Risk governance and financial stability: A comparative study of conventional and Islamic banks in the GCC

While the linkage between bank governance and financial stability has been discussed widely, empirical explorations of the strength of this relationship are scant. This paper examines the specific role of risk governance in promoting financial stability in banks. Using hand-collected data, it develops a Risk Governance Index (RGI) to measure the strength of risk governance structures and then examines its impact on four main indicators of financial stability for conventional and Islamic banks in the countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The results from the dynamic panel models using two-step GMM method suggest that risk governance significantly contributes to the enhancement of the key financial stability measures. The RGI for Islamic banks is found to be smaller than their conventional counterparts and the regression results indicate that risk governance in Islamic banks has a negative impact on stability indicators. While the business models of Islamic banks have features that can enhance stability, poor risk governance can potentially negate this positive feature.     

Do banks effectively manage their risks? The role of risk governance in the MENA region

This study aims to investigate (1) the effects of the creation of a board-level risk committee (RC) and the designation of a chief risk officer (CRO) on the risk-taking practices undertaken by financial institutions and (2) whether these mechanisms improve the risk management effectiveness of both conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic banks (IBs). We contribute to the scarce literature on the relationship between risk governance and risk-taking behaviour and investigate IBs in this context. Using a sample of 573 observations representing 65 banks (28 CBs and 37 IBs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from 2005 to 2015, we find a negative association between the risk governance indices and their risk perspectives across both types of banks for the post-crisis period. Interestingly, we find that the existence of risk governance mechanisms in IBs is associated with higher risk taking for the pre-crisis period, i.e., before the recent amendments to the risk governance principles in the MENA region. This result implies that IBs can respond to regulatory reforms in the post-crisis period by curbing excessive risk taking. We offer further evidence that the risk governance effect on overall risk taking stems only from the stand-alone board-level RC and not from the role of the CRO. We note that the CBs’ performance is more associated with risk taking for banks with stronger board-level RCs. The board-level RCs improve the effectiveness of risk management within CBs but do not influence the risk management effectiveness of IBs.     

伊斯兰银行业公司治理:理论与实践

伊斯兰银行业公司治理由于其自身不同的经营特点而与传统银行业治理存在较大的差异,其治理结构、代理关系较为复杂,成为英美、德日模式之外较具代表性的一种模式。本文从伊斯兰银行的治理结构及其复杂的委托代理关系出发,论述了其面临的代理问题,并就其代理问题介绍了伊斯兰银行业的公司治理实践,以期为我国的银行业治理提供一定的借鉴。     

Islamic versus conventional banks in the GCC countries: A comparative study using classification techniques

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on Islamic finance by investigating the feature of Islamic and conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period 2003–2010. We use parametric and non-parametric classification models (Linear discriminant analysis, Logistic regression, Tree of classification and Neural network) to examine whether financial ratios can be used to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks. Univariate results show that Islamic banks are, on average, more profitable, more liquid, better capitalized, and have lower credit risk than conventional banks. We also find that Islamic banks are, on average, less involved in off-balance sheet activities and have more operating leverage than their conventional peers. Results from classification models show that the two types of banks may be differentiated in terms of credit and insolvency risk, operating leverage and off-balance sheet activities, but not in terms of profitability and liquidity. More interestingly, we find that the recent global financial crisis has a negative impact on the profitability for both Islamic and conventional banks, but time shifted. Finally, results show that Logit regression obtained slightly higher classification accuracies than other models.     

Is spin-off policy an effective way to improve performance of Islamic banks? Evidence from Indonesia

Indonesia has adopted a dual banking system in which both conventional and Islamic banks operate. Most of the sharia-based banks, however, are still operating Islamic windows within their conventional entity. To strengthen the role of Islamic banking in the intermediation system, the government issued Islamic Banking Law No. 21/2008 to encourage Islamic windows of conventional banks to become a legal entity separate from their parent company. Because some Islamic windows have spun off in this fashion, we can employ a difference-in-difference approach to examine the effect of such a spin-off on Islamic banks’ performance, efficiency, and risk. Our study covers all Islamic commercial banks (including Islamic windows of conventional banks) in Indonesia from 2008–2019. We find that the performance and efficiency of full-fledged Islamic banks are significantly lower compared with Islamic windows of conventional banks. Moreover, our results show that financing risk increases after the spin-off. The inferior performance of full-fledged Islamic banks persists for four years after the spin-off. We also find that a conversion strategy results in better outcomes, particularly for profitability and efficiency, than a pure spin-off strategy.     

Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model,efficiency and stability

How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.     

Bank-level stability factors and consumer confidence – A comparative study of Islamic and conventional banks’ product mix

This study examines the behaviour of key bank-level stability factors of liquidity, capital, risk-taking and consumer confidence in Islamic and conventional banks that operate in the same market. Using fixed effect for a sample of 194 banks of Gulf Cooperation Countries between 2000 and 2007, we found that liquidity is not determined by the bank's product mix but rather attributed to systematic factors. However, non-performing assets (representing loans to sub-prime borrowers) have a positive and significant relationship with liquidity, implying that during the crisis Islamic banks tend to take stringent risk strategies compared to conventional banks. Furthermore, Islamic banks generally tend to provide higher consumer confidence levels as they were more capitalized than conventional banks, although conventional banks had carried higher averages of liquidity compared to Islamic banks. Consumer confidence levels or depositors’ discipline as proxied by deposits and customer funding over liabilities generally appear to be higher in Islamic banks than conventional banks.     

Islamic Banks,Deposit Insurance Reform,and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.     

Shari’ah supervision,corporate governance and performance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks

The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power on performance during the period 2005–2011. We find Shari’ah supervision boards positively impact on Islamic banks’ performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (board size and board independence) and CEO power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision boards but also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective.     

Financial fragility of banks,ownership structure and income diversification: Empirical evidence from the GCC region

This paper investigates the role that ownership structure and diversification of income plays in the financial stability of banks from the GCC region. We find evidence that suggests that higher concentration of ownership in any type of shareholding is associated with higher insolvency risk. However, this higher insolvency risk is not associated with any specific type of shareholders. Higher financial fragility is also associated with the size and whether the bank is an Islamic bank. Banks engaged in substantial fee-based activities are more financially stable as compared with banks that predominantly generate their incomes from traditional intermediation activities.     

Payout policy and ownership structure: The case of Islamic and conventional banks

Using a sample of Islamic and conventional financial institutions domiciled in 16 countries for the period 2000–2015, we examine how ownership structure affects dividend policy. Our main findings indicate that ownership identity is important in explaining dividend policy in these banks, albeit in different patterns. In particular, the results suggest that government ownership seems to exert negative effects on dividend payouts in both types of banks, which is in line with the preference of governments towards bank stability. With respect to family ownership, the impact is negative for conventional banks but positive for Islamic ones, consistent with agency theory. These results are to some extent similar in the case of foreign ownership where it is associated with a higher payout policy in Islamic banks, but not significant in conventional ones. Our results are robust to an array of additional analyses including propensity score matching.     

Differences and similaritites between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and Conventional banks

The purpose of this paper is to present the some differences and similarities between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and conventional banks by paradigmatic diversification. Since Corporate governance in Islamic banks is a social phenomenon in Islamic societies, the paper uses social theory paradigms (functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist) to compare between corporate governance in Islamic banks and conventional banks. This paper demonstrates that mainstream corporate corporate governance theories are not a law of nature but a social construct.     

AAOIFI reporting standards: Measuring compliance

Islamic banking and finance have grown rapidly in recent decades. Islamic banks offer a range of products, which, in complying with Islamic law, often differ from traditional Western financial products. Consequently, developing accounting standards to guide Islamic financial reporting is now an important issue. To this end, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Organizations (AAOIFI), was established in Bahrain in 1991. While the AAOIFI has published a substantial body of accounting and governance standards empirical research into compliance with these standards is lacking. This article addresses that gap. A benchmark index is constructed to measure the compliance of Islamic banks licensed and domiciled in Bahrain. The findings of the study show compliance to be very high with respect to the governance standard relating to the in-house supervisory boards of Islamic banks, and reporting the Islamic murabaha contract. In contrast, compliance with the AAOIFI's requirements regarding the zakah religious tax and the mudaraba contract is relatively low.     

