商业银行的博弈困境与竞争力提升策略研究

现实商业银行的竞争现状是寡头垄断、产品同质、价格管制、谈判地位弱化。博弈论中,古诺寡头模型、伯特兰德寡头模型以及寡占的斯塔克博格模型分别从不同侧面描述了商业银行之间的博弈行为以及议价能力的下降、先行者优势丧失等现象。无限次重复博弈的模型以及商业银行的投标竞价博弈模型告诉我们,商业银行之间若注重金融创新、保持产品差异化、加强行业协作,或通过行业协会等各种约束,开始注重长远利益的折现收益,则存在竞争中合作的可能性和条件。     

民航拥堵的经济学解释

中国民航市场寡头垄断的市场格局导致价格刚性的存在,使价格不能成为调整市场供需失衡的基本工具,同时,价格也不能成为航空公司争夺市场份额的竞争手段。为此,航空公司把到站时间作为竞争的基本手段。但是,在价格刚性情况下,航空公司的最优产品定位策略是尽可能地缩小与其他公司之间的差异,导致黄金时点多个航空公司航班到港,造成民航拥堵。因此,治理民航拥堵的根本对策在于引入竞争,打破寡头垄断的市场格局,充分发挥价格调整供需失衡的作用。     

垄断竞争市场中的创新竞争力 ——基于伊利集团的案例分析

市场理论中包括四种市场组织,分别为完全竞争市场、垄断市场、垄断竞争市场和寡头垄断市场.其中垄断竞争市场在我们生活中普遍存在,垄断竞争市场的垄断和竞争分别来源于产品的差异化和产品的替代性.垄断竞争市场中的创新战略包括产品战略、市场战略、价格战略、广告战略、顾客战略以及文化战略.通过分析伊利集团的创新战略,研究创新对企业竞争力的影响.     

寡占市场下的广告成因探究

依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。     

校园内餐饮市场的垄断竞争分析

从经济学角度而言,垄断意味着效率的降低,引起无谓的损失.现实中垄断竞争或寡头垄断这类不完全竞争的市场行为随处可见.校园内的餐饮市场就处于一种垄断竞争市场的状态,消费者要付出高于完全竞争市场价格的价格.由于学校以发放许可证的方式限制了校园内餐饮供应者的数量,使得消费者的福利受到了影响,同时也使得该市场中的供应商不存在超额利润.供应者数量的减少使得产品多样性受到了限制,从而,消费者的效用也受到了影响.     

横向兼并的均衡影响分析——基于供给函数竞争的兼并模型

对于横向兼并所产生的影响,现有研究成果多是在产量竞争的古诺模型或基于价格竞争的伯川德模型基础上进行的.本文以Ugue(2004)提出的供给函数竞争概念为基础,考察了横向兼并、产业集中与福利权衡的关系,分析在同质产品市场上,供给函数竞争对企业横向兼并产生的均衡影响,并与古诺模型做了对比分析.基本结论为:供给函数竞争下,任何兼并都会使产业的总产出下降,价格升高.供给函数竞争导致产量的下降,不仅仅由于兼并企业减少产量,而且非兼并企业也会减少供给,结果导致兼并总是有利可图.     

最终产品市场存在混合寡头竞争的转移定价决策

战略转移定价是在产业环境中考察转移定价和市场竞争间的相互作用.本文利用动态博弈的均衡求解方法,研究最终产品市场存在混合寡头竞争的中间产品转移定价决策.在非对称和对称两种竞争结构下,分析最终产品市场在完全信息和不完全信息两种情形下的市场均衡.结果显示:非对称竞争结构下,完全信息情形下的转移价格大于不完全信息情形下的转移价格,均衡产量和均衡利润随成本率参数取值的不同而变化;对称竞争结构下,完全信息情形下的转移价格大于不完全信息情形下的转移价格,均衡利润小于不完全信息情形下的均衡利润.     

