Foreclosure's Wake: The Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure

While a substantial literature has examined the causes of mortgage foreclosure, there has been relatively little work on the consequences of foreclosure for the borrowers themselves. Using a large sample of anonymous credit bureau records, observed quarterly from 1999 through 2010, we examine the credit experiences of 330,000 borrowers before and after a foreclosure start. Our analysis documents the substantial declines in credit scores that accompany a foreclosure start and examines the length of time it takes individuals to return their credit scores to predelinquency levels. The results suggest that, particularly for prime borrowers, credit score recovery comes slowly, if at all. The lack of recovery appears to be driven by persistently higher delinquency rates on consumer credit (such as auto and credit card loans) in the years that follow their foreclosure start. Our results also indicate that the experiences of individuals whose mortgages entered foreclosure from 2007 to 2009 have followed a similar path to borrowers foreclosed earlier in the decade, though their postforeclosure‐start delinquency rates have been higher and, consequently, credit score recovery appears to be taking longer.     

The Postforeclosure Experience of U.S. Households

Despite the recent flood of foreclosures on residential mortgages, little is known about what happens to borrowers’ households after their mortgages have been foreclosed. We study the postforeclosure experience of U.S. households using a unique data set based on the credit reports of a large panel of individuals from 1999 to 2010. Although foreclosure considerably raises the probability of moving, the majority of postforeclosure migrants do not end up in substantially less desirable neighborhoods or more crowded living conditions. These results suggest that, on average, foreclosure does not impose an economic burden large enough to severely reduce housing consumption.     

Modeling the Conditional Probability of Foreclosure in the Context of Single-Family Mortgage Default Resolutions

Both empirical and pricing-simulation models of mortgage default focus on foreclosure in a one-step decision framework. Such models are misspecified to the extent that mortgage default and foreclosure are two separate decisions or events, where foreclosure is but one outcome of a default episode. This study examines the dynamics of mortgage borrower default episodes using a large sample of FHA-insured single-family mortgages. We estimate the influence of borrower characteristics, mortgage terms, and economic conditions on probabilities of various resolutions, highlighting under what conditions foreclosure is more likely to result from mortgage default.     

The Cost of Foreclosure Delay

We measure the cost of foreclosure delay by estimating time‐related foreclosure costs using a large national sample of residential mortgages before, during, and after the recent U.S. housing crisis. The large volume of foreclosures, coupled with an unprecedented series of government interventions in mortgage servicing practices, significantly extended foreclosure timelines during and after the crisis.  Costs were especially pronounced in judicial review states, which saw average foreclosure costs go up 15 percentage points, 24 percentage points in the highest cost state.  Cost increases of this magnitude are likely to have consequences for servicing practices and mortgage credit availability.     

The Subprime Virus

We examine the correlation between prime mortgage default risk and the introduction of subprime mortgages in a local area. We motivate our analysis with a model of a default contagion effect that spreads the effect of a mortgage foreclosure from one property to surrounding properties. Through numerical analysis, we demonstrate the effect of subprime mortgage originations to the risk of prime mortgages. Finally, we offer empirical support for our model by examining the spatial variation in MSA prime mortgage default rates and the level of subprime mortgage activity.     

Are Investors the Bad Guys? Tenure and Neighborhood Stability in Chelsea,Massachusetts

In this article, we examine the role of investors and occupant‐owners in an urban context during the recent housing crisis. We focus on Chelsea, Massachusetts, because it is a dense city, dominated by multifamily housing structures with high rates of foreclosure for which we have particularly good data. We distinguish between occupant‐owners and investors using local data, and we find that many investors are misclassified as occupant‐owners in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. Then, employing a competing risks framework to study ownerships during the period 1998 through mid‐2010, we find that local investors, who tend to invest more in relation to purchase prices and sell more quickly, experienced approximately 1.8 times the mortgage foreclosure risk of occupant‐owners, conditional on financing. Nonlocal investors have no statistically significant difference in foreclosure risk from occupant‐owners. Nonetheless, those owners with subprime purchase mortgages (most of whom are occupant‐owners) faced the highest foreclosure risk when house prices fell.     

Immigrants and Mortgage Delinquency

This article studies the effect of immigrant status on mortgage delinquency. Due to their different social and economic background, immigrant households may not integrate well into the host society, and therefore are more likely to be delinquent on mortgages than otherwise identical native‐born households. We test this hypothesis by comparing the mortgage delinquency rate between immigrant and native‐born households in the 2009 PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data, in which all the immigrant households have been in the United States for more than 10 years. We find that, after controlling for observables, those relatively recent immigrants who have been in the United States for 10 to 20 years have a higher mortgage delinquency rate than native‐born, while immigrants who have resided in the United States for more than 20 years are no different from native‐borns. In addition, there is no evidence that the second generation of immigrants is more likely to be delinquent than the third‐or‐higher generations. Our results are robust to potential sample‐selection bias and functional misspecifications.     

