Can central bank communication help to stabilise inflation expectations?

This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the information and news channel. A novelty of the study is its use of data from Google Analytics on ECB website traffic as proxy for visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that website attention, as captured by search volumes of visitors, influences euro area inflation expectations. We find that increased website attention contributes to narrowing the gap between market-based forecasts and (the mean of) longer-term professional inflation expectations. Our findings add to the theoretical evidence on the existence of an information and news channel.     

Fed speak on main street: Central bank communication and household expectations

Central banks emphasize the use of communication as a tool of monetary policy. As central banks increasingly recognize that low public informedness limits their ability to communicate with the general public, several have begun to explicitly tailor their communication strategies for a broader audience. Most research focuses on central bank communication with financial markets, but several recent strands of literature address aspects of communication with households. I survey the literature addressing the rationales and efficacy of central bank communication with households, supplementing this with new evidence from an assortment of consumer survey data. I draw from the literature on rational inattention, financial literacy, and political communication to suggest explanations for limited household receptiveness to central bank communications. Finally, I focus on one specific aim of central bank communication, which is to anchor inflation expectations. Previous literature finds that the announcement of an explicit inflation target helps anchor expectations among financial market participants. Using U.S. consumer survey data, I show that consumers’ expectations are imperfectly anchored and that the anchoring of more informed consumers’ expectations increased more than the anchoring of less informed consumers’ expectations following the Fed’s announcement of a 2% inflation target.     

The information content of market-based measures for the long-term inflation expectations of professionals: evidence from a midas analysis

Long-term inflation expectations taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are a major source of information for monetary policy. Unfortunately, they are published only on a quarterly basis. This article investigates the daily information content of market-based measures, such as inflation-linked swaps and breakeven inflation rates, for the next survey outcome. Using a mixed data sampling approach, we find that professionals account for the daily dynamics of market-based measures when they submit their long-term inflation expectations. We propose a daily indicator of professionals’ inflation expectations that outperforms alternative indicators that ignore the high-frequency dynamics of market-based measures. To illustrate the usefulness of the new indicator, we provide new evidence on the (re-)anchoring of U.S. inflation expectations.     

Disagreement in inflation expectations: empirical evidence for Colombia

The literature on expectation disagreements in emerging economies is scarce. This paper examines the disagreements in inflation expectations for the Colombian economy during the 2010–2017 period. We combine empirical tests with an analysis of a monthly survey of expectations of financial analysts in Colombia to obtain valuable evidence to formulate guidelines on the expectations modelling in developing economies. The findings indicate that disagreements present inertia and that inflation volatility increases disagreements. However, the central bank’s stance, as established through a press release, can reduce disagreement. Moreover, if central bank communication is clear and there is a credible inflation target, there tend to be fewer disagreements.     

Reactions of real yields and inflation expectations to forward guidance in the United States

We study the impact of forward policy rate guidance by the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on real and breakeven US Treasury yield curves. We find that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements led to a significant reduction in real yields at horizons of 2 to 5 years ahead. By contrast, long-term breakeven inflation rates were little affected, suggesting that inflation expectations have remained well anchored, and that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance has not adversely affected central bank credibility.     

The time-varying degree of inflation expectations anchoring

Well-anchored inflation expectations have become a key indicator for the credibility of a central bank’s inflation target. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the (de-)anchoring of long-term U.S. inflation expectations has been under debate. We propose a time-varying parameter (TVP) model in order to explore gradual changes in central bank credibility and the corresponding degree of inflation expectations anchoring. Our results confirm that inflation expectations have been partially de-anchored during the financial crisis. However, the TVP model reveals that inflation expectations have been successfully re-anchored ever since.     

Effects of transparency,monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations

The literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.     

Assessing inflation expectations anchoring for heterogeneous agents: analysts,businesses and trade unions

Forecasts of agents who are actively involved in the setting of prices and wages are less readily available than those of professional analysts but may be more relevant for understanding inflation dynamics. Here we compare inflation expectations anchoring between analysts, businesses and trade unions for one country for which comparable forecasts are available for almost two decades: South Africa. Forecasts are modelled as monotonically diverging from an estimated long-run anchor point, or ‘implicit anchor’, towards actual inflation as the forecast horizon shortens. We find that the estimated inflation anchors of analysts lie within the 3–6 percent inflation target range of the central bank. However, those for businesses and trade unions, which our evidence suggests may be the most relevant for driving the inflation process, have remained above the top end of the official target range. Our results point to challenges for central banks seeking to gain credibility with agents whose decisions directly influence inflation.     

Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.     

The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts*

Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for central‐bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. We find evidence for a sizeable effect (e.g., by announcing a quantified inflation objective, or by publishing inflation and output forecasts). However, there are decreasing marginal effects to increases in transparency, and the disagreement among the expectations of the general public is not affected. This suggests that there are possible limits to transparency.     

Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?

