金融市场系统风险与资产证券化的相关性

美国金融市场的资产证券化使金融市场的系统风险陡增,并引发了席卷全球的金融危机。资产证券化增加金融市场系统风险的主要原因在于倒买倒卖的市场运作模式、资产支持的证券流动性不足以及资产证券化交易的复杂性所产生的负面效应。金融危机后应加强我国资产证券化金融监管工作,坚持以有限管制和间接管制为原则,减少直接干预;坚持慎重选择资产证券化类型,逐步推进资产证券化原则;坚持以规范的信息披露为原则,防范系统风险。     

Assessing downside and upside risk spillovers across conventional and socially responsible stock markets

Since the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, socially responsible (SR) investments have become an alternative form of conventional finance, giving rise to further systemic risk between conventional and SR stock markets. In this paper, we assess this risk transmission using Value at Risk (VaR) modeling for the US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, over the period covering January 2004–December 2016. We find that socially responsible stock markets exhibit less risk than do conventional markets in terms of the risk hedging properties induced by the SR screening. Second, contributions to systemic risk vary across market phases and return distribution levels, with a larger contribution and spillover effect during the recent global financial crisis. For example, at the downside of the distribution (CoVaR at 5%), the conventional European index shows the highest contribution to the world market’s systemic risk, while the US stock market shows the highest contribution at the upside of the distribution (CoVaR at 95%). This finding is justified by the difference in the risk aversion of investors that varies with the market state as well as the disparities in the development of SR markets.     

Translating financial integration into correlation risk: A weekly reporting's viewpoint for the volatility behavior of stock markets

We apply the multivariate extension of GARCH-type models in order to assess the systematic and systemic risks as well as the joint volatility behaviors of the U.S. and three European financial markets (Andersen et al., 2010). Therefore, we can appraise the co-movements of the four previous financial markets as well as the joint behavior of their respective volatilities (i.e. systemic risk). Moreover, the resulting conditional variance and covariance metrics allow for handling volatility spillovers (i.e. contagion risk in terms of transmitting volatility shocks from one market place to another market place). Indeed, results highlight the unprecedented high systemic risk levels (i.e. joint increased volatility levels) as well as a high contagion risk (i.e. volatility spillover) during the subprime mortgage market crisis. The transmission process of volatility shocks reveals to be simultaneous across financial markets due to a strong arbitrage activity and electronic trading practices among others. Most importantly, the estimated conditional correlations exhibit an upward sloping trend, which underlines an increase in the correlation risk between financial markets in the late nineties or early 2000. Thus, our major findings are twofold. First, we characterize the dynamic correlation risk across financial markets. Second, we also confirm the increasing and nonlinear trend in the correlation risk, which we are able to quantify.     

Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

Firm-specific information and systemic risk

Although there is substantial literature linking news to the asset return volatility of a single asset, little attention has been paid to how news influences the relationships between firms. This paper addresses this issue by examining how firm-specific scheduled and unscheduled news arrivals influence the systemic risk of individual firms based on a sample of 47 US financial institutions. Whereas negative surprises from scheduled news announcements and a higher rate of unscheduled news both increase the systemic risk of a firm, positive news surprises decrease this systemic risk. In addition, negative scheduled news and a higher rate of unscheduled news across the sector increases the total connectedness or systemic risk across the sector as a whole. These effects are magnified when the market is already in distress. The results indicate that regulators should consider more than volatility and pay attention to the news flow when monitoring systemic risk.     

Volatility transmission to the fine wine market

The goal of this paper is to explore volatility transmission from various markets to the fine wine market. Knowledge of these channels for transmitting volatility to the wine market allows practitioners to anticipate the future volatility and the consequences of a shock on the wine market, to develop their investment strategy and diversify their risk. We especially analyse the impact of U.S. markets (i.e. art, commodities, credit, financial and real estate) during the 2007–2017 period. We shed additional light on how the volatility of the fine wine market varies during an extended period including a financial crisis. Our results indicate that, in the short-term, volatility is transmitted with a negative effect through the financial and commodity markets and with a positive effect through the art, residential real estate, and credit default markets. In the long-term, the wine market is impacted by all other markets. We show that correlations are time-varying.     

