Internal control quality and relationship‐specific investments by suppliers and customers

This paper investigates the association between the quality of internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) and relationship‐specific investments by suppliers/customers. I find a significant negative association between the disclosure of a material weakness (MW) in ICOFR and changes in the relationship‐specific investments of suppliers/customers. Relationship‐specific investments of suppliers/customers have a stronger negative association with inventory‐related MW. The negative association between MW disclosures and the relationship‐specific investments of suppliers/customers is stronger when economic dependence between the firms and the suppliers/customers is more important and when the suppliers/customers have greater bargaining power. Also, suppliers/customers significantly increase their relationship‐specific investments following the remediation of ineffective ICOFR. Overall, my findings show that a firm's quality of ICOFR affects the relationship‐specific investment decisions of suppliers/customers.     

Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers

We investigate the link between a firm's leverage and the characteristics of its suppliers and customers. Specifically, we examine whether firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism to induce suppliers/customers to undertake relationship-specific investments. We find that the firm's leverage is negatively related to the R&D intensities of its suppliers and customers. We also find lower debt levels for firms operating in industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and customer industries are more prevalent. Consistent with a bargaining role for debt, we find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of concentration in supplier/customer industries.     

The Capital Structure of PE‐Funded Companies (and How New Debt Instruments and Investors Are Expanding Their Debt Capacity)

The capital structures and financial policies of companies controlled by private equity firms are notably different from those of public companies. The concentration of ownership and intense monitoring of leveraged buyouts by their largest investors (that is, the partners of the PE firms who sit on their boards), along with the contractual requirement of PE funds to return their capital within seven to ten years, have resulted in capital structures that are far more leveraged than those of their publicly traded counterparts, but also considerably more provisional and “opportunistic.” Whereas the average U.S. public company has long operated with roughly 30% debt and 70% equity, today's typical private‐equity sponsored company is initially capitalized with an “upside‐down” structure of 70% debt and just 30% equity, and then often charged with working down its debt as quickly as possible. Although banks supplied most of the debt for the first wave of LBOs in the 1980s, the remarkable growth of the private equity industry in the past 25 years has been supported by the parallel development of a new leveraged acquisition finance market. This financing innovation has led to a general movement away from a bankcentered funding base to one comprising a relatively new set of institutional investors, including business development corporations and hedge funds. Such investors have shown a strong appetite for new debt instruments and risks that banks have been unwilling or, thanks to increased capital requirements and other regulatory burdens, prohibited from taking on. Notable among these new instruments are second‐lien loans and uni‐tranche debt—instruments that, by shifting the allocation of claims on the debtor's cash flow and assets in ways consistent with the preferences of these new investors, have had the effect of increasing the debt capacity of their portfolio companies. And such increases in debt capacity have in turn enabled private equity funds—now sitting on near‐record amounts of capital from their limited partners—to bid higher prices and compete more effectively in today's intensely competitive M&A market, in which high target acquisition purchase prices are being fueled by a strong stock market and increased competition from corporate acquirers.     

Debt enforcement,financial leverage,and product failures: Evidence from China and the United States

Building on capital structure and product market interactions, and the role of debt enforcement in leveraged firms' investments, we examine whether cross-country debt enforcement can produce different associations between financial leverage and product failures. Results show that different debt enforcement systems can generate opposite leverage effects. In countries with weak/nearly ineffective debt enforcement, financial leverage shows an incentive investment effect due to low default costs, and thus highly leveraged firms tend to invest more and are less likely to have product failures. Conversely, in countries with strict/effective debt enforcement, distressed companies tend to have an underinvestment effect and more product failures.     

