Commissions Matter: The Trading Behavior of Institutional and Individual Active Traders

We examine how commissions influence trading behavior by analyzing a unique data set of the equity trades of both individual and institutional active traders. Individual traders pay higher trading costs than institutional traders. As a result, they engage in more risky trading behaviors in order to cover these costs. Individual traders also trade significantly less because of their higher cost of trading. Individual traders tend to trade higher-priced stocks, hold their trades longer, and they experience much larger price swings than institutional traders. This leads individual traders to realize more dramatic gains and losses on their round-trips.     

Day Traders and the Disposition Effect

The disposition effect refers to the tendency to hold losing investments and sell profitable ones. We examine day trader transactions for evidence of a disposition effect. We find that approximately 65% of sample traders hold losing trades longer than profitable ones, providing evidence that sample day traders display the disposition effect.     

Informed manipulation

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.     

Herding in delegated portfolio management: When is comparative performance information desirable?

We address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory, it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return. Instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset, because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract. On the other hand, herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically, resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that herding occurs, when the cost of information is high, information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse. Moreover, when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager's performance, they will not do so.     

Entry cost, the Tobin tax, and noise trading in the foreign exchange market

Abstract .  Two types of policy have been proposed to eliminate noise trading in the foreign exchange market: increasing the entry cost or imposing a 'Tobin tax' type of transaction tax. In this paper, we endogenize entry decisions of both informed traders and noise traders and show that these policies may be ineffective in reducing exchange rate volatility. This is because these policies will discourage the entry of all traders, so they may not change the relative ratio of traders, or they may affect informed traders disproportionately more, which increases the relative ratio of noise traders and exchange rate volatility.     

Insider trading with public and shared information

We study the impact of public information and shared information on traders' trading behavior in the context of Kyle's (1985) speculative market. We suppose that there are four types of traders in our model: one insider, M outsiders, liquidity traders, and market makers. We explicitly describe the unique linear Nash equilibrium and find that public information harms the insider but benefits the outsiders and noise traders. Also, the market is more efficient because of the existence of public information.     

Rock around the clock: An agent-based model of low- and high-frequency trading

We build an agent-based model to study how the interplay between low- and high-frequency trading affects asset price dynamics. Our main goal is to investigate whether high-frequency trading exacerbates market volatility and generates flash crashes. In the model, low-frequency agents adopt trading rules based on chronological time and can switch between fundamentalist and chartist strategies. By contrast, high-frequency traders activation is event-driven and depends on price fluctuations. High-frequency traders use directional strategies to exploit market information produced by low-frequency traders. Monte-Carlo simulations reveal that the model replicates the main stylized facts of financial markets. Furthermore, we find that the presence of high-frequency traders increases market volatility and plays a fundamental role in the generation of flash crashes. The emergence of flash crashes is explained by two salient characteristics of high-frequency traders, i.e., their ability to i. generate high bid-ask spreads and ii. synchronize on the sell side of the limit order book. Finally, we find that higher rates of order cancellation by high-frequency traders increase the incidence of flash crashes but reduce their duration.     

Market for Information and Identity Disclosure in an Experimental Open Limit Order Book

This paper analyses the effects of pre‐trade transparency on market quality in an experimental open limit order book preceded by a market for information. The design of the trading game is akin to the system in use in an increasing number of financial markets. We find that the disclosure of traders' identities reduces the incentive to acquire information, liquidity and volatility. We also show that a positive relation exists between the proportion of traders buying information and liquidity. The results are consistent with a standard model of price formation where the number of informed traders is endogenous .     

Efficiency of continuous double auctions under individual evolutionary learning with full or limited information

In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents’ behavior affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether learning behavior with and without information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We consider a simple market for a homogeneous good populated by buyers and sellers. The valuations of the buyers and the costs of the sellers are given exogenously. Agents are involved in consecutive trading sessions, which are organized as a continuous double auction with order book. Using Individual Evolutionary Learning agents submit price bids and offers, trying to learn the most profitable strategy by looking at their realized and counterfactual or “foregone” payoffs. We find that learning outcomes heavily depend on information treatments. Under full information about actions of others, agents’ orders tend to be similar, while under limited information agents tend to submit their valuations/costs. This behavioral outcome results in higher price volatility for the latter treatment. We also find that learning improves allocative efficiency when compared to outcomes with Zero-Intelligent traders.     

