美国与法国财政联邦主义比较

财政联邦主义是处理中央与地方政府之间财政关系的一种制度设计。美国和法国分别是典型的联邦制国家和单一制国家,其政府间的职权、支出责任、税收与税权的划分以及转移支付关系等,均表现出极强的财政联邦主义特征,通过比较,既可以为财政联邦主义理论提供实证,也能够为我国分税制财政体制的完善提供可资借鉴的内容。     

新财政联邦主义理论的文献综述

财政联邦主义在经典理论的基础上扩大了其研究方向和视角,它从政治经济学、信息经济学的角度着重论述了财政联邦制结构中的政府关系,从新财政联邦主义理论论述的财政集权和分权选择问题以及软预算约束和中央补助问题,介绍新财政联邦主义理论和经典理论的区别,为理顺政府间财政关系提供了新视角。     

中国的经济转轨与财政联邦主义分析框架

财政联邦主义讨论的是政府结构框架内的财政分权与集权关系。在解释中国经济转轨成功的各种理论中 ,财政联邦主义作为一种解说 ,受到人们的关注。本文就其对中国问题的分析做一个简要的分析和评价。     

中美中央与地方财政税收关系比较

中央与地方的财政税收关系,是一个国家政治和经济制度重要的组成部分。从国体上讲,美国属于联邦制,中国属于共和制。前者各地方较为独立,中央与地方之间的政治经济关系较为松散,后者在政治上较为集中,中央与地方之间的关系较为紧密。联邦制和共和制的财政税收体制各有利弊。就目前来看,我国中央与地方的财政税收关系,还存在着相当多的问题。我们先来看美国联邦、州及市县镇的财政税收关系。1美国联邦政府与地方政府的财政税收关系由于实行的是联邦体制,美国联邦、州及市县镇各自在财政税收方面的独立性很强。财政和税收上下之间互不隶属,也…     

论中国政府间财政关系的特色

在中国,中央与地方的财政关系存在博弈关系。分税制后,中央下放了更多的支出责任,地方财政谋求制度外收入的动机增强。在分析中国的地方财政活动时,不应局限于地方政府的预算表,完全意义上的地方财政体系应包括有关的准财政活动。     

财政联邦主义理论与地方政府竞争:一个综述

地方政府竞争是财政联邦主义经济分权化政策的结果，关于分权政策的理论国内外存在较大分歧，世界各国政府分权化政策也产生了不同经验与结果本文对财政联邦主义以及分权化产生的地方政府竞争相关研究作了一个较为详细的综述，地方政府分权和地方政府竞争已经是当代世界经济的最重要现象，对这一问题的研究无论在西方发达国家还是面临经济转轨的发展中国家，都具有很强的理论和现实意义。     

财政改革的关键

正一是要区分国家治理与地方治理。在学术界,财政体制又称为政府间财政关系,但这个概念模糊了国家治理与地方治理在性质上的区别。也就是说,中央与地方之间的财政关系,跟地方内部省、市、县、乡镇之间的财政关系具有本质的不同,不能同等看待。这意味着财政体制改革要分两个层次来进行:一是在国家层面,二是在地     

借鉴西方财政联邦主义理论 推进我国财政体制改革

文章对第一代联邦主义、第二代联邦主义理论以及联邦主义的三原则———经济联邦主义、合作联邦主义、民主联邦主义作了综合的述评 ,并在此基础上简要分析了我国地区间的财政竞争现状 ,借鉴西方财政联邦主义理论的精髓 ,提出了推进我国财政体制改革的几点建议。     

走向均衡化的大国经济治理：新中国财政集权与分权关系的演变

财政是国家治理的基础和重要支柱,财政集权与分权关系是大国经济治理中的核心问题之一。本文从均衡化视角提出一个分析框架,认为大国财政关系的关键在于实现中央和地方的财政权力均衡,利益冲突则会使既有的财政体制失衡,而双方的利益调整将伴随着财政体制的演变。在这个框架下考察新中国财政集权与分权关系的演变过程发现,随着社会主义市场经济体制和法治体系的完善和发展,主要经历从“统收统支”到“央地权力均衡”、从“放权让利”到“地方主义”失衡、从“分税改革”到“制度均衡”的探索,总的趋势是各级政府和区域利益关系的均衡化及相应的制度化。为此,需要通过制度化和法治化构建均衡化的长效机制：基本目标是围绕大国财政治理中的关键性问题,进一步健全充分发挥中央和地方积极性的体制机制,即在走向均衡化的过程中构建中央和地方财政利益均衡的长效机制;基本任务是建立和完善职责清晰、财力协调、区域均衡的中央和地方财政关系,即完成职责、财力和区域均衡“三位一体”的任务;基本要求是形成各级政府事权、支付责任和财力相适应的稳定制度,即遵循现代财政制度的事权、责任和财力协调的“三项原则”,构建有效的财税体制机制。     

现行财政体制的缺憾、改进及时机选择

财政体制是处理中央和地方各级政府之间财政关系的基本制度。我国1994年开始实施的分税制财政体制,是在不触动原来既得利益格局、带有过渡性质的一种制度安排,与科学、规范、健全的财政体制相比还存在很大差距。财政体制问题是一切财政问题的核心。完善现行财政体制是有效解决城乡"二元"矛盾、落实科学发展观、构建和谐社会、贯彻依法治国方略的重要举措。本文基于现行财政体制的"缺憾"分析,提出了改进建议及时机选择.     