金融压力、所有制结构与银行风险承担——基于中国影子银行活动的实证研究*

2008年金融危机之后，监测与防范系统性金融风险、维护金融稳定成为各国监管机构的工作重点。本文构建了一个反映我国系统性金融风险的中国金融压力指数（FSIC）。基于此，本文研究不同所有制结构的商业银行将如何调整影子银行业务以应对系统性金融风险。实证结果表明，当金融压力上升时，相较于国有银行，非国有银行的风险承担水平显著上升。进一步研究发现，这一差异与两类银行对影子银行这一风险业务的调整有关。当金融压力上升时，国有银行会显著减少影子银行业务，而非国有银行的影子银行业务不会减少。本文提出了国有银行的双重职能这一观点来解释实证研究的发现。本文的研究结论对于指导我国金融市场化改革和防范系统性金融风险具有重要启示。     

Feedback effects between credit ratings and financial markets

Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.     

Who poisons the pool? Time-varying asymmetric and nonlinear causal inference between low-risk and high-risk bonds markets

Corporate bond markets enable the efficient allocation of capital among competing firms, as well as an extensive degree of disintermediation. While the role of the junk bond market in financing leveraged buyouts, “fallen angels,” start-ups, small firms, and sovereign governments is known, little is known about interactions between low-risk (AAA) bonds markets and high-risk (CCC and below) bonds markets. In this study, we used a sample of daily data spanning 20 years to investigate the dynamic link in first and second moments between low-risk and high-risk bonds during calm and turbulent periods in the U.S. financial markets. Using asymmetric and nonlinear causality tests, as well as the extended DCC-GJR-GARCH model, we found evidence of an asymmetric and nonlinear unidirectional causal link from high-risk to low-risk bonds markets, which intensifies during bear markets. There is a bidirectional volatility and shock transmission only during normal bond market conditions. The high-risk bonds market induces more destabilizing effects in the corporate bond market than the low-risk bonds market. The time-varying, highly persistent, and negative correlation during normal market conditions provides the opportunity for combining low-risk and high-risk bonds to diversify a portfolio.     

Challenges for International Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: Institutional Setting, Financial Market Reactions and the Importance of Systemic Risk

The launch of the euro and, with it, the institutional framework that has been established are raising a number of important issues for the co-ordination of policies, not only within EMU, but also with countries outside the euro area. This paper looks at some of the challenges that the institutions and processes put in place for conducting policy in the euro area pose for international co-ordination. More precisely, it assesses whether there are risks that the new institutional arrangements may generate more imbalanced policies than earlier, thereby creating negative international spillovers. This paper also discusses whether these arrangements may create new systemic risks in international financial markets.Counsellor for Macroeconomic Policies     

#br# 不对称信息环境下的金融集权与分权*——基于中央政府视角的研究

近年来地方政府在金融管理和金融风险处置上的作用日益被强调,但中央与地方政府的金融管理权责却模糊不清。本文从中央政府的视角,从信息、道德风险以及金融外部性三方面来分析金融管理的集权与分权问题。研究发现在金融集权的模式下,由于地方政府的隐性干预,一国可能会处于高度的金融抑制状态。在金融分权情境下,地方状态信息对一项金融政策制定越重要、信息甄别成本越大,中央向地方政府授权的价值越大,同时中央对地方政府的道德风险容忍度越高。而当引入金融外部性,尤其是金融风险极易跨区域传染的特性时,有着强大的行政控制力和丰富的宏观金融工具的中央政府在协调地区间金融溢出效应,控制系统性金融风险方面相比地方政府具有比较大的优势。因而,本文认为在金融分权的情境下,政策性金融权力的下放并不是一个绝对的放与不放的问题,而是一个金融适度分权问题,即合理地将一系列的政策性金融权力配置给中央与地方政府,寻求最优金融分权结构,守住不发生区域性、系统性金融风险的底线。     

全面风险管理:必然的选择

始于运用VaR方法度量金融市场风险的金融风险管理革命,目前已扩展至对企业的全面风险管理。一个理想的全面风险管理体系应站在企业全局的角度去识别、度量和管理风险。全面风险管理体系的优势在于:它有助于通过对冲风险以达到降低收益波动性的目的,从而增加企业价值;它有助于降低对冲的成本,因为它实际上是对净风险的对冲,而不是在单独的风险管理方法下的逐个对冲,这就使得风险的对冲成本下降了。     

The interbank market during a crisis

The autumn of 1998 provides a setting in which to test the performance of the interbank market during a potential financial crisis. This period witnessed Russia's effective default on its sovereign bonds and the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. Despite these negative shocks to bank capital and increased uncertainty in financial markets, the federal funds market still effectively channeled liquidity to those institutions in need at rates consistent with Federal Reserve intentions. Further, risk premiums on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased, suggesting that the federal funds market performed well during this period.     