Canadian Business Trusts: A New Organizational Structure

The focus of this paper is a subset of income trusts called business trusts, a Canadian financial innovation that has experienced remarkable success in the Canadian market, but not in the U.S. At theendof2005, there were more than 170 business trusts (most of them in Canada, but a handful in the U.S.) with an aggregate market value of over $90 billion. Like income trusts generally, which include REITs and oil & gas trusts, business trusts are designed in large part to avoid taxation at the corporate level by distributing a substantial proportion of a business's operating cash flow. The business trust structure provides investors (called “unit holders”) with what amounts to a combination of subordinated, high‐yield debt and high‐yielding equity. But unlike the subordinated debt in most highly leveraged transactions (HLTs), the “internal” debt in a business trust unit is effectively “stapled” to the equity part of the security. And this kind of “strip financing” (which was a common practice in U.S. LBOs during the‘80s) means that, besides providing stable cash‐generating companies with a tax‐minimizing way of paying out excess cash, the business unit structure also limits the “financial distress costs” associated with HLTs. In the event of financial trouble, the unit holders are likely to be much more cooperative than ordinary subordinated debt holders in restructuring interest payments since the benefits of so doing accrue to the equity portion of their units. The original income trust structure has also been used by a number of U.S.‐based companies that listed their shares on the TSX. But, in the attempt to make the securities suitable for listing on the AM EX, and in response to auditor demands intended to address potential IRS concerns, the instruments were modified in ways that sacrificed one of the important benefits of the original structure. The changes were designed to make the subordinated debt issued as part of a package with equity look more like external, third‐party debt. And in so doing, the low‐cost restructuring feature built into the Canadian version was lost, and the U.S. trusts failed to gain acceptance.     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

Strategic Financial Management: Lessons from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Each of today's three dominant academic theories of capital structure has trouble explaining the financing behavior of companies that have seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In conflict with the tradeoff theory, the authors’ recent studies of some 7,000 SEOs by U.S. industrial companies over the period 1970‐2017 notes that the vast majority of them—on the order of 80%—had the effect of moving the companies away from, rather than toward, their target leverage ratios. Inconsistent with the pecking‐order theory, SEO issuers have tended to be financially healthy companies with low leverage and considerable unused debt capacity. And at odds with the market‐timing theory, SEOs appear to be driven more by the capital requirements associated with large investment projects than by favorable market conditions. The authors’ findings also show that, in the years following their stock offerings, the SEO companies tend to issue one or more debt offerings, which have the effect of raising their leverage back toward their targets. Whereas each of the three theories assumes some degree of shortsightedness among financial managers, the authors’ findings suggest that long‐run‐value‐maximizing CFOs manage their capital structures strategically as opposed to opportunistically. They consider the company's current leverage in relation to its longer‐run target, its investment opportunities and long‐term capital requirements, and the costs and benefits of alternative sequences of financing transactions. This framework, which the authors call strategic financial management, aims to provide if not a unifying, then a more integrated, explanation—one that draws on each of the three main theories to provide a more convincing account of the financing and leverage decisions of SEO issuers.     

Proactive Leverage Increases and The Value of Financial Flexibility

Traditional tradeoff models of corporate capital structure, although still featured prominently in finance textbooks and widely accepted by practitioners, have been criticized by financial economists for doing a poor job of explaining observed debt ratios. Moreover, the observed ratios are far less stable than what would be predicted by the standard tradeoff models. In a study published several years ago in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors of this article aimed to shed more light on the underlying forces governing capital structure decisions by analyzing a set of major changes in capital structure in which companies initiated large increases in leverage through substantial new borrowings. They then attempted to explain why these companies chose to increase leverage and how their capital structures changed during the years after the large debt issues. As summarized in this article, the authors' findings indicate, first of all, that the large debt financings were used primarily to fund major corporate investments—and not, for example, to make large distributions to shareholders. And the changes in leverage ratios that came after the debt offerings were driven far more by the evolution of the companies' realized cash flows and their investment opportunities than by deliberate or decisive attempts to rebalance their capital structures toward a stationary target. In fact, many of the companies chose to take on even more debt when faced with cash‐flow deficits, despite operating with leverage that was already well above any reasonable estimate of their estimated target leverage. At the same time, companies that generated financial surpluses used them to reduce debt, even when their leverage had fallen well below their estimated targets. Taken as a whole, the findings of the authors' study support the idea that unused debt capacity represents an important source of financial flexibility, and that preserving such flexibility—and making use of it when valuable investment opportunities materialize—may well be the critical missing link in connecting capital structure theory with observed corporate behavior.     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.     

