重大工程中国有企业主导整合实现产业技术追赶机制

依托重大工程,我国在部分领域实现了产业技术追赶.以往研究分别强调政府或市场的作用,本文则从整合视角出发,以中广核为对象开展纵向单案例研究,深入分析了在重大工程中承担政治职能的特殊市场主体——国有企业在主导产业链整合以实现产业技术追赶的作用机制.研究发现:①国有企业受政府意图和市场需求的双重驱动,依托重大工程扮演了产业链整合的主导者角色;②"资源-网络位置-工程技术能力"三者交互发展共同构成国有企业主导产业整合的基础;③国企主导整合的方式经历了从契约规制为主,到平台治理为主的阶段演进,并在此过程中实现了企业自身能力发展及产业技术赶超的双重目标.本文为更好发挥国企引领作用提供借鉴.     

今之国企非昔日国企

改革开放以来,我国的国企改革取得巨大成就。但今天的央企已发生异化,已非昔日的国企,成为特殊利益集团。一些人在维护国企,实际上维护的是特殊利益集团的利益,而不是国家利益,应当认清这一现实。垄断行业是改革的对象,而不是“做大做强”的主体。目前,要对垄断行业进行改革,需要的是中央的共识、坚定的决心和强有力的措施。     

完善国有企业资本结构的思路

公司治理结构的好坏是由资本结构是否合理所决定的,资本结构还会影响企业价值以及企业的融资行为。企业的生存和发展与资本结构有直接的关系。我国资本市场自深沪两市建立以来得到了迅猛发展,多元化的资金来源使得对优化国有企业资本结构的对策所进行的研究具备更多的理论价值和实际意义。     

Chinese lessons: state-owned enterprises and the regulation of foreign investment in Canada

A recent influx of Asian investment is changing the character of the Canadian oil and gas industry and reviving old debates on the regulation of foreign investment. Particular attention has been placed on investment by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), driven in part by public suspicion about investment from China, which has been the largest source of SOE capital flows to Canada. Recent amendments to the Investment Canada Act have made SOE investment more difficult and have raised questions about the country’s attractiveness as an investment destination. This paper makes the case for non-discrimination of SOEs in the investment review process. In the context of a policy framework that is fundamentally supportive of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), the Canadian government does not require a set of redundant measures to protect against the relatively low risk of undesirable investment.     

The economic performance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe

This article explores the economic performance of state ownership in the largest non-financial enterprises operating in 13 post-socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period 2007–2013. The largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are selected based on the ‘Coface – 500 Top Companies in CEE’ list in 2013. Of these 500 enterprises, 69 were identified as state-owned. All originated in the socialist period. The majority of them are from Poland and Ukraine. SOEs hold a dominant position in energy supply, the oil and gas sector, and transport. We find that the persistence of state ownership in post-socialist countries is caused by incomplete privatisation and the presence of SOEs within strategic sectors. The economic performance of the largest state-owned companies is, on average, comparable to their private counterparts.     

A new context for managing overseas direct investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises

Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their overseas direct investment (ODI) have played an important role in China’s economic development. But the rapid expansion of SOE-dominated ODI has also raised concerns, including about state capitalism and the need for competitive neutrality. This paper considers China’s strategy for managing ODI by its SOEs given a changing context. On the one hand, the Chinese economy is rapidly growing and will soon become the largest economy in the world. China’s role in the world, as well as its global responsibility, is therefore changing. China needs to establish a win-win and harmonious relationship with the rest of the world, and ODI has a role to play in this. On the other hand, China’s growth model is shifting to become greener, more balanced, and innovation-driven. China’s changing international role and the changing growth model have created new imperatives for, and constraints on, ODI by SOEs and reforms to SOEs. This paper aims to examine ODI by Chinese SOEs from the two dimensions of China’s changing role and growth model. It discusses strategies for better managing ODI by Chinese SOEs in the new context that is emerging.     

