影响建设项目合同不完备性的因素分析

从交易成本理论角度分析建设项目合同设计和选择逐渐成为项目研究中的重要课题。合同不完备性作为交易成本理论的关键合同分析维度,与交易属性密切相关。建设项目合同不完备性选择同样受到资产专用性、不确定性、复杂性和项目工期等交易属性的显著影响。本文在交易成本理论治理逻辑下,构建了一个简化的建设项目合同不完备性分析框架,并在此基础上探讨了影响建设项目合同不完备性选择的因素及其影响作用。     

关联交易治理研究综述

非公平关联交易是控股股东对中小股东利益侵占的主要途径之一,对关联交易的治理是各国资本市场要面临的一个重大问题。文章从宏观层面的法律规制、政府规制以及微观层面的公司治理三个方面对关联交易治理的国内外研究文献进行了梳理。     

电子商务对会计核算理论的影响

电子商务主要指利用通信手段在网上进行交易活动，包括通过互联网买卖产品和提供服务。这里的产品可以是实体化的，如钢材、木材等；也可以是数字化的，如软件、程序等；此外，还可以是提供各类服务，如安排远程教育、软件在线升级等。电子商务的整个运作过程中实现交易无纸化、直接化，它具有交易虚拟化、交易成本低、交易效率高和交易透明化的特点。     

基于Web的在线大规模定制营销

文章阐述了大规模定制营销的基本思想,提出了Internet环境下在线市场营销组合的五个要素(5P),包括产品、价格、渠道、促销和交互过程,探讨了大规模定制企业在线营销组合策略(5P)。     

交易成本、审计主题和政府审计业务外包

审计业务外包已经成为各国政府审计机关提高效率效果的重要路径。政府审计业务外包的驱动因素是降低交易成本。审计业务从自制改为外包，一方面会增加交易成本，表现为谈判成本和机会主义成本；另一方面会降低交易成本，表现为生产成本与外购价格之差，只有当降低的交易成本大于增加的交易成本时，政府审计业务外包才会发生。审计业务就是审计交易，自制还是外包的选择，其本质就是选择审计交易的治理结构，正是审计业务特征与审计业务治理结构的匹配决定审计交易成本。不同的审计主题具有不同的交易特征，需要不同的交易治理结构，从而对于自制或外包有不同的适宜性。     

医疗服务行业的市场治理和规制研究

医疗服务市场效率问题涉及到制度设计、市场治理和政府规制几个方面,以及由此制约下的市场结构和市场行为问题,而具体则表现在医疗服务产品的交易行为上。应通过"微观规制"和"市场治理"两条主线来解决医疗服务的市场缺陷,建立以规制改革、引入竞争、重建医患关系、信息共享机制为关键内容的综合解决框架。     

组织间信任对网络组织效率的影响——基于交易成本和交易收益的双重视角

网络组织是介于市场与企业科层组织之间的一种治理结构。信任被认为是决定网络组织效率的关键因素之一,构成了网络组织的治理运作基础。本文通过对80家企业的大样本问卷调查,研究了网络成员间信任对网络组织效率的影响。检验结果表明:善意信任对于增加网络组织成员间的交易收益和减少网络组织成员间的交易成本均具有正向促进作用;能力信任对于增加网络组织成员间的交易收益具有正向促进作用,而对减少网络组织成员间的交易成本的促进作用不显著。     

转轨经济中的公司治理结构探析——兼谈中国企业制度创新

一、绪论亚当·斯密认为,企业与市场是两种不同的分工协作方式,但他并未进一步探讨这两者之间的关系。而科斯开创的“现代企业理论”在继承斯密传统的基础上,开创性地探讨了“企业作为市场替代物的存在理由”这一命题,并指出:市场交易是有代价的,可分为组织双方产权交易的谈判费用和履约费用,一总称为交易费用。当建立某种契约化组织使其内部交易成本低于市场交易成本时,企业便产生了;企业的规模边际取决于内部交易成本与市场交易成本（杨小凯称之为内生交易费用和外生交易费用）的均衡点位置。从这种意义上说,企业与市场都是一系列契约的集…     

资本市场中高频交易之特征、价值与危害性解析

高频交易作为资本市场中证券交易领域内信息技术的结晶于20世纪90年代应运而生,如今在欧美资本市场之地位可谓举足轻重。然而,高频交易在我国方兴未艾。文章以欧美经验为基础,着重论述高频交易所具备的高频、高速和自动化运行等特征,并阐明了高频交易在改善资本市场定价效率、提高流动性以及降低交易成本等方面的价值与意义,同时剖析了与高频交易相伴而生的诸多风险与危害性。文章认为高频交易在我国的发展应遵从其自身规律,并借鉴国外成熟经验以制定符合我国实际的监管政策,形成针对高频交易的有效监管体系,从而为其在我国资本市场的良好发展奠定基础。     

基才不同视角EOQ与JIT比较

一、基于交易成本角度的EOQ与JIT比较 交易成本的思想源自于科斯1937年发表的论文《企业的性质》。文中科斯引入交易成本的概念来解释企业存在的原因。他认为，企业与市场是不同的交易机制，市场以价格机制配置资源，企业以行政手段配置资源；企业的存在是由于“使用价格机制是有代价的”，这一代价就是交易成本。1960年，科斯在《社会成本问题》中指出，“为了执行一项市场交易，有必要发现和谁交易、告诉人们自己愿意交易以及交易条件是什么．     

Coping with functional collective action dilemma: functional fragmentation and administrative integration

ABSTRACT

Functional fragmentation among city departments has been a critical public administration problem in practice and theory. This paper investigates the political and administrative motivations for the reform from functionally fragmented water governance model towards an integrative agency design. Drawing on the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework and the literature on bureaucratic structures, we hypothesize that cities’ decisions for administrative reform are influenced by different types of transactions costs incurred in the negotiation process among local agencies. Empirical results of this study provide strong support for the transaction cost hypotheses on the roles of bargaining cost, enforcement cost, and information cost.     

