The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

INTERSTATE BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF BANK MERGERS

We examine a sample of 443 bank mergers between publicly traded banks announced during the 1990s to investigate empirically the role of full interstate banking deregulation. The pre‐deregulation 1990s are characterized by value creation, with mergers involving a high degree of branch overlap experiencing significant announcement gains. Bank mergers in the post‐deregulation 1990s, however, fail to create value, and mergers with a high degree of branch overlap actually experience significant losses. Consistent with prior research, these valuation consequences are magnified for large bank mergers in the 1990s. Overall, our results are consistent with the broader literature on corporate control, suggesting that an economic shock can materially alter industry structure and the economic rationale for the efficient reallocation of assets through merger activity.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Competition and Concentration in the New European Banking Landscape

This paper measures the degree of concentration and competition in the enlarged European Union (EU) banking environment over the period 1998–2002. In the empirical part we opt for a methodology as proposed by Panzar and Rosse based on a non‐structural estimation of market competition. Our results suggest that European banks were operating under conditions of monopolistic competition and that bank interest revenues in the 10 new EU member states was earned under conditions of higher competition than those that existed in the old EU banking countries. The opposite result was observed for total operating revenues. Smaller banks earn interest income in a less competitive environment than larger banks, while the opposite is observed for total revenues.     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.     

The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic Deregulation in Banking: Implications for Productive Efficiency

Deregulation of geographic restrictions in banking over the past 20 years has intensified both potential and actual competition in the industry. The accumulating empirical evidence suggests that potential efficiency gains associated with consolidating banks are often not realized. We evaluate the impact of this increased competition on the productive efficiency of non-merging banks confronted with new entry in their local markets and find that the incumbent banks respond by improving cost efficiency. Thus, studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare-enhancing aspect of merger activity.     

Noninterest Income and Financial Performance at U.S. Commercial Banks

Noninterest income now accounts for over 40% of operating income in the U.S. commercial banking industry. This paper demonstrates a number of empirical links between bank noninterest income, business strategies, market conditions, technological change, and financial performance between 1989 and 2001. The results indicate that well‐managed banks expand more slowly into noninterest activities, and that marginal increases in noninterest income are associated with poorer risk‐return tradeoffs on average. These findings suggest that noninterest income is coexisting with, rather than replacing, interest income from the intermediation activities that remain banks' core financial services function.     

The effects of reform on China’s bank structure and performance

This paper investigates the relationship between market structure and performance in China’s banking system from 1985 to 2002, a period when this sector was subject to gradual but notable reform. Using panel data estimation techniques, both the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses are tested. In addition, the model is extended to consider issues such as the impact of bank size/ownership and whether the big four banks enjoy a “quiet life”. On average, X-efficiency declined significantly and most banks were operating below scale efficient levels. Estimation of the structure–performance models lends some support to the relative market-power hypothesis in the early period. The reforms had little impact on the structure of China’s banking sector, though the “joint stock” banks became relatively more X-efficient. There was no evidence to support the quiet-life hypothesis, probably because strict interest rate controls prevented the state banks from earning monopoly profits. Thus the ongoing liberalisation of interest rates should be accompanied by reduced concentration. Overall, to improve competitive structure, new policies should be directed at encouraging market entry and increasing the market share of the most efficient banks.     

Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.     

The impact of European bank mergers on bidder default risk

We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However, for relatively safe banks, mergers generate a significant increase in default risk. This result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a risk-reducing and stabilizing effect on the European banking industry.     

A Test of the Law of One Price in Retail Banking

This paper investigates the level and the determinants of retail banking interest rate differences among Spanish banks in the period 1989–2003. We find that the interest rates of twenty five different bank loan and deposit products adjust rather rapidly to their long-term values in response to external shocks, as the relative version of the Law of One Price predicts, but the evidence runs contrary to the absolute version of the Law. Credit risk premium, part of the marginal cost of the loans granted by a particular bank, is an important source of interest rate dispersion across banks and loan products, both before and after Spain joined the Euro zone. Therefore, differences in credit risk policies across banks must be taken into account when forming expectations about European retail banking integration.     

