Social class and the fertility transition: a critical comment on the statistical results reported in Simon Szreter's Fertility,class and gender in Britain, 1860–19401

Simon Szreter's book Fertility, class and gender in Britain, 1860–1940 argues that social and economic class fails to explain the cross‐sectional differences in marital fertility as reported in the 1911 census of England and Wales. Szreter's conclusion made the book immediately influential, and it remains so. This finding matters a great deal for debates about the causes of the European fertility decline of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For decades scholars have argued whether the main forces at work were ideational or social and economic. This note reports a simple graphical and statistical re‐analysis of Szreter's own data. We show that social class does explain cross‐sectional differences in English marital fertility in 1911.     

Rebuttal to Barnes and Guinnane

Barnes and Guinnane's ‘Rejoinder’ repeats their previous argument that the professional model of fertility decline produces statistical results which they see as impressive. They continue to ignore the evidence presented in part II of Fertility, class and gender, summarized in my reply to their original article, that the design of the model is both conceptually flawed and methodologically incoherent. It is reaffirmed that therefore its statistical results should be treated with all due scepticism in terms of their historical significance and capacity to inform us about the relationship between changing reproductive behaviour and the complexities of social class relations. Alternative approaches, liberated from the simplifying limitations of the professional model, are required to advance our understanding of the relationship between fertility change and social class.     

Recent declines in fertility in less developed countries,and what ‘population planners’ may learn from them

Significant and rapid fertility declines have occurred in many countries in the poor world over the past decade; many of these were unanticipated by demographers. Despite advances in statistical technique and demographic theory, little is yet known about the demographic rhythms of life in poor countries, or of the social forces behind them. Fertility decline, however, appears to have much to do with changes, economic and otherwise, within the family structure. The impact of ‘family planning’ programmes on fertility decline appears to have been exaggerated. ‘Population planners’ should be sensitive to the fact that a decline in fertility does not necessarily mean that an improvement in the standard of living has occurred, and they should not assume that reducing fertility automatically increases either the quality of life or the prospects for ‘development’.     

Are children poor men's riches?

Abstract

Extract

Fertility declined fairly simultaneously in most western countries nearly a century ago. The question of which social groups were early in starting the decline is thought to have been answered: the common assertion is that the highest social groups started to control their fertility and, as time passed, that their new reproductive behaviour percolated down through the social layers. The current project on the secular decline in fertility in Norway has revealed that the families at the very top of the social hierarchy were the national pioneers in family limitation. The hypothesis in this article is, however, that family limitation in Norway also had an independent point of departure in the rural lower classes. In this article, I will therefore challenge the ‘general truth’ that there is always an inverse relationship between fertility and social status in the initial phase of the secular decline in fertility.     

Fertility Change in Asia and Africa

There have been profound changes in fertility rates in Asia and Africa in the past two to three decades. The availability of new data allows a closer examination of fertility trends and underlying causes than has hitherto been possible. This collection brings together evidence on fertility decline in India, China, and a number of African countries. The papers examine the role of different explanatory factors in lowering fertility, including female education, declines in child mortality, urbanization, and the spread of mass media and “modern” consumer culture. The relative importance of female education as an explanatory factor vis-à-vis other factors is examined, with specific reference to India. The papers also explore the impact of the decline in birth rates for ageing and social security reform as well as health policy.     

Colonial companies and the cost of introducing Indian immigrants into Fiji, 1884–1916

Using Fiji as a case study, I conduct the first cost accounting of government-run Indian indentureship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I analyse multiple official data sources and estimate the total cost of bringing Indians to Fiji was £926,851, roughly a fifth of Fiji's reported expenditure. Businesses funded 92.6% of this cost. However, business payments to the government do not appear in official Blue Books. Incorporating business payments shows that both official revenue and expenditure were underestimated by 15%. My results show how one part of colonialism was funded and how colonial fiscal capacity may be underestimated more broadly.     

