THE DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS: A NEW EMPIRICAL APPROACH

The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings by, firstly, showing empirically that there is a probable bias in the results obtained by previous studies and, secondly, to combine a General‐to‐Specific (GETS) model selection strategy with Dynamic Panel Data estimation techniques to resolve these biases. The results are encouraging: the preferred model is not only statistically adequate, but also economically significant and consistent with the categories of variables deemed to be important by the agencies who construct sovereign credit ratings.     

Deciphering Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Credit Rating Disagreements

This study investigates the role of tax avoidance in the credit‐rating process and whether differences exist in how rating agencies account for the risk relevance of tax avoidance. Using a sample of initial credit ratings assigned to public debt issuances during 1994–2013, our evidence is consistent with Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's assessing the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance differently from one another, resulting in more frequent and pronounced rating agency disagreement. Rating agency disagreement over tax avoidance is most evident when it is accompanied by relatively high levels of uncertain tax positions, foreign activities, research and development activities, or tax footnote opacity. We also find evidence that decreases (increases) in tax avoidance or tax footnote disclosure opacity are positively (negatively) associated with the convergence of split ratings. This suggests that firms can exacerbate or mitigate rating agency disagreement subsequent to bond issuance. Our study complements prior research by examining why sophisticated information intermediaries disagree about the risk relevance of tax avoidance. It also sheds light on how firms can influence rating agencies’ understanding of tax avoidance.     

Assessing Local Government Debt Risks in China: A Case Study of Local Government Financial Vehicles

Strong credit expansion in China after the recent global financial crisis has brought local government financial vehicles (LGFV) into the spotlight. Rapid growth of LGFV has triggered concern about local government indebtedness, banks' asset quality and, more broadly, China's medium‐term financial stability and sovereign risk. This paper constructs a unique firm‐level dataset to evaluate the country's local government debt. We find an uneven distribution of LGFV, which are concentrated in the coastal areas, and a deterioration of their debt repaying ability from 2010 to 2012. We use principal component analysis (PCA) along with multivariate discriminate analysis (MDA) to identify the credit risk of LGFV based on conventional financial variables as well as local governments' fiscal status. We also estimate the safe boundaries of debt bearing at the provincial government level. The estimations reveal more severe local government debt risks in the middle‐western provinces and higher risks associated with LGFV at the municipal and county levels. Although it is very unlikely that there will be a national debt crisis in China, the high risk of LGFV should be noted and effectively controlled by improving the fiscal transparency of local governments and reforming the fiscal system.     

The failure of ‘nationalization by attraction’: Britain's cross‐class alliance against earnings‐related pensions in the 1950s1

In 1957, the Labour Party published radical proposals for a state earnings‐related pension scheme (‘national superannuation’) whose funds were to be invested in stock markets to generate high returns, and to help modernize and dynamize the British economy. This article explores a sophisticated campaign against the proposal by the insurance industry, and the resistance of the unions. In doing so, it considers the implications of this cross‐class alliance, not least in terms of a possible missed opportunity to build a ‘developmental state’ in the UK, but also in terms of the country's increasingly inadequate and inequitable system of pension provision.     

The credit relationship between Henry III and merchants of Douai and Ypres, 1247–70

This article looks at an important but neglected aspect of medieval sovereign debt, namely ‘accounts payable’ owed by the Crown to merchants and employees. It focuses on the unusually well‐documented relationship between Henry III, King of England between 1216 and 1272, and Flemish merchants from the towns of Douai and Ypres, who provided cloth on credit to the royal wardrobe. From the surviving royal documents, we reconstruct the credit advanced to the royal wardrobe by the merchants of Ypres and Douai for each year between 1247 and 1270, together with the king's repayment history. The interactions between the king and the merchants are then analysed. The insights from this analysis are applied to the historical data to explain the trading decisions made by the merchants during this period, as well as why the strategies of the Yprois sometimes differed from those of the Douaissiens.     

The business and the politics of decolonization: the British experience in the twentieth century

In synthesizing recent studies of the relationships between British businesses and British governments during decolonization, the article takes issue with the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ paradigm. Imperial business and imperial government did not represent a cohesive elite; private and public agencies were frequently divided on key tenets of decolonization strategy; and, more often than not, it was broader macroeconomic and geostrategic factors rather than the agendas of particular business interests, that informed imperial policy.     

The changing distribution of earnings in Ireland, 1937 to 1968

Data from the Irish Census of Industrial Production are used to illuminate changes in the distribution of earnings from 1937 to 1968, an important period in Irish economic history, relevant to debates about globalization and inequality. Between the late 1930s and mid‐1950s there was a greater compression of earnings than in the US's ‘great compression’ of the same period. Sectoral data suggest that this occurred quite generally. The degree of integration with the British labour market is key, and the impact of out‐migration, wage controls during the Second World War, and industrial protection all merit in‐depth investigation.     

