Meltdown Iceland: Lessons on the World Financial Crisis from a Small Bankrupt Island

The paper reports that no statistically significant empirical relationship can be shown between total bank credit and the US broad money supply in the period after 1995. It argues that the growing prevalence of non-bank deposits in the form of mutual money market funds and asset securitization are the main culprits for this result. Prior to financial liberalization, the connection between total bank credit and broad money supply was simple enough: new bank deposits were created when banks made loans and were extinguished when loans were paid back. In banks' consolidated balance sheet, total deposits made up total liabilities and were basically equal to the broad money supply. However, in the age of financial liberalization not all deposits bank loans created returned as deposits, whether in banks or non-banks, as deposits could be swapped for non-deposit liabilities without a corresponding draw down on the asset side. Moreover, loans could be extinguished in banks' balance sheets through asset securitization.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

The Politics of Shadow Money: Security Structures,Money Creation and Unconventional Central Banking

ABSTRACT

For the first time in the history of central banks, the Federal Reserve has been pursuing monetary policies which allow shadow banks to access its reserves. The paper examines these policies in an analysis based on the concept of security structure. The aim is to facilitate a better understanding of complex institutional arrangements which convert credit claims into money or enable them to simulate the money-form. As the financial crisis reached its peak in September 2008, the Fed was not able to contain the impact precisely because the security structure existing between banks and the Fed did not extend to the shadow banking system, which had meanwhile become thebackbone of the global financial system. To address this situation, the Fed initiated new security structures that were designed to also give players in the shadow banking system access to liquidity and collateral. The concept ‘security structure’ serves as an analytical tool to explore dynamic forms of safety and liquidity generation and to distinguish between credit expansion and money creation. It also helps to differentiate between three qualitatively different stages of security: central bank money, quasi-money and shadow money. In this way, it foregrounds the politics of (shadow) money creation.     

Central Banking and Post-Keynesian Economics

Abstract

The Post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money has given much attention to the role of the central bank in the money creation process. Circuit theory has neglected this role, in so far as it has focused on the relationship between banks and firms within a monetary production economy. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it intends to fill this gap in circuit theory, by providing a role for the central bank in settlement of interbank debts. Secondly, it aims at reinforcing the Post-Keynesian analysis of central bank money by considering both the money-purveying and the credit-purveying roles of the settlement institution in the interbank market. The result of this analysis is a more comprehensive theory of endogenous money, where the lender-of-last-resort facilities of a central bank are viewed as an endogenous phenomenon involving both a money creation and a credit operation between the central bank and the domestic banking system. In such a framework, monetary policy consists of setting the base rate of interest at a level that enables banks to limit their bilateral debt position in the interbank market, so as not to disrupt the workings of the payment system by either an illiquidity or an insolvency crisis.     

影子银行体系的信用创造：机制、效应和应对思路

本文从金融功能视角,将影子银行体系的范畴界定在发挥了类似于商业银行存款、贷款、结算等功能的三大类非银行金融机构。在此前提下,从金融机构和金融产品视角,重点剖析了前两类金融机构的信用创造机制。同时,提出影子银行体系的信用创造机制对商业银行具有有限替代效应,并在货币市场上产生外部溢出效应。即流动性之谜。最后,基于影子银行体系信用创造机制缺陷,提出从抵押品管理角度入手。在金融市场中建立证券最后贷款人,以规避影子银行体系信用扩张的风险。     

Endogenous money and shareholders' funds in the classical theory of banking

By its nature, bank money is endogenous, but its issuing is risky and presupposes the presence of banks' shareholders' funds. Shareholders' funds give banks the means of dealing with the difficulties involved in the process of money creation and which are inherent to the banking activity: convertibility constraint, credit and liquidity risks. Unlike the Richardian paradigm, Smith's ‘real bill theory’ and Thornton's ‘lender of last resort theory’ point out the functions of shareholder's funds. Therefore their monetary-banking approachs seem more complementary than contradictory. In other respects, the theory of endogenous money and credit introduces risks and capital in the analysis of exchange and lead to questioning the classical market theory constructed on the model of bartering     

Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market: Is there a danger of contagion?

Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects, where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock. Recent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages. We use balance sheet information to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the German banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion. We find that in the absence of a safety net, there is considerable scope for contagion that could affect a large proportion of the banking system. The financial safety net (in this case institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks) considerably reduces—but does not eliminate—the danger of contagion. Even so, the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15% of the banking system in terms of assets.     

Collateral rehypothecation,safe asset scarcity,and unconventional monetary policy

We build a mark-to-market model where commercial banks can enlarge their balance sheets, repledging the available collateral several times to exchange liquidity through the interbank market. In bad times, the fall of risky asset price disrupts the length of the repledging chain due to the increase of the haircut and the decrease of external assets' value. In such a scenario, the central bank can intervene implementing unconventional monetary policies by purchasing a fraction of the banking system's external assets, both safe treasury bonds, and risky asset-backed securities, to inject liquidity. Our results show that a quantitative easing policy that purchases only safe assets is highly ineffective in restoring the intermediation activity to the pre-crisis level due to its inability to sustain the risky asset price and the repledging chain of collateral. Instead, focusing on risky assets only, the monetary authority can sustain risky asset prices, avoiding the freezing of the money market.     

Interest rate pass-through in Morocco: Evidence from bank-level survey data

We investigate the relationship between banks’ marginal cost and retail lending rates in Morocco. The data covers the rates of new business loans for four market segments broken down by institutional sector between 2006Q2 and 2016Q4. We examine the pass-through mechanism using recently developed heterogeneous panel cointegration framework. Our findings suggest that there is a high degree of pass-through heterogeneity over bank products. The weak adjustment for short-term credit facilities and consumption loans can be explained by credit risk compensation allowing banks to reduce their exposition to systemic risks. Corporate loans are priced more competitive than household and individual entrepreneur products, suggesting that negotiation power or the competition from the borrower side matters. Overall, our results indicate that banking market contestability has improved during the last decade.     