Half the power,half the income and half the glory,the use of microeconomic theory in women's emancipation research

Summary Major fields of economic research to understand the development of women's integration into the economy and women's economic independence can be categorized into three main groups. First, theories that attempt to explain wage and earnings differences according to gender; second, theories that attempt to explain the division of work within the family, and third, theories that attempt to explain the determination of fertility and the combination of work and motherhood. This paper offers a review of these three areas of neo-classical theory as well as an evaluation as to what extent the theories are adequate to answer the questions of women's emancipation research.This article is a revised version of my inaugural speech held on May 30th, 1990, at the official assumption of the chair of Labour market issues with special attention to women's emancipation, at the University of Amsterdam. Comments on earlier drafts have been received by Marga Bruyn-Hundt, Joop Hartog, Jan Hoem, Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink, Notburga Ott, Hettie Pott-Buter, Jolande Sap, Kea Tijdens, the participants of the demographic colloquium at Stockholm University, and the editor ofDe Economist.     

The political economy of agrarian reform in Yucatán, Mexico

Fundamental land tenure reform in Yucatán has been characterized by declining productivity in the henequén ejidos (collectives), and the Banco Rural — which supervises and finances the ejidos — has sustained chronic, burgeoning operational losses. Several related causes account for the economic failure of the Reforma Agraria: (1) the disruption of the spatial unity and organizational integrity of the expropriated agroindustrial estates, (2) the perverse incentive structure facing the ejidatarios, the presumed ‘owners’ of the collective ejidos, (3) the debilitating corruption that has characterized the official bank's management of the ejidos, (4) the primacy of the federal government's and the official party's political/ social goals in the state over economic/market considerations.     

Pestilence,poverty, and provision: re‐evaluating the role of the popolani in early modern Venice

The labouring classes of early modern Venice, the popolani, made up nearly 90 per cent of the city's population. To this point the relevant historiography has focused almost exclusively on their professional and civic role. It is the core contention of this article that the contribution of the popolani to the Venetian economy and society far exceeded their documented professional and civic function. Using as a case study the homogeneous group of the shipbuilders and sailors of Venice and drawing on newly discovered primary sources from the Venetian State Archives, this article shows the distinct contributions of the popolani to the city's economy and society through their charity to those in need. This took the form of sizeable dotal and charitable donations within and beyond the family. In one of the first attempts to explore the philanthropy of the Venetian workforce, this article challenges the existing scholarly view that charity was the sole responsibility of the government and the nobility in early modern Venice. It further shows that marriage was not merely a financial union for the popolani; it was a sanctuary for lasting companionship. Ultimately, the article offers a fresh vista onto the socio‐economic role of the popolani in early modern Venice.     

Regions and time in the European fertility transition: problems in the Princeton Project’s statistical methodology1

Much empirical social‐science research, including work in economic and demographic history, has relied on the analysis of published information on administrative districts. One famous example of this type of research, the Princeton Project on the Decline of Fertility in Europe (EFP), was carried out at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research in the 1960s and 1970s. This project aimed to characterize the decline of fertility that took place in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The project’s summary statements argued that social and economic forces played little role in bringing about the fertility transition. A central feature of the EFP argument is a series of statistical exercises which purport to show that changes in economic and social conditions exerted little influence on fertility. Two recent articles on Germany for this period have used similar data and methods to draw different conclusions. We show that the difference reflects problems in the Princeton project’s statistical methods. Those problems affect, potentially, virtually all quantitative research of this type. Our findings suggest cautious re‐thinking of conclusions based on this type of evidence, starting with the EFP.     

Welfare State, Market Imperfections, and International Trade

Within a two-sector-two-country model of trade with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, a more generous welfare state in one country increases welfare in that country and can have positive spillover effects on the other. Furthermore, synchronised expansions of social security are more welfare enhancing than unilateral ones. Our results counter the fears that a race to the bottom in social standards may result from the ‘shrinking-tax-base’ entailed by international capital mobility. While affecting trade patterns and income distribution, capital mobility interacts with welfare state policies in increasing welfare, even when capital flows out of the country that initiates the shock.

Upward mobility and the demand for children: Evidence from China

This paper aims to investigate a new determinant of the demand for children: upward mobility. Upward mobility can affect the demand for children in two opposite directions: upward mobility means more resources to spend on childbearing and increases the demand for children; it also lowers the need to rely on children for old-age support and this leads to lower demand for children. In this paper, we use the difference between the subject's self-evaluations of the future and current social class as the measure of upward mobility, and fertility desire to represent the demand for children. Using the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) data, we find that upward mobility significantly increases the demand for children, and the results are robust across various model specifications (pooled data regression, Poisson regression, and IV regression). The effect is concentrated among affluent and/or urban households, suggesting that those from more advantaged social-economic backgrounds appear to have a higher elasticity of fertility in response to upward mobility. Our results imply that improving upward mobility and public services such as education, health care, and social security would be effective to boost fertility in China.     

