Coordinating unions,wages and employment

Summary In this paper we consider a two-sector economy in which individual unions are affiliated into a federation of unions. We analyze the consequences of two different types of wage setting. Firstly, individual unions set wages in their own sector without taking into account the effect of their wages on the employment level in the other sector. There may be positive as well as negative externalities. A positive (negative) externality may exist if a higher (lower) wage in one sector implies a higher level of employment in the other sector. Both cases may occur in our model. Secondly, wages in the two sectors are set by the federation of unions. We show that in this case higher (lower) wages result than in the first case if a positive (negative) externality exists.Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at seminars at the University of Oldenburg and the University of Groningen and the Fourth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Augsburg, September 2–4, 1989. The authors would like to thank W.H. Buiter, H. van Ees, J. Hartog, Th. v.d. Klundert, S.K. Kuipers, Chr. Mulder and T. van Veen for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

INSTITUTIONAL WAGE EFFECTS: REVISITING UNION AND BARGAINING COUNCIL WAGE PREMIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

The literature on the union wage gap in South Africa is extensive, spanning a range of data sets and methodologies. There is, however, little consensus on the appropriate method to correct for the endogeneity of union membership or the size of the union wage gap. Furthermore, there are very few studies on the bargaining council wage premium in South Africa because of lack of data on the coverage of employees under these agreements. Our study, using 2005 Labour Force Survey data, firstly reconsiders the union wage gap controlling for both firm‐level and job characteristics. When correcting for the endogeneity of union status through a two‐stage selection model and including firm size, type of employment, and non‐wage benefits, we find a much lower union wage premium for African workers in the formal sector than premiums reported in some previous studies. Secondly, our study estimates bargaining council wage premiums for the private and public sectors. We find that extension procedures are present in both private and public bargaining council systems but that unions negotiate for additional gains for their members at the plant level. Furthermore, there is some evidence that unions negotiate for awards for their members in the private sector irrespective of bargaining council coverage.     

Inflation,wage bargaining,wage policy and production structure: Theory and empirical results for the Netherlands

Summary Starting from traditional neo-classical results, a theory is developed in which, in addition to prices, labour productivity and unemployment, the degree of unionization, the profit rate and the shifting-on of direct taxes and social security contributions influence nominal contract wages. A separate theoretical framework is constructed for wage drift.It is furthermore shown how the wage theory presented is related to Friedman-Phelps specifications. After a discussion of wage policy and its potential influence on wages, wage equations are estimated for the key bargaining sector as well as for wage followers. After their characteristics have been dealt with, as well as the effects of wage policy and the role of wage drift, the relationship between key bargaining, inflation and employment is analysed, showing that the model presented is able to explain stagflation.My thanks are due to Mr. H. von Eye for his help in carrying out the calculations and to Mr. A. de Reyger for providing me with the sectoral unionization rates and his general research assistance. Mr. A. J. van Geel kindly prepared the graphs.     

A politicoeconomic model of wage inflation

Summary The paper employs a public choice perspective to develop a model of centralized union wage bargaining. The actors considered are political parties, employers' federations, voters, union officials and members of the rank and file, with the emphasis being put on the latter three. Control theory is used to analyze bargaining outcomes in a dynamic context. The theoretical consequences of the model, which stress the importance of political variables such as government ideology, preferences of the rank and file members, election dates and the degree of union centralization on wage inflation, are supported by West German data.Helpful comments from Chris Goodrich and an anonymous referee of this Journal are gratefully acknowledged.     

The impact of foreign direct investment on wages and employment

This paper studies the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI)on wages and employment When labor-management bargaining isindustry-wide, two effects of FDI are identified; the collusioneffect and the threat-point effect. It is shown that: (i) FDIalways reduces the negotiated wage; (ii) FDI reduces union employmentand the competitive wage if die union cares more about employmentthan wages or is equally concerned about employment and wages.However, if labor-mingement bargaining is firm-specific andunionization is industry-wide, then the above effects of FDIare substantially reduced.     

Cross‐Country Evidence on Labor Market Institutions and Young Adult Employment through the Financial Crisis

I develop and analyze a set of cross‐country facts regarding employment and wage setting institutions over the decade surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. Among long‐industrialized countries, young adult employment declined more than prime age employment over this time period. I show that differences in countries' wage setting institutions strongly predict variations in the magnitude of declines in young adult employment. Both unconditionally and conditional on changes in macroeconomic conditions, young adult employment declined 5 percentage points less in countries where wage setting is driven by collective bargaining arrangements than in countries with statutory wage floors. Evidence on the evolution of legislated minimum wage rates and of an asymmetry in the relationship between growth and young adult employment suggest an important role for a standard “wage rigidity” mechanism.     

