我国利用普惠制的现状

普惠制是普遍优惠制的简称,它是发达国家给予发展中国家出口制成品和半制成品(包括某些初级产品)普遍的、非歧视的、非互惠的一种关税减免优惠制度。该制度自1971年实施以来,迄今已20年,到目前为止,普惠制的给惠国计有27个,它们是:欧共体12国、日本、奥地利、新西兰、芬兰、挪威、瑞士、瑞典、加拿大、澳大利亚、捷克、保加利亚(它既是给惠国同时又是受惠国)、匈牙利、波兰、前苏联和美国。接受普惠制待遇的发展中国家和地区已达170多个。     

欧盟优惠性原产地规则的调整与中国出口战略应对

欧盟优惠性原产地规则包括普惠制和优惠性贸易协定的相关安排,中国从欧盟享受的是普惠制待遇。随着2006—2008欧盟普惠制新方案的生效,许多情况发生了变化。为了尽可能的减少其负面影响,中国应该及时调整自己的战略方针,做好新一轮规划,并尽可能多方位利用其原产地规则,使其优惠性贸易协定为己所用。……．．……………………………………………………………     

入世后中国享受的基本权利和履行的义务

入世会使中国与其他世贸组织成员一样享受如下基本的权利: (1)能使我国的产品和服务及知识产权在135个成员中享受无条件、多边、永久和稳定的最惠国待遇以及国民待遇; (2)使我国对大多数发达国家出口的工业品及半制成品享受普惠制待遇;     

加入WTO后的外贸企业：机遇·挑战·对策

中国加入世界贸易组织，给我国外贸企业带来机遇的同时，也增加了许多不利因素。有利条件是：享有“普惠制”待遇及其他给予发展中国家的特殊照顾，享受削减关税壁垒和非关税壁垒带来的利益，并能充分利用争端解决机制等；另一方面，国内的竞争越来越激烈，作为中介企业的作用越来越小，政府给予的优惠政策越来越少。为此，外贸企业应从外贸发展方式、外贸经营结构、经营机制等方面入手，加快改革步伐，要转变经营策略，进行战略性重组，选择一条适合外贸企业自身发展的道路。     

普惠制方案的修订对我国出口贸易的影响及应对措施

近期 ,欧盟、日本等发达国家对其普惠制方案进行调整 ,正通过缩小普惠制适用范围和提高优惠关税率等措施 ,逐步取消中国的普惠制待遇 ,这对中国企业的出口无疑会形成较大冲击。针对一些发达国家普惠制方案的调整 ,中国扩大出口战略也应做新的规划。     

欧盟普惠制的变化及其对中国的影响

普惠制是发达国家给予发展中国家的一种关税优惠制度,欧盟于1971年建立普惠制,由于欧盟对中国实施普惠制毕业,给中国对外贸易带来巨大挑战。在了解欧盟普惠制的演变和发展的基础上,阐述了欧盟普惠制变化对中国对外贸易的影响,并提出了应对欧盟普惠制变化的对策。     

做好准备迎接“入世”

“入世”是我国实行改革开放的重要组成部分,当前,我们必须做好各项准备,迎接“入世”时刻的到来。加入世贸组织后,我国的产品将在１００多个成员国中享有多边的无条件和稳定的最惠国待遇,还可享受普惠制待遇。这将有利于我国产品参与国际市场公平竞争,有利于实施外...     

国际贸易中的普遍优惠制

普遍优惠制简称普惠制(GSP),是当前国际贸易中,发达国家给予发展中国家出口制成品和半制成品(包括某些初级产品)的一种普遍的、非歧视的和非互惠的关税优惠制度。普遍的,即发达国家对所有发展中国家、地区和最不发达国家出口的制成品和半成品给予普遍的优惠待遇。非歧视的,即应使所有的发展中国家、地区和最不发达国家都不受歧视,无例外地享受普惠制待遇。非     

加入WTO的权利和义务是什么?

