Immigration quotas and skill upgrading

A reason why immigration policy is such a contended issue is that often immigrants end up obtaining the right to vote and, hence, may affect future policies. This paper offers a dynamic, general equilibrium model of immigration policy. In each period, a heterogeneously skilled population chooses an immigration policy by majority vote. Voters anticipate that immigration affects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate. The main insight is the existence of a trade-off between skill complementary immigration and the resulting shift in political power. I argue that a reasonably parameterized version of the model is consistent with the main features of US immigration.     

THE NON‐TRADED SECTOR,LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET

This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low‐skilled median voter voting against predominantly low‐skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti‐immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non‐traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare‐beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available.     

The Immigration Policy Puzzle

This paper revisits the puzzle of immigration policy: standard economic theory predicts that free immigration improves natives' welfare, but (with few historical exceptions) an open door policy is never implemented in practice. What rationalizes the puzzle? We first review the model of immigration policy where the policy maker maximizes national income of natives net of the tax burden of immigration. We show that this model fails to provide realistic policy outcomes when the receiving region's technology is described by a standard Cobb–Douglas or CES function. Then we describe three extensions of this basic model that reconcile theory with evidence. The first introduces a cost of integration of the immigrant community in the destination country; the second takes into account the policy maker's redistributive concern across different social groups; the last extension considers positive spillover effects of (skilled) migrants on the receiving economy.     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

Aging,Factor Returns,and Immigration Policy

Immigration has various economic and non‐economic effects on the destination country's inhabitants. In this paper, we focus on the impact of immigration on factor returns and analyze how aging affects immigration policy, employing a dynamic political‐economy model of representative democracy. Aging, that is, a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration in this framework. This immigration effect may even overcompensate the initial contraction of the labor force. We show that the immigration rate in the representative democracy equilibrium exceeds the immigration rate that would maximize welfare of current and future generations, and we also discuss the influence of social security on immigration policy.     

Dynamic effects of changes to Japanese immigration policy

This paper uses a single-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households to analyse Japanese immigration policy. We examine the effects on output, consumption, factor prices, and utility. We do this for both steady states and transition paths. We find that: (a) aggregate output, investment, and consumption in Japan are likely to rise with any sort of loosening of immigration restrictions; (b) allowing more skilled immigration generates greater aggregate changes; (c) raising skilled immigration relative to unskilled immigration drives down skilled workers’ wages, consumption, and utility, while cutting the skilled to unskilled immigration share has the opposite effects; and (d) such immigration policy changes have small effects compared to those that occur naturally due to business cycle fluctuations     

Immigration Policy and Self‐Selecting Migrants

I build a simple model of self‐selection into migration and immigration policy determination. I first show that the effect of any immigration policy can be decomposed into a size and a composition effect. I then explore how the optimal policy may change once the latter effect is considered.     

U.S. IMMIGRATION REFORM: POLICY ISSUES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

In recent years, legal U. S. immigration has approached historically high levels, and illegal immigration has been thought to be high and perhaps rising. Consequently, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy proposed sweeping changes in the nation's immigration laws. During 1984, both the Senate and House passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (Simpson-Mazzoli Bill). This bill subsequently died in the conference committee that was established to reconcile differences between the bill's two versions. The proposed act has three major provisions: (1) control of illegal immigration, (2) legalization of alienstatus, and (3) reform of legal immigration. Both the House and Senate versions would maintain the present orientation of U.S. immigration policy toward family reunification, but the Senate proposed significant changes in legal immigration restrictions that would shift policy slightly more toward labor considerations. These proposed changes were eliminated in the compromise made in the conference committee. Employer sanctions and legalization of illegal aliens were left as the two most prominent alterations to existing policy. During 1985, the 99th Congress is likely to reconsider the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, perhaps in a streamlined version which emphasizes employer sanctions, legalization, and a substantial increase in border enforcement.     

Immigration policy index

The immigration policy index is based on three types of entry visa restrictions: visa required, visa not required for short stays and visa not required. I identify country pairs which changed their visa regime during 2000–2010 and find that the weakening of visa policy is associated with a 10 percent increase in migrant stocks and a significant shift towards male and less skilled migration from policy affected source countries. In contrast, the tightening of visa policy is not related to a significant change in migrant stocks, their gender or skill composition. The result suggests the existence of immigration policy hysteresis.     

