COMPATIBILITY INCENTIVES OF A LARGE NETWORK FACING MULTIPLE RIVALS*

Under network effects, we analyze when a firm with the largest market share of installed‐base customers prefers incompatibility with smaller rivals that are themselves compatible. With incompatibility, consumers realize that intra‐network competition makes the rivals' network more aggressive than a single‐firm network in adding customers. Consequently, under incompatibility the unique equilibrium can entail tipping away from the largest firm whatever its market share. The largest firm is more likely to prefer incompatibility as its share rises (above fifty per cent is necessary) or the potential to add consumers falls; the number of rivals and strength of network effects have ambiguous implications.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.     

MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS*

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit‐Stiglitz when firms sell multiple products. Both products and firms are (horizontally) differentiated. We propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much (the nested CES is a special case). We use it to determine the market's biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm: firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates over‐entry.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS*

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi‐product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade‐off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price‐coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra‐firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi‐product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit‐sharing, intra‐firm price competition can reduce quality‐adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.     

Product variety and firm survival in the microcomputer software industry

This article provides an analysis of product variety and scope economies in the microcomputer software industry by using detailed firm‐level and product‐level information on firms' bundling of functionalities over application categories and computing platforms. We find that the management of product variety through the way different application categories are integrated in products and the platforms on which these products are offered can be as important as the significance of scope economies at the more aggregated firm level. Specifically, we find that there is little evidence of firm benefits from economies of scope in production, but there is substantial evidence that products benefit from economies of scope in consumption. In addition, we find that firms with products that encapsulate more application categories perform better, and those with products that cover more computing platforms perform worse. Finally, changes in product variety through new product introductions improve firm performance, but extensions to existing products hinder the performance of the firm and the product. We conclude that research in scope economies can benefit from a more detailed model of the evolution of product variety that includes data and analysis at the firm level and at the product level. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐Level Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis

This article analyzes the effect of firm‐level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer–employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, we identify a wage premium associated with firm‐level contracting, which follows a hump‐shaped profile across the wage distribution. Further, the wage differential between workers under firm‐level and broader‐level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to the differences in the regime‐specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm‐specific characteristics for those in the upper tail.     

Product variety and vertical integration

R esearch summary: In vertical relationships, the potential for scale economy in manufacturing often calls for specialization and outsourcing. Specialization, however, depends critically on the stability of the task and contractual environment. In a highly uncertain environment, the need for frequent mutual adjustments favors integration instead of outsourcing. To evaluate vertical relationships in value chains where one stage competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale, we compare operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer. We find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm by aligning incentives and reducing strategic information asymmetry, but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. M anagerial summary: Managers make frequent decisions about outsourcing versus integration. This article helps to crystalize the costs and benefits of integration by pointing to two important factors: the potential for economies of scale and the need for coordination under uncertainty. It studies an industry where one stage of the value chain competes on product variety under great uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale. Based on operations data at about 300 distribution centers within a major soft‐drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an upstream concentrate producer, we find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm (by reducing both stockouts and inventory, and improving sales forecasts), but it worsened coordination for upstream rivals that shared the same downstream facilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

Does product market competition foster corporate social responsibility? Evidence from trade liberalization

This study examines whether product market competition affects corporate social responsibility (CSR). To obtain exogenous variation in product market competition, I exploit a quasi‐natural experiment provided by large import tariff reductions that occurred between 1992 and 2005 in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Using a difference‐in‐differences methodology, I find that domestic companies respond to tariff reductions by increasing their engagement in CSR. This finding supports the view of “CSR as a competitive strategy” that allows companies to differentiate themselves from their foreign rivals. Overall, my results highlight that trade liberalization is an important factor that shapes CSR practices. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Targeting efforts to raise rivals' costs: Moving from “Whether” to “Whom”

Considerable attention has been devoted to determining when a vertically integrated provider (VIP) of an essential input will disadvantage its rivals anticompetitively. In contrast, little attention has been devoted to identifying which of its rivals a VIP will target for cost-raising activities. We identify industry and firm characteristics that render a particular rival a more likely target for a VIP's cost-raising activities. The potential for targeted “sabotage” introduces many subtleties, including the fact that a VIP typically prefers to sabotage an industry leader under retail quantity competition but an industry follower under price competition.     