国有企业改革绩效:2002-2007年状况评估

改革开放三十年来,国有企业改革一直是中国经济体制改革过程中最困难和争议最多最大的改革.2003年,国务院成立了国有资产监督管理委员会,第一次在政府机构设置上实现了政府社会公共管理职能与所有者职能的分离.回顾国有企业改革的历程,中国国有企业改革已取得实质性重大进展,尽管还有一些攻坚任务,但国企改革最困难的时期已经过去.一批"新国企"正在成为中国经济运行中的新亮点.改革实践充分证明,国有企业改革能不能成功与所有制没有必然联系,在市场经济条件下,只要遵循企业发展基本规律,通过体制创新、技术创新和管理创新,国有企业改革就一定能成功.     

论用人力资本所有者产权主导中国国有企业改革

我国国有企业的改革,仍然遵循着"谁投资,谁所有,谁受益"的货币资本产权原则,不能科学地体现中国国有企业的设立宗旨和特定功能,也不能科学地建立国有企业的治理结构。现实需要我们用人力资本产权原则替代货币资本的产权原则主导国有企业的下一步改革,用人力资本产权原则确定全体人民的国有资产所有权。     

经济转轨中国有资本比重的最优路径选择——一个动态模型

This paper presents a dynamic model based on the utility maximum decisions of both the government and private sectors to study the optimal withdrawing path of state-owned capital in economic transition. Numerical simulation shows that: (1) an optimal transition path still exists when treating government and private sectors separately, (2) when the transition cost is higher than its critical value, the economy will never start a transition by itself. In addition, this analysis offers theoretical supports for some reform policies adopted by governments during transition. __________ Translated from Jingjixue Jikan 经济学(季刊) (China Economic(Quarterly)), 2007, 6(2): 561–580     

A Policy Perspective on Outward Foreign Direct Investment by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the latter often based in China. The broad reason for this hostility is the belief that state-owned enterprises pursue non-commercial objectives with resulting damage to host economies. This paper argues that the empirical evidence shows SOEs are increasingly exhibiting market-owned behavior. Furthermore, any adverse consequences of non-commercial behavior are likely to be realized primarily by the SOEs themselves.     

Formal and real ownership structure of the Polish economy: state-owned versus state-controlled enterprises

This article analyses the difference between the state’s formal and real shares in the Polish economy. We identify two basic types of corporate control exercised by the state over enterprises through ownership (in the case of majority ownership) and non-ownership tools (in the case of minority ownership). Consequently, we distinguish between two types of state enterprises: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-controlled enterprises (SCEs). In post-communist economies, SCEs mainly originate from so-called reluctant privatisation, in which the transfer of ownership rights takes place without the appropriate transfer of control rights. We discuss the tools of non-ownership control used by the state. Our estimates of the real share of state enterprises in the Polish economy (which include both SOEs and SCEs) show that it is almost two times higher than the formal share (only SOEs). The share of state enterprises is also highest in the group of Poland’s largest and most important firms. We conclude that the real importance of state enterprises in the Polish economy is much higher than might be expected if only the formal share of state ownership is taken into account.     

Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control

The past reforms of state-owned enterprises in China delegated many effective control rights to managers while maintaining ultimate control rights for the Party and government. The result is that either the agency costs are high because managers lack accountability or the political costs are high because the government causes political interference. Reform of state-owned enterprises in China should aim at reducing both political and agency costs, which can be done through depoliticization, effective corporate governance, and deserialization. In particular, China needs an ownership transformation with a combination of privatization, denationalization, and pluralization; a state assets management system to limit political influence from the government; and corporatization to establish effective corporate governance which may take a variety of forms.     

