Rationales for Government Intervention in the Commercialization of New Technologies

The paper examines rationales relevant to the evolving roles of government intervention and private venture capital industry in the commercialization of new technologies. Specifically, government interventions may aim to mitigate market and systemic failures, eliminate structural rigidities, or respond to anticipatory myopia. Ex ante , constructive, and ex post evaluations are discussed in relation to the possibility that agencies responsible for policy implementation may intervene even in situations in which the benefits of their interventions are not necessarily transparent.     

Support of State and Local Finance under Persistent Federal Deficits

The United States?? federal government subsidizes local public finance through grants. Given projected U.S. deficits, this may prove untenable. Further, a broader range of policy instruments may offer more effective support of local governments. Herein four policies are considered beginning with current policy: federal deficit financed grants, federal placement, federal underwriting, and Federal Reserve System interventions. Options are evaluated in a general framework considering citizen and government objective functions. Policy recommendations are for interventions to specify terms of entry and exit (as with automatic stabilizers), and for initiation of contingency-simulation exercises to determine the potential of options identified herein.     

Information design,externalities, and government interventions

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.     

Nationalizations,bailouts and efficiency

ABSTRACT

We develop a theoretical model in which there are public and private firms and a government. When firms become insolvent, the government can intervene with bailouts or nationalizations. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs. In this setting, we analyze how government interventions affect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalizations of private firms after unprofitable investments lead to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers and employees working for a firm is also affected by the possibility of government interventions, reducing the productive efficiency advantage of private firms.     

Do more open economies have bigger governments? Another look

We reconsider the evidence of a positive relationship between openness and the size of government recently established by Rodrik [Rodrik, D., 1998. Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal of Political Economy 106, 997–1032] and others. While the existing literature focuses on expenditure based measures of government, we consider non-budgetary measures such as government ownership of enterprises, price controls, asset expropriation. Each of these may have little impact on government expenditures, yet can make the role of government sizable. We demonstrate that the scope of government is much larger in less open economies when considering non-budgetary measures. Additionally, we show that higher levels of non-budgetary government are positively correlated with trade barriers. Finally, we provide further evidence on the hypothesis that larger governments provide social insurance in open economies subject to terms of trade shocks. Although we find that greater terms of trade risk is weakly associated with larger government in all forms, these interventions include price controls and greater risk of asset expropriation which are hard to reconcile with a pure insurance motive.     

A Preface to the Economic Analysis of Disease Transmission

Infectious diseases are transmitted from person to person or from vectors such as mosquitos to people. The uninfected take precautions against these diseases and the infected try to mitigate their symptoms and to get cured. In doing so, people may weigh the costs of illness, prevention and therapy. They may also (altruistically) weigh the costs of people whom their own behavior puts at risk, for instance their sexual partners, or they may act entirely selfishly. Some of these behaviours may therefore lead to externalities and a corresponding rationale for government interventions. A recent literature uses economics to investigate the implications of rational choice by individuals about their response to infectious diseases. It analyzes decisions about prevention, vaccination, testing, therapies and government intervention. This paper reviews this literature with an emphasis on examples from the HIV/AIDS epidemic.     

The Washington Consensus revisited: a new structural economics perspective

The Washington Consensus reform resulted in economic collapse and stagnation in many transition economies and “lost decades” in other developing countries in 1980s and 1990s. The paper provides a new structural economics perspective of such failures. The Washington Consensus reform failed to recognize that many firms in a transition economy were not viable in an open, competitive market because those industries went against the comparative advantages determined by the economy’s endowment structure. Their survival relied on the government’s protections and subsidies through various interventions and distortions. The Washington Consensus advised the government to focus their reforms on issues related to property rights, corporate governance, government interventions, and other issues that may obstruct a firm’s normal management. Without resolving the firms’ viability problem, such reforms led to the firms’ collapse and an unintended decline and stagnation of the economy in the transition process. This paper suggests that the viability assumption in neoclassical economics be relaxed when analyzing development and transition issues in socialist, transition, and developing economies.     

