Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

This paper revisits the notion that economic integration—modeled as a reduction of trade costs—may be anticompetitive, in the sense that it may reinforce the ability of an international cartel to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other’s markets. The paper is novel in terms of introducing ad valorem and fixed trade costs in addition to the customary unit trade costs. It is shown that an anticompetitive effect, found for reductions in unit trade costs, may disappear once trade costs are ad valorem or fixed.     

Product differentiation, firm heterogeneity and international trade: Exploring the Alchian–Allen effect

In a model of international trade with horizontally differentiated goods, increasing returns and monopolistically competitive markets, this paper proposes that the degree of differentiation in a product mix–defined as the ratio of the number of varieties to the total value of imports–can be regarded as another aspect of quality. Furthermore, this paper draws a parallel to the Alchian–Allen effect and shows that, when firms are heterogeneous in either fixed or variable costs, the degree of differentiation is increasing in per unit transportation costs.     

Market Size and Economic Integration when Labor Markets are Unionized

The paper explores the effects of economic integration on trade, wages, and welfare when market sizes differ. A duopoly model with two‐way intraindustry trade in similar products and with unionized labor markets is employed. It is confirmed that, for a wide range of different relative market sizes, integration leads to higher wages, employment, and welfare. However, where market sizes differ widely, the reduction of trade barriers leads to a reduction of wages, employment, and—in some circumstances—welfare in the country with the large market.     

Union Wage Strategies and International Trade

We characterise a full set of possible international trade regimes for different combinations of wages in a two-country model of oligopoly with a homogeneous product. We show that the nature of any equilibrium trade will be either inter-industry (one-way) or intra-industry (two-way) depending on (endogenous) union choices between high and low-wage strategies. We show that intra-industry trade is the more likely the lower are trade costs, and that under intra-industry trade, falling trade costs lead monopoly unions to set higher wages, but the opposite obtains under inter-industry trade.     

Skills scarcity and export intensity

We describe a model of trade with skills-based product differentiation and non-proportional trade costs that predicts a positive correlation between firms' export intensity, the price of their exports and the wages they pay to their workers. In equilibrium, firms that employ workers with comparatively scarcer skills export a larger proportion of their output, pay higher wages and charge higher prices. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts that trade liberalization can cause the distribution of earnings to become more polarized, with patterns that reflect the heterogeneous effects of trade liberalization on firms' export performance.     

The Location of Firms in Unionized Countries*

This paper develops a two‐country economic geography model with Cournot competition, where the labor markets are unionized so that trade unions bargain efficiently with each firm over wages and employment. Agglomeration forces are present due to wage premia obtained by the trade unions. It is shown that if the bargaining power of unions differs across countries then, as trade costs are reduced, the country with relatively weak unions gradually acquires all firms. However, for a range of trade costs, it is also a locally stable equilibrium for all firms to locate in the country with strong unions.     

Firms’ location decision across asymmetric countries and employment inequality

This paper analyzes the effect of globalization (lower trade costs) on production and trade patterns if, firms are vertically linked, stages of production differ in labor-factors intensity and countries differ in labor-factors prices. In order to reflect the “Continental Europe” experience, relative wages are assumed fixed and spatial changes in production are translated into changes in relative (skilled to unskilled) employment levels. The asymmetry in factors prices across countries results in a unique agglomeration equilibrium for a broad range of trade costs. At low trade costs, firms’ location depends on production costs—vertical specialization occurs. This paper also provides a consistent explanation of the observed increase in employment inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in relatively high-unskilled wage countries.     

Trade and Wages When the Trade Regime is Determined Endogenously

The paper shows that whether trade is one-way or two-way depends on wage strategies adopted by trade unions. The union's wage strategy choices themselves depend upon the conditions under which trade takes place, as well as upon the characteristics of both the labor and the product markets in the trading countries. Thus, trade and labor market outcomes are determined endogenously. Testable hypotheses are generated, and the implications of the theoretical model for the econometric analysis of trade and wages are discussed.     

Open borders

There is a large body of evidence indicating that cross-country differences in income levels are associated with differences in productivity. If workers are much more productive in one country than in another, restrictions on immigration lead to large efficiency losses. The paper quantifies these losses, using a model in which efficiency differences are labor-augmenting, and free trade in product markets leads to factor price equalization, so that wages are equal across countries when measured in efficiency units of labor. The estimated gains from removing immigration restrictions are huge. Using a simple static model of migration costs, the estimated net gains from open borders are about the same as the gains from a growth miracle that more than doubles the income level in less-developed countries.     