Since the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977), a central bank’s independence (CBI) has been considered an important institutional condition for achieving lower inflation. Recently, however, this long-held belief has been challenged. This paper investigates the relationship between CBI and inflation for a large sample (91 countries) covering the period from 1990 to 2014. We follow the previous literature by considering differences across national monetary regimes in explaining this relationship. Our approach also traces the sources of the inflationary phenomenon. Using panel data and the turnover indicator as a proxy for CBI, we offer two main findings. First, we identify the role of exchange rate regimes in the dynamic between inflation and CBI. Second, our results show that only intermediate and flexible exchange rate regimes are appropriate in this relationship. This finding is explained by the level of CBI, which is very low for countries with a fixed exchange rate policy and low income levels. For policymakers, our results highlight the importance of the choice of monetary regime in controlling inflation in the presence of CBI. For public agents, our results provide guidelines for formulating expectations.     

Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data

This article analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that in the post-crisis period longer-term inflation expectations have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term ones and to actual HICP inflation. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term expectations of professional forecasters and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.     

The Bank Lending Channel and Monetary Policy Rules: Evidence from European Banks

There exist two main channels of the monetary transmission mechanism: the interest rate and the bank lending channel. This paper focuses on the latter, which is based on the central bank’s actions that affect loan supply and real spending. The supply of loans depends on the monetary policy indicator, which, in most studies, is the real short-term interest rate. The question investigated in this paper is how the operation of the bank lending channel changes when this short-term indicator is allowed to be endogenously determined by the target rate the central bank sets through a monetary rule. We examine the effect that a rule has on the bank lending channel in European banking institutions spanning the period 1999–2009. The expectations concerning inflation and output affect the decision of the central bank for the target rate, which, in turn, affect private sector’s expectations —commercial banks— by altering their loan supply.     

Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

Determinants of the sacrifice ratio: Evidence from OECD and non-OECD countries

This paper measures sacrifice ratios for all countries in the world over an approximately forty year time period, in addition to exploring the determinants of worldwide sacrifice ratios. We test the most commonly-cited determinants: the speed of disinflation, openness, inflation targeting, central bank independence, and political factors for both OECD and non-OECD countries. We find that the speed of disinflation is the most important determinant of OECD sacrifice ratios, but puzzlingly has no effect on non-OECD nations' disinflation costs. Instead we find evidence that greater central bank independence and more openness are associated with lower non-OECD sacrifice ratios. We also find that the ratio of government debt to GDP – a variable that is not important when it comes to OECD countries – is highly significant for non-OECD economies. Specifically, we find that higher indebtedness is associated with lower sacrifice ratios in non-OECD nations, suggesting that greater levels of debt do not lead to higher expectations of inflation. Furthermore we find evidence that the negative impact of debt on non-OECD sacrifice ratios is being driven by middle income economies.     

Quantification and characteristics of household inflation expectations in Switzerland

Inflation expectations are a key variable in conducting monetary policy. However, these expectations are generally unobservable and only certain proxy variables exist, such as surveys on inflation expectations. This article offers guidance on the appropriate quantification of household inflation expectations in the Swiss Consumer Survey, where answers are qualitative in nature. We apply and evaluate different variants of the probability approach and the regression approach; we demonstrate that models that include answers on perceived inflation and allow for time-varying response thresholds yield the best results; and we show why the originally proposed approach of Fluri and Spörndli (1987) has resulted in heavily biased inflation expectations since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, we discuss some of the key features of Swiss household inflation expectations, i.e. the fact that there has been a shift in expectation formation since 2000 (expectations are better anchored and less adaptive, and there is lower disagreement of expectations). We suggest that this may be linked to the Swiss National Bank’s adjustment of its monetary policy framework around this time. In addition, we outline how expectation formation in Switzerland is in line with the sticky information model, where information disseminates slowly from professional forecasters to households.     

What determines households inflation expectations? Theory and evidence from a household survey

The purpose of the present paper is to study how households form inflation expectations using a novel survey dataset of Italian households. We extend the existing ‘inattentiveness’ literature by incorporating explicitly inflation targets and distinguishing between aggregate and disaggregate dynamics based on demographic groups. We also consider both the short- and long-run dynamics as households update their inflation expectations. While we find clear distinctions between the various demographic groups behavior, households tend to absorb professionals forecast. The short-run dynamics also indicate they not only overreact when updating their expectations but also adjust asymmetrically to any perceived momentum change of future inflation.     

通胀预期对未来住房价格的影响——基于消费者信心指数的分析

以消费者信心指数作为通货膨胀预期指标,以中国1999—2010年住房市场月度数据为样本,实证检验通货膨胀预期对未来住房价格的影响。实证检验结果表明,通货膨胀预期会导致住房价格上涨,即生产者和消费者对通货膨胀预期将推动住房价格的不断上涨,因此,稳定通货膨胀预期对于稳定住房价格具有十分重要的作用。     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.