ON THE ESSENTIALITY OF BANKS*

We compare allocations sustained by credit with allocations sustained by bank notes (inside money) in a search model with decentralized trade and limited monitoring. We demonstrate that there exists a credit arrangement that is superior to inside money. However, in contrast with inside money, this arrangement is not robust to an expansion of trade that is not accompanied by an adequate increase in the degree of monitoring. Therefore, banks are essential when trade is intense and monitoring is limited. As a historical application, we argue that our model helps explain the origins of banking in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.     

MULTIVARIATE COINTEGRATION APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF RESERVES AND BANK CREDIT: A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY*

The paper estimates both long-run reserves and long-run money demand equations using the multivariate cointegration approach. An economic model is constructed, based on the monetary approach to balance of payments in which the monetary authorities can control money supply through changes in bank credit. The vector auto-regressive methodology is used to derive latent equilibrium relationships, and the short-run error correction equations are estimated for both nominal money stock and reserves. A response function for the short-run changes in bank credit is developed. Given the institutional system and slow adjustments, a response function of changes in bank credit to lagged changes in reserves performs well for the period 1960–88.     

A two-pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area

The current financial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments. Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting strategies by a growing number of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We find some evidence that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We find some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a filtered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money growth periods.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

Risk-taking channel,bank lending channel and the “paradox of credibility”: Evidence from Brazil

If from one hand credibility is important for the conduct of monetary policy, on the other hand, greater credibility may eventually stimulate the creation of bubbles in the credit market and asset prices through the risk-taking channel, and as a consequence, bring to reality the “paradox of credibility”. The “paradox of credibility” is the new dilemma posed to central banking in the effort to conciliate monetary policy and banking regulation under inflation targeting regimes. Thus, the present work aims to: (i) analyze the impact of central bank actions and the macroeconomic environment on the risk perception of banks, and; (ii) analyze the influence of this risk perception of banks on the credit spread, considering both the credit channel and the risk-taking channel. Based on an econometric analysis, the work provides evidence about: (i) the “paradox of credibility” and the risk-taking channel; (ii) the influence of monetary policies on the risk perception of banks and, as a consequence, on the credit spread; (iii) the procyclical nature of banks in relation to economic activity, and; (iv) the adherence of the countercyclical indicator (called credit gap) proposed in Basel III for the Brazilian case.     

金融危机、货币政策与信贷供给*——基于公司层面银行信贷数据的经验研究

不同的银行特征会对金融危机和货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道产生异质性影响。本文运用2001-2015年公司层面银行信贷数据实证检验了我国货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道,随后进一步研究金融危机对不同特征银行信贷供给的影响差异。经验研究发现：我国货币政策银行信贷渠道主要通过非国有控股银行传导,并引起不同资产负债表特征银行信贷供给的异质性反应。银行规模越大、流动性越强、资本充足率越高,银行信贷供给对货币政策越不敏感。金融危机期间,银行信贷渠道的传导效率显著降低,高资本充足水平的银行和国有控股银行受金融危机的冲击较小,并且宽松的货币政策对国有控股银行信贷供给调控的效率更高。     

银行盈利的宏微观因素——对中国银行业的实证研究

This paper seeks to examine the determinants of the profitability of the Chinese banking sector during the post-reform period of 2000–2005. The empirical findings from this study suggest that all the determinants variables have statistically significant impact on China banks profitability. However, the impacts are not uniform across bank types. We find that liquidity, credit risk, and capitalization have positive impacts on the state owned commercial banks (SOCBs) profitability, while the impact of cost is negative. Similar to their SOCB counterparts, we find that joint stock commercial banks (JSCB) with higher credit risk tend to be more profitable, while higher cost results in a lower JSCB profitability levels. During the period under study, the empirical findings suggest that size and cost results in a lower city commercial banks (CITY) profitability, while the more diversified and relatively better capitalized CITY tend to exhibit higher profitability levels. The impact of economic growth is positive, while growth in money supply is negatively related to the SOCB and CITY profitability levels.      

The Number of Bank Relationships of SMEs: A Disaggregated Analysis of Changes in the Swiss Loan Market

This paper investigates changes in the number of bank relationships of small and medium-sized enterprises in Switzerland from 1996 to 2002. It differentiates between overall bank relationships and lending relationships and disaggregates the loan market with respect to firm sizes, industries and banking groups. On average, bank lending declined, and the concentration of lending relationships increased. The changes seem to have been driven by demand and supply for medium-sized firms, but only by supply for micro and small firms. Supply-side reductions resulted from a merger and changes in credit risk management by major banks. We find evidence of increasing specialization of larger banks on transaction lending and of smaller and regional banks on relationship lending.     

Should Banks Be Banned From Creating Money? An Analysis From the Perspective of Hierarchical Money

We extend the concept of “hierarchy of money” to our current monetary and financial system based on fiat money, with monetary policy that is conducted through the sale and purchase of securities and credit intermediation by non-bank financial intermediaries. This exposes a feedback loop between the upper and lower level of the hierarchy, which allows for more than full use of otherwise dormant capital, but that also increases inherent instabilities manifested in asset booms and busts. From the perspective of hierarchical money, we find that the call to ban banks from creating money neglects the significant role of securities-based financing in the global financial markets at the lower level, as well as the money creation capacity of central banks at the highest level of the hierarchy. Moreover, the inherently expansive nature of the hierarchy of money contradicts the long-term feasibility of full-reserve banking.