.     

Forecasting performance of private sector’s unemployment forecasts in advanced economies

This paper provides a full characterization of unemployment rate forecasts using the mean values from Consensus Economics for a sample of nine advanced economies between 1989 and 2012. It also assesses the performance of unemployment rate forecasts around business cycles’ turning points. We find evidence for biasedness, inefficiency or information rigidities and lack of accuracy of unemployment rate forecasts and the distribution of projection errors appears to be slightly twisted to over-prediction (which decreases during recession episodes). Additionally, there is a sense of ‘pessimism’ among forecasters during recovery periods.     

Sovereign Risk and Out‐of‐Equilibrium Exchange Rate Dynamics

We show that the sovereign risk premium contains important information on short‐run exchange rate dynamics in emerging economies. Net foreign assets serve as the key link between both variables, which acts as a “crude form of collateral.” We present two sets of empirical evidence. First, we show that increases in net foreign assets provide a statistically significant reduction on emerging markets sovereign risk premium. Then, we show that out‐of‐sample forecasts using realized values for the sovereign risk premium have a satisfactory performance when evaluated across three metrics: the mean squared error ratio, the direction of change statistic, and the consistency criterion.     

The role of macroeconomic and policy uncertainty in density forecast dispersion

We explore empirically the role of macroeconomic and policy uncertainty in explaining dispersion in professional forecasters’ density forecasts, and in explaining individual forecaster uncertainty (defined as the uncertainty expressed by individual forecasters in their density forecasts). We focus on US real output growth and inflation, using data from the Philadelphia Fed's quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), 1992-2016. We find that dispersion in individual density forecasts is related to macroeconomic uncertainty, especially in longer horizon forecasts, but not policy or forecaster uncertainty. There is also little evidence that forecaster uncertainty reflects macroeconomic or policy uncertainty.     

Can rational stubbornness explain forecast biases?

This paper examines whether the rational jumpiness/stubbornness hypothesis can explain forecast biases. Using a dataset of professional GDP forecasts for the G7 countries over the period 1989–2010, we find evidence supporting the rational stubbornness hypothesis. Specifically, forecasters underreact more when large forecast revisions are highly indicative of low forecast ability. Underreaction is less likely when the size of forecast revisions is unrelated to ability. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that forecasters choose to smooth GDP forecasts to maximize their perceived ability.     

On the accuracy of Blue Chip forecasts of interest rates and country risk premiums

We examine the accuracy of Blue Chip forecasts of short- and long-term interest rates and country risk premiums for the Eurozone and six other industrial countries for 1999–2008. In so doing, we utilize comparable random walk forecasts as benchmarks. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, the long-term interest rate forecasts fail to outperform the random walk. Our findings on the accuracy of short-term interest rate forecasts are, however, mixed. Further results reveal that Blue Chip is more (less) accurate in predicting country risk premiums associated with short-term (long-term) interest rates. Such evidence is reasonable since the short-term country risk premiums contain only the perceived default risk, while the long-term risk premiums, in addition, can contain the perceived inflation and exchange rate differentials.     

The Performance of Exchange Rate Forecasts

Since the floating of the Australian dollar the forecasting of exchange rate movements has become more difficult and received much more attention. As a result, some participants in the foreign exchange market have, on a number of occasions, come under criticism for their inability to predict exchange rate movements. This article seeks to evaluate these criticisms through an examination of exchange rate forecasts made by market participants (as published in the Australian Financial Review from March 1985 to December 1985). The accuracy of the $A/US$ forecasts is compared with that of forecasts generated from a number of simple forecasting rules as well as forecasts of the US$/Yen exchange rate. In general, the simple forecasting rules provide superior forecasts to those provided by the individual market participants. However, under some criteria, the mean of the individual participants' forecasts may be preferred to these simple forecasting rules. Further, the comparison of the US$/Yen forecasts with the $A/US$ forecasts shows the former to be generally more accurate.     

The evolution of inflation expectations in Canada and the US

We model inflation forecasts as monotonically diverging from an estimated long‐run anchor point towards actual inflation as the forecast horizon shortens. Fitting the model with forecaster‐level data for Canada and the US, we identify three key differences between the two countries. First, the average estimated anchor of US inflation forecasts has tended to decline gradually over time in rolling samples, from 3.4% for 1989–1998 to 2.2% for 2004–2013. By contrast, it has remained close to 2% since the mid‐1990 for Canadian forecasts. Second, the variance of estimates of the long‐run anchor is considerably lower for the panel of Canadian forecasters than US ones following Canada's adoption of inflation targets. And third, forecasters in Canada look much more alike than those in the US in terms of the weight that they place on the anchor. One explanation for these results is that an explicit inflation‐targeting regime (Canada) provides for less uncertainty about future monetary policy actions than a monetary policy regime where there was no explicit numerical inflation target (the US before 2012) to anchor expectations.