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES AS A MEANS TO MITIGATE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO SWISS STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES

When governments act as owners of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), they are both principal and agent at the same time. The literature on steering SOEs has mainly focused on the government as the principal that must control SOEs. However, the government is also an agent, vis‐à‐vis the parliament, because democratic constitutions stipulate some form of parliamentary oversight of the government. This oversight includes checks on how the government steers SOEs. However, this oversight function gives the parliament the power and opportunity to interfere into steering SOEs, which may lead to parliamentary interventions that are not coherent with governmental steering. We draw on principal–agent literature and public‐accountability literature to show that arbitrary and hands‐on parliamentary interference pose problems for steering SOEs. We analyze whether strategic objectives for SOEs, as recommended by public corporate governance guidelines, are appropriate to minimize parliamentary interference. We hypothesize that the Swiss government avoids or mitigates parliamentary interference by mid‐term strategic objectives for SOEs, which counteract short‐term parliamentary requests. We find that the Swiss government uses mid‐term strategic objectives, particularly financial ones, to reject parliamentary demands for more intervention into SOE activities.     

The stability of cigarette demand

The relative effects of various governmental interventions upon cigarette consumption is important to policy-makers. Historically, the demand for cigarettes has been quite unstable. Previous studies employ fixed parameter models and use dummy variables associated with interventions to stabilize the demand function. In contrast, we use a varying parameter model aplied to data from the United States for 1953–84 to investigate the stability of demand and show that the demand function is stabilized when dummy variables are employed. Our results suggest that industry advertising increases aggregate consumption while government interventions decrease it. However, the marginal effect of government warnings seems to be small, at least in the US: while the effect of the 1964 health warning is statistically significant, the effect of the 1979 health warning is not.     

Government interventions and the size of the informal economy. The case of Iran (1971–2007)

Literature on the informal economy can mainly be divided into two different contrasting theories. According to the dual labor market theory (DLM), which considers the informal economy as a spare sector providing jobs for formally unemployed resources, unpleasant economic situations force people to act informally. Legalists, on the other hand, blame government interventions such as minimum wages or price control policies for pushing rent-seeking firms toward the shadows. This study using an Error-correction Multi-Indicators Multi-Causes (EMIMIC) model, a systematic method consisting of structural and measurement equations, shows that these two theories are complementary rather than substitutes for one another. While long-term trends are explained by legalists, DLM theory is also suitable for explaining short term changes. Iran’s economy in the period 1971–2007, which was characterized by government interventions, is chosen for this purpose. These interventions are measured by Principal Component Analysis. Finally, an index of the size of Iran’s informal economy is also reported.     

Technical Efficiency Indicators in a Philippine Manufacturing Sector

This paper uses the stochastic production frontier approach to investigate the relationship between size and technical efficiency in the Philippines textile industry. Results show that technical efficiency increases with size, thus weakening the case for SME targeted policies. Moreover, both exports and government interventions are positively associated with efficiency, although the link between government support and technical efficiency is somewhat weaker.     

Forex interventions and exchange rate exposure: Evidence from emerging market firms

Foreign exchange (forex) interventions by central banks have recently become too frequent in emerging markets. The effects of these interventions on exchange rate volatility are widely documented, but their implications for firm-level outcomes have rarely been examined. This study argues that forex interventions should influence the sensitivity of firms’ cash flows to currency movements. Accordingly, I address a novel question regarding the effect of forex interventions on emerging market firms’ exchange rate risk exposure. I find an asymmetric effect, such that the impact of forex purchase interventions differs from that of forex sale interventions. Moreover, the positive effects of forex sale interventions on the magnitude of firms’ exposure are more pronounced during depreciation periods. Study findings imply that firms remain unhedged, given that interventions are perceived as implicit government guarantees against currency fluctuations. Credible communication from policymakers regarding the motives for interventions by central banks would assist in alerting firms to potential currency risks.     

