Input cost, capacity utilization and substitution in the short run

This article studies the behavior of input cost shares in an environment where labor is costly to adjust, materials can be adjusted at no cost and capital is fixed. A model relating cost shares with relative prices and adjustment costs is proposed, allowing joint estimation of the elasticity of substitution and the adjustment cost function, which is an unknown function of the capacity utilization. Based on a panel of more than 700 manufacturing firms, we find evidence of strong input share variations according to the degree of capacity utilization. The estimated shapes of adjustment costs curves of labor are in agreement with our theoretical model, and we obtain sensible elasticities of substitution estimates. Based on such estimates, we find evidence of a negative (positive) bias in downturns (recoveries) in conventional productivity growth measures.     

Cost Signals under Uncertain R&D Outcomes

When it is difficult for firms to differentiate their products from those of their competitors, research and development (R&D) spending on process innovation to lower the cost of production is crucial for profitability. However, the information asymmetry in production costs that results from innovation reduces the efficiency of all firms in a market for a homogeneous good. We employ a signalling game to discuss the feasibility of utilising R&D spending and output levels as cost signals in an environment of quantity competition. The results show that a firm does not spend its money on R&D solely to signal the type of cost. Rather, R&D spending may be chosen as a cost signal over the output level only if expenditures on R&D can lead to a sufficiently high probability of reducing production costs.     

Efficiency and Productivity Change of Non‐Life Insurance Companies in Japan

In a book published in 1994, Production Frontiers , Färe and colleagues developed an output‐based DEA (data envelopment analysis) technique to compute productivity change. The technique constructs the Malmquist index using Farrell measures of efficiency. The Farrell efficiency measures are derived from linear programming problems which allow slack in output constraints. The possible existence of output slack is less than desirable in the computation of efficiency. Therefore, the present paper constructs also the Russell and Zieschang measures of efficiency, which disallow output slack and compares them with the Farrell measures. The analysis uses data on Japanese non‐life insurance firms during the period 1983–94.     

Distortions,efficiency and the size distribution of firms

We develop a model of firms’ growth in which the tax and credit environments act as selection mechanisms. Such a model, parametrized and validated using a variety of data restrictions, can rationalize observations about input choices and size patterns typical of many developing countries. Using counterfactual experiments, we show that firms’ optimal responses to the tax environment are effective in reducing efficiency losses. As a consequence, tax distortions only account for 13% of the gap in output per worker between an undistorted economy and the benchmark. Credit constraints account for 44% of this gap. However, the interaction between the cost of capital and credit constraints appears to be the most important source of misallocation and can explain up to 85% of the difference in output per worker between the benchmark and first-best.     

Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers

Abstract. We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.     

Quantity-cum-quality contests

Quality and quantity are very common features of production processes. People care about these two features and they tend to be connected. I consider a contest in which the quantity and quality of output are rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the quantity contest. This latter feature implies that the two contests are interlinked. I find that when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently high, then treating quality and quantity as the same has a disincentive effect on the production of quality. In contrast, when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently low, treating quality and quantity as the same has no disincentive effect on the production of quality. I also find an equilibrium in which no one exerts effort in the quantity contest. When there is a binding budget constraint on effort, I find that effort in the quantity contest is smaller relative to the unconstrained case but effort in the quality contest may remain unchanged.     

Synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities: the effects of organisational slack and absorptive capacity

Firms undertaking independent and cooperative research and development (R&D) activities simultaneously often have difficulties to realise their synergistic effects. This study contends that such difficulties are caused by tensions between two types of R&D activities in terms of resource competition and knowledge leakage. Moreover, organisational slack and absorptive capacity may affect these tensions and thereby play important role in synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities. Based on a survey data of 286 firms, this study finds that such two types of R&D activities jointly have a negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, organisational slack aids in synergizing them, while absorptive capacity has an adverse impact. These findings enrich our knowledge on the interrelation of independent and cooperative R&D activities and shed light on how firms can synergize them.     

Effluent taxes,market structure,and the rate and direction of endogenous technological change

This paper studies the effects of effluent taxes on firms’ allocation of resources to cost-reducing and emission-reducing R&D, and on entrepreneurs’ decisions to develop new goods and enter the market. A tax set at an exogenous rate that does not depend on the state of technology reduces growth, the level of consumption of each good, and raises the number of firms. The induced increase in the variety of goods is a benefit not considered in previous analyses. In terms of environmental benefits, the tax induces a positive rate of pollution abatement that offsets the “dirty” side of economic growth. A tax set at an endogenous rate that holds constant the tax burden per unit of output, in contrast, has ambiguous effects on growth, the scale of activity of each firm and the number of firms. Besides being novel, the potential positive growth effect of this type of effluent tax is precisely what makes this instrument effective for welfare-maximizing purposes. The socially optimal policy, in fact, requires the tax burden per unit of output to equal the marginal rate of substitution between the growth rate of consumption and abatement. Moreover, a tax/subsidy on entry is needed, depending on whether the contribution of product variety to pollution dominates consumers’ love of variety.      

FIRM SIZE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY*

The South African motor vehicle industry has historically been considered a critical industry in the South African economy and the target of numerous government policies designed to protect it and/or increase its international competitiveness. This study examines the cost performance of firms in this industry according to their size, using data categorised by output level. The results are consistent with statistically significant economies of scale at the lowest output levels and a cost inefficiency averaging from about seven to nine per cent for all firms. The findings also suggest that all else equal, the smallest firms and the largest firms have lower unit costs than mid‐sized firms. While this work suggests that policies that would give incentives for the smallest firms to increase their scale of operations might help to reduce their unit costs, further investigation needs to be done with respect to why firms in the mid‐level size categories appear to be less efficient.     

