How much of the world economy is state-owned? Analysis based on the 2005–20 Fortune Global 500 lists

This paper analyzes the share of state-owned enterprises on the Fortune Global 500 lists from 2005 to 2020. The purpose is to answer two research questions—what is the share of SOEs among the world's largest companies, and is this share increasing over the years? Regarding studies of large sets of companies, the novelty of this article is the method in which SOEs were identified—based on the criterion of actual corporate control of the state and not the threshold of state ownership. The results show that the share of SOEs in the group of the world's largest companies is higher than indicated in previous similar studies, and this value has increased significantly over the last 15 years. In 2005, there were 64 SOEs on the list; in 2020, there were 141 (with the highest number—142—in 2015). In this period, the share of SOEs in revenues doubled (to almost 30%), in assets more than tripled and the total number of employees from SOEs from the list more than doubled. However, these increases were almost solely due to the growth of the Chinese economy, which resulted in more Chinese SOEs being included on the list.     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.     

The economic performance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe

This article explores the economic performance of state ownership in the largest non-financial enterprises operating in 13 post-socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period 2007–2013. The largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are selected based on the ‘Coface – 500 Top Companies in CEE’ list in 2013. Of these 500 enterprises, 69 were identified as state-owned. All originated in the socialist period. The majority of them are from Poland and Ukraine. SOEs hold a dominant position in energy supply, the oil and gas sector, and transport. We find that the persistence of state ownership in post-socialist countries is caused by incomplete privatisation and the presence of SOEs within strategic sectors. The economic performance of the largest state-owned companies is, on average, comparable to their private counterparts.     

Capital Structure Premium in Multinational SOEs: Evidence from China

We investigate the relationship among multinational operations, ownership and capital structure using data from China's A‐share listed companies. We find that, in general, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have lower leverages than domestic enterprises (DEs). More importantly, we document a capital structure premium in China's multinational state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Since the state supports multinational SOEs that promote overseas national strategy, these multinational SOEs will have higher credit availability and therefore higher debt–equity ratios. This study sheds light on the Chinese government's impact on firm's creditability.     

Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

If China’s economy is an example of “state-capitalism,” then its large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could be expected to monopolize key sectors. But previous estimates of industrial concentration, using the Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (HHI), have suggested that the level of industrial concentration—and therefore the potential for the abuse of monopoly power—is very low. These studies have significantly underestimated HHI, since they do not consolidate subsidiary enterprises in Chinese survey data into larger business groups, or according to ultimate ownership. After making these adjustments, a measure of potential HHI shows that large state monopolies remain in oil and gas, electricity, tobacco and, potentially, automobiles. In particular, SOEs supervised by the central government are heavily invested in potentially concentrated industries. But aggregate profits of the state sector are driven more by the portfolio distribution of assets between resources, manufacturing and utilities, rather than industrial concentration within sectors.     

国有企业改革30年

经过30年的改革和制度创新,国有企业不但走出了困境,而且成为具有较高劳动生产率、较强盈利能力和竞争力的市场主体。理论研究与实践证明,很难有最优的所有制结构和股权结构。我们要毫不动摇地"坚持和完善公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度,毫不动摇地巩固和发展公有制经济",坚持在公有制为主体的框架内通过制度建设来完善国有企业公司治理结构。国有企业公司治理结构的完善是一项长期而艰巨的任务。     

税负抑制了公司投资吗?——基于国有股权私有收益的解释

文章分析了税负对公司投资决策的影响.与民营控股股东不同,作为国有企业的最终股东,政府不仅可以获得与股权投资相关的收益,而且可以获得独占性的税收,独占性的税收收入越高,政府控股的私有收益越大.因此,国有企业在投资决策时不仅考虑税后现金流量,而且会关注相关的预期税负,这提高了国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性;政府对税收的需求越大,国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性越高.实证结果表明:(1)与民营控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关关系更弱;(2)随着注册地基础设施投资回报率的增加,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关性显著下降.因此,最大化税收收入也是国有企业投资决策的重要考虑因素.文章为我国股权结构在公司财务决策中的作用提供了新的研究视角.     