Intertemporal consumption choices,transaction costs and limited participation in financial markets: reconciling data and theory

This paper builds a unifying framework based on the theory of intertemporal consumption choices that brings together the limited participation‐based explanation of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model's poor empirical performance and the transaction costs‐based explanation of incomplete portfolios. Using the implications of the consumption model and observed household consumption and portfolio choices, we identify the preference parameters of interest and a lower bound for the costs rationalizing non‐participation in financial markets. Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey and assuming isoelastic preferences, we estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion at 1.7 and a cost bound of 0.4% of non‐durable consumption. Our estimate of the preference parameter is theoretically plausible and the bound sufficiently small to be likely to be exceeded by the actual total (observable and unobservable) costs of participating in financial markets. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于交易费用的物流治理模式探析

根据科斯和威廉姆森的理论,在区分物流成本类型的基础上,对物流业的交易费用进行了详细探讨,进一步论证了双边治理(第四方物流)是物流业发展的主导模式。     

公司治理与绩效关系研究最新进展

公司治理的重要性已经得到理论界和实务界的认可。本文从两个方面论述了好的公司治理能够带来的影响,一方面好的公司治理能够提高管理效率,降低代理成本,进而提升财务绩效;另一方面,好的业绩使公司在资本市场上有更好的表现,即市场绩效,体现为公司治理溢价的存在。     

Transaction costs and a redundant security: divergence of individual and social relevance

This paper shows that, in markets with transaction costs, even if a redundant security does not even save individual investors' total costs for their security trading, the prices of the other securities may well be different were it to not be available for trade, resulting in a different equilibrium consumption allocation. In this sense, a redundant security may give rise to the divergence of individual and social relevance in markets with transaction costs. We then show that this divergence may also be a robust phenomenon with respect to perturbations in utility functions, initial endowments, and transaction costs.     

A Transaction Cost Perspective of Alliance Portfolio Diversity

Alliance portfolio diversity (APD) helps firms access diverse capabilities and knowledge. APD can also increase transaction costs, but it is unknown whether and how transaction cost theory’s (TCT’s) insights about hierarchical integration operate at the portfolio level. We adapt TCT to the portfolio level to suggest that the transaction costs from APD encourage integration into alliance partners’ industries, and we introduce the concept of shared-specific investments to pinpoint one source of transaction costs within portfolios and predict which industries will be integrated. Using data from 1996–2013 on S&P 500 firms, we find evidence in support of our theorising. Juxtaposing results with other theoretical perspectives suggests that TCT offers complementary insights about which activities to perform in the firm versus the alliance portfolio.     

Testing affine term structure models in case of transaction costs

We empirically analyze the impact of transaction costs on the performance of essentially affine interest rate models. We test the implied Euler restrictions and calculate the specification error bound of Hansen and Jagannathan to measure model misspecification. Using both short-maturity and long-maturity bond return data we find, under the assumption of frictionless markets, strong evidence of misspecification of affine yield models with up to three factors. Next, we incorporate transaction costs in our tests. The results show that the evidence of misspecification of essentially affine yield models disappears in case of monthly holding periods at market size transaction costs.     

Numeraire portfolios and utility-based price systems under proportional transaction costs

In a discrete-time incomplete financial market with proportional transaction costs and with independent and bounded returns, we prove the existence of a consistent price system that can be written as the expectation of the discounted claim under the real-world probability measure P and not just under a martingale measure. In fact, the claim is then discounted by some specific dynamic portfolio called the numeraire portfolio as in the classical case of markets without transaction costs. For that specific numeraire, P will be a martingale measure. Naturally, the concept of a numeraire portfolio has here to be adapted to the concept of consistent price systems for markets with transaction costs. Moreover, again as in the classical case, the numeraire portfolio can be chosen as log-optimal portfolio. The same analysis works for power utility functions. However, then a change of measure is necessary. This paper applies methods from stochastic dynamic programming to finance.     

Hybrid governance and governance performance in industrial purchasing relationships

Hybrid governance arrangements (e.g. joint action, long-term contracting and vertical coordination) feature regularly as an effective response to inter-firm dependence in the literature of business-to-business relationships. However, current empirical work has paid little attention to whether such governance arrangements really do improve governance efficacy and reduce transaction costs. The present study focuses on the governance efficacy of vertical coordination in industrial business-to-business relationships. Building on transaction costs arguments, the author examines whether vertical coordination is an effective means for adapting to inter-firm dependence, realized as the substantial employment of specific assets.Empirical findings from a survey of 170 industrial supplier–buyer relationships demonstrate that when asset specificity reaches a certain level, greater vertical coordination reduces ex post transaction costs significantly. On the other hand, this efficacy pattern is modest or non-existent in relationships with low asset specificity.The research findings support the basic TCA assumption that the performance of hybrid governance arrangements is highly dependent on a situation of substantial inter-firm dependence with subsequent small-number conditions.