ＷＴＯ成员享有的基本权利有:(1)在所有成员中享受无条件、多边、永久和稳定的最惠国待遇和国民待遇;(2)享受其他成员开放或扩大贸易、服务市场准入的利益;(3)发展中国家可以享受一定范围的普惠制待遇及发展中国家成员的大多数优惠或过渡性安排;(4)利用争端解决机制,公平、客观     

新疆进一步利用普惠制的建议与对策

一、新疆开发和利用普惠制的必要性 普惠制是发达国家对发展中国家进口的制成品和半制成品给予的一种普遍的、非歧视的和非互惠的优惠关税制度,目前,国际上已有28个发达国家给予我国这种待遇。用好普惠制对提高出口商品竞争能力,使产品顺利打入国际市场,提高出口商品售价,促进出口产品深加工,吸引外商投资及发展旅游业都有重要意义。但目前我区普惠制利用率极低,据自治区进出口商品检验局统计,1996     

COMPETITIVE NEED LIMITS AND THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCE

The United States uses competitive need limits to deny Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) treatment of imports from developing countries. The analysis here estimates in two ways the effect of competitive need limits on GSP imports. First, it uses ex post trade data to determine the effect on import values and shares. Second, it combines an ex ante model with trade and elasticity data to estimate the effect of competitive need limits. Results indicate that competitive need limits reduce affected imports by 10 to 17%. Benefits from this import reduction accrue almost exclusively to U.S. import competing firms.     

GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS

The United States imports around 25% of its merchandise under some form of preferential trade regime. This paper examines both the origins and the consequences of U.S. trade preferences in the context of the gravity model of international trade. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, it provides estimates of the impact of preferential trade regimes in terms of access to U.S. markets while controlling for geostrategic interests that determine the countries that are offered commercial preferences. Second, we consider not only country eligibility but also the extent of utilization of these programs. Third, we provide new estimates of the impact of transport and transactions costs beyond distance. In the standard gravity estimation, we find that beneficiaries of these preferences, except GSP, export between two and three times more than the excluded countries, after controlling for country and product characteristics. Nonetheless, the estimated effects of these programs are lower when controlling for utilization ratios and selection biases due to the correlation between geopolitical interests and the standard explanatory variables used in the gravity model of trade, such as countries' geographic distance from the United States.     

Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War

ABSTRACT

Three major concerns drove the U.S. into initiating the trade war, and they are (a) the concern that China’s chronically large trade surplus was depressing job creation in the U.S. (b) the concern that China was using illegal and unfair methods to acquire U.S. technology at an effectively discounted price; and (c) the concern that China seeks to weaken U.S. national security and its international standing. On the dispute over China’s exchange rate and trade imbalance, the first conclusion is that it was marked by analytical confusion over the meaning of the term ‘equilibrium exchange rate’. The second conclusion is that China’s trade imbalance reflects the economic conditions in both China and U.S., and that the efficient and fair solution of the problem requires policy changes in both countries. On the industrial policy dispute, the first conclusion is that the issue of forced technology transfer is largely a dispute about China using its market power to benefit itself at the expense of its trade partners. The second conclusion is that China’s use of market power can last only until the other large countries could unite and retaliate as a group. The inevitability of retaliation means that China should replace the joint-venture (JV) mechanism for technological diffusion with other ways to strengthen its technological capability. On the U.S. concern about whether China trade weakens its national security, the first conclusion is that the notion of national security that is commonly adopted in the U.S. trade policy debate is ignorant about the primary determinants of U.S. capability in innovation. By focusing instead mainly on how to hold down China technologically, the long-run outcome will be a technologically weaker U.S. and hence, a more vulnerable U.S. The second conclusion is that the U.S. must identify a clear, short list of critical technologies and critical infrastructure for the recently reformed Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to cover, and update this list constantly. Otherwise, the broad and changing nature of notions about national security would allow the bureaucratically driven phenomenon of mission-creep to steadily expand the coverage of the CFIUS process, thereby steadily rendering CFIUS to be operationally capricious. Our principal policy suggestion to China is that, because China’s economy in 2018 is very different from that in 1978 (e.g. many parts of China now look like Singapore and China is Africa’s biggest donor), there should be more reciprocity in China’s trade and investment relations with the advanced economies despite China’s status as a developing economy under WTO rules. Our principal policy suggestion to President Trump is to stop equating strategic competition with economic competition. Strategic competition is normally a zero-sum game. While fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run.     

基于贸易收支数据的美国贸易逆差与美元汇率相互关系研究

通过选择美国与中国、日本、加拿大、英国和欧元区11国等美国主要贸易伙伴的双边贸易数据作为样本,研究美国的双边贸易逆差与美元汇率之间的关系.实证分析表明,美国对主要贸易伙伴国的双边贸易收支与美元汇率没有实质性联系.美国逼迫其它货币升值没有也不能缓解美国的贸易逆差问题,同样,美国逼迫人民币升值也不能缓解美中双边贸易失衡问题.     