Fetching better deals from creditors: Board busyness,agency relationships and the bank cost of debt

In a cross-country setting, we document that busy boards of directors (i.e., outside directors with multiple directorships) enhance a bank's financing capacity by lowering its cost of debt, which is consistent with the signalling quality hypothesis. Our analysis further reveals that this negative association is more pronounced in conventional banks than their Islamic counterparts. Possibly owning to the distinctive governance structure and the complexity of the Islamic business model, which requires closer monitoring, Muslim debtholders might depreciate a busy board of directors as it is likely to associate with lower scrutinising effectiveness. Our results provide a positive counterpoint to the negative relationship that exists between busy directors and firm performance, and contributes to understanding the indispensable role busy boards play in debt financing.     

金融创新、公允价值计量与商业银行股票崩盘风险

选取我国沪深两市A股上市商业银行作为研究对象,利用2007—2017年年报数据,实证研究金融创新对商业银行股票崩盘风险的影响。在此基础上,以公允价值计量作为中介变量研究其在金融创新对商业银行股票崩盘风险影响中的作用机理。研究发现：金融创新与商业银行股票崩盘风险负相关,公允价值计量在其中发挥部分中介效应的同时也增加了商业银行股票崩盘风险。在当前鼓励创新和防范化解重大金融风险的背景下,应当大力提倡金融创新,通过公司治理和内部控制来规范公允价值计量的使用。     

Capital structure of Islamic banks: How different are they from conventional banks?

This paper uses comprehensive data for 112 Islamic and 709 conventional banks from 23 countries over 1995–2015 to compare the capital structure of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) from several perspectives. We find that IBs and CBs seem to face different cost pressures in the process of adjusting towards the target capital structure. Asset growth is a key driver of capital structure change, and CBs adjust leverage more aggressively in response to changes in total assets compared to IBs, because they have an advantage in obtaining external funds and can achieve leverage adjustments faster and at a low cost. IBs have more regulatory capital, but their ability to respond to risks is weaker than traditional banks. The results of this paper suggest that Islamic banks are in a disadvantaged position compared to CBs in capital structure management. The conclusion suggests that IBs need to expand its financing tools and funding sources to reduce adjustment costs and improve their capability to deal with asset risk.     

Time series analysis of financial stability of banks: Evidence from Saudi Arabia

Islamic banks are characterized by their compliance to Islamic laws and practices, primarily the prohibition of interest and the trading of loans. During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when a large number of conventional banks announced bankruptcy, no Islamic bank failures were reported. However, there is no clear consensus in the literature on the question of whether Islamic banks are more or less stable than conventional banks. To shed some light on this issue, we studied a sample of Saudi banks using quarterly data over a period centered on the 2008 financial crisis. Careful analysis of the data suggested first of all that many of the variables typically used in financial stability studies may be non-stationary, a methodological point largely ignored in the literature. Using time series methods suitable for this type of data, we concluded that individual heterogeneity may matter more than either the conventional or Islamic nature of the banks. Concentrating on the largest banks, we find the Islamic banks contribute positively to the stability of the system.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

A Survival Analysis of Islamic and Conventional Banks

Are Islamic banks inherently more stable than conventional banks? We address this question by applying a survival analysis based on the Cox proportional hazard model to a comprehensive sample of 421 banks in 20 Middle and Far Eastern countries from 1995 to 2010. By comparing the failure risk for both bank types, we find that Islamic banks have a significantly lower risk of failure than that of their conventional peers. This lower risk is based both unconditionally and conditionally on bank-specific (microeconomic) variables as well as macroeconomic and market structure variables. Our findings indicate that the design and implementation of early warning systems for bank failure should recognize the distinct risk profiles of the two bank types.