我国出口补贴转变为技改补贴的有效性分析

文章探讨了本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业技改投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业技改投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业技改投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。这一政策可接替在未来实施中具有不确定性的出口补贴政策。     

扶持我国出口导向企业实施RRC战略的理论依据

文章探讨本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业实施提高竞争对手成本(RRC)战略的投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业RRC投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业RRC投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。由于RRC战略较之掠夺性定价温和且更易实施,这一政策对于保持我国出口稳定增长具有一定积极意义。     

出口退税是一项稳健的贸易政策吗?

出口退税作为一项被WTO允许的政策工具,为许多国家的政府所使用。本文在一个国际多市场寡头模型之中,研究出口退税的稳健性。主要结论如下:(1)如果本国政府的目标是最大化国家福利,那么,出口退税不是一项稳健的贸易政策;(2)如果本国政府关心收入分配,对于国家福利的不同组成部分赋予不同的权重,那么,如果政府过于关注本国企业利润,而不是本国消费者剩余和出口退税成本,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策;(3)本国政府过于关注本国企业利润的一个可能原因是,本国企业可以通过政治捐献去游说政府,制定对于自己有利的政策。那么,如果相对于国家福利而言,政府过于关注政治捐献,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策。     

反倾销政策工具下市场均衡价格分析

成本优势是获取垄断利润的主要因素,政府政策介入会改变企业的成本优势,从而改变市场的均衡价格。不同的反倾销和补贴政策影响市场均衡价格和均衡利润的变化,反倾销税和价格承诺能削弱外国企业成本优势,降低对进口产品的需求,导致市场均衡价格上升;反倾销税使外国出口企业利润水平降低,一定程度会引致外国企业直接投资,价格承诺使外国企业完全保留了因提高价格所带来的利润;生产补贴降低了国内企业的边际成本,导致市场均衡价格下降,提高了国内企业的利润,但却减少了政府收入。采取适度的反倾销政策和补贴政策可以使国内外厂商的利润保持在竞争性利润水平上,进口国的利益目标应该是对本国消费者提供更低价格商品的基础上保护本国企业的利益。     

竞争政策与跨国最优技术授权策略

本文探讨当前中国在知识产权领域实施(宽松)竞争政策的理论基础。基于本国国有企业和私营企业与具有成本优势的外国企业进行古诺竞争的寡头模型,分析生产型外国企业如何将降低成本的专利技术分别授权给本国的两家企业。我们的研究表明:当不能歧视性授权时,外国企业总是偏好特许权收费方式;当能够歧视性授权时,外国企业在技术创新程度较大时会偏好固定收费方式。由于在歧视性授权下,外国企业将更多的利润转移到母国,因此本国福利在不允许歧视性授权下更高,但全球福利却相反。因此,本国政府从本国福利极大化的角度往往会强化竞争政策,限制歧视性授权;尽管从全球角度看,不限制歧视性授权的宽松竞争政策能够提升全球福利。     

出口加工企业劳动力培训补贴的策略性效应分析

本文针对近年来我国外向型经济发达地区技术工人短缺的现象,探讨我国出口加工企业与外国企业以产量竞争的方式争夺海外市场的情况下,我国政府对本国企业的劳动力培训进行补贴的有效性。通过对由补贴政策、企业劳动力培训投入、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对出口加工企业劳动力培训进行补贴有利于我国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于提高我国社会总福利水平,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。这一分析结论有助于形成缓解我国结构性劳动力短缺,保持出口稳定增长的政策措施。     

不完全竞争、非对称信息下的最优进口贸易政策和产业政策

本文讨论了不完全竞争和非对称信息情况下 ,如何运用进口贸易政策和产业政策增进本国福利的问题。本文发现 ,(1 )在Cournot同质产品竞争的情况下 ,制定可以诱使本国企业显示真实成本的政策规则可以实现与完全信息情况相同的配置结果 ;并且 ,本国企业的生产成本越低 ,政策规则规定的最优关税越低 ;在某些成本结构下 ,甚至应该执行零关税政策。 (2 )在圆形城市空间竞争 (SpatialCompetitioninCircularCity)的情况下 ,生产补贴和关税的作用完全等价 ;不存在可以实现事后效率的政策规则 ,并且 ,约束最优结果不是一个PBE均衡结果 ,本国政府的最优政策是制定等于单位运输成本的关税。上述结论蕴含 ,最优政策干预以及它能否消除非对称信息可能带来的效率损失依赖于竞争类型 ,而不依赖于信息结构 ,因此 ,它不会发生扭曲     