Outward foreign direct investment by Polish state-owned multinational enterprises: is ‘stateness’ an asset or a burden?

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly associated with undue advantages due to preferential treatment by the state. Simultaneously they are often quoted as handicapped given the notorious state interference, management problems and agency tensions. They used to be regarded as a mainly domestic issue but in the context of globalisation and the fact that states enter treaties with new obligations, SOEs’ performance ceased to be solely a domestic problem, increasingly so as state-owned multinational enterprises (SOMNEs) emerge. This article presents the results of research on Polish SOEs’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). It offers an overview of overseas activities of nine major Polish firms with a state stake and aims to contribute to the conceptual literature on foreign investments conducted by SOMNEs. We distinguish between FDI by SOMNEs as specific – privileged (facilitated) or discriminated (hampered) – investments subject to the home country’s state power and the host country’s state perception.     

Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism; Social Standing in America: New Dimensions of Class; Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland

A very well-established economic literature maintains that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient as compared to privately owned ones (POEs). In this paper, I argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to state ownership per se, but is rather caused conditions other than ownership, to which SOEs often — though not necessarily always — relate. In particular, I focus on dynamic efficiency — specifically, the production of technological innovation — of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. I suggest that targeted measures, which are aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference — albeit complex and difficult to implement — can be much more (positively) impactful on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile state ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.     

THE RESPONSE OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES TO IMPORT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS

We examine the wage and employment impact on Chinese firms of an increase in import competition associated with China's WTO accession in December 2001, with an emphasis on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that both wage and employment are negatively impacted by an increase in import competition, but firms with high state ownership cut employment less and reduce wages more than their private counterparts, suggesting that they prioritize the protection of employment over that of wages. This finding supports the notion that SOEs may have ‘multitask’ responsibilities in terms of protecting employment as well as achieving efficiency. We also find that firms with higher capital intensity reduce their wages less but cut employment more in response to intensified import competition. This provides empirical support for the efficiency wage theory.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

State ownership,political connections and entry barriers: evidence from China

Private enterprises may encounter high industrial barriers in China because of government administrative restrictions. We analyse the effect of partial state ownership on a privately controlled company’s participation in industries with state-imposed barriers. The results indicate that state ownership in privately controlled enterprises has a significantly positive effect on participation in high barrier industries. After controlling for partial state ownership, we find that personal political identity of entrepreneurs, a previously investigated dimension of political connections, becomes less important in explaining private enterprises’ participation in barrier industries. We also find the effect of state ownership on access to barrier industries will become weaker when local economy is more developed.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.     

国有企业双重效率损失研究

本文基于企业效率最大化要求剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应这一企业理论分析了国有企业的生产效率损失和创新效率损失问题。国有企业的公有产权属性决定了国有企业中存在着生产效率和创新效率的双重损失。国有企业改革通过监督和激励机制设计在一定程度上实现了生产中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,从而提高了国有企业的生产效率。然而,由于创新具有不同于一般生产的特殊属性,已有国有企业改革措施并不能实现创新中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,因而无法改善国有企业的创新效率。由此,本文提出了国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。基于中国省级国有企业和民营企业的工业行业数据,统计分析和计量模型估计结果都稳健地支持了该假说。     

A new context for managing overseas direct investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises

Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their overseas direct investment (ODI) have played an important role in China’s economic development. But the rapid expansion of SOE-dominated ODI has also raised concerns, including about state capitalism and the need for competitive neutrality. This paper considers China’s strategy for managing ODI by its SOEs given a changing context. On the one hand, the Chinese economy is rapidly growing and will soon become the largest economy in the world. China’s role in the world, as well as its global responsibility, is therefore changing. China needs to establish a win-win and harmonious relationship with the rest of the world, and ODI has a role to play in this. On the other hand, China’s growth model is shifting to become greener, more balanced, and innovation-driven. China’s changing international role and the changing growth model have created new imperatives for, and constraints on, ODI by SOEs and reforms to SOEs. This paper aims to examine ODI by Chinese SOEs from the two dimensions of China’s changing role and growth model. It discusses strategies for better managing ODI by Chinese SOEs in the new context that is emerging.     