On the relevance of floating exchange rate policies

I study the relevance of the composition of the public debt between domestic and foreign liabilities in a standard stochastic small open-economy framework. The government issues nominal bonds of several maturities with noncontingent face value at redemption. Intervening in the exchange market to implement an adequate state-contingent path for the nominal exchange rate is an effective way for the government to prevent the economy from reaching any competitive equilibrium it wishes to rule out. Most sterilized interventions are not neutral; however, few of them are. As a consequence, the composition in question is undetermined. Hence, a floating regime may decentralize every competitive outcome, even one induced by a pegging policy. Conversely, outcomes brought forth by a floating regime can also be induced by a policy that prescribes active government intervention in the foreign currency market. Moreover, an open-market operation can be replaced by an equivalent combination of an exchange intervention plus a restructuring of the domestic debt maturity. Introducing in the model strategic behavior by the government combined with asymmetric information or lack of commitment can remove that indeterminacy. Hence, these factors seem to be the major determinants of a possible relation between floating exchange rate policies and economic outcomes.     

The welfare impact of policy interventions in the foodgrain markets in Bangladesh

The paper attempts to estimate the welfare impact of different policy interventions in the foodgrain markets in Bangladesh using an economic surplus approach. Over the period of analysis, 1980–2003, the loss in consumer surplus exceeded the gain in producer surplus plus the gain in government revenue. Therefore, the interventions resulted in a deadweight welfare loss for society. In contrast, in the policy of liberalization, the gain in consumer surplus and in government revenue is larger than the loss in producer surplus, producing a net welfare gain to society.     

政府干预下的创新联盟协同行为演化博弈分析——基于联盟分类视角

创新联盟是整合互补性资源,开展协同攻关的重要平台。政府为促进联盟持续健康发展,关键在于把握好各项激励举措对联盟成员协同行为的潜在影响。鉴于此,本文基于国家农业科技创新联盟分类建设与管理实践,构建起了三个包含学研方、上游企业与下游企业的三方演化博弈模型,考虑了政府事前补助、事后成本补贴与事后奖励等潜在干预措施对产业性、专业性与区域性联盟内部协同生态的异质性影响,并对政府干预的激励效果进行仿真模拟。结果表明：中央政府采取额外的经费支持举措是必要的。其中,面向所有积极协同方的事后成本补贴是促进各联盟成员积极协同的关键举措;专业性联盟对此需求尤甚,产业性联盟次之,区域性联盟的需求最弱。此外,针对主导方较高强度的事前补助同样可激励产业性联盟各成员采取积极协同的行为策略。     

Testing the Link between Public Intervention and Food Price Variability: Evidence from Rice Markets in the Philippines

Abstract . A model of inter- and intra-annual food price variability is presented to study the impacts of government food-market interventions in the Philippines. A conceptually simple econometric model is described that provides a general method for testing the impact of government stock changes on prices at farmgate and retail levels. Monthly price and stock data for the period 1975–1992 are used to empirically measure the influence of Philippine government buffer-stock programs on seasonal and annual variability of producer and consumer rice prices. NFA stock changes are shown to have had no significant stabilizing influence on seasonal and annual price changes at the aggregate level.     

General equilibrium with price intervention policies: a computational approach

Three alternative formulations of general equilibrium under price intervention policies are presented in a computational framework. In the first, minimum or ceiling prices are supported by a government marketing agency. Revenues are recycled to consumers in the minimum price case, and losses covered by lump sum taxes in the ceiling case. Similarities to general equilibrium with taxes are stressed. In the second, sector specific minimum prices are considered similar to Harris-Todaro equilibria. In the third, government price supports operate through market interventions. Existence is discussed, numerical examples presented, and possible policy applications outlined.     

Government size,democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation

Previous studies on the effect of government size on corruption have produced mixed results. In an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, this study investigates the effect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of the democracy in each country. Using annual data of 82 countries between 1995 and 2008, the estimation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in corruption if the democracy level is sufficiently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase in corruption if it is too low. As robustness checks, the estimations using a different index of corruption and a different proxy for government size are also conducted. The results reveal that our main findings are robust. Furthermore, to address endogeneity problems, we conduct the instrumental variables estimation and the system generalized method of moments estimation, the results of which also support our primary findings. These results provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to perform government interventions without aggravating corruption.     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.