Nested identities as cognitive drivers of strategy

Research Summary: Organizations face tensions to conform to industry norms for legitimacy yet differentiate for competitive advantage when implementing strategies. We suggest this tension is due to and resolved through organizations’ cognitive negotiations of multiple levels of identity. Through an inductive study in the recreational vehicle industry, we find that organizations concurrently draw on identities at the organizational, industry, and strategic group levels to formulate and enact specific competitive actions. Specifically, we find that organizational identity relates to decisions on product offerings; industry identity relates to downstream strategy; and strategic group identity relates to upstream strategy, firm boundaries, and expansion mode. Our findings highlight the importance of strategic group identity and inform a grounded model describing how organizations draw upon different levels of identity to influence strategy. Managerial Summary: Many managers experience tensions of differentiating their firms’ competitive actions from rivals, while conforming with industry norms and practices. In this article, we argue that a manager can navigate these tensions by understanding their firm, strategic group, and industry identities and how these identities interrelate. Through a qualitative case study of the U.S. recreational vehicle industry, we show that each level of identity influences different competitive actions, with firm identity connected to product offerings, industry identity related to managing downstream distribution, and strategic group identity related to firm boundary and acquisition strategies. Overall, strategic group identity is the most critical for managers as this level filters how they view competitors and provides the rules of competition.     

Incremental and Radical Innovation in Coopetition—The Role of Absorptive Capacity and Appropriability

This study examines why some firms are better able than others to reap benefits from collaborating with their competitors in innovation. Whereas on the general level, collaborative innovation has been studied widely, and firm‐specific success factors in collaboration between competitors (i.e., coopetition) have not been exhaustively addressed. Earlier literature describes coopetition as a risky but potentially rewarding relationship in which sharing, learning, and protection of knowledge are recognized as the key issues determining the possible benefits and hazards. This study provides evidence of factors related to this, suggesting that the firm's ability to acquire knowledge from external sources (potential absorptive capacity) and to protect its innovations and core knowledge against imitation (appropriability regime) are relevant in increasing the innovation outcomes of collaborating with its competitors. This study also distinguishes between incremental and radical innovations as an outcome of coopetition, and provides differing implications for the two innovation types. The empirical evidence for the study was gathered from a cross‐industry survey conducted on Finnish markets. The data are analyzed with multivariate multiple regression analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that (1) potential absorptive capacity and appropriability regime of the firm both have a positive effect in the pursuit of incremental innovations in coopetition, and (2) in the case of radical innovations, appropriability regime has a positive effect, while the effect of absorptive capacity is not statistically significant. However, the results also indicate that there is a moderating relationship between these variables, in that the potential absorptive capacity is positively associated with creation of radical innovations within high levels of appropriability regime. These results yield important theoretical and managerial implications. As a whole, the results presented in this study provide new evidence on which types of firms can reap success in the challenging task of collaborative innovation with rivals. In the case of incremental innovation, a firm‐level emphasis on knowledge sharing and learning will positively affect the results of coopetition, as will an emphasis on knowledge protection. Thus, when incremental developments are pursued in coopetition, firms should not only seek to exchange knowledge to create value but also remember to secure the firm‐specific core knowledge within the firm's borders to stay competitive. On the other hand, when the firm is pursuing radical innovation with its rivals, the heaviest emphasis should be on protecting its existing core knowledge and also emerging novel innovations and market opportunities. Capabilities in knowledge acquisition are also beneficial in these cases, but the full benefits of knowledge exchange realize only when the firm's knowledge protection mechanisms are sufficiently strong, allowing for safe knowledge exchange between rivals.     

Detecting the relationship between competitive intensity and firm product line length: Evidence from the worldwide mobile phone industry

The way firms lengthen or shorten their product line with respect to rivals is regarded as one of the possible strategies firms can pursue to respond to competition. This article builds and tests hypotheses to study the effect of different levels of competitive intensity on product line length. The empirical analysis of data on 3,527 handset models introduced by 66 mobile phone vendors from 1994 to 2010 shows a consistent inverse U‐shaped relationship between competitive intensity and the firm's product line length. In this way, we pinpoint an interesting link between the product line extension literature and the competitive dynamics and competitive intensity perspectives. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Competition and Managerial Incentives: Board Independence,Information and Predation

We show that the choice of an independent board serves as a commitment by management that it will abstain from ex post decisions that are not in shareholder interests. However, an independent board, relying on product market information to make or approve strategic decisions, also makes the firm more vulnerable to predatory information manipulation by its industry rivals. The optimal board type trades off the cost of the agency problem with that from predation. We show that only for weaker firms is an independent board the better choice, and for such firms, increased competition makes board independence even more beneficial.     