A healthy hybrid: The technological dynamism of minority-state-owned firms in China

Since its economic reform began in 1979 China's economy has grown rapidly but its dynamism has not been shared by the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at its core. Although some progress has been made, a large proportion of SOEs remain inefficient and uncompetitive, failing to exploit their advantages in scale, experience and resources. In contrast there has been rapid growth first of the collective and township enterprises, and then of the private sector, now the largest ownership type. However, private businesses continue to be handicapped by poor access to finance and other resources. These have however been made freely available to firms with only a minority state shareholding and otherwise owned by private shareholders and employees. This paper, focussing on the telecoms manufacturing sector, compares minority-state-owned hybrids favourably with other ownership types and argues that in the Chinese setting they can and should play a key role in future development.     

Rethinking the Role of State-owned Enterprises in China’s Rise

The massive overseas expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a central aspect of China’s ‘rise’ to great-power status. There is significant disagreement, however, over how to interpret SOEs’ role. Are they instruments of Chinese statecraft, being directed purposefully from Beijing as part of a ‘grand strategy’? Or are they relatively autonomous, profit-maximising businesses, their free-wheeling behaviour often undermining Chinese foreign policy? Finding that there is evidence for both theses, we provide a framework to explain this. We propose theorising party-state/SOEs relations using the concepts of state transformation and regulatory statehood. We show that the Chinese state’s fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive’s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Party-state/SOEs relations are thus characterised not by direct command and control but weak oversight and ongoing struggles within the party-state. We illustrate this using a case study of China Power Investment Corporation and its Myitsone hydropower dam project in Myanmar. Here, a central SOE clearly defied and subverted central regulations, profoundly damaging Sino-Myanmar state-to-state relations. Party-state authorities are now struggling to rein in this and other central SOEs.     

The targets of state capitalism: evidence from M&A deals

Over the last decade, particularly after the Great Recession, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been expanding their role in the global economy, including through merger & acquisitions (M&As). What are the characteristics of the firms targeted by SOEs? Are they different from firms controlled by private investors? By looking at a unique sample of around 25,000 M&As occurred over the period 2005–2012, we find that only SOEs controlled by means of minority of stakes (state-invested enterprises, SIEs) do not show any statistically significant difference in their targeting strategy compared to private enterprises. Conversely, majority-owned SOEs, and in particular financial SOEs buy lower performing firms compared to private acquirers. We interpret this fact as evidence of the internalization of political objectives by fully controlled and financial SOEs, but not by SIEs.     

地方国有上市公司持股商业银行动机和效应研究*

本文研究地方政府或地方国资委控股国有上市公司（地方国有上市公司）持股商业银行的动机和效应。研究发现，相比于其他国有上市公司，地方国有上市公司更偏好持股商业银行，且多为同地区的商业银行；当公司注册地为省会城市、金融业市场化水平较低、地方官员任职年龄较小时，上述关系更加显著；当政府发布相关促进银行业发展政策后，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的概率显著上升。除此之外，本文对经济后果进行分析发现，持股商业银行提升了地方金融业水平以及地方官员晋升概率。本文的研究结论表明，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的经济行为更多地反映了政府动机和地方官员晋升激励动机。     

地方国有上市公司持股商业银行动机和效应研究*

本文研究地方政府或地方国资委控股国有上市公司（地方国有上市公司）持股商业银行的动机和效应。研究发现，相比于其他国有上市公司，地方国有上市公司更偏好持股商业银行，且多为同地区的商业银行；当公司注册地为省会城市、金融业市场化水平较低、地方官员任职年龄较小时，上述关系更加显著；当政府发布相关促进银行业发展政策后，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的概率显著上升。除此之外，本文对经济后果进行分析发现，持股商业银行提升了地方金融业水平以及地方官员晋升概率。本文的研究结论表明，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的经济行为更多地反映了政府动机和地方官员晋升激励动机。