Are high–frequency traders informed?

Are high–frequency traders (HFTs) informed? To address this question, we examine HFTs' activity in the call auction environment, where speed-related trading is limited and signal processing capacity becomes more relevant. To model the call market, we consider the Kyle (1989) rational expectations framework for strategic trading. The test we propose for detecting informed HFTs in this market assesses potential deviations of the informativeness of HFTs' aggregate (net) demand, from the informativeness of the aggregate demand submitted by the rest of the traders. Data from the Euronext Paris preopening phase indicate that informed HFTs are present in the market just before the opening. Our results provide useful guidance for the assessment of the influence of HFTs’ quotes on price quality, an important issue for market regulators and policy makers.     

Non-reversed trades: Further implications for currency trading

In markets populated by speculators, arbitrageurs and hedgers, it is shown that the conditions for non-reversed trading, which potentially combine investing (borrowing) with hedging must exist. Hence, forward exchange rates always contain an implicit risk premium. Non-reversed trading activity is necessary but not sufficient for all the other classes of trades to exist. If non-reversed traders are active and set arbitrage boundaries, no other type of riskless and profitable one-way arbitrage activity can exist. However, the activities of non-reversed traders cannot preclude rational pure forward speculative activity in the foreign exchange markets.     

关于我国股市知情交易水平及其性质的实证研究

基于Easley、Hvidkjaer和O'Hara的序贯交易模型与PIN (Probability of Information-based Trading,基于信息的交易比率)指标对我国股市知情交易情况进行的实证分析研究结果表明:(1)我国股市信息不对称程度较高;(2)由于知情交易者利用坏消息的能力有限且流动性交易水平较高,我国股市知情交易比率并不太高;(3)知情交易比率与后续期间股票收益率的负相关性,表明我国股市中市场操控型知情交易比较严重.因此,我们认为应进一步完善上市公司的信息披露制度,降低投资者之间的信息不对称程度,同时确保流动性投资者参与股市的积极性;在引入做空机制时应慎重考虑和综合权衡,避免不适当地增加流动性投资者所承担的逆向选择风险水平,降低股市的流动性供给和风险分散功能;证券市场监管部门应进一步加强对异常交易活动的监控,加大对市场操纵行为的打击力度,以确保我国证券市场的健康发展.     

Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?

This paper is the first experimental study of the effects of competition and adverse selection on the performance of market maker (MM-) markets. Information distribution may is either symmetric or heterogeneous. MM-markets are either monopolistic (the specialist markets), or competitive (the multi MM-market). Welfare comparisons are with respect to a continuous double auction (DA-) market. Informed subjects receive an imperfect signal of the true state of the world. We find three main results. First, competition among market makers significantly reduces the bid-ask spread, and increases transaction volume. Second, competition among market makers induces competitive undercutting, yielding net trading losses for market makers as a group in most periods. Third, from the perspective of uninformed traders, a competing MM-regime is optimal, since it minimizes their expected trading losses.     

When and Where Are Informed Traders? What Is Their Relationship with Analysts in the Price Discovery Process?

The authors' aim was to analyze the influence of analysts' recommendations on the activity of informed and uninformed traders and whether such influence produces changes in the price discovery process. The analysis was carried out in the Spanish market, considered to be an ideal market given its characteristics. The authors' results indicate that although investors as a whole react to new information from analysts and their activity increases, this reaction is not independent of the type of stock. Informed traders do not increase their activity with small stocks to the same extent as uninformed investors do. Furthermore, the influence of these movements on price discovery is not significant. The results suggest that the interpretation role of analysts is more important for less accessible firms in terms of assessing their growth opportunities. This role may enhance the herding behavior of uninformed agents trading in those small titles for which they would otherwise need to invest extra time and extra money for taking profitable decisions.     