不完全信息静态博弈视角下的三度价格歧视分析研究

本文针对三度价格歧视存在信息不对称的问题,讨论了两个寡头垄断企业在成本信息不对称的情况下,在两个细分市场实施价格歧视的产量决策问题.将成本函数分为三种、两种及一种可选成本(完全信息)3类情况,通过海萨尼转换,根据成本甄别系数的不同取值范围,得出了两个寡头垄断企业相互制约下的均衡产量、均衡价格、均衡利润及相互关系.研究结果表明:成本甄别系数越小,成本信息劣势企业的均衡产量越高,均衡状态下的总利润也越高;当寡头垄断企业1采用较高成本时,企业1会更加倾向于隐藏自身成本,他在具有信息优势的同时还具有成本劣势;而当寡头垄断企业1采用低成本时,则不会隐藏自己的信息而更倾向通过信号传递,把低成本信息的优势传递出去,以使寡头垄断企业2按完全信息决策产量等结论.本文的研究结果将为信息不对称下的歧视定价提供理论依据.     

寡头垄断市场及其评论

寡头垄断市场,既是不完全竞争市场的另一种类型,也是介于垄断市场和垄断竞争市场之间的一种市场类型。具体地说,寡头垄断市场是指少数几家企业或销售者占支配地位的一种市场类型。少数几家企业生产和销售的产品数量相当多,其产品在该行业产品总量中占有很大的份额,从而能够影响或控制市场价格。如果同一生产行业中少数几家产量份额很大的企业生产的是同质产品,如生产的都是原料产业中钢铁、铝或铜,这类寡头垄断市场便称为纯粹寡头垄断市场。一般来说国家对这类产品都制定有严格的质量标准,企业都按国家的统一标准进行生产,消费者购…     

论促进电信业创新的市场结构选择

相比其他市场结构而言,寡头垄断市场对创新的驱动作用很大。寡头垄断市场具有价格刚性、规模优势、研发投入竞争、市场集中等优势。企业有足够的动力进行创新。本文认为。寡头垄断市场是促进我国电信业创新的较优的市场结构。     

Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under Cournot with Bertrand Competitions

Taking the product substitutability into account, this paper considers the horizontal mergers under Cournot with Bertrand competition. Firstly, the big market size indicates non‐intention to merge. Secondly, independent goods indicate indifferences between the quantity competition and price competition. Finally, firms under quantity competition are more willing to merge than under price competition. The antitrust authority is more inclined to approve the merger under quantity competition than that under price competition.     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.     

Mixed Competition and Patent Licensing

This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot–Bertrand). If the two‐part tariff is applied, then the two‐part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot–Bertrand than under Bertrand–Cournot competition.     

BERTRAND Vs. COURNOT COMPETITION WITH UPSTREAM FIRM INVESTMENT

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated.     

Stakeholders’ relationships and product market competition

In this article, we study the relationships between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees) when firms are consumer oriented (CO) in the sense of caring about consumers’ interests in the objective function. We let these firms first bargain with labour union over their employees’ wages and then compete either in the quantity space (Cournot competition) or in the price space (Bertrand competition). Our model shows that taking care of the consumers’ interests when determining product market strategies may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. This implies that if shareholders in a CO firm can choose either a quantity or a price strategy, they will surprisingly choose the latter. Moreover, we show that the conflicting interests between main stakeholders are attenuated under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: THE COURNOT‐BERTRAND MODEL

Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.     

The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining

This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labor union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences and on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function.     

PROFITABLE STRATEGIC DELEGATION WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS

Firms delegate strategic decisions to managers because they find it profitable to do so. In the product market, when agents make conjectures about the reaction of their rivals to marginal changes in their own strategies, the set of equilibriums can be enlarged with respect to the case of no conjectures. This paper takes a duopolistic linear market parameterization where firms selling differentiated products can delegate either price or output decisions to managers. We show that it is a dominant strategy for firms to delegate no matter whether firms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors, although the equilibrium is not necessarily efficient. Futhermore, in equilibrium Cournot competition is more profitable for firms than Bertrand competition. Finally, requiring consistency in conjectures yields the same outcome no matter what type of strategic interaction and managerial choice there is on the part of firms.     

A note on merger in mixed duopoly: Bertrand versus Cournot

In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27–42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition.     

Mixed Market Competition in a Quality Differentiated Duopoly Model An Approach to Banking Sector

This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks＇ monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare.