Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts

A social planner selects heterogeneously biased experts to (either sequentially or simultaneously) acquire costly signals, and then agents vote between two alternatives. To maximize social welfare, the social planner adopts an alternating mechanism—choosing extremely biased experts whose preferences oppose the pivotal voter's current preference—in the optimal sequential mechanism, whereas she chooses mildly biased experts in the optimal simultaneous mechanism. Despite the flexibility of a sequential mechanism, the optimal simultaneous mechanism can achieve strictly higher social welfare when information cost is low. Supermajority rules can dominate simple majority rule in terms of both information acquisition and social welfare.     

Impact of intelligent decision aids on expert and novice decision-makers' judgments

Businesses have invested tremendous resources into intelligent decision aid development. A good match between user and aid may improve the expert decision‐maker's decision quality. However, novices may be prone to poorer decision‐making if intelligent decision aids are more expert than the user. The present paper provides an empirical test of the impact of decision aids on subjects with differential expertise levels. The results support the contention that intelligent decision aids aggravate bias in novices’ decision‐making but mitigate bias in experts’ decision‐making processes. Intelligent decision aids may be best viewed as complements to expert decision‐makers during complex problem analysis and resolution.     

Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

We consider a persuasion game between a decision‐maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) “quality” or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) “agenda” or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision‐maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b) extreme agendas are always preferred, and (c) the optimal panel may involve experts with identical (rather than conflicting) agendas.     

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert’s bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert’s incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the contribution of each expert, but reduces them when only the collective contribution is identified by the market.     

Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?

We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision‐maker's satisfaction with the underwriter's performance based on Loughran and Ritter (2002) and assess its ability to explain the decision‐maker's choice among underwriters in subsequent securities offerings. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters when our behavioral measure indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter's performance. Underwriters also extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision‐makers. Although our tests suggest that the behavioral model has explanatory power, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns.     

Reputational cheap talk

We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truth telling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others.     

Entrepreneurs and new ideas

We study how early‐stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas, the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea‐thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he should in turn steal the idea. Thus, stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary. In such cases, the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts, thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other's information. Yet, very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them.     

On the Observability of Plans in Dynamic Choice Problems Involving Risk: Comment about J. Hey

We show that in dynamic choice problems, the observability of a decision maker's first move does reveal his plan for the dynamic choice problem, only under strong restrictions about the structure of his preferences. These restrictions imply consequentialism which in turn implies dynamic consistency, a condition which is not necessarily satisfied by experimental subjects.     

Optimal market making in the presence of latency

This paper studies optimal market making for large-tick assets in the presence of latency. We consider a random walk model for the asset price and formulate the market maker's optimization problem using Markov Decision Processes (MDP). We characterize the value of an order and show that it plays the role of one-period reward in the MDP model. Based on this characterization, we provide explicit criteria for assessing the profitability of market making when there is latency. Under our model, we show that a market maker can earn a positive expected profit if there are sufficient uninformed market orders hitting the market maker's limit orders compared with the rate of price jumps, and the trading horizon is sufficiently long. In addition, our theoretical and numerical results suggest that latency can be an additional source of risk and latency impacts negatively the performance of market makers.     

Information acquisition,referral, and organization

Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.     

Relational delegation

We analyze a cheap talk game with partial commitment by the principal. We first treat the principal's commitment power as exogenous and then endogenize it in an infinitely repeated game. We characterize optimal decision making for any commitment power and show when it takes the form of threshold delegation—in which case the agent can make any decision below a threshold—and centralization—in which case the agent has no discretion. For small biases, threshold delegation is optimal for any smooth distribution. Outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal's commitment power is sufficiently small.     

Who makes markets

A dealer needs access to order flow and information to make a market profitably in a Nasdaq stock. Several variables that proxy for the stocks that an individual market maker's brokerage customers trade, including volume, location, underwriting participation and analyst coverage, are significant determinants of market making activity. Informational advantages may also factor in the market making decision as evidenced by dealers specializing in industries. These findings suggest that individual dealers have competitive advantages in making markets in specific stocks, and that potential market making competition comes from the dealers who share those advantages rather than all Nasdaq market makers.     

