Approval voting in scientific and engineering societies

Approval voting is a system in which members can vote for as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. In 1987 and 1988, four scientific and engineering societies, collectively comprising some 350,000 members, used this election reform for the first time. Their reasons for adoption varied but centered around efforts to elect consensus candidates. Approval voting has indeed elected so-called Condorcet candidates, who can defeat all other candidates in pairwise contests. Moreover, these winners generally enjoy support among different classes of voters, so they are not merely lowest common denominators, as some analysts had feared. In at least one instance, approval voting would have led to a different winner from plurality voting (in which voters can vote for exactly one candidate); arguably, this winner would have been the better social choice because he had wider support than his closest opponent. On another occasion, approval voting led to ideological voting—in which the voting patterns reflected an underlying ordering of the candidates—but voting in most societies tends to be nonideological. Overall, the recent experimentation with approval voting has shown that it not only may make a difference but also elects broadly acceptable candidates.     

Contrasting Single User and Networked Group Decision Support Systems for Strategy Making

The use of computers to support group work – as a Group Decision Support System (GDSS) – on strategy making has grown over the last decade. Some GDSS's have a facilitator managing the computer with the group viewing a public screen displaying the debate, problem definition, and agreements of the group as it negotiates strategies. Others involve members of the group in the direct input of data that forms part of the problem definition – data that is then used by the group employing electronic voting and other organizing devices. This paper discusses a real case relating to an organization seeking to reach important agreements about its strategy. The case involved the top management team and over 50 senior managers. The organization used a facilitator driven GDSS for some of this work, and a networked system for other parts. Some of the meetings were video taped, some were observed through one-way mirrors, and all of the participants were interviewed about their reactions to the different systems. This paper reports on some of the significant contrasts between the two approaches.     

累积投票制的博弈性及其解决方法

累积投票制度因具备一个完整的博弈构成要件 (即 ,博弈方、策略空间和支付结构 ) ,具有博弈性。累积投票博弈性的特点有 :累积投票主要是非合作博弈、也可能是合作博弈 ,累积投票是静态博弈、有限策略博弈和非零和博弈。为了减少累积投票的博弈效果 ,鼓励合作博弈 ,可以采取立法手段、分类董事会、缩小董事会规模和购买表决权无效原则等方法。     

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats.     

A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting

A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of representatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to represent all of voters in at least the same proportion. This property is a way of selecting a committee that represents completely all of voters when such a committee exists. The usual voting rules in this context do not satisfy this condition.     

Estimating discrete-choice games of incomplete information: Simple static examples

We investigate the computational aspect of estimating discrete-choice games under incomplete information. In these games, multiple equilibria can exist. Also, different values of structural parameters can result in different numbers of equilibria. Consequently, under maximum-likelihood estimation, the likelihood function is a discontinuous function of the structural parameters. We reformulate the maximum-likelihood estimation problem as a constrained optimization problem in the joint space of structural parameters and economic endogenous variables. Under this formulation, the objective function and structural equations are smooth functions. The constrained optimization approach does not require repeatedly solving the game or finding all the equilibria. We use two static-game models to demonstrate this approach, conducting Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the finite-sample performance of the maximum-likelihood estimator, two-step estimators, and the nested pseudo-likelihood estimator.     

Influence Allocation Methods in Group Decision Support Systems

Influence allocation processes are voting and opinion aggregating methods that allow members to distribute some or all of their decision making influence to others in the group in order to exploit not only the group's knowledge of the alternatives, but its knowledge of itself. Only with the common use of group decision support systems (GDSS) has their use become practical. In this paper we reconsider SPAN, an influence allocation process introduced by MacKinnon (1966a). Experimental comparison shows SPAN to be significantly better at selecting a correct option from a set of options than two common voting methods. An alternative influence allocation process that we call RCON (Rational Consensus), is based on a weighting method proposed by DeGroot (1974) and has been explicated as a normative standard for combining opinion by Lehrer and Wagner (1981). The judgmental inputs to SPAN would appear to be logically related to those for RCON. Submitting the SPAN inputs from the experiment, transformed in this logical way, to the RCON process results in somewhat better performance than with SPAN. However, evidence indicated that the two methods are conceptually and psychologically sufficiently different that an experimental comparison is needed between them.     