Wage formation in the context of collective bargaining

Summary The article analyzes wage developments resulting from collective bargaining between one union representing all employees and one employers' organization representing all employers. The context is an economy consisting of two markets: a labour market and a goods market. An analysis has been made of the costs and benefits for both parties in case of a strike. The strength of both parties has been analyzed, firstly under the assumption of perfect information and thereafter under the assumption of imperfect information. Important determinants of wage increases appear to be the strike costs, the horizon, the bargaining skills and the self confidence of both parties and the wage elasticity of the demand for labour.I acknowledge the helpful comments of Professors Muysken, Kuipers and Pen.     

Trade, capital mobility, and the German labour market

Trade, Capital Mobility, and the German Labour Market. — This paper sets up three structural variants of a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with three sectors (exportables, importables, non-tradables) and three factors (internationally mobile capital and immobile skilled and unskilled labour) in order to analyse the employment and wage effects of globalisation shocks. The model is numerically implemented for West Germany in 1980 on the base of input-output tables and employment data from a random sample of social security accounts. Overall this study indicates that the globalisation process does not have strong effects on unemployment and/or the wage differential in West Germany.     

HOW LARGE IS THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND LABOUR MARKETS

In recent years, the private sector has been recognised as a key engine of Africa's economic development. Yet, very little is known about its size and characteristics. We present novel estimates for 50 African countries and show that the private sector accounts for about two thirds of total investments, four fifths of total consumption and three fourths of total credit. Countries with small private sectors include a sample of oil exporters and some of the poorest countries in the continent. Surprisingly, the size of the private sector does not appear to be significantly correlated with growth performance. Labour market data reinforce the idea of a large private sector, which provides about 90% of total employment opportunities. However, most of this labour is informal and characterised by low productivity: permanent wage jobs in the private sector account on average for only 10% of total employment. South Africa is the notable exception, with formal wage employment in the private sector representing 46% of total employment. Finally, we find evidence of negative private sector earning premiums (?13% on the average), suggesting that market distortions abound. These are likely to prevent the efficient allocation of human resources and to reduce the overall productivity of the African economies.     

Tax Level and Tax Internalization Effects on Union Wage Bargaining

High taxes and generous social benefits are often blamed for causing unemployment. The conventional view is that if taxes on labour are (too) high, jobs will be lost and that generous social benefits will exert an upward pressure on unions' wage claims. In the case where unions co-ordinate their wage bargaining strategy, this need not be the case. A simple model is used to illustrate the effects of the tax rate level and tax internalization on unions' wage bargaining strategy. A high marginal tax rate along with endogeneity of the average tax rate shifts the union's trade-off between wages and employment in favour of the latter. These shifts may have contributed to the success of the so-called polder model or tulip model of the Netherlands.     

The government sector,the export sector and growth

Summary A three-sector, two-input growth model is developed which potentially allows for the separate identification of government and export sector productivity differentials and externality effects. Using data from a limited sample of OECD countries (which are the only countries for which reliable capital stock data are readily available), we find that the export sector is more productive than the rest of the economy, but that neither an externality effect nor a productivity differential can be detected in the case of the government sector.The author wishes to acknowledge financial assistance from a Research Grant from the Division of Commerce of the University of Otago which funded the participation of William M. Jones as research asistant in this work. Thanks are due to Annette Godman for secretarial assistance. The referees of this journal made extensive comments on an earlier version of this paper, and the present version is substantially better thanks to them. Remaining errors are, of course, my responsibility.     

EMPLOYMENT,CAPITAL, AND PRODUCTIVITY DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FROM THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN URUGUAY

Using a sample of Uruguayan manufacturing establishments we analyze employment, capital, and productivity dynamics over a period of currency appreciation; changes in trade policy; and changes in the institutional setting of wage negotiations. As the relative capital–labor price ratio fell, capital intensity increased. At the same time, there was an increase in labor and total factor productivity. Creation and destruction rates were relatively high and pervasive over time, sectors, establishment size, and establishment age, with exits explaining a sizeable part of destruction rates. Most of the excess reallocation was due to movements “within” rather than “between” sectors. Thus, high reallocation rates were linked to establishment‐level heterogeneity rather than aggregate shocks.     

Jobs with different wage determination mechanisms, social efficiency and unemployment

The purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical framework for the labor market, which is composed of a variety of jobs with different wage determination mechanisms. We identify an equilibrium in which some firms post a wage and others bargain with workers. This paper shows that the proportion of firms adopting wage bargaining in a decentralized equilibrium is below the socially optimal level. We identify policies to increase this proportion and to improve social efficiency. Furthermore, we examine the impact of those policies on unemployment. The results of this study will determine the direction of employment policy on the labor market with various employment styles.     