Inpres and Inequality: A Distributional Perspective on the Centre's Regional Disbursements 1

Central government funding of local expenditures under the Inpres programs is a potentially important policy instrument for redressing regional inequalities in Indonesia. This paper examines the implicit distributional objectives underlying Inpres. The scheme is modelled as the outcome of a constrained social choice problem facing the centre. An econometric model of Inpres allocations is used to identify the centre's implicit social preferences over alternative regional distributions of consumption. Mild absolute-inequality aversion is revealed, although it is somewhat swamped by province-specific preference factors related to population size and density. No other local welfare indicators appear to influence Inpres allocations.     

Women's work and wages in the sixteenth century and Sweden's position in the ‘little divergence’

We use a unique source from the Swedish royal demesnes to examine the work and relative wages of women in sixteenth-century Sweden, an economic laggard in the early modern period. The source pertains to workers hired on yearly contracts, a type more representative of historical labour markets than day labour on large construction sites, and this allows us to observe directly the food consumed by workers. We speak to the debate on the ‘little divergence’ within Europe, as women's work and gender differentials in pay is a key indicator of women's relative autonomy and seen as a cause for the economic ascendency of the North Sea region during the period. We find small gender differentials among both unskilled and skilled workers, indicating that Sweden was a part of the ‘golden age’ for women. We argue that despite superficial equality, women's economic outlooks were restrained in many other ways – including their access to higher-skilled work and jobs in the expanding parts of the economy – adding important nuance to the discussion about the relationship between women's social position and economic growth in the early modern period.     

Book reviews

Books reviewed in this article: GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND A. R. Bridbury, The English economy from Bede to the Reformation Eric Kerridge, The common fields of England R. H. Britnell, The commercialisation of English society, 1000-1500 P. J. P. Goldberg, Women, work, and life cycle in a medieval economy: women in York and Yorkshire, c. 1300-1520 Margaret MacCurtain and Mary O'Dowd, eds., Women in early modern Ireland Lawrence Stone, Uncertain unions: marriage in England, 1660-1753 D. Kynaston, Cazenove and Co.: a history Alastair J. Reid, Social classes and social relations in Britain, 1850-1914 Edward H. Lorenz, Economic decline in Britain: the shipbuilding industry, 1890-1970 Eric Hopkins, The rise and decline of the English working classes, 1918-1990: a social history Philip Williamson, National crisis and National Government: British politics, the economy and the empire, 1926-1932 Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, 'Goodbye, Great Britain': the 1976 IMF crisis GENERAL A. Forrest and P. Jones, eds., Reshaping France: town, country and region during the French Revolution Richard Vinen, The politics of French business, 1936-1945 Clara Eugenia Núñez, La fuente de la riqueza: educación y desarrollo económico en las España contemporánea Aurel Schubert, The Credit Anstalt crisis of 1931 Bo Sandelin, ed., The history of Swedish economic thought Youssef Cassis, ed., Finance and financiers in European history, 1880-1960 Peter Mathias and John A. Davis, eds., Innovation and technology in Europe: from the eighteenth century to the present day Teresa L. Amott and Julie A. Matthaei, Race, gender and work: a multicultural economic history of women in the United States David E. Nye, Electrifying America: social meanings of a new technology, 1880-1940 James Schwoch, The American radio industry and its Latin American activities, 1900-1939 Chan Wai Kuan, The making of Hong Kong society: three studies of class formation in early Hong Kong Penelope Francks, Japanese economic development: theory and practice Y. S. Brenner, Hartmut Kaelble, and Mark Thomas, eds., Income distribution in historical perspective H. F. Gospel, ed., Industrial training and technological innovation: a comparative and historical study     

Comparing family changes in two rural areas of Kenya: Past legacies and present realities

ABSTRACT

Fertility in Kenya declined from total fertility rate (TFR) 6.7 to 4.6 between 1989 and 2008/09. Initially, Western and Coast Provinces returned figures above and below the national average with TFR 8.1 and 5.4 respectively. Then fertility in Western Province declined substantially to TFR 5.6 while in Coast Province the decline was modest to TFR 4.8, above the national average in both provinces. I shall scrutinise this development by examining two rounds of qualitative case studies in rural villages in the two provinces, first in 1988–90 with a follow up in 2011. The analysis revealed that over time fewer children were born in the Western villages, but more in the Coast villages. The hypothesis is that differences in cultural (patriarchy and a mix of matriarchy and patriarchy) and religious (Christian and Muslim) legacies are crucial to understanding such disparities in childbearing. Attention is given to marriage, gender relations and female education.     