Private Equity,Corporate Governance,and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control

In the early 1980s, during the first U.S. wave of debt‐financed hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, finance professors Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback introduced the concept of the “market for corporate control” and defined it as “the market in which alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources.” Since then, the dramatic expansion of the private equity market, and the resulting competition between corporate (or “strategic”) and “financial” buyers for deals, have both reinforced and revealed the limitations of this old definition. This article explains how, over the past 25 years, the private equity market has helped reinvent the market for corporate control, particularly in the U.S. What's more, the author argues that the effects of private equity on the behavior of companies both public and private have been important enough to warrant a new definition of the market for corporate control—one that, as presented in this article, emphasizes corporate governance and the benefits of the competition for deals between private equity firms and public acquirers. Along with their more effective governance systems, top private equity firms have developed a distinctive approach to reorganizing companies for efficiency and value. The author's research on private equity, comprising over 20 years of interviews and case studies as well as large‐sample analysis, has led her to identify four principles of reorganization that help explain the success of these buyout firms. Besides providing a source of competitive advantage to private equity firms, the management practices that derive from these four principles are now being adopted by many public companies. And, in the author's words, “private equity's most important and lasting contribution to the global economy may well be its effect on the world's public corporations—those companies that will continue to carry out the lion's share of the world's growth opportunities.”     

The Leveraging of Corporate America: A Long‐Run Perspective on Changes in Capital Structure

In a study published recently in the Journal of Financial Economics, the authors of this article documented a substantial increase in the use of debt financing by U.S. companies over the past century. From 1920 until the mid‐1940s, the aggregate leverage of unregulated U.S. companies was low and stable, with the average debt‐to‐capital ratio staying within the narrow range of 10% to 15%. But during the next 25 years, the use of debt by U.S. companies more than doubled, rising to 35% of total capital. And since 1970, aggregate leverage has remained above 35%, peaking at 47% in 1992. Moreover, this pattern has been observed in companies of all sizes and operating in all unregulated sectors. Changes in the characteristics of U.S. public companies during this period provide little help in explaining the increase in corporate leverage. For example, the displacement of tangible by intangible assets in many sectors of the U.S. economy during the past 50 years would have led most economists to predict, holding all other things equal, a reduction rather than an increase in aggregate corporate leverage. Instead, according to the authors' findings, the main contributors to the increases in U.S. corporate leverage since the 1940s have been external changes, including increases in corporate income tax rates, the development of financial markets and intermediaries, and the reduction in government borrowing in the decades following World War II. The authors' analysis also identifies these last two changes—the development of financial markets, including the rise of institutional investors and shareholder activism, and the post‐War reduction in government debt—as having played the biggest roles in the leveraging of corporate America.     

Private Equity: Boom and Bust?

The private equity or leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe and the U.S. has grown enormously over the last two decades, from $7.5 billion in 1991 to $500 billion in 2006. Much of the financing of recent transactions has come in the form of syndicated debt, which is dispersed after origination to many non‐bank financial institutions. This financing practice has two important possible consequences: First, bankers' incentives to engage in effective ex‐ante screening and ex‐post monitoring of deals have been weakened, which may have led to excessive lending while encouraging buyers to overpay. Consistent with this possibility, the authors provide new evidence that some recent transactions have occurred at very low EBITDA‐to‐capital ratios, financed with high levels of debt that recall those of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, there is a scarcity of information about the identity of the ultimate holders of the LBO debt; and as a consequence of the resulting uncertainty, a few defaults of major LBO deals could cause a drying up of new funding for financial institutions. The end result could be that the veil covering the repackaging of LBO debt converts a small shock to the LBO sector into a liquidity crisis for its financiers. Such liquidity problems could in turn affect not the financing and re‐financing of just LBO deals, but other as set classes as well, including lending by banks to public firms. The authors offer a number of suggestions for increasing the transparency of this market.     