The Impact of Interstate Foreclosure Cost Differences and the Value of Mortgages on Default Rates

Previous research on mortgage default has focused on the costs, benefits, and characteristics of the mortgagor. In such studies default rates have been taken as a measure of mortgage risk. In this paper we present a model where the position of the lender affects the default-foreclosure process. Important to the lender's decision to foreclose rather than renegotiate an existing loan are the value of mortgage and the legal costs associated with foreclosure.
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that both the value of the mortgage and legal foreclosure costs affect the foreclosure rate. In those states where legal foreclosure costs are high rates are significantly less than where costs are low. This suggests that previous models which include only the costs and benefits of default to the borrower are incomplete and that foreclosure rates can not be taken as a strict measure of mortgage risk. That is, low foreclosure rates may indicate that losses occur in other forms of loan negotiation rather than in expensive legal costs.     

The HAMP NPV Model: Development and Early Performance

The foreclosure crisis that began in 2008 triggered the need for new approaches to treat distressed mortgages. A key component of the Obama Administration's Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was the development of a standardized Net Present Value (NPV) Model to identify troubled loans that were value‐enhancing candidates for payment‐reducing modifications. This article discusses the development of the HAMP NPV Model, 1 its purpose and some important constraints that dictated its structure and limitations. We describe the structure and the estimation of the model in detail. We also describe the responsiveness of the model to key characteristics, such as loan‐to‐value and credit score, as well as provide new evidence on the relationship between HAMP modification performance and key borrower and modification characteristics. The article concludes with a discussion of model limitations and the future role of systematic loan modification using NPV analysis.     

Privatized Default Risk and Real Estate Recessions: The U.K. Mortgage Market

A mortgage pricing model is developed when a borrower goes through a series of distress states, including delinquency, long-term nonpayment and ultimate default. These steps are sequential, and depend on prices and alternatives faced by the borrower. The multistate default model is applied to the mortgage market in the United Kingdom. As a byproduct, a pricing structure for the U.K. endowment mortgage, which combines a good and a life insurance policy, is developed. Income and liquidity constraints are shown to affect the decision to keep a mortgage current in different states of distress. Solvent borrowers may thus keep their mortgages current, even when equity is negative.     

Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns

The lack of a consistent definition of foreclosure discount gives rise to discount rates that vary from nonexistent to sizeable across locations and time. We define the foreclosure discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal‐sale estimated market value. With a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale transactions, across 16 CBSAs between 2000 and 2012, we find three noteworthy empirical findings. First, a high REO sale concentration in a market increases the foreclosure discount. Second, foreclosure discount is negatively related to recent house‐price appreciation. Third, the often reported high foreclosure discount for lower value properties is likely due to property condition.     

A note on vertical market foreclosure

The judicial fear of vertical market foreclosure has been criticized severely in the academic literature. The focus of this criticism isnot that foreclosure is impossible; rather, it is that foreclosure is not a profitable business strategy. In this note, we show that this criticism is not valid under conditions of partial ownership. If effective vertical control can be achieved with partial ownership, vertical market foreclosure can be used to increase the partial owner's profits. We use theduPont (GM) litigation as a vehicle to explore this point.     

Prepayment Risk in Adjustable Rate Mortgages Subject to Initial Year Discounts: Some New Evidence

This paper uses microlevel data to examine recent prepayment performance of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) employing the competing risk methodology developed by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000). We find support for the teaser rate and adjustment date effects implied by the theoretical model of Kau et al. (1993). In addition, we find that teased ARMs bear prepayment risk related to their discount, contrary to results reported by VanderHoff (1996) and Green and Shilling (1997). Finally, and contrary to the usual finding for fixed-rate mortgages, we find that loan age has a negative effect on prepayment risk for ARMs, consistent with the phenomenon that borrowers with high mobility and/or propensity to refinance exit the pool early.     

Interest Rate Risk, Residential Mortgages and Financial Futures Markets

Residential mortgage markets in both the United States and Canada have recently been dominated by instruments such as variable-rate and short-term rollover mortgages which require borrowers to assume a greater burden of interest rate risk. An outstanding question is whether this approach to risk allocation is Pareto optimal or whether there are other more effective methods of dealing with the risk created by interest rate volatility. This study examines the potential for shifting this risk from the mortgage market to the financial futures market. After considering the rationale for expecting that neither mortgage borrowers nor lenders wish to absorb the high levels of risk present in the existing financial environment, this study discusses the hedging of interest rate risk through financial futures markets. Empirical tests are then performed to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. futures markets for hedging positions from the U.S. mortgage market. These results indicate that the interest rate risk inherent in residential mortgages can be substantially shifted through one or more positions in the existing futures contracts and long-term, fixed-rate mortgages may still be financially feasible under conditions of interest rate volatility.     