策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。     

贸易保护政治经济学的产生及其最新发展

传统的自由贸易理论认为，自由贸易能够最大限度地增加世界福利，因而应该是各国政府的最优政策选择。但在现实中，贸易保护主义一直盛行。对此，新贸易理论和战略贸易政策理论做出了解释，其核心是“利润转移理论”和“外部经济理论”。“利润转移理论”认为，在不完全竞争市场结构下存在超额垄断利润，而政府单边的贸易支持措施就可以使本国企业获得此项超额利润，只要该利润超过政府付出的成本，就可以增加本国福利。“外部经济理论”认为，如果存在市场的不完全以及外部效应等市场失灵的情况，政府适度的贸易干预政策可以纠正这些市场失灵造成的扭曲，增加本国福利。上述理论似乎为政府的贸易干预和保护措施提供了合理的辩护。但在现实中，这些贸易干预和保护政策是否能够真正提高本国的福利却遭到了质疑。“利润转移理论”面临着如何测算政府支持政策的经济效应和成本的困境，即使是非常有效率和决策能力的政府也难以保证政策的成功。而“外部经济理论”中的市场扭曲也很难度量，况且贸易干预和保护政策往往并不是纠正市场扭曲的最佳政策选择，相反却有可能造成其他生产和消费的扭曲，其效应甚至不如一些直接生产或消费补贴措施。因此，将贸易政策仅仅作为提高一国福利的手段来解释存在明显缺陷。于是，经济学家们开始尝试从全新的角度来解释贸易政策的产生和变化。这是贸易保护政治经济学理论产生的重要前提。     

模糊需求环境下企业合并的效果分析

通过构建一个模糊需求环境下的寡头垄断模型,具体分析存在政策性补贴、外国进口关税时本国受补贴企业、不受补贴企业和外国企业之间的合并选择行为.我们发现,当政策性补贴较高时,合并会发生在本国企业之间;当关税较高、政策性补贴较低时或者关税非常低、政策性补贴较高时,合并均会发生在本国企业与国外企业之间;本国不受补贴企业和外国企业之间不会产生合并.需求模糊函数中斜率的不确定性不影响对企业对合并的选择,但对企业的产量及利润大小具有负作用.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

Optimal Trade Policy with Horizontal Differentiation and Asymmetric Costs

This paper examines the optimal export policy under Bertrand competition when the products exhibit horizontal differentiation and production costs are asymmetric. The focus of this paper is on the product‐differentiation effect in the determination of the optimal export policy. We show that given that the equilibrium characteristic of a foreign firm's product R&D lies to the left‐hand side of its initial level , since the foreign firm has a unit cost advantage and the efficiency of its R&D technology is sufficiently low, a rise in the export subsidy of the domestic country increases a domestic firm's profits and then welfare by extending the degree of horizontal differentiation between the two products. Thus, the optimal export policy under Bertrand competition may turn out to be an export subsidy rather than an export tax. This result is in sharp contrast to that of Eaton and Grossman (1986 ).     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

Optimal policy for environmental goods trade in asymmetric oligopolistic eco-industries

In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs.     

Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

Strategic interoperability standards and trade taxes

In a two-country international trade framework, the paper considers the interplay between the governments' incentives for conducting traditional trade policies and their incentives for the policies toward compatibility between the products of the firms competing in the international market. The model assumes that one domestic and one foreign firm supply partially incompatible products for the home country market while consumers value both variety and a network externality. Motivated by the benefits of the network externality, the home government sets a standard requiring the foreign firm to guarantee a minimum level of compatibility between its own product and the product of the domestic rival. The paper analyzes the home country standard setting and import tariff policies as well as the incentives of the foreign country for imposing the export tax and conducting a policy which enhances the degree of compatibility between the rival products in the export market.     

International Competition in one Country: Comparative Static Analysis

A comparative static analysis is conducted for international competition among several domestic and foreign firms in one country in relation to a change in the domestic firms' cost parameter, which could be technological, export subsidy or tax, or pollution tax rate. The general result is made more transparent for some simple cases. The effects of entry of a new domestic firm are analyzed.     

LOBBYING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy-maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy-maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy-maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy-maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.     

Strategic R&D policy under vertically differentiated oligopoly

In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a high-tech firm and a low-tech firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( high-quality and low-quality ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's product R&D activities. If the product market is under quantity competition, the results are opposite: an R&D subsidy (tax) incentive for the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government; and the high-tech firm's government always gains in the R&D policy game, in contrast to the standard prisoner's dilemma result of the R&D policy literature. JEL Classification: F13     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.