An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility

In summarizing the findings of their recent study, the authors report findings that suggest that not all socially responsible corporate policies are likely to have the same effect on a company's ownership and value. Using environmental policy as their proxy for CSR activities, the authors classify corporate environmental practices into two categories: (1) actions that reduce the likelihood of harmful outcomes by reducing the corporate exposure to environmental risk; and (2) actions that enhance companies' perceived ‘greenness’ through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale. Although both groups of environmental practices are likely to be viewed as socially beneficial, corporate expenditures that reduce a firm's environmental risk exposure are more likely to benefit shareholders by limiting the risk of losses arising from environmental accidents, lawsuits, and fines—and possibly thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital. By contrast, corporate expenditures that enhance the firm's perceived greenness by going beyond legal requirements and risk management rationales could actually reduce shareholder value. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that institutional investors tend to own smaller than average percentages of both companies the authors identify as ‘toxic’ and make limited efforts to manage their environmental risk, and companies they label ‘green’ with low environmental risk exposure but relatively high CSR spending on the environment. At the same time, such investors hold larger‐than‐average positions in ‘neutral’ companies with relatively low, or effectively managed, environmental risk exposures and limited investment in ‘greenness’ programs. The authors also find that both toxic and green companies have lower (Tobin's Q) valuations than neutral companies, and that otherwise toxic companies that effectively manage their environmental risk exposures have higher valuations.     

Single vs. Multiple Discount Rates: How to Limit “Influence Costs” in the Capital Allocation Process*

Most finance textbooks suggest that companies evaluate investment projects using discount rates that reflect both the debt capacity and the unique risks of the project. In practice, however, companies often use their company‐wide WACC to evaluate such investments because of the difficulty of (and subjectivity involved in) estimating the risk of individual projects, and the potential for managerial bias and influence to distort the estimates. This article proposes a practicable method for calculating the cost of capital that produces different discount rates for investment projects with different risks while minimizing the “influence costs” that arise when managers have discretion in the choice of discount rates. The proposed approach makes use of market information (in the form of the firm‐wide costs of debt and equity), thereby limiting managerial discretion, while typically still providing a good approximation of theoretically correct, project‐specific discount rates. The key to the method's effectiveness is its use of a project's debt capacity to define the capital structure weights, where debt capacity is defined by the amount of debt financing the project will support without lowering the firm's credit rating.     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

Complicating the current corporate governance controversy is a major disagreement about the fundamental purpose of the corporation. There are two main views on what should constitute the principal goal of the firm. Most economists tend to endorse value maximization—that is, maximization of the value of the firm's debt plus equity—or a version of value maximization known as “value‐based management” (VBM) that aims to maximize shareholder value. The main challenger is “stakeholder theory,” which argues that the corporation exists to benefit not just investors but all its major constituencies—employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and the federal government, as well as shareholders. Thus, whereas the success of a corporation under VBM could be assessed simply by its long‐run return to shareholders, under stakeholder theory a company's success would be judged by taking account of its contributions to all its stakeholders. Using statistical analysis of various measures of corporate success in satisfying non‐investor stakeholders, the author investigates whether a broader focus on multiple stakeholders is necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of long‐term shareholder value. His main findings in fact suggest just the opposite—namely, that long‐term value creation appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. More specifically, the author's study shows that companies with higher levels of value creation tend to have stronger reputations for treating stakeholders well while companies that create little value end up shortchanging not just their shareholders but all their constituencies. For profitable companies that have previously failed to devote the optimal level of resources to their non‐investor stakeholders, the message of this article is that investing in stakeholders can add value—and, in fact, it pays for companies to spend an additional dollar on stakeholder relationships as long as the present value of the expected (long‐run) return is at least a dollar.     

FINANCIAL STRATEGY FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES: a ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

Dennis Soter begins with the provocative observation that “U.S. companies, private as well as public, are systematically underleveraged,” and goes on to suggest that debt‐financed stock repurchases may help address the current valuation problems faced by many middle market companies (and by many larger firms in basic industries as well). Soter makes his case by presenting two case histories. In the first, Equifax, the Atlanta‐based provider of credit information services, combined a leveraged Dutch auction stock repurchase with a multi‐year series of open market repurchase programs and an EVA incentive plan to produce large increases in operating efficiency and shareholder value. In the second, FPL Group (the parent of Florida Power and Light) became the first profitable utility to cut its dividend, substituting a policy of ongoing stock repurchase for its 33% reduction in dividend payments. Following Soter, John Brehm, the CFO of IPALCO Enterprises (the parent of Indianapolis Power and Light), explains the rationale for his company's decision to become the first utility to do a leveraged recap (while also cutting its dividend by a third). As in the case of Equifax, IPALCO's dramatic change in capital structure (also combined with an EVA incentive plan) was associated with major operating improvements and a positive stock market response. But, of course, high leverage is not right for all companies. And, to reinforce that point, James Perry, CEO of Argosy Gaming, recounts his harrowing experience of having to raise new equity shortly after taking charge of his overleveraged company. By arranging an infusion of convertible preferred, Argosy was able not only to stave off bankruptcy, but to fund major new investment and engineer a remarkable turnaround of its operations. Finally, William Dutmers, Chairman of Knape & Vogt, a small midwestern manufacturing company, discusses the role of debt‐financed stock repurchases and an EVA management approach in his company's recent operating improvements.     

University of Texas Roundtable on Financing and Managing Energy Investments in a Low‐Price Environment

During the past 18 months, the U.S. oil industry has seen oil prices plunge from well over $100 a barrel to under $30. In a session that was part of a recent Private Equity Conference at the University of Texas in Austin, the CEO of a small independent producer and a representative of a large global oil and gas company discussed the challenges of financing and operating energy companies in today's low‐price environment with the director of energy research at a brokerage firm, the senior partner responsible for the natural resource investments of a well‐known private equity firm, and the head of the oil and gas restructuring practice of a national law firm. The panelists appeared to reach a consensus on at least the following three arguments:

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Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal Debt

We argue that domestic business groups are able to actively optimise the internal/external debt mix across their subsidiaries. Novel to the literature, we use bi‐level data (i.e. data from both individual subsidiary financial statements and consolidated group level financial statements) to model the bank and internal debt concentration of non‐financial Belgian private business group affiliates. As a benchmark, we construct a size and industry matched sample of non‐group affiliated (stand‐alone) companies. We find support for a pecking order of internal debt over bank debt at the subsidiary level which leads to a substantially lower bank debt concentration for group affiliates as compared to stand‐alone companies. The internal debt concentration of a subsidiary is mainly driven by the characteristics of the group's internal capital market. The larger its available resources, the more intra‐group debt is used while bank debt financing at the subsidiary level decreases. However, as the group's overall debt level mounts, groups increasingly locate bank borrowing in subsidiaries with low costs of external financing (i.e. large subsidiaries with important collateral assets) to limit moral hazard and dissipative costs. Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of a complex group wide optimisation process of financing costs.     

Social Capital,Trust, and Corporate Performance: How CSR Helped Companies During the Financial Crisis (and Why It Can Keep Helping Them)

The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.     

Do Corporate Managers Know When Their Shares Are Undervalued? New Evidence Based on Actual (and Not Just Announced) Stock Buybacks

This article summarizes the findings of the authors' recent study, published in the Journal of Financial Economics, of whether public companies are able to repurchase their own shares at a discount to the market, thereby earning more than a market return on such “investments.” To the extent the answer is yes, it would suggest that management has an advantage in assessing the intrinsic value of the companies they manage. Using as their sample all 2,237 publicly traded U.S. companies that repurchased their own stock between 2004 and 2011, the authors compared the average price paid during the month to the average price at which the firm's shares traded during that month as well as three and six months after the repurchase. (All earlier studies had measured stock performance from the date of the repurchase announcements rather than from the date of the actual repurchases.) The authors' conclusion, which may come as more of a surprise to financial economists than practicing corporate executives, was that the majority of companies repurchasing their shares have in fact earned a positive return on their investment in their own stock. Perhaps the most important finding of the study, however, was that infrequent repurchasers—defined as companies that bought back their own stock four or fewer times a year—have been much more successful in buying undervalued shares than regular repurchasers. For example, when evaluated over a six‐month holding period, the annual “alpha” of infrequent repurchasers was 2.4% greater than that of frequent repurchasers—those that bought back their shares at least nine times a year. And this advantage was even more significant for companies that repurchased just once during the year—a group that recorded an alpha of 5.9%, as compared to 1.5% for monthly repurchasers. Moreover, the results were essentially the same when extended over considerably longer holding periods. For the entire sample of companies that repurchased their shares, the authors reported finding positive and significant alphas of 0.3% per month over windows ranging from three months to three years after the repurchase. But, as reported above, the infrequent repurchasers significantly outperformed frequent repurchasers over all time horizons, with differences in alpha that ranged from a low of 0.3% and to as high as 0.6% per month.