Mortgage Choice: What's the Point?

This article shows that, in the presence of transaction costs payable by borrowers on refinancing, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which borrowers with differing mobility select fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) with different combinations of coupon rate and points. We also show that, in the absence of such costs, no such equilibrium is possible. This provides a possible explanation for the large menus of FRMs typically encountered by potential borrowers, and suggests that the menu available at the time of origination should be an important predictor of future prepayment. We numerically implement the model, developing the first contingent claims mortgage valuation algorithm that can quantify the effect of self-selection on real contracts in a realistic interest rate setting. The algorithm allows investors to account for self-selection when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. It also, for the first time, allows lenders to determine the optimal points/coupon rate schedule to offer to a specified set of potential borrowers, given the current level of interest rates.     

Do Borrowers Make Rational Choices on Points and Refinancing?

Utilizing individual mortgage data, we find that borrowers with points are less likely to refinance, and when they do, they take longer to refinance. This finding supports the separating equilibrium prediction of earlier studies that borrowers with higher (lower) refinancing costs self‐select into mortgages with higher‐point/lower‐rate (lower‐point/higher‐rate) loans.     

Simulations of Savings Associations Using Alternative Mortgage Instruments

This paper reports on the development and use of a deterministic, accounting identity, simulation computer model of a federally chartered savings and loan association to observe the effect upon earnings and net worth growth, over the 1964 to 1974 period, of the use of various alternative mortgage instruments. Experiments were conducted on several kinds of variable rate mortgages, graduated payment mortgages, and price level adjusted mortgages; various interest reference rates were tested along with alternative systems of constraining VRM changes, alternative graduation rates, and various systems for paying interest to savers.     

Determinants of Credit Spreads in Commercial Mortgages

This article examines the cross-sectional and time-series determinants of commercial mortgage credit spreads as well as the terms of the mortgages. Consistent with theory, our empirical evidence indicates that mortgages on property types that tend to be riskier and have greater investment flexibility exhibit higher spreads. The relationship between the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and spreads is relatively weak, which is probably due to the endogeneity of the LTV choice. However, the average LTV ratio per lender has a strong positive relation with credit spreads, which is consistent with the idea that lenders specialize in mortgages with either high or low levels of risk, and that high LTV mortgages require substantially higher spreads. Finally, we observe that spreads widen and mortgage terms become stricter after periods of poor performance of the real estate markets and after periods of greater default rates of outstanding real estate loans.     

Bank Capital and the Credit Crunch: The Roles of Risk-Weighted and Unweighted Capital Regulations

We investigated whether in recent years banks have increased their holdings of securities at the expense of their holdings of business loans in response to shortfalls of their capital relative to risk-weighted capital standards and relative to a capital standard that made no explicit allowance for credit risk. We estimated that bank credit fell by about $4.50 for each $1 that a bank's capital fell short of the unweighted capital standard. Banks that had less capital than required by the risk-weighted standard appear to have shifted away from assets with low risk weights (securities and single-family mortgages) and to have shifted toward assets with higher risk weights (commercial real estate and commercial and industrial loans). When we included both shortfall variables in a regression, shortfalls relative to the unweighted capital standard significantly affected bank credit, while shortfalls of capital relative to the risk-weighted standard did not. We found no significant effects of capital shortfalls at other, local-competitor banks on bank portfolios. Delinquencies in a given category of a bank's loans generally had significantly negative effects on that bank's holdings of loans in that category. In contrast, banks tended to increase holdings of loans in categories in which local-competitor banks were experiencing higher delinquency rates.     

Choice of Mortgage Contracts: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances

This study revisits the empirical question of the determinants of the choice between fixed‐ and adjustable‐rate mortgages using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances that overcome some of the data limitations in previous studies. The results from a logit model of mortgage choice indicate that pricing variables and affordability are important considerations. We also find that factors, such as mobility expectations, income volatility and attitudes toward financial risk largely influence mortgage choice, with more risk‐averse borrowers preferring fixed‐rate mortgages. For households that are less risk averse, the mortgage type choice decision is less sensitive to pricing variables and income volatility, and affordability factors are not significant. These findings provide empirical support that underscores the importance of attitudes toward risks in mortgage choice.