ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON FIRM-FINANCED R&D

Abstract

Business cycles might affect the ability of firms to finance R&D, since firms rely on cash flow to finance most R&D activities. However, business cycles also influence the incentive to perform R&D. The opportunity cost of funds devoted to R&D falls during recessions, since the return on production will likely be lower than during an expansion. During recessions, this provides firms with an incentive to redistribute an existing pool of funds away from production and towards R&D projects. The changes in the size and distribution of the pool may also be asymmetric across the business cycle. For example, cash-flow constraints are more likely to bind during recessions than expansions. This paper finds strong evidence for the cash-flow effect, but not the opportunity-cost effect. This means that R&D is pro-cyclical, but smoothing out the business cycle will actually lead to reduced R&D, since the duration of expansions exceeds the duration of recessions.     

How do housing cycles influence listed firms’ R&D investment: evidence from the collateral channel

ABSTRACT

Firm innovation is essential to long-run economic growth. Financially constrained R&D firms may use firm-owned properties as collateral to finance their R&D projects. Therefore, the housing price cycle can affect firms’ R&D investment through influencing their real estate value. By examining listed R&D firms during the housing boom period 2002–2006 in the U.S., we find that a $1 increase in real estate value leads a firm to increase its R&D investment by $0.38. We also find that this collateral effect is more pronounced among financially constrained R&D firms than that among unconstrained ones. Additionally, we examine the housing bust period 2008–2012, and find that real estate depreciation retarded R&D investment, especially among constrained R&D firms.     

R&D investment,cash holdings and the financial crisis: evidence from Korean corporate data

This article examines the real effects of the financial crisis in 2008 on corporate R&D investment by analyzing firm-level panel data from 2005 to 2011 obtained from KIS-VALUE, a Korean corporate finance database. I estimate a dynamic panel model of R&D investment that includes an after-crisis dummy to reflect the effects of the external finance supply shock after the financial crisis, an interaction term of the dummy and cash holdings to measure the marginal effect of cash holdings after the crisis, investment opportunities (sales and the q ratio) and financial positions as the debt-equity ratio. The estimation implies a negative yet relatively small impact of the credit supply shock from the financial crisis on R&D investment and the mitigation of the negative impacts by cash holdings after the onset of the financial crisis, whereas the data show decreasing R&D investment and sales for the whole period. Based on the data and the estimation, I find that firms were able to lessen the pressure from diminishing market demand before the crisis using external finance, but they had to use internal financial sources after the crisis smooth R&D investment.     

Dynamic R&D choice and the impact of the firm's financial strength

ABSTRACT

This article investigates how a firm's financial strength affects its dynamic decision to invest in R&D. We estimate a dynamic model of R&D choice using data for German firms in high-tech manufacturing industries. The model incorporates a measure of the firm's financial strength, derived from its credit rating, which is shown to lead to substantial differences in estimates of the costs and expected long-run benefits from R&D investment. Financially strong firms have a higher probability of generating innovations from their R&D investment, and the innovations have a larger impact on productivity and profits. Averaging across all firms, the long-run benefit of investing in R&D equals 6.6% of firm value. It ranges from 11.6% for firms in a strong financial position to 2.3% for firms in a weaker financial position.     

Does R&D spending boost tangible investment? An analysis on European firms

This article investigates the relationship between firm’s R&D intensity, expressed as R&D expenditure over sales, and investment intensity in tangible assets. It is commonly acknowledged that R&D requires additional physical investment to be implemented. R&D increases a firm’s productivity and return to tangible investments, thus, providing to the firm incentives to bear high tangible capital costs and to invest more. This represents a crucial issue for a firm’s growth, particularly considering the strong interaction between physical capital accumulation and technological progress. The analysis is based on a large sample of manufacturing firms across seven European countries in the period 2007–2009. Since the sub-sample of firms performing R&D might not be random, there may potentially be an endogeneity issue. The analysis also considers that firms may decide to spend on R&D and investment in physical capital simultaneously. The questions of both endogeneity and simultaneity are dealt with by employing an instrumental variable two-step procedure. We find a positive and significant impact of R&D intensity on firms’ tangible investment intensity. The econometric results highlight the importance of financial factors, particularly with respect to firms’ internal resources. Exposure to international trade has a negative impact on investment, possibly depending on the time-span of the sample used.