Trading platform,market volatility and pricing efficiency in the floor-traded and E-mini index futures markets

This study examines the pricing efficiency of E-mini and floor-traded index futures under electronic versus open-outcry trading platforms. By using OLS and quantile regressions to control for changes in market characteristics, we find that pricing errors are smaller in the E-mini markets than the floor-traded markets, thereby confirming that electronic trading has special attractions for arbitrageurs and informed traders. However, during periods of higher volatility, the advantages of speedier execution, anonymity and information efficiency may be offset by arbitrage risks; as a result, larger pricing errors are observed in the E-mini markets. We provide new evidence confirming the important roles in pricing efficiency played by both traditional open-outcry systems and electronic trading systems.     

Rolling settlement and market liquidity

This paper investigates the impact on UK stock and option markets of the change from an account based settlement system to a rolling settlement procedure. Such a change increases the transaction costs of short-term margin traders, and is likely to impact on the liquidity of the underlying market, as well as trading in the options market. Evidence is presented that the settlement procedure does impact on the liquidity of the market. Further, we find that rolling settlement increased market liquidity, consistent with the exit of margin traders as a result of the increase in short selling costs. Associated with this increase in liquidity is a significant reduction in nonoptionable stock trading volume, implying that margin trading may have been more prevalent in stocks without options. Finally, it is shown that while trading in stock options increased, the volatilities implied from call and put option prices indicate that put options have become relatively more expensive. This reflects the change in demand induced by the new settlement procedure, especially in terms of the increase in short selling costs.     

THE DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN RETURNS,TRADING VOLUME,AND VOLATILITY: LESSONS FROM SPILLOVERS BETWEEN ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES

This paper investigates the dynamic relationship between index returns, return volatility, and trading volume for eight Asian markets and the US. We find cross‐border spillovers in returns to be non‐existent, spillovers in absolute returns between Asia and the US to be strong in both directions, and spillovers in volatility to run from Asia to the US. Trading volume, especially on the Asian markets, depends on shocks in domestic and foreign returns as well as on volatility, especially those shocks originating in the US. However, only weak evidence is found for trading volume influencing other variables. In the light of the theoretical models, these results suggest sequential information arrivals, with investors being overconfident and applying positive feedback strategy. Furthermore, new information causes price volatility to rise due to differences in its interpretation among traders, but the subsequent market reaction takes the form of adjustment in price level, not volatility. Lastly, the intensity of cross‐border spillovers seems to have increased following the 1997 crisis, which we interpret as evidence of increased noisiness in prices and diversity in opinions about news originating abroad. Our findings might also help to understand the nature of financial crises, to predict their further developments and consequences.     

Intra-good trade in Germany: a first look at the evidence

This article contributes to the literature by using newly released comprehensive transaction-level data on all exports and imports to document facts about the amount of intra-good trade – the simultaneous export and import of identical goods by one firm – in Germany. Combined data for trade transactions and for characteristics of a representative large sample of trading firms are then used to report differences between firms that export and import different goods only (inter-good traders) and firms that engage in the simultaneous export and import of identical goods (intra-good traders). We find that the share of intra-good trade in total trade was some 17% in Germany in 2012. Intra-good trade matters. This share differs widely between broadly defined groups of goods and between industries. Controlling for detailed industry affiliation, intra-good traders differ significantly from inter-good traders – they are larger, more human capital intensive, more productive, have a higher R&D intensity and are more profitable. The data, however, are not rich enough to reveal the direction of causality between intra-good trade and firm performance and to investigate empirically the reasons why some firms engage in intra-good trade.     

Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and fall of gurus

We introduce an order driver market model with heterogeneous traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. The communication structure evolves endogenously via a fitness mechanism based on agents performance. We assess under which assumptions imitation, among noise traders, can give rise to the emergence of gurus and their rise and fall in popularity over time. We study the wealth distribution of gurus, followers and non followers and show that traders have an incentive to imitate and a desire to be imitated since herding turns out to be profitable. The model is then used to study the effect that different competitive strategies (i.e. chartist & fundamentalist) have on agents performance. Our findings show that positive intelligence agents cannot invade a market populated by noise traders when herding is high.     

Compensation schemes,liquidity provision,and asset prices: an experimental analysis

In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices, two outcomes that are important for financial stability. Compensation schemes can drive a wedge between how investors and traders value the asset. Limited liability makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and increase prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors increase liquidity provision and asset price bubbles are larger. Bonus caps have no clear effect on liquidity provision and they fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving traders skin in the game fosters financial stability.