从美国金融危机看我国个人金融服务创新

从个人金融的概念界定和服务特点入手,分析了我国个人金融服务所面临的问题、挑战和机遇,并指出:事实上,就服务的角度而言,中国的个人金融不是创新过度而是创新不足,且与欧美国家有很大差距;加入WTO后要在金融危机的严峻形势下开拓市场,则需要改变观经营念,在道德风险防范以及服务方式、服务渠道、服务机构的创新等方面付出努力。     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME LEVELS ACROSS U.S. STATES: A SPATIAL PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

There is a large literature estimating the effect of economic freedom on economic growth or income levels. Most studies examine the relationship between economic freedom and growth or income levels for countries, while a few examine the relationship for U.S. states. Absent in the state‐level literature is consideration of the presence of spatial spillovers affecting the freedom‐income relationship. Neglecting to account for spatial autocorrelation can bias estimation results and therefore inferences drawn. We find evidence of a spatial pattern in real per‐capita gross state product (GSP) that affects nonspatial estimates of the freedom‐income relationship. Taking into account the direct and indirect effects of economic freedom on real per‐capita GSP, we find a 10% increase in economic freedom is associated with a 5% increase in real per‐capita GSP. (JEL E02, O47, R11)     

Steel safeguards and the welfare of U.S. steel firms and downstream consumers of steel: a shareholder wealth perspective

Abstract.  This paper analyses the steel safeguards applied during 2001–3. Results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies safeguards generated positive 'abnormal' returns of approximately 6%. The cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of −5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. had violated WTO law. Our results are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Also, findings indicate that downstream-consuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with higher steel costs caused by safeguard protection.     

U.S. R&D internationalization in less‐developed countries: Determinants and insights from Brazil,China, and India

The growing U.S. R&D internationalization has historically been concentrated in developed countries. However, in the past few decades, the internationalization has moved toward less‐developed countries (LDCs), particularly Brazil, China, and India. What location factors are making some LDCs more “inviting” for U.S. R&D offshore? To answer this first question, we constructed a panel data using secondary data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis regarding the R&D investment made by the majority‐owned foreign affiliates of U.S. parent companies in 71 countries. We then applied a Heckman two‐step correction for selection bias test. The results highlight some important differences between developed countries’ and LDCs’ attractiveness. Based on these initial results, we conducted a detailed analysis of the determinants of U.S. R&D investments in Brazil, China, and India, which revealed that China’s determinants mostly match those found in more developed countries.     

Are China and India backward? Evidence from the 19th century U.S. Census of Manufactures

Hsieh and Klenow (2009) argue that a large fraction of aggregate TFP differences between the U.S. and the developing countries of China and India can be explained by factor misallocation. Their interpretation is that this misallocation is due to institutions and policies in these developing countries that redirect resources from productive to unproductive firms. Using the U.S. Census of Manufactures from the late 19th century, I find that the level of dispersion in these modern, less developed countries is very similar to that in the 19th century U.S. What is similar about the countries is their level of development not the existence of institutions that Hsieh and Klenow (2009) emphasize such as state-owned enterprises as in China or entry restrictions as in India. These results suggest that the institutional basis of misallocation potentially goes beyond these overtly distortionary policies. I apply their accounting procedure to the U.S. and find that between 4% and 7% of total manufacturing TFP growth in the 20th century can be attributed to a more efficient intra-industry allocation of resources. I conclude by discussing some other explanations for these results including differences in transportation networks and lack of competitive regulation.     

China–US trade: implications on conflicts

ABSTRACT

In this study, we examine various aspects of China’s trade, the U.S.’ trade, and the bilateral trade between the two countries. The analysis of each aspect has direct and indirect implications on trade conflicts between the two countries. We focus on important factors, such as the growth of trade, import penetration, increased competitiveness of Chinese firms, comparative advantages of Chinese goods, China’s WTO entry and its compliance, and bilateral trade imbalance. While each of the factors can lead to trade frictions, individual factors will not have led to a large-scale trade war. These factors converge within a brief period and thus can be considered the China shock, thereby making other countries’ adjustments to their economic structures difficult. Therefore, trade frictions are inevitable.