HUMAN NATURE, COMMUNICATION AND TRUST

ABSTRACT ** :  The facts that people can sometimes commit to fulfill promises even when there are no binding penalties and that kind and trusting acts are often reciprocated by trustworthy ones make possible forms of group action that might be ruled out in a hypothetical world of perfectly opportunistic individuals. I discuss some new experiments with a modified Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) ' trust game' that provide evidence that most subjects adhere to non-binding agreements, that many are prepared to rely on trust rather than use binding but moderately costly contracts, that the possibility of exchanging words rather than mere numerical proposals enhances trusting and trustworthiness, and that subjects are drawn to fair and efficient exchanges despite the self-interest model's prediction of outcomes more favorable to first-movers.     

Trust as belief or behavior?

Despite its proposed importance for economic performance, there seems to be little agreement on what trust really is. In economics, trust is generally viewed as a belief regarding the action that is to be expected from others. This contrasts with the view that trust is a way of acting. In his influential book on the nature of explanation in the social sciences, Jon Elster argues that trusting is to act with few precautions. I argue that it is possible to reconcile these seemingly conflicting views about trust. I develop a simple model of trust where both beliefs and precautions play an important role – and where Elster’s understanding of trust can be viewed as a special case.     

Cooperation,Trust and Economic Development: An Experimental Study in China

Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e. whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination of public goods, gambling game and trust game experiments, we investigate the links among cooperation, trust and economic development in four regions of China. Our results suggest that, first, there is a U‐shaped or V‐shaped relationship between cooperation and economic development. Second, on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other hand, more cooperative behaviour may be created by rewarding trusting behaviour. Third, men are more cooperative and trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used ‘GSS trust’ question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions ‘GSS fair’ and ‘GSS help’ have weak predictive power for trusting behaviour but not for cooperative behaviour.     

The Lasting Well-Being Effects of Early Adulthood Macroeconomic Crises

This paper studies the effects of macroeconomic crises experienced in early adulthood on subjective well-being (SWB) later in life. Using repeated cross-sectional survey data of over 100,000 individuals from 38 countries around the world combined with historical data on macroeconomic circumstances, I find that having experienced a macroeconomic crisis at ages 18–25 is detrimental to SWB. This result is in line with earlier literature that focuses on other individual-level outcomes. However, the analysis presented in this paper reveals that outcomes related to individual’s earnings, employment status, family life, and religion cannot fully explain the lasting effect of macroeconomic crises on well-being. Results on heterogeneous responses show that the negative effect is largest for females and for individuals with low educational attainment.     

Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game

Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic performance. Reputation on the trusteeʼs past behavior in the same role has proven to be greatly effective at raising the level of trust. In this study, we show that providing information on the trusteeʼs past behavior as the trustor is equally effective as a reputation system. In fact, people still find it worthwhile to invest in a reputation as a trusting person, even though the immediate payoff for trusting is poor. This confirms the role of indirect reciprocity as a strategic notion based on reputation, whereby pro-social actions by one person towards a second person are sanctioned by a third party.     

Religiosity and social trust: evidence from Canada

Using the latest wave of the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey, I investigate whether religious identity and religious intensity associate with the degree to which people trust others, controlling for a wide range of characteristics. The analysis shows that Canadian Roman Catholics are appreciably less trusting than mainline Protestants, and religious nones are situated in between these two groups. With regard to religious intensity, I find that higher commitment negatively correlates with trust in unknown others for Roman Catholics. The reverse is true for Protestants. Results also show stark cross-denominational variations within Protestantism, as two highly committed denominations of Mennonite and Pentecostal are found to be the most and the least trusting religious groups in Canada. No non-Christian religious minority is found statistically significantly less trusting than Canadian Roman Catholics. Considering particularized trust in one’s neighbours and co-workers yields comparable conclusions.     

Social capital and political institutions: Evidence that democracy fosters trust

This paper finds evidence that more democratic political institutions increase trust. Second generation immigrants with ancestries from 115 countries are studied within 30 European countries. Comparing individuals born and residing in the same country, those whose father was born in a more democratic country express higher trust than those whose father was born in a less democratic country. The results are robust to individual, parental, and ancestral country controls.     

Religion,discrimination and trust across three cultures

We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how individuals are socially identified and connected. Religiosity and religious affiliation may serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, affiliation to the same religion may enhance group identity, or affiliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice. We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants׳ willingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We find that interpersonal similarity in religiosity and affiliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Religious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity amplifies this effect. Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

A note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in economic growth

This paper takes issue with the trend to attribute differencesin economic growth rates to differences in interpersonal trust.I discuss the World Values Survey (WVS) measure that is usedto operationalise trust at the macro level. I hypothesise thatthere is a mismatch between the theoretical argument and theempirical operationalisation of trust. Instead of measuringtrust, the WVS measure may instead proxy the well-functioningof institutions. I provide circumstantial evidence for thisthesis by a principal components analysis of trust and institutionsand a robustness test of Zak and Knack's (2001. Trust and growth,Economic Journal, vol. 111, 295–321) seminal study ontrust and economic growth.     

Contracts and competition: an introduction

Changes in public policy and corporate strategy have enhancedthe role of contracts as mechanisms of economic governance.The understanding that norms, standards and other forms of regulatorymechanism can affect the structure of incentives and the qualityof contractual outcomes has helped to stimulate a wider debateconcerning institutions and economic performance. Among thethemes explored in this Special Issue, which draws on the UKESRC's Contracts and Competition Programme, are the need forinterdisciplinary analysis of economic organisation; the linkbetween contracts and trust; and the complex relationship betweeninstitutional forms and economic outcomes.     