Choose to Fight or Choose to Flee? A Network Embeddedness Perspective of Executive Ship Jumping in Declining Firms

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship‐jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network‐based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive‐level ship‐jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship‐jumping decision. Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (*ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U‐shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well‐established firm‐level alliance network discourage the ship‐jumping choice. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,IMITATION, AND THE INCENTIVES FOR COST REDUCING R&D EFFORT*

I develop and test a model of strategic R&D investments where innovating and non‐innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals. I find that a larger proportion of non‐innovating rivals stimulates cost‐reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level R&D. Key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of R&D, using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of U.S. industrial R&D. Results also suggest that R&D and size are simultaneously determined, with R&D being proportional to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.     

Model Exit in a Vertically Differentiated Market: Interfirm Competition versus Intrafirm Cannibalization in the Computer Hard Disk Drive Industry

What characteristics of a product’s local market make its withdrawal more likely? This study investigates the importance of intrafirm “cannibalization” of a product’s demand by products manufactured by the same firm versus interfirm competition from others’ products. While both forces impact product withdrawal, cannibalization has a more robust and significant effect. Hedonic price regressions also reveal higher discounting of older models’ quality-adjusted prices, strengthening the argument for caution when treating list prices as proxies for transaction prices.     

Platform competition: Strategic trade‐offs in platform markets

Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribes rapidly expanding a network of platform users and complementary applications to capture entire markets. We challenge the unconditional logic of a winner‐take‐all (WTA) approach by empirically analyzing the dominant strategies used to build and position platform systems in the U.S. video game industry. We show that when platform firms pursue two popular WTA strategies concurrently and with equal intensity (growing the number and variety of applications while also securing a larger fraction of those applications with exclusivity agreements), it diminishes the benefits of each strategy to the point that it lowers platform performance. We also show that a differentiation strategy based on distinctive positioning improves a platform's performance only when a platform system is highly distinctive relative to its rivals. Our results suggest that platform competition is shaped by important strategic trade‐offs and that the WTA approach will not be universally successful. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product line strategies of new entrants in an established industry: evidence from the U.S. bicycle industry

A firm's product line breadth in a given market has both benefits and costs; these effects can be more clearly seen by examining not only the number of products a firm offers, but also the degree of complexity that the product line represents. The effects of breadth are particularly important for new entrants in a relatively mature industry and I examine the breadth–survival relation on new entrants in the bicycle industry in the period 1993–98. I find that firms offering a greater number of products, those with very simple and very complex product lines, and those whose product lines have a moderate degree of overlap with rivals have the highest survival rates. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Frictions in Routine Execution on Economies of Scope

Research summary: Based on a detailed database of a beverages producer‐distributor that expanded its product variety by leveraging its logistic network, we show that product diversification generates economies of scope and also higher operational costs. The result is an inverted‐U relationship between variety and productivity: When the firm offers few additional categories, productivity grows, but as the number of categories rises, the costs of executing the operational routines increase rapidly and productivity falls. The negative effect on productivity increases if the added product category is more dissimilar to previous ones, and decreases with learning from operational experience. Our results highlight how frictions at the operational level can limit the benefits of diversification, even in the absence of other sources of diseconomies, such as increased coordination needs. Managerial summary: One of the prevalent reasons for companies to expand to adjacent product lines is attaining economies of scope. However, such growth strategy also generates operational frictions, even if the day‐to‐day routines do not appear to change at all. Product diversity is disruptive for routine execution, as it requires coordination and exception handling, and may ultimately overcome any efficiency obtained from growth. We estimate the relevance of such operational friction using data from a beverages distribution network. When product variety is low, additional categories do generate efficiency, but after reaching a given threshold, friction prevails. We find that operational friction increases when products are more dissimilar, but is attenuated when workers learn from their own and other's experience. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.