Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations

Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously.     

Revenue Sharing,Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function

Abstract. This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two‐teams contest model of a sports league with Nash behavior of team owners. The innovation of the analysis is that it focuses on the role of the contest success function (CSF). In case of an inelastic talent supply, revenue sharing turns out to worsen competitive balance regardless of the shape of the CSF. For the case of an elastic talent supply, in contrast, the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on the specification of the CSF. We fully characterize the class of CSFs for which revenue sharing leaves unaltered competitive balance and identify CSFs ensuring that revenue sharing renders the contest closer.     

Regret theory and the competitive firm

This paper examines the production decision of the competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. If the firm is not too regret averse, we show that the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty holds. Using a simple binary model wherein the random output price can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability, we show the possibility that the firm may optimally produce more, not less, under uncertainty than under certainty, particularly when the firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail.     

A Rationale for the Coexistence of Central and Decentral Marketing in Team Sports

Abstract. In some sports leagues, the sports association sells broadcasting rights centrally in order to create competitive balance. In other ones, the market is decentral. As a result, there is competitive imbalance. In this paper, the preferred kind of marketing of sports associations is analysed. Distinctions are made between three cases. In case one, the sports association is only interested in competitive balance. In the second case, it wishes to create a single high-performing team, and in the third, it maximizes aggregate performance. It is found that, depending on the preferences of the association, both kinds of marketing can be optimal.     

Uncertain contest success function

In this article, contestants play with a certain probability in Contest A and with the complementary probability in Contest B. This situation is called contest uncertainty. In both contests, effort is additively distorted by a contest noise parameter which affects the sensitivity of the contest success function (CSF). In Contest A (B), this parameter is linearly added to (subtracted from) effort. We analyze the interaction of contest uncertainty and contest noise on contestant behavior and profit. For symmetric contestants, contest noise has an ambiguous effect on effort and profit. We show that more contest uncertainty can imply greater effort. Furthermore, an introduction of an infinitesimal degree of contest uncertainty can have a large impact on effort and profit. Based on the analysis, this article presents the contest organizer's incentive to manipulate the degree of uncertainty in the contest. For profit or effort maximization, the contest organizer should always eliminate any uncertainty. If contestants are asymmetric, more contest noise increases effort as well as competitive balance if both Contests A and B have the same probability of occurrence.     

Weitzman Revisited: Emission Standards Versus Taxes with Uncertain Abatement Costs and Market Power of Polluting Firms

Studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets. By introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of Weitzman (Rev Econ Stud 41:477–491, 1974), this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric Cournot oligopoly that Weitzman’s policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market power. Since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price, their total abatement effort, including the restriction of output, is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price-taking firms. Consequently, the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes. In a further step, the provided policy recommendations are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric.     

Optimal pricing of public lotteries and comparison of competing mechanisms

This article establishes optimal pricing rules for rationing indivisible units of rival and otherwise nonexcludable goods by lottery or a hybrid of a lottery and outright sale by posted price. Given the distributional objective of maximizing expected consumer surplus, the solutions to unconstrained and constrained versions of the pricing problem may be expressed in classic inverse elasticity form, with the lottery price appearing as an entry fee, user fee or a combination of the two. Numerical analysis of a rich class of private value distributions indicates that sizable gains in expected consumer surplus can be realized over competitive pricing and zero pricing.     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

Choice of currency basket weights and its implications on trade balance

This paper seeks to find an optimal choice of currency basket weights for emerging economies that peg their currencies to a currency basket, and to examine the long-run relationship between the real exchange rates of a group of trading partners. A general equilibrium model is set up to establish an optimal set of currency basket weights, coupled with the choice of fiscal policy, to simultaneously stabilize trade balance and aggregate price level of an economy. This optimal set of weights is a weighted average of two sets of weights; each targets at one policy goal (stabilizing either balance of trade or aggregate price level) at a time. Empirical studies including vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and cointegration analysis on the long-run relationship between the Thai baht and the real exchange rates of its major trading partners are presented.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Multisector Model: The Price Consequences of Government Spending

This paper investigates optimal fiscal policy in a static multisector model. A Ramsey type planner chooses tax rates on each good type as well as spending levels on each good type subject to an exogenous total expenditure constraint. It is shown that, like taxes, government spending policy has price effects and that these price effects have significant implications for optimal policy. These price effects imply a U shape to the government's objective function and this U shape results in boundary values for the choice of the spending allocation. In particular, it is shown that the optimal allocation of government spending tends to be concentrated on one good rather than spread among many goods.     

Effort,efficiency, and incentives in economic organizations

This paper establishes the possibility of achieving both efficiency and incentive compatibility within a hierarchical organization, even when managers are effortaverse, as long as efficiency is defined as incorporating managers' effort disutilities as opportunity costs of production. It is further argued that this approach yields the same (i.e., Pareto) type of efficiency as achieved by the perfectly competitive price system when managerial disutility of effort is allowed. Thus, the negative results published by Miller and Murrell hold because of the non-Paretian objective functions assumed for central planners.     