Social trust,institutional and political constraints on the executive and deregulation of markets

Social trust is frequently claimed to be conducive for economic reforms. Likewise, the scope of policy liberalization is influenced by the political power structure as manifested in institutional and political constraints on the executive (IPCE). However, social trust and IPCE are possibly intertwined in their effects on economic liberalization. This paper empirically explores the relationship between social trust, IPCE and the scope of economic deregulation as measured by the first difference in the regulation subindex of the Economic Freedom of the World index. The results provide evidence in favor of a positive association of social trust with deregulation and of a negative association between institutional or partisan veto-points and deregulation. Yet, according to our analysis IPCE are an obstacle for economic deregulation only in relatively low trusting environments and social trust unfolds a particular strength as driver of deregulation with increasing levels of IPCE.     

Historical legacies in savings: Evidence from Romania

This study explores channels of savings persistence using a spatial regression discontinuity across an imperial border in present-day Romania. With data obtained from a lab in the field experiment and household survey, the findings suggest that imperial history influences savings behaviors today. I find no evidence that economic preferences for risk and time differ across the border, nor that these preferences are culturally transmitted. Rather, imperial history is strongly correlated with current financial access and asset choice, which affect savings accumulation. To confirm the robustness of these findings, I conduct falsification tests that arbitrarily move the border and also rule out several alternative mechanisms, including trust in financial institutions, financial literacy, and migration. I establish the external validity of the field experiment using nationally-representative data, which also suggests that savings legacies have important welfare consequences for the ability to mitigate household shocks. These findings highlight the role of history in under-saving, as well as the reinforcing nature of culture and institutions in shaping contemporary economic outcomes.     

Does trust favor macroeconomic stability?

This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroeconomic volatility. An illustrative model rationalizes the relationship between trust and volatility. In this model, trust relaxes credit constraints and diminishes investment’s procyclicality. I provide empirical evidence for the basic predictions of the model. Then, I show that higher trust is associated with lower macroeconomic volatility in a cross section of countries. This relationship persists when various covariates are taken into account. I use inherited trust of Americans as an instrumental variable for trust in their origin country to overcome reverse causality concerns. Using changes in inherited trust over the 20th century, I do not find clear evidence that increasing trust is also associated with decreasing volatility across time at the country level.     

Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives

Individuals are often given the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of a group or an organization. However, little is known about preferences or behavior in such contexts. In an adapted trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group-representatives differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous situation. Group-representatives are given the responsibility of unilaterally and privately making a decision on behalf of a three-person group. Results from both the main and the follow-up studies show that people trust less and reciprocate less as group-representatives, and thus demonstrate that the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect not only exists in group behavior but also in individual behavior of group-representatives. Moreover, results show that trusting behavior is driven by reciprocity expectations, while reciprocating behavior is not sensitive to the first mover's behavior, i.e., the level of trust experienced.     

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence

It has been shown that both formal existence and actual use of direct democratic institutions have effects on a number of variables such as fiscal policies, quality of governance but also economic growth. Further, it has been argued that direct democratic institutions would not only have an impact on policy outcomes but influence citizen participation and attitudes toward politics. For the first time, these conjectures are tested in a large cross-country sample here. Overall, we do not find strong effects and some of the significant correlations are rather small substantially. In contrast to previous studies, voter turnout is not higher when direct democracy is available or used. Further, and also in contrast to previous studies, citizens do not express a greater interest in politics in countries with direct democracy institutions. Finally, they display lower trust in government and parties but not in parliament. These results shed some doubt on the hope that direct democracy would make for better citizens.     

PERSISTENT IDEOLOGY AND THE DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC POLICY OVER TIME*

This article investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico‐economic equilibria. To this end, I develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals’ intertemporal choice, and the evolution of political constituency. My main finding is that a right‐wing ideology may increase the size of government. Data from a panel of 18 OECD countries confirm that after controlling for the partisan effect, there is a positive relationship between the right‐wing political constituency and government size. This is consistent with my theoretical prediction, but hard to explain by existing theories.     

Did support for economic and political reforms increase during the post‐communist transition,and if so,why?

We study the dynamics of individual support for changes in the economic and political system, using a unique dataset for 12 transition economies over the period 1991–2004. We document that support for transition was initially lower in the CIS countries and that there has been a converging trend in the support for reforms between the CIS and the Baltic and Central and Eastern European countries. We suggest several explanations for the initial divergence and the post‐98 convergence in support for transition between these three groups of countries, and show that economic growth, declining income inequality and improving quality of governance have contributed to increase the support for transition. In addition, we find that increased support for the market economy and democracy in the CIS is accompanied by a larger increase in trust towards the political institutions. Our results also confirm the implications of Aghion et al. ( 2010 )'s model of a negative correlation between trust and the demand for government regulation.     

Trade,trust and the rule of law

Well-functioning institutions, both formal (i.e. rule of law) and informal (i.e. trust), facilitate economic exchange. To investigate the nature of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, we analyze bilateral trade patterns in a sample of 16 European countries between 1996–2009. Our results show that trust and rule of law are substitutes, as the positive effect of trust on trade is conditional on the quality of the rule of law. When the rule of law of the importing country increases relative to that of the exporter, the effect of trust on trade decreases. The decline in the effect of trust on trade is less for importers than for exporters, a result that can be attributed to the risk of non-payment that exporters run.     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.