Abbreviations: Technological Innovation and R&D; Investment Capital; Industry Studies; Firm Behavior; Empirical Analysis     

融资结构、企业异质性与研发投资*——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

企业融资结构影响研发投资强度吗？是否存在能促进企业研发投资强度提升的最优融资结构？对不同类型的企业而言,最优融资结构是否存在差异呢？本文运用中国上市公司2007—2015年的面板数据进行实证研究,结果表明：（1）企业越偏向于股权融资,研发投资强度就越高;（2）存在有利于促进研发投资强度提升的最优融资结构;（3）企业的最优融资结构随企业所属的产业性质、股权集中程度、银企关系强度及所有权性质的不同而呈现显著的差异。本文的研究发现有助深入理解融资结构与研发投资的关系,也为决策者制定宏观金融结构优化政策提供了来自微观企业层面的证据。     

The impact of R&D programme success on the decision to capitalise development expenditures in European firms

The financial reporting treatment of R&D expenditures can have important implications for firms’ strategic investment in R&D. Yet, financial reporting issues have been largely neglected in the R&D management literature. In this study, we first hypothesise that firms’ capitalisation of development expenditures subsequent to the mandatory adoption of IAS 38 (International Accounting Standard 38: Intangible Assets) is positively and significantly impacted by a measure of R&D programme success. Our empirical findings – based on a pan-European sample of firms – reveal strong support for this prediction. Our findings also offer support for our second hypothesis which predicts that capitalisation of development expenditures in conjunction with an evaluation of R&D programme success has a positive and significant impact on growth in shareholder value. Consequently, our work suggests that an important challenge for R&D professionals within firms is to develop improved measures of R&D success and to communicate this information to senior executives.     

To what extent do earnings affect the R&D decision of Chinese manufacturing firms?

ABSTRACT

As R&D activities are involved in inherent uncertainty of large investment, high risk and long return periods, earnings, as the main source of internal financing, have been a significant factor of R&D decision in the firms. In contrast to the previous research, this study investigates the impacts of firm’s earnings on R&D decision, in which earnings are measured by the indicators of earnings level, earnings quality and earnings persistence, while separating firm R&D activity into two stages of (i) the decision to undertake R&D activity and (ii) the amount to be invested on innovation activities. We document that earnings level can increase the probability of undertaking R&D activity, but has no effect on R&D investment intensity. Earnings quality and earnings persistence have a promotional effect on both stages of R&D decision. The empirical evidence of the subsamples shows that the impacts of earnings are heterogeneous across different ownership and technology-intensity firms.     

The financing of small innovative firms: the Italian case

Small firms encounter difficulties in collecting external finance due to greater information problems. For small innovative firms, whose activity is more difficult to evaluate, the cost of external finance could be even higher. This paper aims to shed light on special features in financial structures of small innovative firms, compared with firms of similar size that do not innovate. The evidence shows that small innovators rely less on financial debts and more on internal financial resources; no important differences appear for large firms. This is consistent with the view that information problems mainly affect small firms. Another finding is that small innovative firms show a lower investment sensitivity to cash flow than small non-innovative firms: it is likely that the high incidence of internal financial resources allows them more flexibility in deciding their investments. No difference in investment sensitivity to cash flow, by innovative attitude, is found for large firms.     

Asymmetric firms,technology sharing and R&D investment

We use a combination of theory and experiment to study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they engage in research and development (R&D) in an uncertain environment. We consider both symmetric and asymmetric starting points with regards to the amount of initial knowledge firms have before conducting R&D and look at how differences in starting positions affect the willingness of firms to share knowledge. We investigate when and if firms find R&D cooperation beneficial and how investment in R&D is affected by the outcome of the sharing decisions. The experimental evidence shows that overall subjects tend to behave consistently with theoretical predictions for the sharing of knowledge, although leaders who are not compensated by a side payment from laggards are more willing to share than predicted by the theory, and leaders who are compensated are less willing. The data on investment suggests less investment with sharing than without, consistent with theory. Compared to exact numerical predictions, there is overinvestment or underinvestment except for symmetric firms under no sharing. All cases of overinvestment and underinvestment, regardless of sharing or not and regardless of starting positions, are well explained by smoothed-out best (quantal) responses.     