Taxes and firm investment

We investigate the firm-level investment response to unanticipated narrative shocks to average personal and corporate tax rates using a universal micro dataset of publicly-traded U.S. firms for the post-1976 period. Using local projections, we show that: (i) corporate tax shocks have significant effects on investment while personal tax shocks do not; (ii) corporate income tax responses are negative overall, and this result is driven by smaller firms who face larger borrowing constraints, especially when the accompanying monetary policy is contractionary or output gap is slack; (iii) there is some evidence of positive personal income tax responses during monetary contractions by dividend-paying firms, which is consistent with the recent literature.     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

The effect of crises on firm exit and the moderating effect of firm size

The liability of smallness assumption suggests that smaller firms face higher exit risks. However, does it apply during crises? We show that during downturns size reduces firms’ exit risk by less; the hazard rate increases more rapidly in size.     

Can privatization be a catalyst for environmental R&D and result in a cleaner environment?

In this paper we explore whether privatization helps to catalyze a firm's environmental research and development (ER&D) and improve environmental quality. By defining ER&D as the effort undertaken by a firm to reduce its pollution per unit of output, we find in a duopoly framework that privatization cannot catalyze both public and private firms’ ER&D efforts simultaneously; it can increase one but decrease the other firm's investment, or it may even lower both firms’ ER&D investments. Moreover, when production causes severe environmental damage, or the imposition of environmental taxes poorly internalize the pollution externality, privatization may result in a poorer environment. For the sake of having a cleaner environment, policy-makers can impose higher environmental taxes on a highly polluting industry when it is being privatized.     

NONLINEAR PRICING IN ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY

We characterise, for both separate and interdependent markets, the local pure-strategies Nash equilibrium of a spatial duopoly game, where consumers are horizontally and vertically heterogeneous, and firms have different cost structures and ranges of product lines. We show that standard results which emerged in the monopoly context can not be generalised to strategic contexts where firms retain market power and there is sufficient competitive pressure. We prove that in the asymmetric duopoly case, when markets are interdependent, the incentive compatibility constraints are slack, and there is no quality distortion.     

Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks

We study the welfare cost of market incompleteness in a generalized Bewley model where idiosyncratic risk takes the form of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. Market incompleteness in our framework has two dimensions. First, in the Bewley tradition, only a limited set of instruments for consumption smoothing is available. Second, entrepreneurs? capital rental is subject to collateral constraints. As is well known, it is harder to self-insure against more persistent shocks, and the welfare cost of missing consumption insurance increases with shock persistence. On the other hand, with collateral constraints, an increase in shock persistence leads to better allocation of production factors through entrepreneurs? self-financing, and the welfare cost of imperfect capital rental markets decreases with shock persistence. The overall welfare cost of market incompleteness can be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotone in shock persistence, depending on the relative strengths of its two components—the cost of missing insurance and the cost of imperfect capital markets.     

Costly Search, Capacity Constraints, and Bertrand Equilibrium Price Dispersion

This article analyzes the impact of transaction (search) costs and capacity constraints in an almost competitive market with homogeneous firms that compete on price. We characterize conditions under which Nash equilibria with price dispersion exist; in equilibrium, firms play pure strategies in prices and consumers adopt a symmetric mixed search strategy. Price dispersion is possible even though consumers all have the same search cost and valuation for the item and prices charged by all firms are common knowledge.     

Wage bargaining and induced technical change in a linear economy: Model and application to the US (1963–2003)

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy operating at full capacity, wages are set through generalized axiomatic bargaining à la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor-augmenting innovations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy, 1964, Funk, 2002). The aggregate environment resulting by self-interested decisions made by economic agents is described by a two-dimensional dynamical system in the employment rate and output/capital ratio. The economy converges cyclically to a long-run equilibrium involving a Harrod-neutral profile of technical change, a constant rate of employment of labor, and constant input shares. The type of oscillations predicted by the model matches qualitatively the available data on the United States (1963–2003). Institutional change, as captured by variations in workers’ bargaining power, has a positive effect on the rate of output growth but a negative effect on employment.     

ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON FIRM-FINANCED R&D

Abstract

Business cycles might affect the ability of firms to finance R&D, since firms rely on cash flow to finance most R&D activities. However, business cycles also influence the incentive to perform R&D. The opportunity cost of funds devoted to R&D falls during recessions, since the return on production will likely be lower than during an expansion. During recessions, this provides firms with an incentive to redistribute an existing pool of funds away from production and towards R&D projects. The changes in the size and distribution of the pool may also be asymmetric across the business cycle. For example, cash-flow constraints are more likely to bind during recessions than expansions. This paper finds strong evidence for the cash-flow effect, but not the opportunity-cost effect. This means that R&D is pro-cyclical, but smoothing out the business cycle will actually lead to reduced R&D, since the duration of expansions exceeds the duration of recessions.     

The performance and objectives of public and private utilities operating in the United States

This paper compares the production efficiency of public and private utilities to determine if a significant cost differential results from different behavioral objectives under the alternative modes of ownership. The procedure is to estimate the cost and input demand functions simultaneously while accounting for differences in input prices and technology across firms. The parameter estimates are then employed to compare the efficiency and objectives of public and private firms. The results suggest that public firms minimize cost and have 24–33% lower per unit costs than their privately owned counterpart. This cost differential appears to result from rate-of-return regulation of the privately owned firms.