Corporate social performance and financial risk: Further empirical evidence using higher frequency data

Using a unique dataset of corporate social responsibility rating – available on a monthly basis – we shed new light on the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and firm risk. Where previous studies use annual (at best) measures of CSP, assuming that a change in CSP leads a change in risk, we formally test the direction of the relationship using Granger causality. Looking at large UK companies over 2002–2018 (for a total number of 19,832 firm-months), we reject any causality (either way) between CSP and financial risk (both systematic and idiosyncratic risk). This shows that the CSP-risk relationship is not an endogenous one, contrary to what previous evidence has found. Given the structure of our panel data (long T and short N), we apply GLS based estimator to correct for serial correlation in our panel regressions. We find strong evidence that CSP has a negative impact on idiosyncratic risk; however, the effect of CSP on systematic risk is not statistically significant. The existence of a contemporaneous, rather than lagged relationship doesn't fare well with established CSP theories. Overall, our original approach has opened a new door to further the study of the link between CSP, financial performance and financial risk.     

The IPO corporate social responsibility information disclosure: Does the stock market care?

We create textual information indices using corporate social responsibility (CSR) information extracted from IPO prospectuses in China. We use the indices to measure the issuers’ corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate environmental performance (CEP) and assess how the stock market reacts. We find that CSP disclosure is significantly related to the post‐market performance of the firm. Specifically, better CSP disclosure is correlated with higher post‐IPO listing holding period returns among firms that do not disclose donations or environmental expenditures, although the association does not hold for firms that make donations and environmental expenditures. In addition, institutional investors seem to care more about the CEP information for a firm than the CSP information.     

Does It Pay to Be Socially Responsible? Evidence from Spain's Retail Banking Sector

This paper extends the research on the relation between financial performance and corporate social responsibility in two respects. First, it develops a model of strategic competition that includes consumer perceptions with respect to firm social performance. It is shown that in the presence of a positive valuation of social responsibility practices by consumers, a firm that endorses this responsible behaviour may obtain a better strategic position in the market, along with higher margin, demand, and profit. Second, the model's predictions are tested with a sample of Spanish banking firms. The empirical analysis confirms that consumers significantly value other features apart from price in making deposit and mortgage decisions, particularly a financial institution's social responsibility. A more disaggregated analysis shows first, that not every CSR dimension has relevance for consumers and second, that customers equally value activities that can have a direct impact on their well‐being (e.g., culture and leisure), as well as other activities that can be viewed more generally as public goods (e.g., heritage and the environment). These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm's social or ethical activities. It is shown that, provided that consumers value corporate social responsibility activities, firms can improve both their competitive position in the market and their profits by behaving in a socially responsible manner. Therefore, the design and implementation of corporate social responsibility practices could confer upon firms an initial competitive advantage over their competitors.     

Corporate social responsibility and Eurozone corporate bonds: The moderating role of country sustainability

In this paper, we empirically examine whether superior performance in corporate social responsibility (CSR) results in lower credit risk, measured by credit ratings and zero-volatility spreads (z-spreads). We are especially interested in how the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) related performance of the corresponding countries moderates this relationship. We find only weak evidence that superior corporate social performance (CSP) results in systematically reduced credit risk. However, we do find strong support for our hypothesis that a country’s ESG performance moderates the CSP–credit risk relationship. Superior CSP is regarded as risk-reducing and rewarded with better ratings and lower z-spreads only if it is recognized by the environment. In addition, we find a reduction of corporate bonds’ z-spreads by approx. 9.64 basis points if the CSP of a company mirrors the ESG performance of the country it is located in.     

Does it cost to be sustainable?

We investigate whether firms’ corporate social performance (CSP) ratings impact their performance (cost of capital) and risk. Using a proprietary CSP ratings database, we find no difference in the risk-adjusted performance of UK firms with high and low CSP ratings. Additionally, the firms do not differ in their amount of idiosyncratic risk. We find some evidence of high-ranked firms being larger. The empirical evidence therefore indicates that investors and managers are able to implement a CSP investment or business strategy without incurring any significant financial cost (or benefit) in terms of risk or return.     

Corporate social responsibility performance,financial distress and firm life cycle: evidence from Australia

This study examines the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and financial distress and additionally the moderating impact of firm life cycle stages on that association. Based on a sample of 651 publicly listed Australian firm‐years’ data covering the 2007–2013 period, our regression results show that positive CSR activity significantly reduces financial distress of the firm. In addition, the negative association between positive CSR performance and financial distress is more pronounced for firms in mature life cycle stages. Our results are robust to alternative proxy measures of financial distress, CSR performance and life cycle stages.     

The effect of corporate culture on firm performance: Evidence from China

This study examines whether corporate culture promotion affects firm performance in China in terms of firm market value, firm financial performance and innovation output. We find consistent evidence that corporate culture promotion is negatively related to firm market value, positively related to innovation output and not significantly related to firm financial performance. In addition, the negative effect of corporate culture promotion on firm market value is driven by small firms and firms located in less developed provinces. Furthermore, we find that some specific corporate culture promotions, such as innovation culture promotion and integrity culture promotion, are not related to firm value or financial performance. However, innovation culture promotion is positively associated with innovation output.     

Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: the “virtuous circle” revisited

We examine the causal relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial performance. Consistent with past studies, we find that the two variables appear to be related when we use traditional statistical techniques. However, using a time series fixed effects approach, we find that the relation between CSR and financial performance is much weaker than previously thought. We also find little evidence of causality between financial performance and narrower measures of social performance that focus on stakeholder management. Our results suggest that strong stock market performance leads to greater firm investment in aspects of CSR devoted to employee relations, but that CSR activities do not affect financial performance. We conclude that CSR is driven more by unobservable firm characteristics than by financial performance.

Social Capital,Trust, and Corporate Performance: How CSR Helped Companies During the Financial Crisis (and Why It Can Keep Helping Them)

The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.     

Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

Powerful CEOs,cash bonus contracts and firm performance

We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.     

Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?

This study examines the impact of corporate boards on firm performance during the current financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the crisis to measure firm performance, we find that board independence, as traditionally defined, does not significantly affect firm performance. However, when we redefine independent directors as outside directors who are less connected with current CEOs, a measure we call strong independence, there is a positive and significant relationship between this measure and firm performance. Second, outside financial experts are important for firm performance. We find that the positive impact of outside financial experts on firm performance is more significant than that of strong independence. Overall, our results suggest that firm performance during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate boards.     

Managerial hedging,equity ownership,and firm value

Suppose risk‐averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash‐flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm‐specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm‐specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such forms of moral hazard give rise to excessive aggregate risk in stock markets. In this context, optimal managerial contracts induce a relationship between managerial ownership and (i) aggregate risk in the firm's cash flows, as well as (ii) firm value. We show that this can help explain the shape of the empirically documented relationship between ownership and firm performance.     

Do early and voluntary filers of financial information in XBRL format signal superior corporate governance and operating performance?

On March 16, 2005, the SEC issued Final Rule 33-8529 encouraging registrants to voluntarily file tagged financial statement information on the EDGAR reporting System using XBRL format. In this paper, we examine whether early and voluntary filers of financial information in XBRL format demonstrate superior corporate governance and operating performance relative to their non-adopting peers. We investigate performance, market, and structure-related firm variables. Our results suggest that corporate governance is significantly and positively associated with a firm's decision to be an early and voluntary filer of financial information in XBRL format. At the same time, firm performance factors including liquidity and firm size are also associated with the early and voluntary XBRL filing decision. Our findings should be particularly interesting for the SEC, as it considers the corporate governance and firm-performance related associations between certain registrants' early and voluntary response and its call for XBRL-based filings.     

Insider ownership and corporate performance: Evidence from the adjustment cost approach

This paper examines the relation between insider ownership and corporate performance in the presence of adjustment costs and investigates how the adjustment costs are determined. In a model specification without adjustment costs, we find that insider ownership is significantly positively associated with corporate performance. But once we allow for adjustment costs, the relationship no longer exists. We find that insider ownership and corporate performance can be explained by their respective lagged values and that many firm characteristics that were previously useful in explaining these two variables turn out to be statistically insignificant. In addition, there is no evidence that insider ownership and corporate performance affect each other. This is consistent with the adjustment cost argument. It is also consistent with the “endogeneity” argument suggested by Demsetz [Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375–390.], Demsetz and Lehn [Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.], and Demsetz and Villalonga [Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. The ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209–233.]. Finally, we document that the speed of adjustment of insider ownership is positively related to insiders' market timing but negatively to the number of insiders and that the speed of adjustment of Tobin's Q is positively associated with financial leverage and stock price volatility.     

Corporate social responsibility: An umbrella or a puddle on a rainy day? Evidence surrounding corporate financial misconduct

We examine the way a fraudulent firm's pre‐ and post‐misconduct corporate social responsibility engagement is associated with its stock performance to investigate the reputational role of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the short term, firms with good CSR performance suffer smaller market penalties upon the revelation of financial wrongdoing, supporting the buffer effect, as opposed to the backfire effect, of a good social image. We also find that the misbehaving firms’ post‐misconduct CSR efforts are negatively associated with delisting probabilities, and positively with stock returns. These findings support the argument that increasing post‐crisis CSR engagement can be an effective remedy for a damaged reputation.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

The Pragmatic Theory of the Firm

Four key ideas provide the foundation for the pragmatic theory of the firm, which is expecially useful for managements and boards in developing an understanding of how companies create long‐term value for the benefit of all stakeholders. First, and a necessary point of departure, is clarity about the purpose of the firm. Maximizing shareholder value is viewed not as the social purpose of the firm, but as a consequence of a company's effectiveness in carrying out a purpose that recognizes the benefits of success to all key corporate stakeholders. Second, a company's knowledge‐building proficiency, in relation to that of its competitors, is viewed as the primary determinant of its long‐term performance. Nurturing and sustaining a knowledge‐building culture facilitates the discovery of obsolete assumptions and early adaptation to a changing environment. Third, the theory avoids “compartmentalizing” a company's activities into silos by treating the firm as a holistic system. A key component of the theory that quantifies corporate performance is the life‐cycle framework in which economic returns exhibit “competitive fade” over the long term. This holistic way of thinking provides insights about intangible assets and other sources of excess shareholder returns. Fourth, managing corporate risk should focus on identifying and removing all major obstacles to achieving the firm's purpose. Such obstacles can lead to value destruction through, for example, unethical behavior and all forms of shortsighted failure to recognize and make the most of opportunities to increase long‐run productivity and value. This theory of the firm is pragmatic in the sense that it aims to produce insights about a company's (or business unit's) performance that can improve management's decisions, especially in allocating capital and other corporate resources. The author uses John Deere's life‐cycle track record over the past 60 years to illustrate a successful application of the theory.     

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.