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION*

In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions.     

Public opinion on immigration in Europe: Preference and salience

Studies of public opinion on immigration have focused on the responses to survey questions about whether the individual would prefer more or less immigration (preference) but not on his or her assessment of its importance as a policy issue (salience). Analysis of data from the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer indicates that preference and salience are associated with different individual-level characteristics. At the national level they move differently over time and in response to different macro-level variables. Both dimensions of opinion must be taken into account as influences on the formation of immigration policy.     

Immigration Policy and Highly Skilled Workers: The Case of Japan

Concerned about shortages of highly skilled workers, especially those with international specialties, Japan adjusted its immigration policy in 1990. The government made it easier for skilled foreign specialists to work in Japan. In the wake of the policy adjustment, this study examines whether there have been changes in inflows of skilled foreigners. Though Japan is still wary of immigration and official policy remains comparatively strict, it is clear that skilled professionals are entering Japan in larger numbers.     

Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis

"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country."     

The impact of immigration on U.S. demographics

The author discusses the impact of immigration on the demographic profile of the United States, with a focus on changes in the sources of immigration and the effect of U.S. migration policy. "The demographic destruction of the U.S. has been swift and dramatic. The transformation, made in constant contravention of popular mandate, has been unprecedented in the history of democratic societies. To better understand this phenomenon and the role which post-1965 immigration policy plays in it,...15 tables have been created and compiled from the official statistics of the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service."     

The macroeconomic impact of foreign labour influx into the industrialized nation state and the complementary policies

This paper makes a numerical assessment on the macroeconomic impact of foreign labor influx into the industrialized nation state allowing free trade in goods but imposing an immigration quota on labor, and then explores the complementary policies for the impact of foreign labor influx. One of the main findings is that immigration itself brings welfare gains only if prices are flexible, but a skill-biased intake policy can bring a much larger welfare gain. The complementary policy options to boost welfare gains by immigration increase are monetary expansion, adopting foreign components more, and influencing foreign demand for intermediate goods indirectly by inviting foreign direct investment. For these policies to cope, the destination country should try to correct the market structure so that prices can be flexible.     

IMMIGRATION, POPULATION HETEROGENEITY, AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY IN HONG KONG

This paper analyzes the heterogeneity effect of immigration on earnings in-equality by decomposing the aggregate measure of total inequality. The analysis shows that a substantial portion of an increase in measured inequality could be due to shifts in shares of heterogeneous population groups caused by immigration policy rather than by widening earnings dispersion within these groups. The analysis is illustrated with census data of Hong Kong from 1981 to 1991. Income redistribution policy based on measured total inequality when there are shifts in population shares could be misguided.     

More than Additions to Population: The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Immigration

In the conceptual framework of the Intergenerational Reports, immigration features as an exogenous input into the size of the population and its composition by age and sex. There are good reasons for believing that immigration has sizeable endogenous components, that attributes other than age and sex distinguish immigrants from the native‐born, as well as from each other, and that these features are of significant economic and fiscal import. Last, it is suggested that, in the context of an ageing population, we may learn much about the effectiveness of different policy responses in achieving fiscal sustainability—as well as immigration policy—through a dynamic life cycle accounting approach.     

Illegal Immigration and Second-best Import Tariffs

A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows.     

Risk preference,immigration policy and illegal immigration

The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance.     

Welfare Leakage and Immigration Policy

This paper analyzes the interaction between the welfare stateand immigration policy. We establish a negative relationshipbetween the number of dependents and the extent of the welfarestate due to the leakage of benefits. We also explain the determinationof immigration policy as the outcome of a lobbying game betweendomestic interest groups and the government. Our results indicatethat there is evidence for welfare leakage and for lobbyingas a determinant of immigration policy. In our baseline specification,a 10 percentage points increase in the share of dependents leadsto a 7–10 percentage point decrease in the labor tax rate.Furthermore, an increase by 10 percentage points in union densityleads to a decrease of one percentage point in the share ofimmigrants in the population. In the context of EU enlargementand the ensuing migration flows, our model predicts a reductionin the size of the welfare state in the old member countries.(JEL H5, J1, J61)