Demographic trends in late-slavery Jamaica, 1817–32

Early nineteenth-century demographic trends on sugar estates in Jamaica, the most important British Caribbean colony, are examined through the 1817–32 public slave registers. We seek evidence regarding the background to the island's 1831–2 popular insurrection, the immediate cause of the London parliament's vote in 1833 to abolish colonial slavery. Some historians argue that the revolt occurred as ‘political’ effect from a sudden upsurge of metropolitan anti-slavery activism in 1830–1. They believe the uprising broke out despite improvement in enslaved people's material welfare, favoured by many slaveholders to secure population increase after the closure of the British transatlantic slave trade in 1808. Alternative ‘economic’ assessments judge that increasing workloads had been aggravating popular unrest before the revolt. Commercial pressures, and the imminent likelihood of emancipation, allegedly outweighed welfare concerns. The excess of slave deaths over births widened between 1817 and 1832. However, the registers show that demographic deficits resulted mainly from the ageing of the last Africa-born cohorts. Jamaica-born enslaved people became self-reproducing. There was no general pre-1831 regime deterioration. Most slaveholders sought to maintain their Jamaican assets for the long term through pro-natalist measures, and did not expect emancipation. The revolt's causes were thus more ‘political’ than ‘economic’.     

Constraints in Access to and Demand for Rural Credit: Evidence from Uganda

Abstract: Like in most developing countries, Uganda's financial sector is largely underdeveloped and concentrated in urban areas, leaving the majority of the agricultural producers in the rural population with no access. However, agriculture forms a significant part of the lives of the rural households, who constitute about 85 per cent of the population. This study uses the Uganda household surveys conducted in 1992/93 and 1999/2000 to shed some light on access to, and the characteristics of demand for credit among the rural population. We employ the probit, tobit and multinomial logit model estimations and we analyse demand for credit and find that Uganda's credit market is highly segmented. The rural peasant producers are largely served by relatives/friends and self‐help credit associations and their loan applications are less likely to succeed, and of those that do, smaller loans are granted. The educated and the young are more likely to demand credit while women are less likely to, and to apply for smaller loans. Therefore, while government's agricultural modernization policy considers credit as an important input to its success and as the government plans to roll out the ‘wealth‐for‐all’ programme, more needs to be done to get credit to the sector and to ensure that it can be usefully utilized. Programmes to promote skills and vocational training to enhance production and training in appropriate use of credit are also needed.     

ECONOMIC REFORM WHEN THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS: INDONESIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND ARTICLE 33

Article 33 of Indonesia's Constitution requires the state to ‘control’ important branches of production and natural resources. The meaning of ‘control’ has been a matter of significant debate since Indonesia's independence: does it require the state to manage directly, or is regulation enough? The government has recently sought to break down government monopolies and attract private investment in key sectors. To this end it has enacted a raft of new statutes, but they have been challenged in Indonesia's new Constitutional Court. The Court has opted for the ‘direct manage ment’ interpretation of article 33, striking down statutes that implicitly interpret it as requiring government regulation only. This paper discusses these decisions and, more broadly, problems arising from judicial intervention in economic policy formation. It also considers how the government has sought to circumvent the decisions, and the possible consequences of state non-compliance for the Court's future.     

Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega (delta) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB?) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta. Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.     

Extreme divorce: the managerial revolution in UK companies before 19141

We present the first broadly representative study for any early twentieth‐century economy of the extent to which quoted company ownership was already divorced from managerial control. In the 337 largest, independent, UK companies in the Investor's year book (those with £1 million or more quoted share capital in 1911), the generality of public shareholders were a narrower group than today, but directors personally owned only 3.4 per cent of the shares. This indicates a lower level of personal ownership (and board voting control) in the largest securities market of the early twentieth century than in any of the world's major securities markets toward the end of that century. Berle, Means, Gordon, and others subsequently quantified the US's later and (on this dimension) less advanced managerial ‘revolution’. Their evidence was widely misinterpreted: some erroneously concluded that the US pioneered this aspect of ‘modernity’ and that the ‘divorce’ of ownership from control, globally, was a new and continuing trend.     

Laissez‐faire,the Irish famine,and British financial crisis

The decision in 1847 to cut Treasury spending on public relief efforts during the Irish famine is generally attributed by economic historians to the pervasive influence of ‘laissez‐faire’ ideas on the Whig government of Lord John Russell. This article draws on the papers of political leaders and contemporary financial information to argue that economic reasons were the trigger for the change in policy. Robert Peel and Charles Wood's macroeconomic policies of the 1840s, including the gold standard, the Bank Charter Act, and corn law repeal, left the Whigs unable to borrow to finance relief efforts in Ireland without panicking markets. The scaling back of public assistance programmes that resulted from this—and which increased mortality at the height of the Irish famine—was the unintended result of Peel and Wood's economic policies, in the context of the Whig government's parliamentary weakness.     