R&D subsidies and private R&D expenditures: evidence from Italian manufacturing data

This paper uses a comprehensive firm level data set for the manufacturing sector in Italy to investigate the effect of government support on privately financed R&D expenditure. Estimates from a non‐parametric matching procedure suggest that public assistance has a positive effect on private R&D investment in the sense that the recipient firms achieve more private R&D than they would have without public support. This indicates that the possibility of perfect crowding out between private and public funds can be rejected. Furthermore, in this sample of Italian firms, tax incentives appear to be more effective than direct grants. The paper also examines whether public funding affects the financial sources available for R&D and finds that grants encourage the use of internal sources. The results also show some evidence of positive effects on credit financing for R&D.     

R&D investment and internal finance: the cash flow effect

This paper investigates the cash flow effect on R&D investments for firms in Denmark. Evidence is found that internal funds are important in explaining R&D investments, indicating that R&D investment decisions are affected by credit market imperfections. Cash flow sensitivities are larger both for smaller firms and for firms with low debt relative to assets. Furthermore, this effect is also present after controlling for cash flow’s potential role as a predictor of future profitability.     

Corporate Tax Incentives for R&D Investment in OECD Countries

Differentiating internal equity from debt finance, this study examines the generosity of R&D-specific tax incentives in OECD countries based on an NPV model. The corporate tax system generally favours debt finance and some previous findings on the possible preponderance of internal equity for financing R&D investment cannot be explained in relation to R&D-specific tax concessions. The OECD comparison demonstrates that R&D tax allowances adopted in the Czech Republic, Belgium, the UK, Denmark, Hungary, Austria and Australia generated the most substantial tax savings in 2006. Combined with such incentives, the after-tax NPV increases with the corporate tax rate, suggesting stronger investment stimulation through a tax-rate-increase-cum-base-broadening policy.     

Does issuing equity help R&D activity? Evidence from unlisted Italian high-tech manufacturing firms

This paper evaluates the causal effect of issuing equities on the probability that a firm engages in R&D activity. Equity is a better source of external finance than debt for innovation. It does not require collateral, does not exacerbate moral hazard problems connected with the substitution of high-risk for low-risk projects, quite common when using debt, and, unlike debt, does not increase the probability of bankruptcy; equity also allows investors to reap the entire benefit of the returns of successful innovative projects. This paper focuses on high-tech firms for which asymmetric information problems are more pervasive. Implementing an instrumental variable estimation, we find that issuing equity increases the probability that the firm has R&D expenditures by 30–40%. We detect considerable heterogeneity in this effect: the impact of issuing equity is significant only for small, young and more highly leveraged high-tech firms. We also find interesting evidence that issuing equity increases R&D expenditures in relation to sales.     

Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities

This paper analyzes the impact of simultaneous increases in piracy (piracy effect) and network externalities (network effect) on R&D investment. A single firm's R&D investment increases (or decreases) if the network effect (or piracy effect) is dominant. With R&D competition, if the firms “significantly” differ with respect to their R&D efficiencies and if the piracy effect dominates the network effect then the less efficient firm's R&D investment increases and that of the more efficient firm's decreases. In this case, the overall probability of successful innovation increases. The reverse holds if the network effect dominates the piracy effect. If the firms are “less” asymmetric then their R&D investment either increases or decreases depending on the relative strengths of the piracy and network effects.     

Financial innovation in the UK

This study employs a national survey of over 1100 British financial firms to ascertain the determinants of financial innovation and their sales success using the logit and the generalized Tobit models. We find that the likelihood of financial innovation rises with the size of financial firms, employee education, greater expenditure on research and development, the availability of finance and the extent to which firms cooperate with each other. Perceptions of economic risk and innovation costs are also influential. R&D, cooperation and human capital are the main variables driving the success of financial innovation, measured by the percentage share of innovations sold. Firms in London/the south have a significantly greater tendency to innovate, though Scotland also does well. Stock broking, fund management and related activities are more innovative than firms in the financial intermediation and pension/insurance sectors.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.      

Relocation and investment in R&D by firms

The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.