Non-standard Employment in Sweden

In Sweden, as in many other countries, marginal groups tend to be overrepresented in non-standard employment. A decomposition of the employment rate of full-time workers on permanent contracts reveals that non-standard employment contributes to a substantially weaker labour market attachment for females and the foreign born than suggested by conventional employment figures alone. Our econometric analysis shows that the negative wage premia associated with fixed-term employment are considerably smaller in Sweden, both for natives and foreign born, than those that have been found for other countries. This may be due to a highly compressed wage structure and extensive coverage of collective bargaining in Sweden. On the whole, the type of fixed-term contract seems not to matter for the estimated wage premia.     

An Equilibrium Theory of Wage and Employment Cyclicality by Gender and by Industry

This paper presents an equilibrium theory that accounts for how cyclical patterns of employment and real wages vary between genders and across industries. Workers' self-selection of industrial sectors, gender differences in comparative advantage among sectors, sector-nonneutral shocks, and resulting mobility of workers across sectors play the key roles in explaining wage and employment cyclicality by gender and by industry. Numerical simulations demonstrate that reasonable parameter values exist under which the current model accords with several stylized facts. These parameter values are characterized most importantly by men's comparative advantage in the sector subject to larger cyclical demand shocks.     

Trade Union and Global Economic Growth

Abstract

This paper develops a simple framework for examining the role of unions in a global economy. It builds on the model of different institutions by comparing America with a flexible wage and Europe with a rigid wage (the existence of union), where the two areas are integrated via perfect capital mobility. We find the necessary condition that the degree of wage orientation of the union is larger than the firm's bargaining power and determines the positive direction on global economic growth. In addition, the effect of union's bargaining power on global economic growth is ambiguous. If the sum of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour and the output elasticity of labour is smaller than one, or the firms are characterized by a Leontief production function (Harrod–Domar growth model) or an extremely low substituting elasticity (much empirical literature is supported), the union's bargaining power will lead to an increase in the growth of the global economy. In the general Cobb–Douglas production function (Solow–Swan neoclassical growth model), the union's bargaining power will result in a decline in the growth of the global economy.     

Capital mobility and labor market volatility

We used a dynamic two-country optimizing model featuring efficiency wages to analyze the implications of capital mobility for labor market volatility. Capital mobility magnifies the short-run effects of productivity shocks and monetary shocks on employment and the real wage, but dampens the medium-run effects. The overall effects of capital mobility on the volatility and the cyclical properties of employment and the real wage are moderate.     

Sectoral Wage Rigidities and Labour and Product Market Institutions in the Euro Area

We estimate wage Phillips curve relationships between sectoral wage growth, unemployment and productivity in a country-industry panel of euro area countries. We find that institutional rigidities – such as labour and product market institutions and regulations – limit the adjustment of euro area wages to unemployment, in both upturns and downturns, particularly in manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, in the construction and service sectors. In addition, there are further limitations in the response of wages to changes in unemployment during economic downturns which suggests that euro area wages are also characterised by significant downward wage rigidities, especially in the manufacturing sector. These results are robust to specifications that account for factors that may affect structural unemployment (such as duration-dependent unemployment effects), as well as changes in the skill composition of employment that may affect the evolution of aggregate wages. The results also hold for panels including or excluding the public sector (where wages may be determined differently to the private sector also due to the effects of fiscal consolidation on public sector wages during the crisis). From a policy perspective, reforms in product and labour markets which reduce wage rigidities can facilitate employment growth and enhance the rebalancing process in the euro area.     

EVALUATING THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF A WAGE SUBSIDY SCHEME FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Unemployment among semi‐ and unskilled labour has reached severe proportions (over 50%) and threatens the political and economic stability of the South African economy. In this paper a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the South African economy is used to assess the effectiveness of a wage subsidy in raising employment of semi‐ and unskilled workers. We find that employment of semi‐ and unskilled workers can be raised quite significantly. Further, the wage subsidy schemes compares favourably with alternative welfare grant schemes in terms of employment growth. However, the results are sensitive to the targeting of sectors and the substitutability between labour of different skill levels.     

Labour market adjustment a hundred years ago: the case of the Catalan textile industry, 1880–19131

This paper studies the way workers and firms behaved in a highly cyclical sector such as the Catalan cotton textile industry. Using firm level evidence from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the paper shows that, in spite of weak unionization and the lack of regional or local collective bargaining institutions, piece rates in cotton spinning and weaving were not subject to competitive rate cuts and remained fixed over the cycle. When facing a negative demand shock, firms adjusted by reducing output, hours of work, labour productivity, and employment. The paper finally evaluates the possible sources of wage rigidity in the industry.