The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.     

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE LABOR MARKET

The literature on the impact of immigration on the labor market is highly controversial. The aim of this paper is to review the existing literature and draw some general conclusions on how wages and employment respond to immigration. Economic studies indicate that the impact of immigration on the average wage and employment of native workers is null or slightly positive. However, because adjustments take time, the immediate labor market effects of unexpected (as opposed to expected) migration episodes can be detrimental. Immigration also can have distributional consequences. In particular, the skill composition of immigrants matters in determining their impact on native labor market outcomes. An inflow of immigrants will tend to reduce the wages of competing native workers (with skills similar to those of the migrants), and increase those of complementary workers (with skills that complement those of immigrants). By affecting the skill composition of the workforce, immigration can create winners and losers among native workers via changes in the wage structure.     

Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium

This paper considers optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved job search effort. The Planner chooses unemployment benefits, taxes and job creation subsidies to maximise a Utilitarian welfare function. Optimal policy involves a trade-off between higher employment taxes (which finance more generous unemployment benefits) and greater market tightness (which reduces the average unemployment spell). Optimal UI implies the initial UI payment equals the wage, thus ensuring consumption is smooth across the job destruction shock, and UI payments then fall with duration.     

Union wage setting and progressive income taxation with heterogeneous labor: theory and evidence from the German income tax reforms 1986–1990

This paper analyzes the effects of tax shifting in a model with union wage setting and progressive income taxation. The setup allows for different skill levels of the workforce and accounts for the union's distributional objective of income equality. The theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested with a panel of German micro-data covering the period of the income tax reforms 1986–1990. It is shown that average taxes raise wages, whereas increasing the progressivity of the tax system reduces wages. The effect of progressivity on high-skilled labor tends to be less significant and smaller. Stronger preferences for equality compress the (pre-tax) wage distribution.     

Industrial subsidies and technology adoption in general equilibrium

Industrial subsidies to failing establishments are common across developed economies. The paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with a view to study the effects of this policy. Interestingly, subsidies to failing plants may increase productivity and accelerate the diffusion of new technologies. In spite of this, labor productivity, employment and income decrease, as resources are devoted to maintaining and updating establishments that would otherwise have closed.     

Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

Labor Supply Effects of Federal Rental Subsidies

Federal rental subsidies appear to create disincentives for work through marginal taxes on earnings, income effects, and requirements that nonrecipients on waiting lists maintain low incomes in order to remain eligible. This paper takes advantage of the rationing of housing subsidies by identifying labor supply effects using analytic methods that could not be validly applied to unrationed programs. It finds that subsidies substantially reduce hours worked and labor force participation among recipients.     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES: A META‐ANALYSIS

Controversy over labor market policy often centers on achieving a balance between preventing worker exploitation, and avoiding loss of productivity or employment through excessive regulation. Although the literature documenting the impact of labor market regulation on employment is extensive, there is a dearth of evidence on the impact of such policies in low‐income countries (LICs). Since it is easier for workers, especially women, to slip into the informal sector in LICs, regulations are likely to have stronger impacts on formal employment in these countries (but lower impacts on unemployment). We systematically reviewed available research from countries that are, or were until recently, LICs. Most studies document that more stringent labor regulations are associated with lower formal sector employment and higher informal sector employment. We also conducted a metaregression analysis of the impact of minimum wages on formal and informal employment. After controlling for publication bias, higher minimum wages are associated with lower formal employment and a higher share of informal workers.     

Accounting for wage and employment changes in the US from 1968–2000: A dynamic model of labor market equilibrium

In this article, we present a unified treatment of and explanation for the evolution of wages and employment in the US over the last 30 years. Specifically, we account for the pattern of changes in wage inequality, for the increased relative wage and employment of women, for the emergence of the college wage premium and for the shift in employment from the goods to the service-producing sector. The underlying theory we adopt is neoclassical, a two-sector competitive labor market economy in which the supply of and demand for labor of heterogeneous skill determines spot market skill rental prices. The empirical approach is structural. The model embeds many of the features that have been posited in the literature to have contributed to the changing US wage and employment structure including skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarity, changes in relative product-market prices, changes in the productivity of labor in home production and demographics such as changing cohort size and fertility.     

The cyclical upgrading of labor and on-the-job search

This paper examines patterns of worker reallocation in the search and matching model of the labor market. We show that on-the-job search is crucial for explaining the observed cyclical upgrading of workers to better employment opportunities in booms. This is due to the rising availability of employed searchers which facilitates recruitment for newly created high-wage jobs. The standard model fails to exhibit such behavior. At the same time, the model is consistent with salient features of labor market dynamics, such as the volatility of vacancies and unemployment, and a highly procyclical rate of job-to-job transitions. This suggests an important channel for the reallocation of workers across jobs as well as the propagation of aggregate shocks.     

Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles

This paper analyzes the effect of recontracting and matching verifiable wage offers on the intertemporal structure of contract wage and consumption profile for a two-period economy. A contract firm provides specific training for a worker during the first period, which increases his productivity if he stays in the second period, but the worker may quit to accept an alternative wage offer after a successful search. Wage offers are private to the worker but can be presented to the contract firm for matching. This paper shows that when capital markets are imperfect and wage offers are verifiable, the contract firm recontracts and matches any wage offers the worker receives up to the second-period productivity. The ex ante contract wage profile will be flat. Inefficient quits will be eliminated and there will be complete ex ante consumption smoothing. It is significant to note that the result of rising wage profile derived in numerous contract models is fragile with respect to assumptions on mechanism of interfirm labor mobility.     

Firm-specific wage growth and changes in the labor market for managers

This paper analyzes recent changes in the employment relationships between managers and firms. In both Becker's and Lazear's models of firm-specific wage growth, compensation is deferred from early in an employee's tenure with a firm until later in the contract. The deferred compensation bonds the worker to the firm. Based on cross-sectional data from Current Population Surveys, rates of firm-specific wage growth are estimated for the managerial labor market. The findings show that the rate of wage growth that is firm-specific for managers in manufacturing industries declined significantly during the early 1980s. It is estimated, for example, that a manager with 12 years of tenure in a manufacturing firm enjoyed, on average, a 25% wage premium in 1979 over an otherwise similar manager who was a new hire in a firm. By 1983 the firm-specific wage premium for a manager with 12 years of tenure was only 5%. These changes represent a significant reduction in the strength of the employment bond between firms and managers, and a reduction in the incentive effects previously enjoyed by firms from the use of deferred-compensation schemes. This change is consistent with the significant increases in the displacement rates of managers that occurred during the 1980s.     

The government wage bill and private activity

We estimate the macroeconomic effects of public wage expenditures in U.S. data by identifying shocks to public employment and public wages using sign restrictions. We find that public employment shocks are mildly expansionary at the federal level and strongly expansionary at the state and local level by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force participation and private sector employment. Similarly, state and local government wage shocks lead to increases in consumption and output, while shocks to federal government wages induce significant contractionary effects. In a stylized DSGE model we show that the degree of complementarity between public and private goods in the consumption bundle is key for explaining the observed heterogeneity.     

Skill shortages and firms' employment behaviour

This study investigates the effects of skill shortages on the dynamics of employment at the firm level for UK manufacturing between 1984–94. We find that shortages of skilled labour have a statistically significant effect on firms' employment behaviour. It has a positive effect on firms' adjustment costs leading to employment being more sluggish to respond when the labour market is tight, implying that employment adjustment will be more responsive in the downward direction. This result is robust to the inclusion of a measure of firms' sales expectations, with the effect of skill shortages being greater in periods when firms expect sales to rise.     

On recalls, layoffs, variable hours, and labor adjustment costs

The paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment. The analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires, layoffs, and quits, but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off. Thus, we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input. It is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers. Further, it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers.     

Managing the Contingent Workforce—Gaining the Advantages, Avoiding the Pitfalls

Part-time employment arrangements constitute a rapidly growing segment of the U.S. labor force. Such employment arrangements offer advantages to both employers and employees. Part-time employees offer employers reduced wage and benefit costs, workforce flexibility, aid for special projects, replacement fill-ins and a chance to preview candidates for full-time employment. Part-time work enables employees to supplement family income, enjoy flexible hours as well as a change in job environment and a chance to substitute for full-time employment when there is no choice. The advantages of contingent employment come at a cost. Employers must comply with laws and give up control over much of the employment relationship in order to avoid co-employment status and to gain the benefits of contingent employment. Employees in contingent work arrangements frequently do not qualify for many of the benefits available to full time employees. Suggestions made for managing contingent workers may reduce some of the problems, but they would also remove some of the advantages.     

Labor composition and long-run employment in a minimum-wage economy

This article examines the long-run consequences of minimum wage regulation within the framework of a two-labor-sector growth model, where a minimum real wage is effective only in the “unskilled” labor sector. The assumption of heterogeneous labor makes possible a stable steady-state growth equilibrium. Conditions for the stability and existence of steady-state equilibrium are presented. A significant implication of the model is that selective immigration policies that encourage the influx of skilled workers would have the long-run effect of increasing the employment rate of unskilled labor, even in cases where the two labor sectors are nearly perfect substitutes.