Decision‐making capabilities of a hybrid system applied to the auditor's going‐concern assessment

The purpose of this study is to evaluate a hybrid system as a decision support model to assist with the auditor's going‐concern assessment. The going‐concern assessment is often an unstructured decision that involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative information. An expert system that predicts the going‐concern decision has been developed in consultation with partners at three of the Big Five accounting firms. This system is combined with a statistical model that predicts bankruptcy, as a component of the auditor's decision, to form a hybrid system. The hybrid system, because it combines the use of quantitative and qualitative information, has the potential for better prediction accuracy than either the expert system or statistical model predicting separately. In addition, testing of the system provides some insight into the characteristics of firms that experience problems, but do not necessarily receive a going‐concern modification. Further investigation into those firms that have problems could reveal factors that may be incorporated into decision support systems for auditors, in order to improve accuracy and reliability of these decision tools. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Innovation and Information Acquisition under Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty

When an agent invests in new industrial activities, he has a limited initial knowledge of his project's returns. Acquiring information allows him both to reduce the uncertainty on the dangerousness of this project and to limit potential damages that it might cause on people's health and on the environment. In this paper, we study whether there exist situations in which the agent does not acquire information. We find that an agent with time-consistent preferences, as well as an agent with hyperbolic ones, will acquire information unless its cost exceeds the direct benefit they could get with this information. Nevertheless, a hyperbolic agent may remain strategically ignorant and, when he does acquire information, he will acquire less information than a time-consistent type. Moreover, a hyperbolic-discounting type who behaves as a time-consistent agent in the future is more inclined to stay ignorant. We then emphasize that this strategic ignorance depends on the degree of precision of the information. Finally, we analyse the role that existing liability rules could play as an incentive to acquire information under uncertainty and with regard to the form of the agent's preferences.     

Redacted Disclosure

In this paper we investigate a firm's decision to redact proprietary information from its material contract filings. Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) grants a firm's request to withhold information from investors in its material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary. We hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection deteriorate. That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread, reductions in market depth, and lower market turnover. In addition, we conjecture that the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the competitiveness of the firm's industry, and the performance of the firm. Overall the results of our analysis generally support our predictions. We find that when firms redact information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase in adverse selection. We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long‐term debt and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or experience losses.     

Proactive or Reactive: An Analysis of the Effect of Agent Style on Organizational Decision-making Performance

This paper addresses the issue of agent style—proactive and reactive—from a theoretical perspective. The results show that agent style, though often considered key in decision making, only affects the organization's performance when the organization is under moderate time pressure. Further, the effect of agent style depends on the type of training given to organizational agents and the internal condition under which the organization operates. This research suggests that, when resources are scarce, organizations should spend these resources on organizational design and on increasing the accuracy of incoming information rather than on altering the agents' style.     

INDEPENDENT EXPERT'S REPORTS IN TAKEOVER BIDS

This paper reports an empirical examination of independent expert reports in takeover bids using the 170 reports that were issued in the 364 cash-based bids that occurred between January 1988 and December 1991. It was found that bid premia offered in takeover bids where an expert's report was issued were not significantly lower than bid premia in other bids. This may be attributable to independent experts acting as a countervailing influence on bidders holding a superior pre-bid bargaining position. Next, some dimensions of the “fair and reasonable” criterion that experts are required to use are examined. These are the single-test and dual-test interpretations of the phrase, the relation between offer price, market price and the expert's valuation of the target, the cost and length of expert's reports and, finally, the influence an expert has on the outcome of a bid.     

Enterprise Risk Management Through Strategic Allocation of Capital

This article presents a conceptual framework for operationalizing strategic enterprise risk management (ERM) in a general firm. We employ a risk‐constrained optimization approach to study the capital allocation decisions under ERM. Given the decision maker's risk appetite, the problem of holistically managing enterprise‐wide hazard, financial, operational, and real project risks is treated by maximizing the expected total return on capital, while trading off risks simultaneously in Value‐at‐Risk type of constraints. This approach explicitly quantifies the concepts of risk appetite and risk prioritization in light of the firm's default and financial distress avoidance reflected in its target credit rating. Our framework also allows the firm to consider a multiperiod planning horizon so that changing business environments can be accounted for. We illustrate the implementation of the framework through a numerical example. As an initial conceptual advancement, our formulation is capable of facilitating more general ERM modeling within a consistent strategic framework, where idiosyncratic variations of firms and different modeling assumptions can be accommodated. Managerial implications are also discussed.     

Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.     

Experts and quacks

What happens when “type” is endogenous in a reputational setting? Here, customers cannot tell “experts” from imitative “quacks,” but gain information through repeated interaction. Firm incentives to invest in expertise vary nonmonotonically in how tolerant customers are of bad outcomes; more tolerant customers are both more forgiving, making expertise less necessary, and longer tenured, increasing the value of retaining them. In equilibrium, the proportion of expert firms is bounded away from one; some quacks are necessary to keep incentives of experts in line. The fraction of experts is decreasing in customers' switching costs and the relative cost of expertise over quackery.