Why the industrial revolution was British: commerce,induced invention,and the scientific revolution1

Britain had a unique wage and price structure in the eighteenth century, and that structure is a key to explaining the inventions of the industrial revolution. British wages were very high by international standards, and energy was very cheap. This configuration led British firms to invent technologies that substituted capital and energy for labour. High wages also increased the supply of technology by enabling British people to acquire education and training. Britain's wage and price structure was the result of the country's success in international trade, and that owed much to mercantilism and imperialism. When technology was first invented, it was only profitable to use it in Britain, but eventually it was improved enough that it became cost‐effective abroad. When the ‘tipping point’ occurred, foreign countries adopted the technology in its most advanced form.     

Supervision without regulation: Discount limits at the Austro–Hungarian Bank, 1909–13

We show that nineteenth century central banks could use credit limits for discount loans as a means to enforce supervisory standards long before they had any formal regulatory powers. Drawing on novel microdata from the Austro–Hungarian Bank's archives, we document that credit limits were continuously monitored and that their size was contingent on counterparties’ liquidity and capital position. Counterparties had an economic motive to abide by informal prudential ‘rules of the game’: higher credit limits enabled counterparties to streamline their day-to-day liquidity management. We exploit the heterogeneous exposure of counterparties to an exogenous liquidity shock to evidence that the Bank relaxed credit limits during crises to fulfil its role as a lender of last resort.     

Sovereign credit spreads and the composition of the government budget

This paper investigates the relationship between sovereign credit spreads and the composition of the government budget. The key result of this paper is that governments that invest more and spend less on consumption have significantly lower sovereign credit spreads. This finding is in accordance with the endogenous growth theory, which predicts a positive impact of government investment and a negative impact of government consumption on the long-term growth rate. Finally, a broader tax base significantly reduces sovereign credit spreads. A possible explanation may be that governments with more tax receipts are less likely to have liquidity problems to finance their debt charges.     

Sovereign credit spreads and the composition of the government budget

This paper investigates the relationship between sovereign credit spreads and the composition of the government budget. The key result of this paper is that governments that invest more and spend less on consumption have significantly lower sovereign credit spreads. This finding is in accordance with the endogenous growth theory, which predicts a positive impact of government investment and a negative impact of government consumption on the long-term growth rate. Finally, a broader tax base significantly reduces sovereign credit spreads. A possible explanation may be that governments with more tax receipts are less likely to have liquidity problems to finance their debt charges.     

‘Stop‐go’ policy and the restriction of postwar British house‐building

From the mid‐1950s to the early 1980s the Treasury and the Bank of England successfully advocated a policy of restricting both private and public sector house‐building, as a key but covert instrument of their wider ‘stop‐go’ macroeconomic policy framework. While the intensity of restrictions varied over the economic cycle, private house‐building was restricted (through limiting mortgage availability) for almost all this period. This was achieved by keeping building society interest rates low relative to other interest rates and thus starving the building society movement of mortgage funds. Mortgage restriction was never publicly discussed and sometimes operated alongside ambitious housing targets and well‐publicized policy initiatives to boost housing demand. This article outlines the evolution of house‐building restriction, together with its impacts on the housing sector and the wider economy. We review the evolution of the policy framework and its consequences, compare the level and stability of British house‐building during this period—historically and relative to other countries—and undertake time‐series econometric analysis of its impacts on both house‐building and house prices. Finally, implications for debates regarding stop‐go policy, Britain's housing problem, and the distributional consequences of government macroeconomic policy are discussed.     

Indonesia's economic performance in comparative perspective and a new policy framework for 2049

This is the first paper of a planned ‘Indonesia 2049’ project, which asks how far Indonesia's economy will have developed 100 years after actual political independence in 1949. We compare dimensions of Indonesia's economy with those of two oil exporters (Mexico and Nigeria), three large populous developing economies (China, India and Brazil) and three Southeast Asian neighbours (Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines). Under Soeharto, Indonesia's economic performance was better than it had been under Soekarno, and above the average of the eight comparator countries, but below that of the East Asian economies. Our view is that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second administration must adopt a new economic policy framework to ensure successful transition to knowledge-based growth. This proposed new framework goes beyond the Washington Consensus of ‘getting prices right’ and ‘getting institutions right’ to include ‘getting the role of science right’ and ‘getting the conception of the reform process right’.     

Clark's Malthus delusion: response to ‘Farming in England 1200–1800’

Clark's claims about the scale of English agricultural output from the 1200s to the 1860s flout historical and geographical reality. His income‐based estimates start with the daily real wages of adult males and assume that days worked per year were constant. Those advanced in British economic growth make no such assumption and instead are built up from the output side. They correlate better with population trends and are consistent with an economy slowly growing and becoming richer. Clark's denial that such growth occurred, his assertion that substantially more land must have been under arable cultivation, his belief that conditions of full employment invariably prevailed in the countryside at harvest time, his concern that the wage bill would have exceeded the value of output in British economic growth, his refusal to consider the possibility that the working year was of variable length, and his assertion that output per acre must have been equalized across arable and pasture are all shown to be figments of his ‘Malthus delusion’.