Ready to stop: socioeconomic status and the fertility transition in Stockholm, 1878–1926

The western fertility decline is arguably the most significant demographic change to have occurred in the past 200 years, yet its causes and processes are still shrouded in ambiguity due to a lack of individual‐level longitudinal data. A growing body of research has helped improve our understanding of the decline's causes by examining the development of socioeconomic differences in fertility using historical micro‐data, but these have largely only considered rural areas where fertility was generally slower to decline. This article contributes to the literature by utilizing individual‐level data from the Roteman Database for Stockholm, Sweden between 1878 and 1926 to examine the association of socioeconomic status and fertility and the adoption of stopping behaviour during the city's transition. Using piecewise constant hazard models and logistic regression, we find that a clear class pattern arises in which the elite were early practitioners of fertility control, followed by the working classes. As the transition unfolded, socioeconomic differences in stopping behaviour disappeared and overall fertility differentials were also minimized, both of them being consistent with patterns observed in rural populations. The implications of these findings for major explanations of the decline are discussed in the concluding section.     

Genes and Social Mobility: A Case for Progressive Income Tax

Abstract

The effect of ability inheritance on income distribution and social mobility is analyzed with an emphsis on the role of progressive income tax. Epstein–Zin style utility function is used to highlight the role of risk aversion. The result shows that higher genetic inheritability leads to lower per capita income, higher income variance and lower aggregate welfare at the steady state. This tendency is intensified when the elasticity of a child's income to parent's educational investment is higher. In this setup, it is shown that progressive income tax can be a welfare-enhancing tool by increasing social mobility. The optimal progressive income tax rate is obtained in the benchmark model and its positive effect is discussed in the context of “Veil of ignorance”, a concept proposed by Rawls (A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, University Press), 1971).     

Land,ladies, and the law: a case study on women's land rights and welfare in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century†

This study evaluates women's de jure and de facto land rights and their implications for household welfare in nineteenth‐century Bangkok. Women constituted a significant share of agricultural landowners holding government‐issued land deeds in central Siam (now Thailand)—a pattern that stands in contrast to both historical and contemporary developing economy contexts where the structure of land rights often favours men. The findings show, through both direct and indirect evidence, that women's de jure rights were upheld in practice. Women made significantly more agricultural investments than male or mixed‐gender owners, which supports the assertion that women perceived their land rights as secure under Siam's traditional usufruct land rights system. An assessment of land‐related court cases directly supports our claim, showing that women in Siam had access to legal representation and were protected when their land rights were challenged by investors and local elites in the context of high demand for both agricultural and urban land. Such secure land rights helped preserve women's livelihoods as agriculturists and household well‐being. We estimate that the median female‐owned orchard could support 10 adults annually, achieving a standard of living comparable to unskilled labourer households in Beijing and Milan during the same period.     

Love,life, and “leftover ladies” in urban China: Staying modernly single in patriarchal traditions

The population in urban China has shown rising age at first marriage and declining marriage rates, especially among college educated professional women who are in their late 20s or their 30s. We investigate the determinants of marriage formation for urban women aged 27 or above who tend to be termed “leftover ladies”. We estimate a recursive mixed-equation model to describe correlated profiles of career, education and marriage. Conventional social norms on gender, especially patriarchy, still prevail. Factors that are not favorable for a conventionally wifely role reduce women's likelihood of marriage. In particular, we reveal a “marital college-discount” of college education. It reduces the probability of marriage by 2.88%–3.6% and a postgraduate degree further oppresses it by 8.4%–10.4%. Favorable characteristics such as facial attractiveness only raises the likelihood of marriage formation for non-college educated women, while pushing up non-marriage probabilities for women with at least college degrees.