The Effect of Bank Debt Downgrades on Stock Prices of Other Banks

We find that debt downgrades of money center banks elicit negative stock price responses in nondowngraded money center banks. Stock prices of larger regional banks also react to these downgrades. Although downgrades of regional banks evoke negative stock price responses for regional banks in the same geographic region, the importance of geographic region as a factor determining the extent of intra‐industry reactions has diminished since 1989. Our results indicate that the merger and expansion activities triggered by interstate banking have blurred differences between regional and money center banks as interstate banking activity has moved towards nationwide banking     

Financial crises and the asymmetric relation between returns on banks,risk factors,and other industry portfolio returns

We show that the relations between the returns on the banking industry, risk factors, and other industries often are asymmetric. Lagged banking industry returns seem to improve predictability but the positive impact of a 1‐month lag of the return on the banking portfolio is much higher in the lower part of the return distribution. However, after the Dodd‐Frank Act in 2010, the cross‐autocorrelation with banks is changed and becomes negative in the upper part of the distribution. Returns on banks also seem to lead returns on five risk factors. This relation, however, is not robust across the distribution.     

Are foreign banks more profitable than domestic banks? Home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, governance, and supervision

Using both bank- and country-level data on banking sectors from 70 countries over the period 1992-2006, this paper empirically investigates the joint home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, macroeconomic condition, governance, and changes in bank supervision on foreign bank margins. We find that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks when they operate in a host country whose banking sector is less competitive and when the parent bank in the home country is highly profitable. Moreover, when foreign banks operate in a host country with lower growth rates of GDP, higher interest and inflation rates, and more stringent regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights, their margins increase. Specifically, changes in bank supervision of a parent bank’s ownership restrictiveness in the home country significantly increases foreign bank margins, while supervisory changes in regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights in the host country enhances foreign bank margins.     

Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition

Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide micro‐level (within‐county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger‐induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

Banks’ earnings: Empirical evidence of the influence of economic and financial market factors

The structure of income is a foremost address within research on banks’ performance, especially with regard to effects on the resilience of banks’ earnings. Indeed, given their central position in the economy, banks shall thrive to generate sustainable earnings and control for their potential volatility. Existing studies mostly consider the weight of non‐net interest income (nonNII) as opposed to the traditional NII income source. Such aggregated nonNII is found to increase earnings risk but more granular studies conflict. We propose an original investigation of the influence of economic and financial conditions on various income types, assuming that performance may actually be driven by both the income structure and external conditions. We focus European banks, which have long been allowed to diversify beyond retail banking. Out of a straight panel framework, we question if the influence of external conditions spreads to earnings components other than credit losses and trading income and if it does allow for diversification benefits among components. We find that each component actually evolves owing to its own equation. Furthermore, effects of single variables may cumulate over different components of earnings (e.g. GDP) or provide with diversification benefits. These effects are all the more important since they are not mitigated by operating expenses. Hence, over a regarded period, banks’ performance depends upon their structure of income and upon volatilities and correlations of influential variables. Besides controlling for ex‐ante volatility, our approach shows that a given structure of income is not necessarily more resilient than others but that selected non‐banking income may support a higher stability of Earnings     

Bank activity and funding strategies: The impact on risk and returns

This paper examines the implications of bank activity and short-term funding strategies for bank risk and return using an international sample of 1,334 banks in 101 countries leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Expansion into noninterest income-generating activities such as trading increases the rate of return on assets, and it could offer some risk diversification benefits at very low levels. Nondeposit, wholesale funding in contrast lowers the rate of return on assets, while it can offer some risk reduction at commonly observed low levels of nondeposit funding. A sizable proportion of banks, however, attract most of their short-term funding in the form of nondeposits at a cost of enhanced bank fragility. Overall, banking strategies that rely prominently on generating noninterest income or attracting nondeposit funding are very risky, consistent with the demise of the US investment banking sector.     

The Euro and the Changing Face of European Banking: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

During the last fifteen years, the European banking industry has experienced considerable consolidation through mergers and acquisitions against the background of the introduction of the single currency and reductions in cross‐border barriers. This paper investigates whether these changes impacted on announcement period gains of the banks acquiring targets by examining the pre‐euro, run‐up to the euro and post euro eras. Evidence suggests bidders' gains have fallen with the development of economic and monetary union. It also reveals significant differences in the gains from acquisitions within and outside the eurozone. These results are consistent with increased competition among bidders and increased integration of the market in the eurozone area in the post‐euro era. However, differing results relating to focused and diversifying bids suggest that the level of market integration is sector dependent.     

Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator's competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behavior can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators' ability to stem panics ex post.