央地财政关系：协调失灵与地方政府财政赤字扩张偏向

文章基于央地财政关系协调失灵导致地方财政赤字扩张偏向的理论假设和现实背景,通过构建一个协调博弈理论模型,运用我国1995-2012年省级空间面板数据模型的GS 2 SLS 和System GMM的回归分析,系统研究了“央地财政关系”对地方政府财政赤字扩张偏向的影响机制。研究发现：我国地方政府存在财政赤字决策的相互模仿行为,中央政府存在通过财政协调机制来协调地方政府的财政决策行为,但并不成功。这意味着我国“央地财政关系”确实存在协调失灵,进而导致地方政府财政赤字持续膨胀的经济现象。     

A New Perspective for Fiscal Federalism: The NK Model

Economic models of fiscal federalism, according to different settings, are generally linear and static, offering unique and deterministic solutions starting with simplifying assumptions. This article stems from the idea of investigating how decision-makers, abandoning their traditional economic models and focusing on innovative components of evolutionary economics instead, can achieve better performance results in organizing and optimizing an economic system based on fiscal federalism. For this purpose, fiscal federalism must be understood as a dense network of economic relationships between different complex adaptive and co-evolving systems, the jurisdictions, linked by strong interdependencies. A better understanding of the links between interdependence will be provided by Stuart Kauffman’s NK model. The relevance of the NK model in the study of economic organizations has been noted in the relevant literature. This literature, however, neglects the problem of co-evolution, which underpins our article.     

Fiscal federalism,jurisdictional competition,and the size of government

Fiscal federalism is commonly held to reduce the size of government, but how does it do so: through shrinking the welfare state, cutting government consumption, or reducing public investment? This paper examines tax competition under fiscal federalism through the lens of imperfect competition theory, derives new empirical implications from different theories of fiscal federalism, and tests those hypotheses with new variables and data. Cross-national statistical results show that jurisdictional competition under fiscal federalism is associated with reductions in the administrative expense of government but not the size of the welfare state. Moreover, the apparent impact of fiscal federalism with a high degree of jurisdictional competition is larger than that estimated in previous research. Once the models have been appropriately specified, the United States is no longer an outlier among high-income democracies on either government consumption or social spending. Close examination of the data reveals that some fiscally federal systems better approximate a “market-preserving model” and others a “capital-privileging” or “state-corroding” model.     

Fiscal federalism in monetary unions: hypothetical fiscal transfers within the Euro-zone

Net fiscal transfers are commonly seen as a possible means to ensure the well-functioning of a currency area. We show that US net fiscal transfers, measured as the difference between gross federal revenues and federal expenditures per state, are enormous. Moreover, we run panel regressions that suggest their dependence on relative GDP and relative GDP growth during crisis periods, evidence of net fiscal transfers from relatively rich to relatively poor states (redistributive effect) and to states with an underperforming economic development (stabilization effect). The Euro-zone (EZ) lacks a system of fiscal federalism, which raises the question of whether it should be established in the medium- and long-run. If so, which should be the magnitude of net fiscal transfers? We calculate these transfers hypothetically for 1999–2010, using a relative volume comparable to the one in the USA.     

我国省际间财政差异趋势与影响因素的实证研究

本文通过1980-2005年间的样本数据,揭示1980年以来我国省际间财政差异的变化趋势,以及这种变化趋势的影响因素.我们的研究表明,在财政收入方面,受地区经济差异加大的影响,1994年以后财政收入差异有扩大态势,而分税制改革有助于缩小省际间财政收入差异.在财政支出方面,1995年以后财政支出差异呈上升趋势,这是地区间经济发展水平差异与分税制共同作用的结果,但是前者的作用远远大于后者.因此,缩小省际间财政差异的途径除转移支付外,还应当主要致力于缩小省际间经济发展水平差异.     

Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization

The decentralization of fiscal authority to lower level jurisdictions contributes to the efficient delivery of public services, but conflicts with national objectives. This paper argues that the system of fiscal relations, including both the grant structure and institutions for policy coordination, are necessary for achieving the full benefits of fiscal decentralization while preserving national efficiency and equity objectives. The case for decentralization is recounted, along with the ways it can impinge upon efficiency and equity in the national economy. These adverse effects can be mitigated by appropriate fiscal transfers, both equalizing and conditional, and suitable measures of policy harmonization.     

交易成本、政府级次与财政体制改革

由于受交易成本的制约,管辖范围小、涉及人数少的"小政府"作为降低公共产品供给交易成本的制度安排首先得以形成.而后,为降低受益范围超出小政府辖区的公共产品供给的交易成本,更高层次的政府得以出现.政府级次化降低了公共产品供给的横向交易成本却增加了纵向交易成本,当横向交易成本的减少额与纵向交易成本的增加额在边际上相等时,政府级次达到均衡.由此看来,基层政府具有"逻辑先在性",采用"自上而下"分权的思路来构建财政体制是值得商榷的.财政体制的构建从逻辑上讲应该是"自下而上"授权而不是"自上而下"分权.     

Fiscal policy,government size and EMU business cycle synchronization

We provide new evidence on the effects of fiscal policy and government size on pairwise business cycle synchronization in EMU. A novel time-varying framework is employed to estimate business cycle synchronization and subsequently a panel approach is used to establish the role of fiscal variables in determining the pairwise synchronization observations across time. The findings suggest similarities in the size of the public sector, yet divergence in fiscal policy stance, matter for the determination of business cycle synchronization. Hence, increased fiscal federalism in EMU will contribute to increased business cycle synchronization. Our results remain robust to different specifications and sub-periods.     

Fiscal federalism approach for controlling global environmental pollution

This paper finds that optimal international carbon taxes are country specific and we can decompose a tax on a domestically produced carbon-intensive commodity into a revenue tax, a tax to control local atmospheric pollution and an international carbon tax. It shows that an institutional arrangement for the world economy similar to the fiscal federalism in the federal countries can be useful to internalize the global externalities of atmospheric pollution.