Export and import composition as determinants of bilateral trade in goods: evidence from Russia

Conventional theory and several empirical studies state that incomes and exchange rates are the key determinants of the trade balance. Here, we argue that export and import composition are also key explanatory variables because some goods are inelastic and/or with a high added value, directly and indirectly affecting income and price elasticities and trade balance. Thus, if exports and/or imports significantly consist of price inelastic products, then, a positive and a negative effect, respectively, should be expected on the trade balance. Using bilateral trade data and dynamic panel models, we found that the ratio of exports of crude petroleum and natural gas (price inelastic goods) to total exports is significantly and positively associated with the Russian trade balance in goods. For its part, Russian imports of high-tech goods (income elastic and price inelastic with a high added value) show a negative association. The goods balance of Russia also responded to changes in relative income, but there is only weak evidence of reactions to changes in the exchange rate. These findings partially explain the persistent surplus in the Russian trade balance and current account.     

Fresh surface water resource allocation between Bulgaria and Greece

This paper addresses the important issue of transboundary sharing of fresh surface water resources, including quantity and quality dimensions. It carves a simple economic model of the benefits which can be generated by maximizing the joint profits earned, when the resource is shared efficiently between two countries. The appropriate policy instrument towards this end is a bilateral agreement to charge the same water price to all water users in a given sector. Market clearance will then follow to determine the optimal water price. The case of the Nestos river flowing through Bulgaria and Greece, but overexploited by Bulgaria, in the Balkans is used as a case study. The empirical estimation of a fixed proportions production function for corn derives a marginal water value of the Nestos water for Greece. This value, which applies under the current non-cooperative solution, is higher than the optimal water price in the cooperative solution.     

Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

The equilibrium price path of timber in the absence of replanting: does Hotelling rule the forests too?

Prior to 1985, virtually all analyses of forestry economics took the price of timber as given. Since Mitra and Wan (1985), however, the literature has sought to solve social planning problems where the price of timber, as reflected in the path of the marginal utility of consumption, is endogenous. The purpose here is to focus directly on the equilibrium price path of timber under the stringent assumption that once a site is cleared, no new tree is planted and the site is used for some other purpose with an exogenously specified value. While extreme, this assumption permits us to show that familiar results from the Hotelling literature have their counterparts in forestry economics. The paper begins by describing the equilibrium price path if all trees are the same age and sit on sites of equal value. This turns out to generate a U-shaped price path under some circumstances. Heterogeneity is then introduced. It is shown that if trees differ only in site value, then in the competitive equilibrium it is optimal to extract the last tree on a more valuable site before extracting the first tree on a less valuable site. It is also shown that if trees differ only in their initial age, then in equilibrium, it is optimal to extract the last older tree before extracting the first younger tree. In short, the inisights of Hotelling (1931) and Herfindahl (1967) are shown to extend. As the concluding section suggests, some of these results reappear in special cases of the model with replanting.     

The equilibrium price path of timber in the absence of replanting: does Hotelling rule the forests too?

Prior to 1985, virtually all analyses of forestry economics took the price of timber as given. Since Mitra and Wan (1985), however, the literature has sought to solve social planning problems where the price of timber, as reflected in the path of the marginal utility of consumption, is endogenous. The purpose here is to focus directly on the equilibrium price path of timber under the stringent assumption that once a site is cleared, no new tree is planted and the site is used for some other purpose with an exogenously specified value. While extreme, this assumption permits us to show that familiar results from the Hotelling literature have their counterparts in forestry economics. The paper begins by describing the equilibrium price path if all trees are the same age and sit on sites of equal value. This turns out to generate a U-shaped price path under some circumstances. Heterogeneity is then introduced. It is shown that if trees differ only in site value, then in the competitive equilibrium it is optimal to extract the last tree on a more valuable site before extracting the first tree on a less valuable site. It is also shown that if trees differ only in their initial age, then in equilibrium, it is optimal to extract the last older tree before extracting the first younger tree. In short, the inisights of Hotelling (1931) and Herfindahl (1967) are shown to extend. As the concluding section suggests, some of these results reappear in special cases of the model with replanting.     

Currency hedging with options and futures

This paper examines the optimal hedging decision of a competitive exporting firm which faces concurrently hedgeable exchange rate risk and non-hedgeable price risk. We show that the hedging role of currency options is due to two distinct sources of non-linearity: (i) the multiplicative nature of the price and exchange rate risk; and (ii) the marginal utility function of the firm. In particular, we show that a long put option position is optimal when the price risk is negatively correlated with the exchange rate risk and/or the firm is prudent.     

Theory of the firm in relation to exchange rates,import substitution and export

Neoclassical theory deals with the profit maximizing beheviour of the firm in a closed economy. Once an open-economy condition is introduced, the impact of the exchange rate on the cost and price parameters of the firm and, consequently, its import substitution and export decisions becomes relevant. A model is presented with case studies in which, given the exchange rate, the firm seeks to determine the optimal level of import substitution, output and export with the objective of maximizing its profit. In today's competitive world when countries are liberalizing and moving towards an open trade regime, the influence of exchange rates on the decision-making processes of firms is bound to be significant. An approach which provides them with a methodology for spelling out their options and making optimal choices is, therefore, of considerable practical interest.     

Import Competition and Worker Productivity in Unionized Firms

This paper analyzes the effects of trade and labor market liberalization on wages and worker productivity/effort in a domestic unionized firm with firm-union bargaining over wages and effort. It is shown that both types of liberalization will induce a 'cold shower effect' (a rise in effort) if the union's objective function is more heavily weighted towards employment. However, the welfare effects of the two policies can differ markedly. The paper also identifies a separate productivity cost of protection associated with the distortionary effect of protection on worker effort.     

Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort. In particular, the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum. An intervention, that limits price competition via price control, increases welfare.