科技进步对央地政府间环评审批事权划分的影响--基于1997-2013年省级面板数据

我国政府间公共事务事权划分不仅参照效率原则,而且考虑政治风险因素。基于此逻辑,通过对环境治理事权细分并构建博弈模型,发现不同环境治理事权划分存在差异。具体到环评审批事权,其分权程度受地方科技水平的直接影响,本文采用省级面板数据对此进行实证检验,结果表明科技进步会促使中央下放环评审批事权,这也符合我国环评审批制度的改革历程。此外,中央政府不仅可以通过环境体制改革以降低政治风险,而且可以通过改变中央、地方和居民三者间环境偏好传导机制来改善环境治理效果。     

投资审批体制改革推动投资增长了吗——来自2004年中央投资审批体制改革的经验证据

中国经济由高速增长转向高质量发展的新阶段,亟须重塑经济增长的投资动能。本文以2004年中央投资审批体制改革为自然实验,采用双重差分法和三重差分法考察了投资管制调整的投资效应。研究发现,投资审批体制改革导致投资管制程度放松,促进了相关行业和领域的投资扩张。投资管制程度放松的投资效应在规模相对小和获得政府补贴相对少的企业中更为明显,而且在地区市场化程度和地方政府效率相对低的地区更为明显,表明管制程度放松压缩了地方政府及官员干预和控制企业投资的空间。本文研究还发现投资审批体制改革具有投资效率提升的效果。本文验证了放松管制所具有的积极的经济效应,为进一步深化经济体制改革提供了政策思路。     

Direct Election of Group Decision-Makers Can Facilitate Cooperation in the Public Goods Game

Research on social dilemma has shown that the delegation of decision-making to group leaders can increase cooperation in the collective action problem. In this paper, we show that the voting scheme used for the election of leaders could make a difference to the emergence of cooperation. We design a public goods game experiment in which actors elect leaders to make decisions on their behalf in the contribution to public goods. In particular, we compare the leadership elected from direct and indirect election systems. In direct election, a leader is elected directly by majority-votes from a group, whereas in indirect election the group is divided into smaller subgroups and a leader is elected from the elected subgroup leaders. We run a simulation model to show that direct election would choose a more cooperative leader than indirect election when voters’ preferences of leadership are not homogenous. A laboratory experiment with human subjects further indicates that people hold stronger preferences for cooperators as leaders in direct election than in indirect election, suggesting that the voting scheme has an effect not only on the processing of actors’ preferences, but also on the shaping of their preferences of leadership in the public goods dilemma.     

On Voting Power Indices and a Class of Probability Distributions: With applications to EU data

Properties of a class of voting power indices, defined as the expected number of swings under a probability model, are discussed. For decisive voting games swing sets exhibit symmetries which can be used to characterize the voting power indices. Numerical illustrations based on EU Council data are provided.     

Persuasive social approval cues in print advertising: Exploring visual and textual strategies and consumer self-monitoring

This study focuses on exploring the persuasion effects of social approval cues in both visual and textual formats in print advertising. It also examines the moderation role of a consumer dispositional factor – self-monitoring orientation – on the effectiveness of visual and textual cues. Through a controlled experiment involving four versions of a fictitious ad, this study demonstrates that social approval cues in either visual or textual format can significantly increase consumers' brand evaluation and purchase intention. Furthermore, it shows that the effectiveness of social approval cues can vary across different combinations of visual and textual presentations, either enhancing or diminishing the overall persuasion outcomes. These observed effects of social approval cues occur only for high self-monitors, but not for low self-monitors. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in relation to advertising strategies and research.     

亲情原则还是能力取向?——家族上市公司权力配置机制的实证研究

本文以2008年187家狭义家族上市公司中的572位家族成员作为研究对象,借助改良的五等亲分类方法,从所有权、投票权及管理权三个维度探讨家族成员内部权力配置结构的影响机制。研究发现,亲缘关系对所有权和投票权的分配影响显著,亲情原则显露无疑,但管理权的分配并未呈现类似特征;个人的能力因素在管理权配置中的正向影响大于在所有权和投票权配置中的影响,但对整个权力配置体系而言并不存在显著的正向调节效应。     

Intransitive Preferences in Retailing

According to Arrow's well-known ‘parardox of majority voting’, intransitivities can occur in the attempt to establish a social, inter-personal preference ordering. As has been shown by May [1954], for example, a logical equivalent of this paradox can also arise in the case of individual, personal preference orderings. The present paper shows that such cases are quite plausible and natural, in as common a context as the choice of a grocery store. The paper also shows that intransitivities may occur more generally, as a result of decision rules other than the logical equivalent of majority voting.     

Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Previous analyses have considered (1) voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners (and the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules) as well as (2) refined measures of Group Mutual Coherence that assess the presence of underlying models of rational behavior that governs voter preferences. In this paper, we present the final step of this particular line of analysis by analyzing (1) and (2) simultaneously. We conclude that there is a considerable benefit on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency from asking voters to submit candidate rankings in three-candidate elections.     

The use and abuse of executive powers in warding off corporate raiders

As corporate raids become more prevalent, top corporate executives have asked for and often received additional executive power to ward off raiders or “sharks”. For example, they have been given the use of “shark repellents” such as staggered elections for board members, cumulative voting, super majority voting requirements, and the power to sell off the firm's “crown jewels”. Are they abusing these powers as they attempt to save their jobs, at the expense of stockholders, by driving off the corporate raiders who might unseat ineffective management? In this article the practices being used by entrenched managers to make their firms less attractive to raiders and the defense tactics they are using in corporate takeover battles are examined from an ethical viewpoint.     

A Voting Mechanism Designed for Talent Shows in Mass Media: Weighted Preference of Group Decision Makers in Social Networks Using Fuzzy Measures and Choquet Integral

As the development of social networks tends to shape people’s view about choices, decision making theories are challenged by numerous unprecedented difficulties, from both the theories and practice. One hot topic is how to design a voting mechanism for talent shows in mass media that not only attracts public attention but also reflects an objective and fair principle. Weighted voting, where the voting power of a representative is proportional to the population in his or her district, has been widely adopted in legislative selections and talent show competitions. However, weighted voting system may cause disenfranchisement of some representatives and reduce the entertainment and interest of talent shows because of the ignorance of complex interactions among the representatives. In this paper, possible interactions among representatives are analyzed by investigating the associated social networks and subsequently some fuzzy measures are utilized to quantify these interactions. Specifically, the weights determination model is adopted in this situation for defining fuzzy measures to avoid the disenfranchisement, and a multiple-group hierarchy decision model is developed to solve social network group decision making problems where the Choquet integral is employed to reduce the impact from synergy and redundancy between representatives. Moreover, a voting mechanism for talent shows in mass media is provided. Finally, an illustrative example, and a close look at the current algorithmic issues and future trends from different angles are provided.

     

A new view of shareholder voting in the nineteenth century: evidence from Brazil,England and France

Business corporations in the nineteenth century often imposed limits on the voting rights of large shareholders. Economic historians have generally interpreted these voting restrictions as a contractual mechanism designed to protect small shareholders in a legal environment that afforded insufficient investor protection. This dominant account, however, fails to explain the variation in the incidence of voting restrictions across different industries and firm ownership structures, as well as their eventual disappearance from corporate charters over time. In this Article, we advance an alternative interpretation for these early voting schemes as efforts at consumer protection employed primarily by firms that were local service monopolies and collectively owned by their principal customers, none of whom wished the firm to come under the exclusive control of their competitors or of profit-maximising investors. We explore and test this proposition by analysing data on shareholder voting rights in the nineteenth century in Brazil, England, and France.     

Decisional Power in Group Decision Making: A Note on the Allocation of Group Members' Weights in the Multiplicative AHP and SMART

Many complex decisions are made in a group environment, where the decision is made jointly by a committee or group structure. The individual group members are often not equally qualified to contribute equitably to the decision process, or may have different saliences (desires) to influence the decision. A quantitative knowledge of the players' decisional power is useful for better understanding of the group decision process, and could even be used in weighted voting within the group structure. We adapt the REMBRANDT suite of decision models (multiplicative AHP and SMART) to measure decisional power in groups, and we generalise this to cater for the case where power itself is deemed to be multidimensional in nature, and the case of uncertain subjective judgements of power amongst group members.     

On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure

We study in this paper some features of a new voting rule recently proposed by K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush. The (conjectural) optimality of this voting rule with respect to statistical manipulability by coalitions is discussed under two alternative probabilistic assumptions, namely the impartial culture condition (IC) and the impartial anonymous culture condition (IAC). We also analyze the ability of Kim and Roush procedure to fulfil the Condorcet conditions. Some representations of its Condorcet efficiency in three-alternative elections are obtained.