Efficient risk sharing,non-marketable labor income and fixed-wage contracts

This paper seeks to explain fixed-wage labor contracts. The traditional rationale that fixed wages represent an implicit sale of ‘wage insurance’ by risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers is rejected as being incompatible with the fact that firms are owned by risk-averse investors. Instead, it is shown that fixed-wage contracts might arise from the non-marketability of labor income. When human capital is not marketable, it becomes optimal to shift all the risk in production onto the firm, since trading in equity markets enables efficient allocation of the uncertainty. The fixed-wage contract shifts the risk to equity owners and in fact replicates the first-best equilibrium that would emerge if individuals were paid their realized marginal product and allowed to trade shares in human capital.     

全球制造业工资停滞之谜*——来自进口中间产品质量视角的经验证据

本文从快速增长的中间产品贸易及其质量视角研究了全球制造业工资停滞现象。首先，基于DS垄断竞争框架和Koch & Smolka(2019)的研究，本文重新构建开放条件下的工资决定模型，发现进口中间产品质量影响各国劳动工资。其次，借鉴Feenstra & Romalis(2014)的研究，本文构建全新的测度产品—行业—国家层面进口中间产品质量GEKS 指数法，估算1995—2011年37个国家从248个出口市场进口的制造业四位码中间产品质量指数，发现全球制造业进口中间产品质量上升趋势明显但分化严重，中等和低等收入国家质量指数持续上升，高等收入国家质量指数持续下降。最后，本文从跨国—行业层面定量识别进口中间产品质量对进口国制造业工资的具体影响，发现：(1)进口中间产品质量对全球制造业的劳动工资有显著负向影响，对中等收入国家、中级技术密集型行业、高技能劳动者以及进口矿物类中间产品制造业的工资降低效应最大；(2)进口中间产品质量通过“就业破坏效应”和“研发激励效应”两种机制造成全球制造业工资下降；(3)进口中间产品质量变化造成制造业工资下降是全球化中的市场性经济规律和暂时性“全球冲击波”。上述发现解释了全球制造业工资停滞之谜，并启示各国须尊重全球化的市场规律，加强国际合作，共同应对冲击，提高民众福祉，携手共建人类命运共同体。     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

The impact of trade on the relative wages and employment of low skill workers in France

The impact of international trade on labour markets in developed countries will be different according to the degree of competition in product markets, the flexibility of the labour market and the skill intensity of production. An econometric analysis of the impact of trade in France has been undertaken using sectoral data for the period 1985–p1992. It is found that lower relative import prices reduce the relative employment of low skill workers in the first half the period and reduce their relative wages in the second half. In both cases the effect is more pronounced in sectors where the skill intensity of production is initially low.     

Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I use the Azevedo and Leshno (2013) framework, in which a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers.In equilibrium, even if wages are exogenous and fixed, firms have incentives to strategically reduce their capacity, to increase the quality of their worker pool. The intensity of incentives to reduce capacity is given by a simple formula, analogous to the classic Cournot model, but depends on different moments of the distribution of preferences. I compare markets with uniform and personalized wages. For fixed quantities, markets with personalized wages always yield higher efficiency than markets with uniform wages, but may be less efficient if firms reduce capacity to avoid bidding too much for star workers.     

Openness, managerial incentives, and heterogeneous firms

This paper examines the effects of trade openness on managerial incentives and firm-level productivity by incorporating the principal-agent mechanism into the heterogeneous firm trade framework inter alia Melitz (Econometrica 71:1695?C1725, 2003). We show that opening up to trade generally leads to a steeper optimal managerial incentive scheme (and hence, higher firm productivity) via a new mechanism by which selection of heterogeneous firms into the export market plays a key role. This is because trade openness unambiguously increases the variation of firm profits by reallocating profits towards ex post low-cost exporters, leading to a higher stake of the market game faced by the principals. Interestingly, it is further shown that, whilst falling variable trade costs unambiguously increase managerial incentives, a reduction in fixed trade costs could possibly lead to weaker incentives and thus generate productivity losses due to an adverse inter-firm reallocation effect. Hence, the model establishes a causal link between the Melitz-type reallocation effect and the within-firm productivity changes, both of which have been identified as important sources of aggregate productivity gains from trade by recent empirical studies.     

Ambiguity and spurious precision in the modern microeconomic cost framework

The MMCF stresses ‘variable’ and ‘fixed’ costs; homogenizes the firm's output; and limits itself to a single period to gain insight into the way markets do and/or should behave. Simplifying thus, it confounds expenditures and costs; fixed facilities and fixed costs; time-incremental and output-incremental costs; fixed capital and sunk costs; and ‘drawing board time’ and chronological time. The apparent precision of conclusions following therefrom is of little use in classifying a firm's expenditures even in simple one-site activities, such as a power plant or a cinema; and as is apparent through four econometric studies, MMCF provides little guidance for cost or price policy in network activities, since variable and short-run marginal costs may be defined arbitrarily.     

Endogenous timing,strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries’ decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.