国企改革的关键:产权制度与分配制度对企业效率的约束

国有企业“三年脱困”目标的基本实现,标志着我国国企改革进入了新的攻坚阶段。在新的阶段,国企改革取得成功的关键在于深化产权制度和分配制度改革。 一、关于产权制度 从产权角度看,没有能够对市场供求与价格变化作出预测并及时灵敏地调整以适应市场竞争变化需求的市场主体,社会主义市场经济将成为一句空话。自主地根据市场信号去配置生产要素,进行生产组织、产品销售并承担经营风险,享有经营成果,是市场主体正常运行的一般条件。但在我国,这个一般条件长期受到体制的困扰。因为所有者缺位而造成企业政企不分、产权不清晰而影响企业追求自身利益、自我发展和自我约束不健     

Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform

Using data from a recent national survey on the ownership reform of state‐owned enterprises in China, we study the effects of reducing politician control and agency problems on a number of reform outcomes. Taking into account the endogenous nature of the reform, we find that these outcome measures of the reform's success are positively affected by the lessening of politician control through increasing the firm's flexibility in labour deployment and by the mitigation of agency costs through the introduction of more effective corporate governance mechanisms such as one‐share one‐vote and shareholding‐based board structure composition. Ownership structure also matters: relative to shareholding by the state, foreign ownership has a positive effect on reform outcomes; individual (mostly employee) shareholding has a negative or insignificant effect. Somewhat surprisingly, operating autonomy (excluding labour deployment flexibility) has a negative effect on firm performance, suggesting serious agency problems in the reformed enterprises.     

FDI溢出效应、创新活动与技术进步—基于中国高技术产业的实证分析

科技创新投入、人力资源积累以及FDI引致的技术外溢效应都对中国高科技产业技术进步产生正向的影响。当区分行业中不同的产权组织形式后再进行检验时,结果差异很大,国有企业的技术进步主要来源于人力资本积累而非科技创新投入,FDI技术外溢效应对技术进步也产生不利影响;而三资企业中的技术进步基本上来源于FDI技术外溢效应,而不是来源于科技创新投入和人力资源的积累。     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.     

中国养老保险制度变迁的经济学分析

1980年前后随着市场化改革的进行,中国也开始了养老保险制度的改革①。自20世纪90年代建立部分基金制后,制度的转轨带来了前所未有的转轨成本和激励问题,这给羽翼未丰的中国养老保险制度带来了沉重的负担。文章透过中国养老保险制度的变迁,分析了不同时期不同利益集团是如何推动养老保险制度改革,分析了利益集团在当前情况下对下一步改革又会产生如何的影响。一种可行的养老保险制度的选择还有待进一步讨论。     

不应把股份制等同于公有制--关于社会主义市场经济与股份制的研究之一

股份制本质上是生产社会化和市场经济发展的产物,它本身并不具有所有制属性,其核心问题是由“控股权”掌握在谁手里来决定企业法人产权的归属,因此股份制与公有制不是一回事。十五大报告关于股份制性质的论断是侧重于理论认识,十六届三中全会《决定》强调“使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式”,则侧重于改革实践。股份制是实现国有企业改革的最好途径。     

利益集团理论与国有企业制度变迁--国有企业承包制-股份制案例研究

该文利用利益集团理论对承包制-股份制这一制度变迁过程进行了分析,具体考察了这一过程中各利益集团关于新制度的预期效用,以及由此它们对这一制度变迁所施加的影响,从而揭示这一制度变迁过程产生的根本原因:在1992年之前,承包制是各利益集团一致的选择.1992-1996年地方政府和国有企业偏好于股份制,而中央政府从最大化其风险规避的预期效用的角度出发,并不偏好股份制.但因为地方政府和国有企业组成了利益集团联盟,中央政府在信息与权力、财力上都处于劣势,所以最终股份制取代了承包制,成为国有企业改革的方向.     

关于资本有机构成理论的几点思考

笔者认为理论界对资本有机构成理论关注不够,既有刻意回避的因素,又有认识不足的原因。社会主义条件下,资本有机构成的提高也可能引发经济危机;政府既应推动部分行业资本有机构成的提高,又应避免社会总资本有机构成在短时期内迅速提高。