A methodology for constructing a financial systemic stress index: An application to Greece

The paper develops a financial systemic stress index (FSSI) for Greece. We present a novel methodology for constructing and evaluating a systemic stress index which i) adopts the suggestion of Hollo et al. (2012) [“CISS — A ‘Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress’ in the Financial System” ECB working paper] to incorporate time-varying correlations between different market segments, but uses a multivariate GARCH approach which is able to capture abrupt changes in correlations, shown to be a prerequisite for correctly identifying financial crises, ii) utilizes both market and balance sheet data which is a novel feature for systemic stress indicators and iii) evaluates the FSSI utilizing the results of a survey, conducted among financial experts, in order to construct a benchmark chronology of financial crises for Greece, which in turn is used to investigate whether changes in the FSSI are good leading indicators for financial crises. The results show that the FSSI is able to provide a precise periodization of crises. Our findings suggest that accurate depiction of the systematic nature of stress is pivotal in order to provide proper policy guidance with respect to financial crisis identification.     

对建立银行存款保险制度的分析研究

金融中介机构在现代市场经济中起着至关重要的作用,但是伴随着中国银行业市场化步伐的加快,金融领域的平静日益被打破,“优胜劣汰”的改革会使一些金融机构退出金融市场。为了保护这一退出过程中的存款者利益,构建良好的改革氛围,迫切要求我国尽快建立起存款保险制度。本文主要分析建立存款保险制度的时机选择,并结合我国实际情况,提出中国建立存款保险制度的构想。     

企业绿色营销正外部性市场失灵及其治理

作为可持续发展的一个微观拓展,绿色营销属于准公共物品,具有正的外部性。但是,正是这种正的外部性也给开 展绿色营销的企业带来了负的效应。根据外部性理论,本文立足于企业分析了绿色营销的外部性及其市场失灵对绿色营销 企业的负效应,分别从微观企业的角度和借助宏观政府的角度提出了治理措施。     

Modelling the spreading process of extreme risks via a simple agent-based model: Evidence from the China stock market

This paper focuses on investigating financial asset returns' extreme risks, which are defined as the negative log-returns over a certain threshold. A simple agent-based model is constructed to explain the behavior of the market traders when extreme risks occur. We consider both the volatility clustering and the heavy tail characteristics when constructing the model. Empirical study uses the China securities index 300 daily level data and applies the method of simulated moments to estimate the model parameters. The stationarity and ergodicity tests provide evidence that the proposed model is good for estimation and prediction. The goodness-of-fit measures show that our proposed model fits the empirical data well. Our estimated model performs well in out-of-sample Value-at-Risk prediction, which contributes to the risk management.     

Market discipline in the Brazilian banking industry: an analysis for the subordinated debt holders

Market discipline is a regulatory mechanism which has as its main task the punishment of bad risk management by financial institutions. Subordinated debt holders are considered by the literature as the most propitious private agent to discipline the financial institutions. The key to prove the existence of market discipline is to show the relationship between banks’ asset prices and its respective risks. The main objective of this article is an empirical analysis of the relation between credit risk (ratings and accounting information) and debentures return for the Brazilian case. The results denote a weak presence of market discipline in Brazil.     

Does foreign exchange derivatives market promote R&D? International industry-level evidence

Efficient financial markets can motivate and nurture innovation. The foreign exchange derivatives (FXD) market, an important part of financial markets, provides instruments to hedge profits from currency fluctuations. However, whether and how FXD market development benefits innovation remains unclear. Using data from a sample of 45 developed and emerging economies, this paper is among the first to examine the impact of the development of the FXD market on industry-level research and development (R&D) investment. We find that a better-developed FXD market significantly enhances industry-level R&D investment, especially in emerging economies. When the average daily FXD turnover that measures FXD market development increases by one standard deviation, industry-level R&D expenses increase by 27% in the following year. This effect is more significant for industries with higher foreign exchange rate risk. Policymakers should consider the benefits of developing the FXD market to the real economy when optimising FXD regulations.     

Bank competition, financial reform, and institutions: The importance of being developed

In this paper, I estimate the degree of market power at the bank-level for 84 banking systems worldwide. Subsequently, I analyze the sources of bank competition, placing emphasis on the impact of financial reform and the quality of institutions. I find that financial liberalization policies reduce the market power of banks in developed countries with advanced institutions. In contrast, banking competition does not improve at the same pace in countries with weaker institutions and a lower level of institutional development. The results hold across a wide array of identification tests and estimation methods. The main policy implication to be drawn is that a certain level of institutional development is a precondition for the success of reforms aimed at enhancing the competition and efficiency of banking markets.